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Abstract 
 
 This dissertation explores the interplay of early radio technology and twentieth-century 
state power in Mexico.  It argues that wireless technology was crucial to government attempts at 
incorporating frontiers, foreign policy, the outcome of the Mexican Revolution, and the 
formation of the single-party state that ruled from 1929 to 2000.  Examining radio development 
in Mexico is especially useful because political leaders first incorporated the technology 
immediately preceding a fractious revolution turned civil war.  The subsequent dissolution and 
reconsolidation of the political order shows how wireless technology affected new attempts at 
state building during the first half of the twentieth century.  Initially used as a tool of 
centralization, trade, and military domination, the Revolution proved that in the hands of 
insurrectionists and foreigners, radio could also be a tool of decentralization.  The Revolution 
intensified the tendency of leaders to focus on the medium’s military potential as warring 
factions incorporated wireless devices to advance their causes.  The destabilizing potential of the 
technology pushed the victors to pursue a policy of strict surveillance and regulation over radio, 
provoking heightened attempts at centralization and monopolization.  At the exact time that the 
warfare wound down, advancements in wireless technology gave rise to a more expansive form 
of communication—broadcasting.  Radio was no longer used solely as a point-to-point tool of 
generals and communications officers; it had become the first electronic form of mass media, a 
crucial medium for integrating the general population across the national territory by means of 
generating consent, and at the same moment that a revolutionary government was attempting to 
consolidate its control militarily and culturally.  These coinciding processes helped establish 
populist politics in Mexico earlier than in other Latin American nations.  
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Introduction 
A Tale of Two Revolutions 
 
 On Valentine’s Day 1924, the residents of Mexico City awoke to discover a 
strange and tragic story in the daily El Demócrata.  After scratching a brief note into a 
piece of maguey, a middle-age man purportedly distraught over his wife’s adulterous 
affair had climbed to the top of one of the radio towers near Chapultepec Castle and 
jumped to his death.  The article described his end in gruesome detail.  The next day, 
however, the tale took a dramatic turn when the newspaper revealed that instead of a 
heart-broken lover, the deceased was actually a member of the rebellion recently started 
by Adolfo de la Huerta, a high-level member of the revolutionary leadership who was 
then attempting to overthrow the president, General Alvaro Obregón Salida (1920-24).  
Apparently the death in question had resulted when the man electrocuted himself in a 
botched attempt to sabotage an important component of Obregón’s communications 
system.1
 This tale of espionage, sensational as it was, touched upon real problems and 
fears.  Just as surely as spousal infidelity wreaked havoc on Mexico City marriages, 
delahuertistas had taken a number of important wireless stations in the country, and 
spies were operating radios from the rooftops of crowded houses in the nation’s capital.  
General of the Federal District, Arnulfo Gómez, then ruthlessly hunting down 
insurrectionists, went so far as to tell journalists that radio was “the principal enemy of 
   
                                                     
1 “Desde la cúspide de una torre inalámbrica del bosque de Chapultepec se arrojó un sentimental 
y excéntrico suicida,” El Demócrata, 14 Feb. 1924, II 1; “El hombre que cayó de la torre inalámbrica de 
Chapultepec no era un suicida sino un audaz agente de los rebeldes,” El Demócrata, 15 Feb. 1924, II 1.  
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the government,” and to demand that radio owners register all their devices.2
 Because of the difficulty of preserving and expanding wire communications, 
revolutionary leaders increasingly turned towards a new technology, one that was going 
through a revolution of its own.  Telegraphs and telephones had been the dominant form 
of electronic communication in the 1910s, but they were easily disrupted.  All one had 
to do was cut, at any point, a part of the miles of indefensible cables upon which the 
technologies relied, and the connection failed.  But radio stations had no interconnecting 
wires, and were harder to sabotage.  As a result, radio gained a more prominent place in 
communications.  Before the end of the Revolution, wireless technology itself went 
through a metamorphosis.  American engineers and experimenters had made the 
  In reality, 
Gómez was articulating a fear of wireless communication that had developed among 
military commanders during the preceding Mexican Revolution (1910-20).  A 
massively violent and destructive civil war that erupted after the overthrow of the 
longtime dictator Porfirio Díaz (1876-80, 1884-1911), it sired a number of subsequent 
revolts, of which the De la Huerta Rebellion was among the most significant.  Porfirian 
generals close to Díaz had first brought radio devices to Mexico in order to expand state 
power.  The Revolution disrupted this plan while simultaneously expanding the use of 
the technology.  But whatever the political situation, radio remained a component of 
control.  Just as the Díaz administration hoped to unite the nation’s hinterlands to 
Mexico City, the leaders of the various revolutionary factions used the medium to gain 
dominance over their enemies.  Territorial control and communications went hand in 
hand, for to have the former, one had to develop and maintain the latter.   
                                                     
 2 “Formal batida contra los aparatos radiotelefónicos,” El Universal Gráfico, 16 Jan. 1924, 2.  
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adjustments necessary to transform wireless transmitters and receivers from tools used 
for point-to-point transmissions of Morse code to a medium of voice broadcasting that 
could reach thousands of people.  Consequently, commercial broadcasters in the United 
States began airing music and advertisements.  Almost immediately thereafter, Mexican 
engineering students, businessmen, and military communications specialists with U.S. 
connections started their own experiments.  
  The fact that radio developed and then radically changed during the revolutionary 
era begs a number of questions.   Did wireless technology affect the outcome of the 
Revolution and the revolutionary state?  How did the extreme violence and instability 
affect radio development in Mexico?  How did the subsequent government leaders, 
whose control over the state was still challenged, attempt to use and manage radio?  To 
what extent could they?  All of these questions, in turn, relate to more fundamental 
issues, namely, the complex role of electronic communications in war, government, and 
modern society.  
 Radio, of course, was not the only technology transforming Mexico.  It was but 
one of a number of important innovations that occurred during the long administration 
of Porfirio Díaz and the subsequent Revolutionary era.  Fueled by industrialization and 
scientific research in Europe and the United States, a massive technological 
transformation was sweeping across much of the inhabited world.  Steamships, 
railroads, electricity, machine guns, and telegraphs all proved useful to agents of 
imperial powers who were rapidly expanding global trade and exploiting colonial 
possessions.   
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 Similar to European and U.S. empire-building practices, Díaz first adapted radio 
as a means to advance trade and connect frontier hinterlands.  In the decades prior to his 
rule, especially before 1867, civil war, banditry, and foreign invasions had all wreaked 
havoc on Mexico’s transportation and communication networks.  The government had 
failed to maintain roads adequately, and in some ways the region was more disunited 
than it had been under Spanish rule prior to 1821.  In the 1840s Mexico lost nearly half 
of its territory—a huge portion of the northern periphery with which the capital had 
possessed weak transportation and commercial links—to the rapidly expanding United 
States.  In the south, creoles in the mostly disconnected Yucatán briefly declared 
independence and became absorbed in a bloody civil war with Mayan communities that 
had become upset by the costs of maintaining the nascent Yucatecan state and by the 
associated growth of political violence.  Between these extremes, even many of the 
more central states maintained a relatively high degree of isolation from federal 
authority. 
 Attempts at advancing communications had been underway since the 1850s, and 
included such innovations as the first railroads and telegraph lines.  The invasion of 
French forces in 1862, however, temporarily halted progress in transportation and 
communications.  Following the French intervention, Napoleon III made Archduke 
Maximilian of Hapsburg the Emperor of Mexico in 1864.  The latter individual and his 
wife, Carlota, traveled aboard Mexico’s first train.  As described in a popular history 
textbook, the royal couple took the newly constructed railway but disappointingly had 
to depart at the small community of Totalco, where the tracks ended well short of 
Mexico City.  Originally transferring to an ornate carriage that they brought from 
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Europe, the imperial family discovered that it constantly broke down on the poorly kept 
road, forcing them to switch to a hardier and more rustic stage for the remainder of the 
journey.3  But during Maximilian’s reign, and following his defeat and execution by 
nationalists under the leadership of Benito Juárez, laborers slowly added new railroad 
tracks and telegraph lines.  The Veracruz-Mexico City railway, for example, reached 
completion in 1873.4
 But it was not until the Díaz era that modernization advanced at a rapid and 
consistent pace.  Indeed, the administration presided over a genuine communications 
boom.  The government funded and directed the maintenance and construction of a 
large number of roads, and the Secretary of Communications and Public Works 
(SCOP), in collaboration with foreign capitalists, expanded railroads at an astounding 
pace.  There were fewer less than 400 miles of railroad track in 1877; by 1910, there 
were over 11,000 miles of track.
  
5
                                                     
3 Michael C. Meyer, William L. Sherman, and Susan M. Deeds, The Course of Mexican History, 
9th ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), 293. 
  Meanwhile, telegraphy and telephony experienced 
similar growth.  In fact, railroad and wire communication growth often went hand-in-
hand.  Train stations often doubled as telegraph offices.  Juan de Granje, a Mexican 
merchant of Spanish origins, introduced telegraphy to Mexico in 1849.  As with the 
railroad, the construction of the first telegraph line occurred in the1850s between the 
port of Veracruz and Mexico City.  But it was not until the late 1870s that cables 
connected the Atlantic and Pacific coasts.  Over the next two decades the newly created 
Department of National Telegraphs (DGTN), under the direction of the SCOP, started 
4 John H. Coatsworth, Growth against Development: The Economic Impact of Railroads in 
Porfirian Mexico (DeKalb: Northern Illinois Press, 1981), 35.  
5 Ibid, 36-37. 
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expanding lines, once again in collaboration with foreign businesses, to the country’s 
fringe territories.6
But despite the massive increase in development, the vast majority of the 
country remained unconnected by electronic communications.  Particularly problematic 
were the frontiers, especially Mexico’s two peninsulas, which remained separated from 
Mexico City by harsh terrains and large bodies of water.  The SCOP struggled, often 
unsuccessfully, to construct telegraph lines through the jungles and deserts, or to lay 
them under the Sea of Cortez.  It was in these regions that the Díaz administration 
decided to build the first radiotelegraph offices, bypassing the problem of connecting 
the regions by wire.  In early 1903, with the aid of German engineers, the DGTN 
finished the first two stations, one in the Southern District of Baja California and the 
other in Sinaloa.
   
7
 Radio operations by state and rebel officials increased during the Revolution, an 
important development overlooked by most scholars.  Indeed, there is a general absence 
of research and publications on the role of modern technology in the Mexican 
Revolution.  This is a strange void, since there are enough books about this great 
upheaval to fill a small library, and because the Revolution was unquestionably a testing 
ground for modern machines.  For example, the first bombings of surface warships from 
  Prior to the Revolution, the Díaz government used radio for these 
frontier-connecting developmental programs and maritime trade, though military 
experiments with portable wireless technology were also underway by 1907.  
                                                     
6 Leopoldo Noyola, La raza de la hierba: Historia de telégrafos Morse en México, 2nd ed. 
(Puebla: Benemérita Universidad Autónoma de Puebla, 2004), 19, 24-5, 56-7, 66. 
7 Leandro Fernández, Memoria . . . por el Secretario de Comunicaciones y Obras Públicas, 
1902-1903 (Mexico City: Tipografía de la Dirección General de Telégrafos, 1904), 244. 
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an aircraft occurred during the Revolution.8
                                                     
8 See, Alan Knight, The Mexican Revolution, vol. 2 (Lincoln: University of Nebraska, 1986), 
148, 161.  Knight also suggests that the first use of aerial propaganda occurred during the Mexican 
Revolution.  See also, Dan Hagedorn, Conquistadors of the Sky: A History of Aviation in Latin America 
(Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2008), 76-77. 
  Alongside machetes and old rifles, 
airplanes, cars, trucks, machine guns, trench warfare, steam powered and electrified 
ships of war, and, of course, radio, all contributed to the armies of the various fighting 
factions.  Of these, radio has been especially ignored despite the fact that he DGTN had 
already constructed ten stations when the forces of Francisco I. Madero, a wealthy 
landowner from Coahuila, overthrew the octogenarian dictator.  Although briefly 
interrupted by the subsequent civil war, political and communications leaders continued 
to expand on the practices and ideas of their Porfirian predecessors.  Indeed, many of 
the SCOP and DGTN employees who built government radio stations in the 1910s and 
1920s had either worked for the same agencies during the Porfiriato, or were trained in 
Porfirian universities.  Radio also proved crucial to important battles during the wars, as 
each faction possessed its own cadre of wire and wireless telegraphy operators.  The 
Constitutionalists under the leadership of Venustiano Carranza (1915-20), the victors of 
the Revolution, relied on these specialists and increased their ranks while 
reconsolidating control over larger and larger portions of the country.  Due to 
continuing instability and the threat of anti-Constitutionalist communications, Carranza 
decreed a policy of state monopolization of wireless technology, which legislators 
codified in the Constitution of 1917.  When the famous one-armed general Alvaro 
Obregón took the presidency in 1920 following the last successful coup of the 
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Revolution, twenty-seven radiotelegraph stations operated across the country, in 
addition to a number of portable military radios.9
 The following year the first broadcasting exhibitions took place during the 
Mexico City centennial celebrations of independence from Spain.  This new use of 
radio revolutionized politics as the Obregón and subsequent Plutarco Elías Calles 
administration (1924-28) obtained a firmer if still contested control over the state 
apparatus.  While military radio helped the army contain rebellions, broadcasting 
allowed revolutionary leaders to spread their ideals among labor and peasant groups, 
foreign audiences, and a growing urban middle class.  This transformation had massive 
ramifications.  Radio was no longer used solely as a point-to-point tool of the postal 
service, seafarers, and the military; it had become the first electronic mass-media 
medium, a crucial tool for integrating the general population across the national 
territory by means of generating consent.  
   
 Unlike Carranza, subsequent leaders, beginning with Obregón, abandoned the 
policy of monopolizing radio development.  Recognizing the economic and political 
potential of broadcasting, Obregón followed the advice of state technicians and 
representatives of a prominent Mexico City radio club who promoted private 
commercial and experimental radio use.  The relationship forged between commercial 
radio leaders, most notably the Azcárraga family, and the government leaders of the 
1920s and 1930s, established a mutually beneficial partnership that helped establish 
one-party rule, the consolidation of commercial broadcasting under XEW, XEQ, and 
their affiliate stations, and a vibrant and complicated Mexican nationalism.  
                                                     
9 Informes de las dependencias de la Secretaría de Comunicaciones y Obras Públicas del 11 de 
abril de 1919 al 31 de mayo de 1920 (Mexico City: Dirección de Talleres Gráficos, 1921), 175. 
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 This dissertation examines the advancement of radio communications in a crucial 
period of technological, political, and societal change.  It first follows how people used 
radio devices from their initial incorporation into European empires in the late 1800s, 
and then turns its gaze toward Mexico.  Most of the work focuses on the period between 
the establishment of a Mexican radio system under Porfirio Díaz to the founding of the 
single-party state by the Partido Nacional de la Revolución or National Revolutionary 
Party (PNR) in 1929 and the subsequent Partido Mexicano de la Revolución (PRM) and 
presidency of Lázaro Cárdenas (1934-40).  Instead of treating these political eras 
separately, or dividing radiotelegraphy and broadcasting, I have placed them together, 
allowing me to better trace political and technological continuity and change.  Radio 
development, like the belief in the progressive nature of technology and modernity, 
bridges the positivist and nationalist eras. 
 My work shows that radio development was a major component in government 
plans for nation and state building, beginning with the first radiotelegraphy stations.  I 
argue that the Revolution affected the developmental course of the technology in 
important ways and vice versa, which makes Mexico an especially interesting and 
important place to study early radio development.  During the Revolution, wireless 
messages influenced the outcomes of decisive battles and greatly aided the ultimate 
victory of Carranza’s Constitutionalist forces.  The most significant consequence that 
the Revolution had on the radio development was that military concerns continued to 
shape how government leaders, mostly military men themselves, perceived the 
medium.10
                                                     
 10 Here, my work compliments Edwin Lieuwin, Mexican Militarism: The Political Rise and Fall 
of the Revolutionary Army, 1910-1940 (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1968), 58; see 
  This focus on preventing radio from aiding new rebellions or being used to 
10 
 
spread anti-government messaging limited the brief democratic tendency in radio that 
occurred with the advent of broadcasting and the coinciding growth of private radio 
hobbyists and privatization under Obregón.  As a result, the state continued to play a 
strong role in wireless use and growth; those whom the government allowed to transmit 
radio services faced strong regulatory restrictions, and all political broadcasting became 
dominated by state leaders who collaborated in the PNR and the subsequent PRM.  In 
addition to domestic uses, state communications officials used the technology to 
establish a new era of foreign relations.  Radio spread presidential addresses and 
fomented international trade, government alliances, and transnational cultural diffusion 
in a way never before conceivable.  But there were also a number of important 
continuities that bridged the Revolution.  Presidents following Díaz, including Madero 
and then Carranza, Obregón, and Calles, expanded on preceding Porfirian policies, 
aided by increased radio equipment imported for military activities.  By the end of the 
Calles era (1924-35), radio had become a larger component of national and international 
public communications services, plans to incorporate the frontiers, military operations, 
and intelligence gathering.11
 As a result of the state’s strong role in broadcasting and government leaders’ fears 
of instability, radio became an essential part of postrevolutionary populist politics 
beginning with Calles.  The intertwined trends of state broadcasting and populism 
reached their zenith during the Cárdenas administration.  But by the time that Cárdenas 
took office, presidents had been using broadcasting for over a decade, and wireless 
   
                                                                                                                                                                        
also Aaron Navarro, Political Intelligence and the Creation of Modern Mexico, 1938-1954 (University 
Park, PA: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 2010).   
11 Although Calles’s presidency ended in 1928, I am including the “Maximato” period, where 
three separate presidents—Pascual Ortiz Rubio, Emilio Portes Gil, and Abelardo Rodríguez—ruled under 
considerable influence and interference from Calles.  
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telegraphy for thirty-five years.  The traditions of using radio to relay inaugural 
addresses, congressional speeches, state-sponsored events, and presidential campaigns 
had all been placed upon sturdy foundations built by Calles and, starting in 1929, the 
political party he helped found, the PNR.  To a large extent, Cárdenas’s ability to rouse 
large portions of the nation and to increase government corporatism had as much to do 
with the maturation of populist politics, the broadcasting industry, and radio 
consumerism as much as his own special skills as a political leader.    
 The legacy of pre-broadcasting practices and legislation, and of the Revolution 
itself, left other significant marks on Mexican broadcasting.  Radio specialists who 
fought with Carranza’s Constitutionalist forces transformed themselves into influential 
radio experimenters, builders of commercial-station transmitters, and government 
regulators.  The historical precedence for state-controlled wireless operations and of 
political instability influenced the strong regulatory measures on commercial 
broadcasting in the 1920s and 1930s.  Originating as an important auxiliary tool for 
expanding telegraphic communications, radio became a crucial component of post-
revolutionary state building, including military domination, political and cultural 
broadcasting, the rise of populist politics, and the success of single-party rule.  
 As the title suggests, my dissertation emphasizes the relationship between radio 
and the Mexican state.  Within the larger realm of radio, I am addressing wireless 
electromagnetic communications mediums, in particular radiotelegraphy, 
radiotelephony, and radio broadcasting.  In regards to the Mexican state, I generally 
agree with an expanded version of Max Weber’s well-known definition, that “a state is 
that human community which (successfully) lays claim to the monopoly of legitimate 
12 
 
physical violence within a certain territory.”12
 
  But the state’s role cannot be limited to 
“legitimate” or legal violence; rather, the state is also the sum of people who operate 
and enforce a system of law within a country’s political boundaries.  During the 
Revolution, factions fought over control of the state apparatus.  As a result, a substantial 
portion of my work examines the way that those fighting over possession of the state 
incorporated radio into their strategies, and how the legacy of the Revolution, and the 
preceding era, affected the rebel leaders who eventually came to dominate the central 
government based in Mexico City. 
Review of Literature 
 My dissertation fits within a number of different but intertwined historiographies.  
In a broad sense, it contributes to a growing literature on the correlation between 
technology, empire, state formation, and nationalism.  University of Toronto professor 
Harold Innis’s Empire and Communications (1950),  based on six lectures given at 
Oxford University in 1948, provided an foundational survey of how communications 
influenced the rise and fall of empires, from clay tablets to telephones, from Babylon to 
the British Empire.13
                                                     
 12 Max Weber, quoted in Duncan Kelly, The State of the Political Conceptions of Politics and the 
State in the Thought of Max Weber, Carl Schmitt and Franz Neumann (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2003), 77. 
  Of the numerous studies that subsequently provided more nuance 
to the field, those on modern transportation and telecommunications practices proved 
most informative to my study.  Representative of these works are the publications of 
Daniel R. Headrick, Michael Adas, Hugh G. J. Aitken, Susan J. Douglas, James 
Schwoch, Sungook Hong, Anton A. Huurdeman, Aitor Anduaga, Russell Burns, Tapan 
 13 Harold Innis, Empire and Communications (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2007). 
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K. Sakar, Daqing Yang, Bernard Finn, Peter Hugill, David Paull Nickles, Michael A. 
Krysko, Jill Hills, Jorma Ahvenainen, Dwayne R. Winseck, Robert M. Pike, David 
McCreery, Rebecca Raines Robbins, Hugh Barty-King, and Tim Wu.14
                                                     
 14 Hugh G. J. Aitken, Syntony and Spark: The Origins of Radio (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 
1976); Hugh Barty-King, Girdle Round the Earth (London: Heinman, 1979); Daniel R. Headrick, The 
Tools of Empire: Technology and European Imperialism in the Nineteenth Century (New York and 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1981); Susan J. Douglas, Inventing American Broadcasting, 1899-1922 
(Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 1987); James Schwoch, The American Radio Industry 
and its Latin American Activities, 1900-1939 (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1990); Daniel R. 
Headrick, The Invisible Weapon: Telecommunications and International Politics, 1851-1945 (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1991); David McCreery, “Wireless Empire: The United States and Radio 
Communications in Central America and the Caribbean, 1904-1925,” South Eastern Latin Americanist 37 
(Summer 1993): 23-41; Rebecca Robbins Raines,  Getting the Message Through: A Branch History of the 
U.S. Army Signal Corps (Washington, DC: Center of Military History, United States Army, 1996); Jorma 
Ahvenainen, The History of the Caribbean Telegraphs before the First World War (Helsinki: The Finnish 
Academy of Science and Letters, 1996); Peter Hugill, Global Communications since 1844: Geopolitics 
and Technology (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999); Sungook Hong,  From 
Marconi’s Black-Box to the Audion (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2001); Jill Hills, The Struggle for 
Control of Global Communications: the Formative Century (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2002); 
David Paull Nickles, Under the Wire: How the Telegraph Changed Diplomacy  (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 2003); Anton A. Huurdeman, The Worldwide History of Telecommunications 
(Hoboken, NJ: Wiley-Interscience, 2003);  Russell Burns, Communications: An International History of 
the Formative Years (London: The Institution of Electrical Engineers, 2004); Jorma Ahvenainen, The 
European Cable Companies in South America before the First World War (Helsinki: The Finnish 
Academy of Science and Letters, 2004); John A. Britton and Jorma Ahvenainen, “Showdown in South 
America: James Scrymser, John Pender, and United States-British Cable Competition,” Business History 
Review 78 (Spring 2004): 1-27; Tapan K. Sakar et al, History of Wireless (Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & 
Sons, 2006); Dwayne R. Winseck and Robert M. Pike, Communications and Empire (Durham: Duke 
University Press, 2007); John A.  Britton, “‘The Confusion Provoked by Instantaneous Discussion’: The 
New International Communications Network and the Chilean Crisis of 1891-1892 in the United States,” 
Technology and Culture 48 (Oct. 2007): 729-757; Bernard Finn and Daqing Yang, eds., Communications 
under the Seas (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2009; Aitor Anduaga, Wireless and Empire: Geopolitics, 
Radio Industry & Ionosphere in the British Empire, 1918-1939 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009); 
Daquing Yang, Technology of Empire: Telecommunications and Japanese Expansion in Asia, 1883-1945 
(Cambridge, MA and London: Harvard University Press, 2010); Michael A. Krysko, American Radio in 
China: International Encounters with Technology and Communications, 1919-1941 (New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2011); Tim Wu, The Master Switch: The Rise and Fall of Information Empires (New York: 
Alfred A. Knopf, 2011). 
  Although these 
authors write about different political and business entities and stages of 
communications development, they all discuss the role of telecommunications in one or 
all of the reinforcing processes of globalization, empire, state formation, and 
nationalism. 
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 My dissertation has also benefited from a number of important studies on radio, 
culture, and national identity.  In addition to Douglas’s Inventing American 
Broadcasting, 1899-1922 (1987), Joelle Neulander wrote a history of radio culture and 
national identity in 1930s France.15  A number of U.S. scholars of Latin American 
history and communications have provided studies of radio’s importance to modern 
culture, nation-building, and populist politics.  Especially relevant to my study are 
Bryan McCann’s Hello, Hello Brazil: Popular Music in the Making of Modern Brazil 
(2004), Robert Howard Claxton’s From Parsifal to Perón: Early Radio in Argentina, 
1920-1944 (2007), and Mathew B. Karush’s Culture of Class: Radio and Cinema in the 
Making of a Divided Argentina, 1920-1946 (2012).  These works provided information 
that allowed me to place my findings on state broadcasting and the relationship between 
the Mexican government and commercial station owners in a comparative context.16  
One clear and interesting difference between Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico, for 
example, is that Mexican state officials deliberately and directly used broadcasting to 
build a corporatist base of support much earlier than governments in Argentina or 
Brazil—a consequence of the Revolution.17
                                                     
 15 Douglas, Inventing American Broadcasting; Joelle Neulander, Programming National Identity: 
The Culture of Radio in 1930s France (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University, 2009). 
  
 16 Other trailblazing studies in Latin American radio include, Enrique C. Betancourt, Apuntes para 
la historia: Radio, televisión y farándula de la Cuba de ayer . . . . (San Juan, Puerto Rico: Ramallo Bros., 
1966); J. A. De Armas Chitty, Historia de la radiodifusión en Venezuela (Caracas: Edición de la  Cámara 
Venezolana de la Industria de la Radiodifusión, 1975); Raúl E. Barbero, De la galena al satélite: Crónica 
de 70 años de radio el Uruguay, 1922-1992 (Uruguay: Ediciones de la Pluma, 1995); Juan Gargurevich, 
La Peruvian Broadcasting Co.: Historia de la radio (Lima: La Voz Ediciones, 1995); Elizabeth Fox, 
Latin American Broadcasting: From Tango to Telenovela (Lutin, England: Lutin University Press, 1997); 
Hermano Vianna,  The Mystery of Samba: Popular Music and National Identity in Brazil, ed. and trans. 
by John Charles Chasteen (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1999); Beatriz Sarlo, The 
Technical Imagination: Argentine Culture’s Modern Dreams, trans. by Xavier Callahan (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 2008). 
 17 Also see Bryan McCann, “Carlos Lacerda: The Rise and Fall of a Middle-Class Populist in 
1950s Brazil,” Hispanic American Historical Review 83, no. 4 (Winter 2003): 661-96.  
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 Joy Elizabeth Hayes is one of a small number of U.S. scholars who have provided 
significant contributions to the history of radio in Mexico.  Her Radio Nation: 
Communication, Popular Culture, and Nationalism in Mexico, 1920-1950 (2000) is the 
most comprehensive English-language book on the subject.  Preceding her, Philip 
Barbour, Marvin Alisky, and James Schwoch wrote respectively on radio legislation, 
education, and U.S. corporate influence.18
Two other American scholars who have contributed to Mexican radio studies are 
Rubén Gallo and Elissa J.Rashkin, who both completed works that discuss radio in 
Mexican avant-garde culture during the 1920s.
  But Hayes’s work, more than that of any 
other American scholar to date, has influenced U.S. historians of Latin America.  In 
many ways my dissertation reinforces her arguments about the importance or 
broadcasting to the culture and growth of Mexican nationalism during President 
Cárdenas’s presidency.  He used the medium with political skill, gaining a huge popular 
base of support for his policies.  We also agree that Mexican broadcasting can only be 
understood within the context of American expansionism.   
19  Two recent dissertations have further 
informed my work, especially the sections that look at education and the U.S.-Mexican 
border in my final two chapters.20
                                                     
 18 Marvin Alisky, “Educational Aspects of Broadcasting in Mexico,” PhD diss., University of 
Texas, Austin, Texas, 1953; Philip Barbour, “Commercial and Cultural Broadcasting in Mexico,” Annals 
of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 208, Mexico Today (Mar. 1940): 94-102. 
  Chappell H. Lawson’s Building the Fourth Estate: 
Democratization and the Rise of a Free Press in Mexico (2002), looks at the 
democratization of broadcast media in the 1990s.  He also discusses how mass media 
 19 Rubén Gallo, Mexican Modernity: The Avant-Garde and the Technological Revolution 
(Cambridge, MA and London: The MIT Press, 2005); Elissa J. Rashkin, The Stridentist Movement in 
Mexico: The Avant-Garde and Cultural Change in the 1920s (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2009).  
 20 Elena Jackson Albarrán, “Children of the Revolution: Constructing the Mexican Citizen, 1920-
1940,” PhD diss., University of Arizona, Tucson, Arizona, 2008; Sonia Robles, “Shaping México Lindo: 
Radio, Music, and Gender in Greater Mexico, 1923-1946,” PhD diss., Michigan State University, 
Lansing, Michigan, 2012. 
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became monopolized during the “perfect dictatorship” of the Partido Revolucionario 
Institucional (PRI).   Indeed, the history of Mexican communications is a growing field 
in the United States.  These works are providing a better understanding of how modern 
Mexico developed and how artists, entrepreneurs, and government officials portrayed 
their country to their fellow citizens and the outside world.  As a result, their works, and 
I hope mine as well, provide important insights into how mass media has been crucial to 
twentieth-century nation building and transnational cultural and political diffusion.  
 Mexican communications scholars have a much stronger record of publications on 
the history of radio in Mexico.  I owe a great debt of gratitude to a number of talented 
academics who wrote prior studies on telecommunications.  The works of Roberto 
Ornelas Herrera, Carlos A. Merchán Escalante, Gloria Fuente, and Ana Luz Ruelas 
were especially important to my research since they provided the first investigations 
into pre-broadcasting wireless communications in Mexico.21
                                                     
21 Roberto Ornelas Herrera, “Radio y contidianidad en México (1900-1930),” in Historia de la 
vida cotidiana en México, tomo V, vol. 1, Siglo XX, Campo y ciudad, edited by Aurelio de los Reyes 
(Mexico City: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 2006); Roberto Ornelas Herrera, “La radiodifusión 
mexicana a principios del siglo XX (Las comunicaciones inalámbricas en México 1900-1924),” tesis de 
licenciatura, Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, Mexico City,1998; Carlos Merchán Escalante, 
Telecomunicaciones (Mexico City: Secretaría de Comunicaciones y Transportes, 1988); Gloria Fuentes, 
La Radiodifusión (Mexico City: Secretaría de Comunicaciones y Transportes, 1988); Ana Luz Ruelas, 
México y Estados Unidos en la revolución mundial de las telecomunicaciones (Mexico City: 
UNAM, 1996); also useful for understadning wire telegraphy in Mexico is Leopoldo Noyola, La raza 
de la hierba: Historia de telégrafos Morse en México, 2nd ed. (Puebla: Benemérita Universidad 
Autónoma de Puebla, 2004). 
  Also important to my 
project are a number of scholars who invested tremendous time and energy studying 
broadcasting, including but not limited to Jorge Mejía Prieto, Felipe Gálvez Cancino, 
Fernando Mejía Barquera, José Luis Ortiz Garza, Ángel Miquel, Enrique E. Sánchez 
Ruiz, Rosalía Velázquez Estrada, Gilberto Vargas Arana, Virginia Medina Ávila, 
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Cuauhtémoc Anda Gutiérrez, Romeo Figueroa Bermúdez, and Fátima Fernández 
Christlieb.22
 The first serious study of radiotelegraphy in Mexico appeared with Carlos 
Merchán Escalante’s Telecomunicaciones, written for a volume on communications 
coordinated by Enrique Cárdenas de la Pena and sponsored by the Mexican Secretariat 
of Communications and Transportation (SCT) in 1988.  Although only one component 
of a more general work on telecommunications, Merchán Escalante used the 
department’s public records to trace electronic communications development from the 
first telegraphy project to the country’s multi-faceted network of 1988.  His work is 
more descriptive than analytical, providing basic information on when and where 
stations were built and, occasionally, on how they were used.  He also discusses early 
radio legislation.  Though no small work by any means, Merchán Escalante only 
scratched the surface of available documentation, predominately limiting himself to 
SCT records.  Gloria Fuentes’s La Radiodifusión, part of the same series, is similar in 
many ways, but with a greater focus on broadcasting.  
  
                                                     
22 Jorge Mejía Prieto,  Historia de la radio y la t. v. en México (Mexico City: Editores 
Asociados, 1972); Felipe Gálvez Cancino, “Los felices del alba,” tesis de licenciatura, Universidad 
Nacional Autónoma de México, Mexico City, 1975; Fátima Fernández Christlieb, Los medios de difusión 
masiva en México (Mexico City: Juan Pablos, 1982); Enrique E. Sánchez Ruiz, Orígenes de la 
radiodifusión en México: desarrollo capitalista y el estado (Mexico City: ITESO, 1984); Fernando Mejía 
Barquera, La industria de la radio y televisión y la política del estado mexicano (1920-1960) (Mexico 
City: Fundación Manuel Buendía, 1989); José Luis Ortiz Garza, La guerra de las ondas: Un libro que 
desmiente la historia “oficial” de la radio Mexicana (Mexico City: Planeta Mexicana, 1992); José Luis 
Ortiz Garza, Radio entre dos reinos: la increíble historia de la radiodifusora mexicana más potente del 
mundo en los años 30 (Mexico City: Vergara, 1997); Ángel Miquel, Disolvencias: Literatura, cine y 
radio en México (1900-1950) (Mexico City: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 2005); Rosalía Velázquez 
Estrada, “La Radiodifusión Mexicana: encuentro con su espada (1923-1945),” in Miradas sobre la nación 
liberal: 1848-1948: Proyectos, debates y desafíos, Libro 2, Formar e informar: la diversidad cultural 
(Mexico City: Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, 2010): 275-313; Virginia Medina Ávila and 
Gilberto Vargas Arana, Nuestra es la voz, de todos la palabra: Historia de la radiodifusión mexicana, 
1921-2010 (Mexico City: Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México-FES, Acatlán, 2011).  
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 Roberto Ornelas Herrera’s tesis de licenciatura “La radiodifusión mexicana a 
principios del siglo XX (Las comunicaciones inalámbricas en México 1900-1924)” 
(1998) was the first work to specifically address early radio technology in Mexico.23
 Although this dissertation compliments these works, my research stands apart in a 
number of ways.  I argue that radio was a crucial factor in the outcome of the 
Revolution, changing the course of important battles and uprisings.  The 
Constitutionalists’ dominance over communications technologies, especially radio, 
proved critical to their ability to win the war.  Just as importantly, wireless use during 
the Revolution and subsequent rebellions directly influenced government policies.  By 
continuing to examine the role of radio in military and transportation endeavors, I show 
how the technology became an important facet of state suppression and structural 
development while also serving as a tool for populist politics and cultural nation 
building.  In turn, military concerns remained a dominant part of the thinking of leaders 
  
He followed this with a published essay titled “Radio y contidianidad en México (1900-
1930)” (2006).  Opening the box on the previously hidden lives of radiotelegraphers 
during the Porfiriato and the Revolution, Ornelas Herrera also provides the first 
academic study to focus on radio’s role in the Revolution.  To better understand this 
crucial period, I expanded on Ornelas Herrera’s work by adding new source materials 
from previously unused archives and newspapers and by expanding the historical and 
geographical context.  Like Ornelas Herrera, I find that the number of radios and radio 
specialists expanded significantly because of the Revolution and played an important 
role in the rise of Mexican broadcasting. 
                                                     
 23 A tesis de licenciatura is a thesis written for the obtainment of what in the United States would 
equate to a bachelor’s degree.  However, these works are more similar to a U.S. master’s thesis,  and 
often represent high levels of scholarship. 
19 
 
during the 1920s and 1930s.  As wireless technology diversified, the state’s use of radio 
became more complex, the government leaders controlled and supervised political and 
military aspects of radio while they encouraged commercial entities they favored to 
expand cultural and nationalist broadcasting.   
While recognizing my debt to Hayes, I must also point out crucial differences 
between her work and my own.  One, we highlight different times and aspects of radio 
development.  She focuses most of her attention on the 1930s to 1950, giving brief 
attention to the 1920s, whereas I examine the use and influence of radio from 1897 to 
1938, emphasizing the pre-Cárdenas years.  Whereas Hayes’s book looks at theories of 
modernism and anti-modernism, culture, paternalism, and nationalism, my dissertation 
focuses more attention on radiotelegraphy, state building, intelligence practices, 
structural development, militarism, and corporatist politics.  My research also 
emphasizes the importance of the Calles administration and the PNR in the 
development of nationalist and populist broadcasting.  In regards to radio, Cárdenas 
capitalized on well-laid foundations more than inventing any new method of using 
mass-media.  Lastly, I use a wider variety of primary source materials, a fact that has 
allowed me to detect actors and tendencies invisible to previous scholars.   
 As with Hayes, most Mexican publications on radio focus on the 1930s through 
1950s, although some carry the development up to more current times.  My work delves 
deeper into the roots of early Mexican radio.  By examining the technology’s origins in 
Europe and the role of Mexican ambassadors in obtaining wireless equipment, I 
broaden the historical and geographical context of Mexican radio studies.  This 
approach has also allowed me to bridge the historiographical divide between works on 
20 
 
communications and empire building and those on radio and Mexican nationalism and 
state formation.  The processes of state consolidation in Latin America and European 
and U.S. empire building went hand-in-hand, and at times the former mirrored the 
latter.  I additionally lay a much stronger emphasis on the role of the Revolution and 
subsequent violence on state broadcasting policies.  It was a fear of continued 
insurrection, together with the drive to consolidate a firm control over the state that 
pushed the military to expand its wireless operations and national political leaders to 
increase government broadcasting, collaborate with specific commercial stations on 
programming and state propaganda, and to limit the scope of oppositional political 
speech over the air.  As aforementioned, the Revolution is why populist politics 
emerged over the airwaves in Mexico earlier than in other Latin American nations.  
 My work also makes a contribution to the existing literature on the Porfirio Díaz 
era and the Mexican Revolution.  The works on these periods are so numerous that 
listing them all would be a cumbersome task.  Some publications about the Porfiriato 
discuss technology, public works projects, and modernization, but none excepting the 
aforementioned works on telecommunications discuss the importance of wire and 
wireless communications to Porfirian schemes.24
                                                     
 24 For examples see, Coatsworth, Growth against Development; Stephen Haber, Industry and 
Underdevelopment: The Industrialization of Mexico, 1900-1940 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 
1989); Priscilla Connolly, El contratista de don Porfirio: Obras públicas, deuda y desarrollo desigual 
(Mexico City: Fondo Cultura Económica, 1997); Paul Garner, Porfirio Díaz (Edinburgh: Longman, 
2001);  William Beezley, Judas at the Jockey Club and Other Episodes in Porfirian Mexico, 2nd ed. 
(Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2001); Claudia Agostoni, Monuments of Progress: 
Modernization and Public Health in Mexico City, 1876-1910 (Calgary: University of Calgary Press, 
2003); Michael Matthews, “De Viaje: Elite Views of Modernity and the Porfirian Railway Boom,” 
Mexican Studies/Estudios Mexicanos 26, no. 2 (Summer 2010): 251-89. 
  Similarly, most books on the 
Revolution and the subsequent governments tend to focus on ideology and culture more 
than structural development.  Some larger monographs on the Revolution do make 
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reference to technologies, though none emphasize the point, but still, they are excellent 
works that I used and hope to complement.25
 Perhaps it should not be surprising that radio was important in the Revolution, 
first as a military tool and then subsequently in the 1920s and 1930s as a mass medium 
to spread revolutionary culture.  There has been a longstanding relationship between 
communication mediums and revolution.  Often scurrilous penny-papers helped build 
momentum for the French Revolution.
   
26  Following the Mexican Revolution, radio 
became an essential component of revolutions and counterrevolutions in Cuba, 
Guatemala, and Nicaragua.  Scholars and journalists since 2010 have commented on the 
importance of the Internet and social media in the Arab Spring.27  A growing 
international movement has used both conventional broadcasting and the Internet to 
influence people struggling under an oppressive regime in North Korea.28
 The Mexican Revolution provides the earliest example of radio technology in a 
major social revolution.  It shows that electronic communications have been important 
to both challenging and maintaining government control since their introduction.  Radio 
during the Revolution was a novel but valuable tool for administrating government in 
    
                                                     
 25 Gallo’s Mexican Modernity focuses on technology and culture. Some of the many works on the 
Mexican Revolution that are of high caliber include, Frank Tannenbaum, The Mexican Agrarian 
Revolution (New York: The MacMillan Company, 1929); John Womack, Jr., Zapata and the Mexican 
Revolution (New York: Vintage, 1970); Adolfo Gilly, La revolución interrumpida (Mexico City: El 
Caballito, 1971); Ramón Eduardo Ruíz,  The Great Rebellion, 1904-1924 (New York: W.W. Norton & 
Company, 1980); Knight, The Mexican Revolution, 2 vols.; Friedrich Katz, The Life and Times of Pancho 
Villa (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998); Berta Ulloa, “La lucha armada (1911-1920),” in 
Historia general de México (Mexico City: Colegio de México, 2000),  757-817; John M. Hart, 
Empire and Revolution: The  Americans in Mexico since the Civil War (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 2002). 
 26 See Jeremy D. Popkin, Revolutionary News: The Press in France, 1789-1799 (Durham: Duke 
University Press, 1999).  
 27 Thomas L. Friedman, “A Theory of Everything,” New York Times, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/14/opinion/sunday/Friedman-a-theory-of-everyting-sort-
of.html?src=ISMR_AP_LO_MST_FB, accessed 14 August 2011. 
 28  “Fleeing North Korea through ‘Asia’s Underground Railroad’,” Talk of the Nation, 4 Dec. 
2012, National Public Radio, audio program, http://www.npr.org/2012/12/04/166500413/fleeing-north-
korea-through-asias-underground-railroad, accessed 4 Dec. 2012. 
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conquered territories, organizing military operations, and conducting foreign relations.  
But unlike penny-presses and Facebook, wireless telegraphy was not, at least 
intentionally, a mass media.  Still, its value and importance as a communications tool 
should not be under emphasized.  The use of radiotelegraphy during the Revolution is 
also important because it provided a cadre of wireless specialists and inspired 
authoritarian tendencies in later Mexican broadcasting.  Brought to Mexico by private 
experimenters and military men, broadcasting became an essential component in the 
way that revolutionary-era governments attempted to garner public support and shape 
the image of the new Mexican state.  These coinciding social and technological 
revolutions make radio development and its role in state formation and centralization 
especially interesting in Mexico.  
 Born from experiments conducted in laboratories in Europe, radio became a 
crucial tool for the acquisition and solidification of state power in Mexico.  From the 
moment the technology reached Mexico in 1899, it was a tool of state expansion and 
nation-building.  But as the Revolution clearly demonstrated, the technology, when not 
monopolized or firmly controlled, could be a force of rebellion, resistance, and 
factionalism.  As developed and amplified during one of Mexico’s most massive and 
violent struggles over state power and the course of the nation, controlling radio became 
an essential component of war and governance. 
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Chapter One 
 
Scientists and Inventors, Empires and Latin America: 
Early Global Wireless Communications  
 
 
Brripp—brripp—brripp—brripp. 
Brripp—brripp—brripp—brrrrrr— 
Brripp—brrrrrr—brripp.  Brripp—brripp! 
—Cleveland Moffett, describing 
Guglielmo Marconi’s wireless 
telegraphy in action, 1899 
 
   
 In the summer of 1899, Cleveland Moffett, a journalist for McClure’s Magazine, 
traveled far to get the scoop on a much talked about new invention, Guglielmo 
Marconi’s wireless telegraph machine.  The writer crossed the Atlantic, leaving the 
United States for the Isle of Wight, a small island of the southern coast of England.  
Making his way to the westernmost point of the isle, Moffett reached the Royal Needles 
Hotel at Alum Bay.  Marconi had set up his experimental station inside and outside of 
the two-story building.  Over the course of the next few days, Moffett became better 
acquainted with radiotelegraphy.  Marconi, for his part, had already achieved worldwide 
fame by transmitting Morse code messages through the air.  He had succeeded in 
sending signals from Alum Bay to mainland England and between England and France 
across the Strait of Dover.  The ambitious experimenter was now enthusiastically 
anticipating his chance to exhibit his apparatus for U.S. newspapers during the 
upcoming American Cup yacht races.1
                                                     
 1 Cleveland Moffett, “Marconi’s Wireless Telegraph,” McClure’s Magazine 8, no. 2 (Jun. 1899), 
American Periodicals Series Online, hereafter cited as APS; “Marconi’s Wireless,” New York Times, 23 
Jan. 1898, IWM3; “The Wireless Telegrapher, Friends’ Intelligencer 56, no. 52 (Dec. 30, 1899): 995; 
“Wireless Telegraphy,” New York Times, 29 Mar. 1899, 1; “Wireless Telegraphy for Yacht Races,” New 
York Times, 30 Mar. 1899, 3. 
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 Over the course of a number of investigative trips to Britain and France, Moffett 
discussed the workings and possibilities of Marconi’s wireless telegraph with the 
inventor and his employees, summing up his findings for McClure’s magazine.  
Moffett, and his boss Robert McClure, were thoroughly intrigued with Marconi’s 
invention, and deeply curious about its implications for their publication and the world.  
After describing one of Britain’s most famous natural landmarks, “the horseshoe cavern 
of Alum Bay, a steep semicircle, bitten out of chalk cliffs,” and the “brripp” of Morse 
code in action,” Moffett expounded on the process of wireless telegraphy for his 
readers:  
With each movement of the key bluish sparks jump an 
inch between the two brass knobs of the induction coil . . . 
For one dot, a single spark jumps; for one dash, there 
comes a stream of sparks. One knob of the induction coil 
is connected with the earth, the other with the wire 
hanging from the masthead. Each spark indicates a certain 
oscillating impulse from an electrical battery that actuates 
the coil; each one of these impulses shoots through the 
aerial wire, and from the wire through space by 
oscillations of the ether, travelling at the speed of light, or 
seven times around the earth in a second. That is all there 
is in the sending of these Marconi messages.2
 
 
Moffett provided a well-summarized and readable account of how wireless telegraphy 
functioned, but the simple explanation concealed a history of years of research by a 
number of people.  Scientists and electrical experimenters originally fostered radio-
wave technology in Europe and the United States during the mid 1800s.  Practical 
applications, however, did not emerge until the 1890s.  By 1897 leaders in these regions 
perceived radio as a new and valuable tool for maritime communications, empire 
building, and the economic exploitation of colonies.  As a result, the technology first 
                                                     
 2 Moffett, “Marconi’s Wireless Telegraph.” 
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became popular among navies, in colonial hinterlands, and for connecting island 
possessions to the mainlands of nearby nations.  Demand for the devices quickly 
expanded to a number of developing countries as well.  In Mexico, Porfirio Díaz’s 
government obtained radios in 1899 at about the same time that Moffet made his 
journey to the Isle of Wight.  But before we enter into that story, it is essential to 
understand more about early radio use in Europe and the United States, because 
Mexican officials borrowed directly from the policies that these expansive governments 
used for centralization, state building, trade, and the suppression of autonomous groups.   
Mexican leaders also hoped to counter the influence of the very same empires they 
mirrored.  Exploring global developments and trends in wireless technology also 
provides a better geographical, political, and cultural context for understanding 
decisions and practices regarding radio in Mexico.  
 
Scientists and Inventors 
 There already exists an impressive body of literature on the earliest pioneers of 
radio.3
                                                     
3 Important works on this topic include W. H. Eccles, Wireless (London: Thornton Butterworth 
Limited, 1933); Aitken, Syntony and Spark; Douglas, Inventing American Broadcasting; Tom Lewis, 
Empire of the Air: The Men Who Made Radio (New York: Edward Burlingame Books, 1991); Hong,  
From Marconi’s Black-Box to the Audion; Huurdeman, The Worldwide History of Telecommunications;  
Russell Burns, Communications: An International History of the Formative Years (London: The 
Institution of Electrical Engineers, 2004; Tapan K. Sakar et al, History of Wireless (Hoboken, NJ: John 
Wiley & Sons, 2006). 
  The child of many parents, wireless technology possesses a long history filled 
with the obsessive work of a large number of scientists and amateur experimenters.   
Throughout much of the 1800s, European physicists, or “natural philosophers,” debated 
electromagnetic theories and phenomenon, with ideas ranging from the prescient to the 
hair-brained.  In the preceding century, many natural philosophers focused on 
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astronomy, but the nineteenth century ushered in an era of increased interest in 
electrical phenomena in general, not only among physicists but across scientific 
disciplines, and additionally among businessmen.  As an American delegate to the 1927 
International Radiotelegraph Conference put it, 
The knowledge of laws of electricity, in conjunction with 
the fundamental laws of mechanics learned by the 
astronomers, has had a tremendous influence on the 
industrial history of the world since that time [the 1800s].  
Radio is but one of the examples of the complementary 
relation between mathematical and experimental effort in 
furthering human progress.4
 
  
Additionally, the mid to late 1800s ushered in a more cooperative era between western 
European academics, something that intensified research into electromagnetic waves.  
This coactive spirit allowed Europe to gain an edge in science and empire building, and 
sparked competition among its member states, but ultimately led to world wars and, in 
many ways, Europe’s fall from global dominance.   
 Although we could trace the progression of radio development to earlier scientists 
and experimenters, a practical starting point is the experiments of Danish physicist and 
chemist Hans Christian Oersted.  Already infatuated with the relationship between 
electricity and magnetism for a number of years, he confirmed this electro-magnetic 
partnership during a lecture on electricity, galvanism, and magnetism at the University 
of Copenhagen on April 21, 1820.  That day he exhibited that an electric current 
affected the needle of a compass.  Later that year he penned an article on electric 
currents and magnetic fields, a publication that had a profound impact on the European 
                                                     
 4 Laurens E. Whittemore, “The Development of Radio,” Annals of the American Academy of 
Political and Social Science, 142, Supplement: Radio (Mar. 1929): 1. 
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scientific community, including French physicist André Marie Ampère who conducted 
more extensive work on electromagnetism.5
 A number of scientists and amateur experimenters built on these advances by 
tinkering with wireless experiments during the mid 1800s.  Mahlon Loomis provides a 
good example.  An American dentist, he demonstrated radio communication in 1866 
when he transmitted signals between “two mountains in the Blue Ridges range, at a 
distance of 22 km.”
  
6 Although the theoretical underpinnings for his experiments would 
not hold up to later scientific rigor—he believed the Earth was blanketed in a “static 
sea” or layer of static—he did successfully exhibit his “aerial telegraph” on multiple 
occasions and received the first patent for wireless telegraphy.7  As communications 
scholar Anton A. Huurdeman noted, Loomis—shortly before he died—wrote to his 
brother stating “The time will come when this discovery will be regarded as of more 
consequence to mankind than Columbus’s discovery of a new world.  I have not only 
discovered a new world but, the means of invading it.  My compensation is poverty, 
contempt, neglect, and forgetfulness.”8  Interestingly, at least one later academic has 
referred to the discovery of wireless communications as “in many ways analogous to 
the discovery of a new continent.”9
                                                     
 5 George Sarton and John Christian Oersted, “The Foundation of Electromagnetism,” Isis 10, no. 2 
(Jun. 1928): 435-44; Roberto De Andrade Martins, “Resistance to the Discovery of Electromagnetism: 
Ørsted and the Symmetry of the Magnetic Field,” 
  And, indeed, the discovery of messaging through 
the “ether” did, in many ways, open up a whole new world.  However, Loomis was not 
the only person experimenting with this new and little understood form of 
http://ppp.unipv.it/Collana/Pages/Libri/Saggi/Volta%20and%20the%20History%20of%20Electricity/V&
H%20Sect3/V&H%20245-265.pdf, accessed 21 Jan. 2012. 
 6 Huurdeman, The Worldwide History of Telecommunications, 200.  
 7 Ibid. 
 8 Mahlon Loomis, quoted in Huurdeman, The Worldwide History of Telecommunications, 200.  
 9 Aitken, Syntony and Spark, 32. 
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communication, a number of experimenters had successfully sent wireless signals 
through methods of electromagnetic induction in the 1840s.10
 It was the mathematics of James Clerk Maxwell that established a sound 
theoretical underpinning for electromagnetic wave studies.  In turn, he had a profound 
impact on later exhibitions of radio and its more successful applications.  Indeed, his 
1865 paper, “A Dynamical Theory of the Electromagnetic Field” laid the groundwork 
for Heinrich Hertz’s successful, if primitive, demonstration of radio transmission and 
reception.  With the publication of his article, Maxwell was the first to articulate 
mathematically how electromagnetic waves could be transmitted through the air and 
that they travelled at the speed of light.  As economics and communications scholar 
Hugh G. J. Aitken summed up, Maxwell’s theory argued that “light itself was 
electromagnetic radiation, within a certain narrow range of wavelengths.  If Maxwell’s 
models were valid, optics and electromagnetism would merge, and science would have 
at its disposal a single conceptual scheme with vastly greater explanatory power than 
either of its distinct and separate antecedents.”
  But as with Loomis, a 
limited theoretical understanding of electromagnetic waves and the limitations of this 
specific form of wireless communication made it impossible for them to regularly 
obtain clear reception beyond small distances.  The discoveries were awe inspiring, but 
by the same token, not very practical.  
11
                                                     
 10 Douglas, Inventing American Broadcasting, 11. In the late 1820s and 1830s American scientist 
Joseph Henry and British scientist Michael Faraday discovered electromagnetic induction. For the 
transmission of wireless signals, the method involves two unconnected wires. When a magnet is placed 
near the wire it creates a constant magnetic field. If the magnet is moved it induces a current.  Any 
change in the current of one wire will induce a change in the other. By manipulating the state of the 
current one can send signals.  
  His research influenced generations of 
 11 Aitken, Syntony and Spark, 22. The italics are Aitken’s.  
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scholars and amateurs who worked with light and radio, including Albert Einstein and 
his Theory of Relativity. 
 Heinrich Hertz was the first person to successfully prove Maxwell’s theory.  In 
1886, while a professor at the Karlsruhe Technical High School he began to seriously 
experiment with the production of electromagnetic waves by creating osculating sparks 
of energy.  After devising sufficient equipment the following year, he triumphantly sent 
and received radio waves across a short space in a recordable manner.  His findings 
made a huge impact in scientific circles. But just as importantly, they influenced a 
number of inventors outside of those circles.  Newspapers, magazines, and other public 
presentations provided a large platform for Hertz’s findings.  However, Hertz had no 
intention of financially capitalizing on the transmission of electromagnetic waves for 
wireless communication; he was not even sure if obtaining profits from this scientific 
breakthrough was feasible.12  But influenced by this discovery, the young Guglielmo 
Marconi became obsessed about the practical and profitable possibilities for 
transmitting messages through the air.  Although he had no intention of doing so, Hertz 
had laid the foundation for a new period of communications, the “spark era of long-
distance wireless.”13
                                                     
 12 Charles Süsskind, “Hertz and the Technological Significance of Electromagnetic Waves,” Isis 
56, no. 3 (Autumn 1965): 342-45. 
 
 The British physicist Oliver Lodge also needs mentioning because of the 
importance of his work to radio technology.  While Hertz was attempting to prove 
Maxwell’s theory in Germany, Lodge was doing the same thing—via different means—
in England.  Although beat to the punch by Hertz, Lodge’s coherer, based on the 
experiments of Edourd Branly, became the model for those used in the first 
 13 Aitken, Syntony and Spark, 66; also see, Douglas, Inventing American Broadcasting, 13-15.  
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radiotelegraph machines.  The coherer was essentially a small glass tube filled with 
metal filings.  The resistance of these filings decreased when affected by 
electromagnetic waves.  However, they returned to their state of higher resistance when 
the coherer was tapped.  Unlike Branly’s, Lodge’s coherer possessed a “trembler,” or a 
decoherer, which mechanically knocked the filings back into their original state.  This 
development made it easier for later inventors and manufacturers to produce radio 
devices for telegraphic communication.  Lodge’s coherer was also the most sensitive 
wave-detection device that had been created up to that point, making it a desirable 
model for the construction of radio receivers.14  Lodge additionally claimed that in 1894 
he, not Marconi, was the first person to exhibit that radio technology could operate as a 
medium for Morse code, a claim that has caused considerable disagreement among 
communications scholars since.15
 However, it was not until Guglielmo Marconi began to market radios as practical 
communications devices that the technology found its way into commercial and popular 
culture.  Although others claimed to have used wireless for similar reasons beforehand, 
he, more than any other person, made wireless communication a reality.  His machines 
were based on the work of prior scientists, such as Hertz, Branly, and Lodge, but 
Marconi, in 1896, was the first to file a patent on Hertzian-wave telegraphy, and he 
worked tirelessly to showcase and market his wares to governments and businesses 
around the world.  In the words of William Crookes, a prominent British scientist and 
contemporary of Marconi: it was when Marconi’s efforts in the 1890s that “induced the 
  
                                                     
 14 Douglas, Inventing American Broadcasting, 1899-1922, 13-14. 
 15 Eccles, Wireless, 53-55; Aitken, Syntony and Spark, 123; Anthony N. Stranges, “Review of 
Syntony and Spark by Hugh G. H. Aitken,” American Historical Review 91, no. 5 (Dec. 1986): 1166-67; 
Hong, Wireless, 25-51; Sungook Hong, “Marconi and the Maxwellians: The Origins of Wireless 
Telegraphy Revisited,” Technology and Culture 35, no. 4 (Oct. 1994): 717- 49; Burns, Communications, 
274. 
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British post office and foreign governments to try large scale experiments did wireless 
signaling become generally and popularly known or practically developed as a special 
kind of telegraphy.”16
 Born in Italy in 1874, Marconi came from a prominent family.  Marconi’s father, 
Giuseppe Marconi, was a wealthy landowner with property near the city of Bologna. 
Marconi’s mother, Annie Jameson, descended from the well-off Scot-Irish Jameson 
family, which had gained wealth as whisky distillers.  From an early age Marconi 
experimented with machines and electricity.  He acquainted himself, for example, with 
the scientific work of Benjamin Franklin and Michael Faraday.  While attending the 
Technical Institute of Bologna as a young teenager he learned Morse code from a 
retired telegrapher, and in 1893 his mother convinced the noted Italian physicist Aguste 
Righi to allow Marconi to attend his classes and obtain access to the University of 
Bologna labs and library.  It was from Righi that Marconi learned important theoretical 
concepts circulating in academia and practical techniques used in the physicist’s 
laboratory.  Meanwhile, Marconi’s mother made sure that her son mastered English, a 
skill that would prove invaluable to him.
  His company became the frontrunner in the manufacture and sale 
of radio equipment, and the policies of Marconi’s Wireless Telegraph and Signal 
Company had major ramifications for radio development and international debates over 
how the new technology was to be used, including in Mexico.  
17
 Shortly after conducting his first successful tests sending Morse code messages at 
his family’s property in Italy, Marconi shifted towards making his experiments into a 
financially fruitful enterprise.  His mother tirelessly supported and promoted his efforts 
  
                                                     
 16 William Crookes, “Address of the President before the British Association for the Advancement 
of Science, Bristol, 1898,” Science, New Series 8, no. 201 (Nov. 4, 1898): 603. 
 17 Douglas, Inventing American Broadcasting, 14-16. 
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and was crucial to his initial success.  After the Italian Ministry of Posts and Telegraphs 
displayed no interest in her son’s invention, she turned her attention to Britain, where 
she possessed greater influence.  It was there, in 1896, that Marconi obtained a patent 
and where he first marketed his device to William Preece, Chief Engineer of the British 
Post Office.  The following year he started the Wireless Telegraph and Signal 
Company, promoted his product on a greater scale, and began successful negotiations 
with the navies of both Britain and Italy.18
 A number of other experimenters quickly followed suit.  In 1897Adolf Slaby, a 
German radio pioneer who had witnessed an exposition of Marconi’s work earlier that 
year, conducted successful wireless experiments using military balloons in Germany.
  
19  
In May 1898, W. J. Clarke, the manager of United States Electrical Supply Company, 
exhibited radio equipment at Madison Square Garden in New York City.  In addition to 
using the technology to ring a bell and to send telegraphic messages, he showed how 
electromagnetic waves could be used to detonate an explosive by blowing up a model 
Spanish cruiser.20  Lee De Forest, John Stone, and Reginald Fessenden started wireless 
companies in the United States.  Russian physicist Alexander Popov established his 
homeland’s first radio stations.  Based largely on Popov’s designs, Edourd Ducretet’s 
devices were for sale in France by 1898.  Julio Cervera Baviera, who had visited some 
of Marconi’s stations, developed a radio system in Spain during 1901 and 1902.21
                                                     
 18 Ibid, 16-17, Hong, Wireless, 1. 
  
These are but a few of the people working in the field of wireless communications 
during the 1890s and the first decade of the 1900s.  
 19 “Telegraphy without Wires,” New York Times, 9 Oct. 1897, 7. 
 20 “New Way to Fire Mines,” New York Times, 7 May 1898, 12.  
 21 Domencio Mazzotto, Wireless Telegraphy and Telephony, tr. by Selimo Romeo Bottone 
(London: Whittaker & Co., 1906), 217. 
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 Marconi was far and away the most successful in the business arena.  He had 
operations in multiple countries, including the Marconi Wireless Telegraph Company of 
America subsidiary established in 1899.22  He ardently strove to dominate the ship-to-
shore telegraph business and to challenge, at least by 1901, wire cable services.  And as 
stated before, he successfully aspired to provide apparatuses to navies and militaries.  In 
fact, his determination to succeed pushed him to pursue a policy of monopolization.  
Important to this development was the Marconi Company’s non-intercommunication 
rule, which stated that Marconi operators and equipment could only be used to 
communicate with others from Marconi.23  Marconi disallowed the use of their devices 
to contact or receive message from other wireless providers, such as by Slaby or 
Ducretet, except for in cases of emergency.  Although Marconi ultimately sought to 
dominate the global market, his most pressing goal was to first connect the British 
Empire and to be its sole wireless provider.  As the 1900s began, his goal of 
monopolization became an increasing reality.  He had formed partnerships with the 
English and Italian navies, multiple steamship companies, coastal radio stations, and 
most importantly a contract with Lloyd’s of London, a company that provided (and 
continues to provide) marine insurance, and which possessed operations across the 
British Empire.  If they stuck to Marconi’s non-intercommunication policy it would 
force the large number of businesses that worked with Lloyd’s to do the same.24
                                                     
 22 “Wireless Telegraphy,” Zion’s Herald 77, no. 48 (Nov. 19, 1899): 1515. 
  This 
attempt at domination, however, provoked the ire of other European state officials and 
wireless providers who began an international crusade to halt this process, resulting in 
the first international conferences on radio in Berlin in 1903 and 1906.  Mexican 
 23 Douglas, Inventing American Broadcasting, 70; Hills, The Struggle, 93-152. 
 24 Ibid, 67-70. 
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leaders, dissatisfied with the high prices of Marconi’s instruments and services, allied 
with German firms, joining the representatives who opposed Marconi’s monopolistic 
practices.  
 
Empires  
 As other scholars have discussed, communications and transportations 
technologies have played an immensely important role in empire building, maintenance, 
and colonial exploitation.25
 Almost from the technology’s inception, experimenters and state leaders used 
radiotelegraphy to incorporate island populations to larger mainlands.  The reason was 
  Mexican governments would also incorporate 
centralization schemes with the same tools.  During the nineteenth century these 
technologies included steamships, railroads, and cable telegraphs.  Radio technology 
was the last of these nineteenth-century communications developments utilized for 
empire, though it became a much more important factor in the subsequent centuries.  
And although cable telegraphy remained dominant during the early 1900s because 
many government officials and businessmen considered the technology more secure, 
economical, and dependable, many European leaders outside of Britain hoped 
radiotelegraphy could break the British monopoly on submarine cables.  Early wireless 
communications made the greatest headway in four areas: ship-to-shore 
communications, connecting insular possessions, naval operations, and in colonial 
hinterlands.  
                                                     
 25 Innis, Empire and Communications; Headrick, The Tools of Empire; Headrick, The Invisible 
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twofold: to communicate with ill-connected populations and to better link lighthouses 
and sea vessels.  Starting in 1897, Marconi and British Post Office employees applied 
wireless technology to the task of connecting smaller islands to the rest of Britain.  That 
year postal authorities selected Sark, the smallest of the Channel Islands, as the first 
post office to rely on radiotelegraphy because “the island has no telegraphic 
communication with the outside world, and is often isolated by fogs and storms.”26  
Other operations that began shortly thereafter included between Lavernock Point and 
Flat Holm Island in the Bristol Channel (3.3 miles) and between Ballycastle, Ireland, 
and Rathlin Island (7.5 miles).27  In Russia, Alexander Popov built a wireless link 
between Suursaari Island in the Gulf of Finland and Kotka, the nearest mainland town 
31 miles away.28
 Beginning in 1898, the British corporation Trinity House acquired Marconi’s 
services to establish wireless communication between the company’s lightships (ships 
that acted as beacons in water too deep for lighthouse construction), the South Foreland 
lighthouse, and the company headquarters.  The apparatuses proved crucial in a number 
of emergencies, highlighting radio’s practical applications to marine search and rescue 
operations.
  
29  Similar developments occurred in other parts of Europe and the United 
States.  The U.S. Signal Corps established a wireless link between Fire Island and the 
Fire Island lightship in 1899.30
                                                     
 26 “The Outlook,” Zion’s Herald 75, no. 27 (Jul. 7, 1897): 1, APS. 
  The following year, the Marconi Wireless Telegraph 
Company established wireless communications on the German lightvessel Borkum Riff 
and the Borkum lighthouse, and on multiple Belgian steamers in addition to a 
 27 Burns, Communications, 302-03, 306. 
 28 Ibid, 351. 
 29 Ibid, 308; G. Marconi, “Origen and Development of Wireless Telegraphy,” The North American 
Review 168, no. 510 (May 1899): 628, APS.  
 30 “Colonial Telegraph Lines,” New York Times, 6 Nov. 1899, 7.  
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corresponding Belgian shore station at La Panne.31  In 1905, during the escalating 
dispute between Marconi and the German company Telefunken, the latter company 
began building shore stations to replace the Borkum operation at the request of Kaiser 
Wilhelm II.32
 And European navies were quick to adopt wireless.  Until the introduction of 
radio, sea vessels relied on flags and light signals for communications.  Wireless 
provided a number of advantages: messages could be sent in the dark and through fog, 
at further distances, and from naval officers on land.  And even though some sea 
captains disdained the loss of their autonomy, the military benefits of the technology 
pressured navies to adopt it.  
  These are but a handful of examples of early radio stations used for 
maritime safety.  Such operations corresponded with an increasing use of wireless 
equipment aboard commercial and naval sea vessels.  
 British sea forces took to Marconi’s radio devices almost instantaneously.  It 
helped that officers within the navy were already experimenting with the technology.  
Although more conservative members of the Royal Navy were wearier of change, 
sailors including Captain Henry B. Jackson embraced Marconi’s findings and applied 
them to naval explosives and communications.33  Jackson also built a number of radio 
sets for the navy himself.  But naval officers also realized that wireless transmissions 
could be a liability.  One commander commented on the possibility of jamming radio 
signals by transmitting from other devices on a similar wavelength.34
                                                     
 31 Burns, Communications, 351.  
  During a mock 
skirmish in 1901, one fleet picked up and deciphered the messages sent by the opposing 
 32 Huurdeman, The Worldwide History of Telecommunications, 272.  
 33 Burns, Communications, 273, 284-86. 
 34 Ibid, 305. 
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ships, leading to the loss of a “decisive battle.”35  But overall, the admiralty found that 
the benefits outweighed the liabilities.  By 1900 Great Britain’s fleet far outpaced any 
other navy in wireless communications.  They possessed over fifty sets and had already 
used some of them in military operations.36
 Although Britain’s Royal Navy possessed a commanding lead in radiotelegraphy 
in 1900, the navies of other countries and imperial powers began using the technology 
as well.  The Italian navy bought Marconi devices starting in 1897, placing them on a 
handful of ships and in shore stations at La Spezia, Leghorn, San Bartolemo, and 
Varugiano.  By 1900 the Japanese possessed five Marconi sets in their navy.  Germany 
had a small number of apparatuses that the different sections of the military shared.  The 
navies of France, Russia, and the United States had experimented with radio but had not 
incorporated a wireless system of any kind.
  
37
 During the next five years, however, these powers, and a number of other nations, 
more fully embraced radio use in their navies.  In 1901 the New York Times reported 
that the “British, French, German, Japanese, Russian, Italian, Spanish, and Swedish 
navies have adopted wireless telegraphy to a greater or less extent.”
  
38  In 1902 Kaiser 
Wilhelm II, in protest of Marconi’s monopolistic tendencies, ordered that all German 
navy vessels and shore stations use Slaby-Arco devices.  According to one report, 
thirty-two German ships of war already possessed the equipment.39
                                                     
 35 “Defeat of Admiral Noel,” The Rhodesia Herald, 21 Sept. 1901, 4.  
  In 1903, after 
accepting the inevitability of radio’s growing presence on the seas, the American navy 
seriously invested in radio.  Officers obtained approximately fifty sets and built twenty-
 36 Burns, Communications, 349-50. 
 37 Ibid, 350-351; “The Wireless Telegrapher,” Zion’s Herald 56, no. 52 (Dec. 30, 1899): 995, 
APS; “Wireless Telegraphy in Germany,” New York Times 11 Mar. 1899, 7.  
 38 “Report on Foreign navies,” New York Times, 31 Aug. 1901, 2.  
 39 “In Foreign lands,” New York Times, 6 Apr. 1902, SM16. 
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four stations along the coast of the U.S. mainland and two in the Philippines.  By the 
end of 1904 the Italian government controlled nineteen shore stations and Germany had 
equipped seventy-five ships and four Baltic stations.  France had five stations along the 
Atlantic and plans to build others along the coasts of Corsica and its possessions in 
northern Africa.40
 Using radio in colonial hinterlands played a prominent role in how imperial 
leaders visualized the technology’s role.  This was especially true where officials had 
difficulty constructing cable telegraphs and where combat regularly occurred.  Britain, 
for example, used wireless telegraphy in its distant territories.  Yet, because of Britain’s 
dominant position in regards to submarine cables, using radio to connect the empire 
often met with detractors.  Throughout the first decade of the 1900s, Marconi pushed 
for the British government to help fund a huge wireless network throughout the empire, 
but he encountered resistance from officials who felt that the idea was too costly and 
unpractical, or who wanted greater state control over the medium.
  
41  British residents in 
the imperial colonies, however, paid close attention to radio.  Jagadish Chandra Bose, 
the great Indian polymath, started experiments with radio by 1895 and newspapers in 
India regularly reported on wireless developments in the late 1890s and early 1900s.42  
In 1899 Nagendra Chandra, a professor residing in Agra, India, in conjunction with 
employees of the government telegraph office there, made his own coherer and 
successfully conducted wireless experiments at a distance of 108 yards.43
                                                     
 40 Burns, Communications, 356-57. 
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some tech-savvy residents hoped that radio would better connect India to other parts of 
the world, development was slow.  The demand was limited.  India already had cable 
telegraphs that connected it to England and other parts of the globe. 
 Events in South Africa had a greater influence on wireless use.  Unlike India, 
South Africa was not yet connected to the rest of the British Empire by submarine 
cables. The region had also been the site of ongoing military conflicts.  In 1899 the 
Second Boer War rocked the colony, threatening to oust the British government.  The 
Boers, Dutch and English settlers of the breakaway nations of Orange Walk and 
Transvaal, originally outnumbered the British forces and surrounded the South Africa 
cities of Kimberley, Mafeking, and Ladysmith.44  Knowing that militaries were 
excellent potential customers, Marconi consistently emphasized how wireless 
technology could be useful for these types of conflicts.  The New York Times stated in 
one article that “Signor Marconi is enthusiastic over the uses of his invention in case of 
war.”45
Let us imagine a small detachment of Europeans, say 
during one of these frontier wars, stationed in a rather 
lonely spot.  They of course set up telegraphic 
communications with wires.  The enemy is not likely to 
allow this state of things continue, and one night the little 
band is surrounded and the wires are cut down … Now, 
with the new system there would be nothing to give notice 
  He, like American inventors of the era, mentioned the possibility of detonating 
explosives via wireless.  More importantly, he argued that his devices would allow for 
communication when combatants cut regular telegraph lines—a problem that had 
worried the British in South Africa since the First Boer War (1880-81).  In Marconi’s 
words: 
                                                     
 44 For an account of the Second Boer War, see Thomas Pakenham, The Boer War (London: 
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 45 “Marconi’s Telegraphy,” New York Times, 23 Jan. 1898, IWM3. 
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to the enemy that these small outlying parties were in 
communication with the main body, and all the time the 
electric waves are in use, and perhaps ten miles away they 
are reading by the ticking of a receiver, messages of 
paramount importance.46
 
 
South Africa became Marconi’s testing ground and leaders in Mexico took note.  
 One of Marconi’s first big equipment sales was to the British War Office in 1898, 
which used the devices in the Second Boer War.47  Accompanying British 
reinforcements, at least five apparatuses arrived for the fight in South Africa the 
following year.  The military leadership hoped to use the radios to better facilitate the 
landing and then to subsequently support the expeditions to the besieged towns.48  On 
March 04, 1899, The Times of Swaziland printed an account of the first successful 
wireless trials in Cape Town.49  By the end of 1899, wireless complimented the British 
armed forces by offering a means of communication that avoided sabotage by Boer 
forces and transmitted useful military intelligence.  For example, a letter from a British 
officer to a Boer general in The Mafeking Mail stated “I fear from what I have just 
heard by wireless telegraph that the natives are contemplating further operations should 
your forces continue to remain within or on the border of their territories.”50   
Information supplied to foreign presses stated that radio experiments in the settlements 
of Modder River and De Aar, and along the Orange River, had been “highly 
successful,” some at the distance of seventy miles.51
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 47 Aitken, Syntony and Spark, 232. 
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 50 “A Letter to the Boers,” The Mafeking Mail (Mafeking, South Africa), 12 Nov. 1899, 1. 
 51 “Foreign Intelligence,” The Pioneer, 20 Nov. 1899, 1, APS; “Wireless Telegraphy,” Zion’s 
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transmission and reception, and to acclimate wireless to warfare, the British used “war 
kites” and balloons developed by F. S. Balden-Powell of the Scots Guards to help send 
messages.52  The British navy used wireless to communicate orders between the Kosi 
and Delagoa Bays and in their operations off of the South African coast.53  
Interestingly, the Los Angeles Times also reported that British forces seized “six 
Marconi instruments intended for the Boers” at Cape Town, though it appears that the 
Boers used wireless far less than the British, if they ever managed to use the technology 
at all.54  While the war was winding down radio development continued, though more 
so for infrastructural development than warfare.  In early 1902, after the formation of 
the Marconi-Lloyd’s partnership, the Cape Town government made plans with Lloyd’s 
for the installment of wireless stations on Dassen Island and Robben Island, which were 
then to be connected to Cape Town.55
 But using wireless technology proved difficult during the Second Boer War. 
Other reports on the Moddle and Orange River experiments stated that there was 
considerable interference, blaming iron-filled hillsides.
   
56  One African paper stated that 
“Wireless telegraphy appears up to the present to have done very little service during 
the present war.”57
                                                     
 52 “Hero of Mafeking,” Mexican Herald, 23 Apr. 1900, 8. Marconi and Slaby used kites in 
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  Although kites worked to some extent, the lack of sufficient masts 
was problematic.  Facing constant difficulties, the Director of Army Telegraphy ordered 
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 55 “Wireless Telegraphy,” The Journal (Graham’s Town, South Africa), 23 Jan. 1902, 2. 
 56 “Foreign Intelligence,” The Pioneer, 29 Dec. 1899, 1; “Enemy’s Guns,” Los Angeles Times, 27 
Dec. 1899, 2; “Wireless Telegraphy,” The Rhodesia Herald, 18 Jan. 1900, 2.  
 57 “Wireless Telegraphy,” The Bulawayo Chronicle (Bulawayo, Zimbabwe), 20 Jan 1900, 3; 
Burns, Communications, 400-02.  
42 
 
the South Africa land sets dismantled and transferred to the navy in 1900.58   Thereafter, 
aboard the ships of the Delagoa naval squadron, the equipment served an important role 
in the blockade of the Lourenco Marques region, preventing supplies from reaching the 
Boers in the Transvaal.59
 French officials and businessmen also took up radio.  As communications scholar 
Daniel R. Headrick states: “there had always been a crying need for better 
communications in the colonial empire, especially in equatorial Africa and Indochina, 
where telegraphs were unsatisfactory.  It is there that French radio developed.”
  The devices functioned better over the ocean.  But even if 
only somewhat successful, the radio experiments during the Second Boer War provided 
the first testing space for wireless in warfare.  And despite the problems, military 
officials around the world believed that the technology was going to play an 
increasingly important role in combat.  
60  Radio 
experiments had started earlier within France itself, where inventor Edouard Ducretet 
had experimented with radio since 1897.  The government had also collaborated with 
Marconi.  In 1901 French officials successfully implemented wireless communication 
in Gabon in Africa.  The following year, the volcano Mont Pelé had erupted on the 
island of Martinique in the Caribbean, razing the city of St. Pierre and destroying the 
telegraph lines.61
                                                     
 58 Peter Lewis and Corinne Pearlman, Media & Power from Marconi to Murdoch: A Graphic 
Guide (London: Camden Press, 1986), 37. 
  In order to establish communications with the island, army telegraph 
officers Gustave-Auguste Ferrié and L. Magne established a successful wireless 
operation between Martinique and the island of Guadeloupe where there was a 
submarine cable link.  In 1904 French operatives built three small portable radios in 
 59  Burns, Communications, 349, 402. 
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Indochina, placing them in Hanoi, Kien-An, and Cap Saint-Jacques, which aided 
colonial businesses and military officials battle the Chinese who were cutting telegraph 
lines on the colony’s northern frontier.62
 The German state, under the leadership of Kaiser Wilhelm II, invested heavily in 
radio.  Wilhelm’s government and German businesses hoped to increase the power of 
Germany’s maritime operations, break Britain’s monopoly on electronic 
communications, and build stronger contacts with its colonies and developing nations.  
In 1903 Wilhelm II prompted the two largest German wireless firms, Adolf Slaby and 
George von Arco’s Allegemeine Elektricitäts-Gesellschaft (AEG) and Siemens & 
Halske, which famed scientist Karl Ferdinand Braun had partnered with, to merge 
forces, creating Telefunken.  The company had strong support from the emperor and the 
military.  In 1905 Germans started construction on powerful radio operations at Nauen 
and Nordiddeich.  With these latter two stations, German officials strove to 
communicate with the Americas and with colonies in Africa, especially Togo.  
Although Germany officers could boast of transmitting at distances of over 900 miles, 
they could not achieve direct wireless communication with its African possession or the 
Americas until the World War I era.  AEG also provided equipment for the Herero War 
of 1904 and the Russo-Japanese War.
  
63
 The Spanish too used radio to connect to their colonies and insular possessions. 
Immediately after losing a number of their overseas domains to the United States, 
Spanish officials worked to install wireless communications in their northwest African 
colonies and to connect the Balearic Islands in the Mediterranean Sea with mainland 
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Spain.64
 The American victory over Spanish forces in the Spanish-American War (1898) 
enticed U.S. government officials and businessmen to grow their imperial ambitions.  
Radio became an important tool in this period of American expansionism.  Although the 
rise of wireless occurred at the same time as the Spanish-American War, and despite the 
fact that members of the U.S. journalist community had promoted the need to develop 
radio during the conflict, the use of the technology was extremely limited.
  Despite Spain’s losses during the late nineteenth century, its remaining 
possessions were relatively close, providing an ideal environment for radio 
development.  
65  In late 
1899 General Adolphus Washington Greely, head of the U.S. Signal Corps, talked 
about joining “close together the United States and its Pacific colonies,” and he believed 
that radio would provide “a means of connecting the islands of the West Indies, Hawaii, 
and the Philippines.”66  In 1904 American naval officials constructed a station near 
Manila.  Shortly thereafter the U.S. military constructed more wireless operations in the 
Philippines at Jolo, Zamboanga, and Cabra.67
                                                     
 64 “Navies of the World,” New York Times, 3 Sept. 1901, 8. 
  Greely also used wireless technology in 
the Signal Corps’ plans to better incorporate the territory of Alaska.  In addition to 
building the Washington-Alaska Military Cable from 1900 to 1903, the Signal Corps 
 65 “Wireless Telegraphy,” Scientific America 78, no. 14 (Apr. 2, 1898), 213, APS; Rebecca 
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 67  Adrian M. Peterson, “Early Wireless Stations in the Philippines, Wavescan, 
http://www.ontheshortwaves.com/Wavescan/wavescan090830.html, accessed 21 Feb. 2012.  
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installed radio outposts spanning the 107 miles across Norton Sound in 1904, “where 
ordinary cables fail in important points owing to climatic conditions.” 68
 Private enterprises played a large role in U.S. endeavors.  The Spanish-American 
War ultimately gave the United States actual colonial possessions in Puerto Rico and 
the Philippines, and a protectorate in Cuba.  American expansion continued with the 
annexation of Hawaii in 1899 and the subsequent acquisition of Midway, Wake, Guam, 
and American Samoa.  But colonial imperialism as carried out by European powers in 
Africa was losing popularity.
 
69
 
  In response, the U.S. government turned to a model of 
economic expansionism and dominance—a sort of informal empire. 
Latin America 
 Top U.S. government officials promoted American private business abroad as a 
method to achieve greater hegemony over areas it decided to exploit, especially in Latin 
America.70  Radio was one component of this strategy.  In 1901 a subsidiary of United 
States Rubber Company—Amazon Wireless Telephone and Telegraph Company—
commenced wireless operations in the Amazon basin of Brazil.  Using Fessenden-
designed apparatuses, the company expanded deeper into the dense-forested inland to 
obtain new rubber sources.71  In 1902 the Ward Line, a steamship company, brought De 
Forest equipment to Havana, Cuba, in order to establish a station there.72
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later the station was in prefect operating order.  The following year the American 
military established a station at its newly established military base at Guantanamo 
Bay.73
 The United Fruit Company ran the most successful of the American commercial 
radiotelegraphy operations.  In 1903 it established a wireless network using De Forest 
equipment that included stations at Port Limón, Costa Rica, and Bocas del Toro, 
Panama. They soon thereafter established other stations in Colón and Panama City, 
Panama.  By 1913 United Fruit had equipped its “Great White Fleet” of passenger 
steamships in addition to expanding its land stations.  Throughout United Fruit’s 
endeavors in wireless, it possessed the firm backing of the U.S. government, including 
the navy.
   
74  Sometime around 1906, American mining interests also started using radio 
apparatuses in Latin America, especially in Mexico.75
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  These businesses used wireless 
outposts for communications in their mines, but also to talk with their parent companies 
in the United States.  Most of these stations operated contrary to the policies of the 
Mexican government, failing to register with the SCOP, which Díaz charged with 
providing licenses in order to keep a close eye on private operations and to comply with 
the1906 International Radio Telegraph Convention of Berlin.  Although it was difficult 
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 Across most of Latin America, governments agreed that state consolidation and 
economic advancement rested on attracting investments and exporting commodities.76 
Industrialized empires invested heavily in Latin American infrastructure and public 
works, as an asset in and of itself, but also as a way to gain greater access to a wide 
array of foodstuffs and natural resources.  Oftentimes this led to outright ownership of 
transportation services, agricultural operations, and mines.  However, empires faced 
limitations to their imperial endeavors and their ability to exploit Latin American 
countries.  As historian Tulio Halperín Donghi stated, “Whatever their political and 
economic insufficiencies, the sovereignty of Latin American countries was well 
established, complicating any project of imperial expansion in the region.”77
 Radiotelegraphy was a tool of nation-building and empire building for imperial 
powers, but it was initially used more strictly for internal centralization in Latin 
America countries.  Governments, including in Mexico, used radio to help incorporate 
populations that resisted central control, but this was done within existing political 
boundaries.  Transportation and communication technologies in general provided the 
key to development strategies that allowed Latin American states to establish greater 
control over their political domains.  Goods could be moved faster and military forces 
could more easily react to rebellions.  In turn, foreign governments and local capitalist 
  Local 
elites demanded a share of the benefits and wealth and they demanded respect of their 
nations’ sovereignty.  This was especially true in the Latin American countries with 
larger economies.  
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were more willing to invest their money, helping facilitate a new wave of economic 
growth, and a new era of wealth inequality.78
 By the end of the 1910s radio had affected most Latin American nations.  United 
Fruit dominated the technology throughout Central America and in parts of the 
Caribbean.  The Colombian government allowed the Central and South American 
Company, a U.S. entity, to monopolize wire and wireless communications between 
Colombia and Panama.  In Venezuela, representatives from France, Britain, and the 
United States jockeyed for influence in cable and wireless communications.  The 
Venezuelan government did concede to some private concessions but ran its own radio 
stations off the coast by 1912.  The British governments established wireless offices in 
their positions.  Specialists established stations in Trinidad and Tobago in 1906 and in 
Trinidad and British Guiana shortly thereafter.  Jamaica had a fully operational office 
by 1913.  United Fruit built a station, with permission from British officials, in British 
Honduras.
  Radio was not usually the most important 
of these technologies.  Railroads and telegraphs played more dominant roles.  But radio 
proved useful to imperial resource-extraction projects that occurred in parts of South 
and Central America where there was little infrastructural development and where 
building telegraphs would be difficult and costly.  In other countries, including Mexico, 
government officials had shifted towards a more nationalistic position and kept a firmer 
control over wireless services, using them for their own state-expansion projects.  
79
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 Of course, progress in wireless communications differed in Latin America 
according to the circumstances and decisions of the members of each nation.  
Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico, and Uruguay led the way in radio development, and 
they were the first Latin American countries in which European and American radio 
businesses established commerce.  In 1901, for example, the German electric company 
AEG put serious effort in courting officials from these countries, displaying their wares 
to their representatives.80  It was also these countries that represented Latin America at 
the 1906 International Radio Telegraph Convention of Berlin.81
 Argentine experimenters and government officials, meanwhile, delved into radio 
development quickly and enthusiastically.  They interacted with both Marconi and 
Telefunken.  The Argentine Postal Service enforced laws about radio, but private 
foreign firms maintained the services.  Argentina possessed its own gifted wireless 
enthusiasts as well.  Physicist Teobaldo Ricaldini began replicating Marconi’s work as 
early as 1896, and in 1898 he designed the radiotelegraphy station at Dársena Norta 
near Buenos Aires.  Argentine experimenter Federico N. del Ponte performed spark 
transmitter experiments as early as 1902.
 
82  Marconi began operations in Argentina the 
same year.83
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Marconi sent George Monroe to complete that very task.84  The Marconi Company also 
sent engineer Edgar Berry to oversee the construction of a powerful station at Bernal, 
near Buenos Aires.  He additionally installed the first wireless station in neighboring 
Uruguay, initiating commercial radio services between the two countries.  AEG had 
also been selling equipment—with the approval of the nation’s Department of Letters 
and Telegraphs—in Argentina since at least 1904.85
 In Brazil government leaders tended to focus their plans for wireless development 
on the coasts and with sea vessels, allowing foreign industries to have greater control 
over service in the interior.  American and French companies each possessed radio 
operations in the country during the early 1900s.  U.S. Rubber’s subsidiary Amazon 
Wireless began radio experiments in the Amazon basin in 1901 and received an official 
concession for radio communications from the governor of the state of Amazonas the 
following year.  A government commission in 1905, however, ruled against Amazon 
Wireless’s operations, especially its interstate transmissions, but U.S. businesses 
continued in disobedience of the Brazilian government.  Undeterred, a French 
communications company applied for a radio concession to establish a link between the 
city of Pará and French Guiana the same year.  It was not approved, however, until 
1907.  Meanwhile the Brazilian government pursued its own plans for radiotelegraphy.  
In 1904 Brazilian communications officials established their own wireless stations that 
connected Rio de Janeiro with Grande Island 70 miles away.  They also started to 
  They established their own 
subsidiary in Buenos Aires to compete in the country’s shipping business. 
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incorporate radio services into their navy.86  But state officials appear to have focused 
on cable telegraphy for developing communications in the Amazon, a practice that 
some Brazilian critics later attacked as less practical and more costly than building radio 
stations.87
 In Mexico, wireless communications were predominately a matter of the state. 
Unlike other public transportation and communication works where foreign investors 
operated the services, government telegraphers ran most of the first radio stations.  
Mexican communications and military leaders bought the equipment abroad, mostly 
from Germany, and had German engineers train Mexican operators.  But Mexicans ran 
the stations upon their construction.  Even though some U.S. mining interests brought 
radio equipment into Mexico, federal telegraphers ran the main wireless operations, 
including in the port of Veracruz, on both sides of the Gulf of California, and in the 
Mexican frontier with British Honduras, or present-day Belize.   
 
 
Conclusion: The First Decade of Wireless Expansion 
 Looking back at the first decade of applied radio technology, promoters and 
innovators could already claim many advances.  The medium had gone from a handful 
of experiments in university labs and attics to a viable global system of 
communications.  Despite lingering problems with reception and transmission, many of 
the most advanced navies had successfully incorporated devices and the first 
experiments with wireless in warfare had already occurred in Africa and Asia.  The 
medium had helped empires to grow and consolidate their control over vast regions 
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while simultaneously expanding trade capabilities and maritime safety.  But this new 
tool, which promised to link the world and build new partnerships, also intensified 
divisions.  The English, Germans, and Americans became especially competitive over 
who controlled wireless development.  The English, French, Russians, and Japanese had 
all used radio in combat, showing the medium’s dark side.  Indeed, while wireless 
improved general communications and useful postal services in a number of the places 
that technicians built facilities, state and corporate forces used the technology to 
reinforce their power over others.  
 At the same time, or at least by 1900, Latin American nations had also started to 
incorporate the technology for what were essentially the same reasons: increased trade 
capabilities, control over territory, and the suppression of autonomist groups.  In this 
case, nation and empire building mirrored each other.  As with other technologies, the 
embrace of radio also represented an attempt by Latin American leaders to exhibit the 
power and potential of their respective countries as they strove to push their way into a 
more important role in the global community.  Wireless communications during the 
1890s and the first decade of the 1900s aided imperial ambitions, but they were also 
important to nation formation in Latin America.  The presence of Argentina, Brazil, 
Chile, Mexico, and Uruguay at the 1906 International Radio Telegraph Convention in 
Berlin, and their use of radio communications itself, symbolized the importance of these 
growing nations to the world economy.  It was one of a number of ways—including  
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developments in electricity, medicine, sanitation, public works, and transportation—in 
which Latin American leaders paraded their countries as upcoming and modern.88
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Chapter Two 
 
Imperial Designs for a Mexican Nation: Wireless in Porfirian Mexico 
 
The effective government of large areas depends to a very 
important extent on the efficiency of communications. 
—Harold Innis1
 
 
 Staring out over the gulf waters off the coast of Veracruz in 1902, the young 
telegrapher Alejandro Gutiérrez dreamed of accomplishing great things.  The government 
had selected him to learn the new science of wireless telegraphy and to head experiments 
with recently acquired devices.  Using German equipment, Gutiérrez had already 
successfully signaled a fellow radio operator on the steamship Melchor Ocampo, a coast 
guard vessel, with great success.  He bragged that he consistently achieved a clear 
reception at distances of “more the than 113 kilometers [70 miles] . . . under bad and 
good atmospheric conditions.”2  Although deservedly proud of his accomplishment, not 
only in distance of transmission, but in communicating with a moving target, Gutiérrez 
and other DGTN and military officials had actually reached a plateau in their 
experiments, which had been underway for over two years.  But despite the hurdle in 
moving beyond the 70-mile mark, he still aspired to connect “Veracruz, Frontera, 
Progreso, Campeche, Tampico, and Túxpan, for the service of the Public 
Administration.”3
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  He genuinely believed in the ability of the technology to expand trade, 
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increase the reach of government, and to facilitate Mexico’s rise into the membership of 
modern nations.   
  Foreign practices and developments greatly influenced Porfirian leaders, 
including perceptions about radio.  But unlike other public works, state officials 
established a stricter monopoly over this new form of communication.  They wanted to 
expand the power of the ruling elite, not the power of outsiders.  Díaz and his advisors 
argued that it was time to assert Mexico’s place as a sovereign and respected nation.  
Noting how European imperial powers incorporated telegrafia sin hilos or TSH to control 
and exploit colonies, Mexican military and communications officials decided to apply the 
technology in similar ways.4
 
  Mexico possessed no provinces outside its own claimed 
political boundaries, but it did have frontier territories that resisted central control and 
others threatened by U.S. usurpation.  With the assistance of German engineers, the first 
large-scale radio projects in Mexico aimed at building stronger federal links with these 
largely autonomous regions.  Although some private enterprises—foreign and 
domestic—used radio in Mexico during this period, state officials with the aid of foreign 
experts drove development.  This government initiative was but one component of the 
complicated but intertwined forces of state expansion, nation building, globalization, and 
modernization underway in Mexico during the last decade of the Porfiriato. 
Learning of Radio: Mexican Ambassadors and Information Abroad 
 The first challenge facing authorities was how to adapt radio, a foreign 
technology, to their own designs.  Ambassadors in Europe first brought news of radio to 
Mexico.  Military officials shortly thereafter began fact-finding missions abroad to 
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examine and acquire wireless devices.  The accounts of these envoys reveal the 
international breadth and high demand of the technology, the motives behind the 
businesses and governments first involved with wireless, and the reasoning behind the 
Mexican government’s decision to purchase its own apparatuses at the turn of the 
twentieth century.  Additionally, a growing interest by Mexican periodicals during the 
last five years of the Porfiriato helped shape public opinion about radio among 
communications officials and urban populations. 
The story of Mexican radio starts in Italy: a fitting location actually, since it was 
the birth place of Guglielmo Marconi.  Italy’s leaders and scientists took pride in the 
inventions of their increasingly famous native son and publishers enthusiastically spread 
word of his innovations.  In 1897 Marconi returned to Rome from England to conduct 
experiments in the palace of the Minister of the Navy and between the shore of Spezia 
and Italian ships of war.  By the latter half of the year, Marconi had successfully 
communicated with the ironclad San Martino at a distance of up to 12 miles.5  By 
October these experiments were “followed by the greatest interest in Italy by royalty, the 
government, the press, and the public.” 6  The widespread publicity about TSH also 
reached the ears of the Mexican consul in Rome, G. A. Esteva.  Recognizing the 
possibilities of the technology and the attention that it was rapidly receiving, Esteva 
relayed information about the new marvel “that interests the entire civilized world” to 
Ignacio Mariscol, the Secretary of Foreign Relations in Mexico.7
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his initial statements by sending back publications and more elaborated opinions on the 
medium’s development.  His first package consisted of an article in the Italian journal 
L’elettricista by the prestigious professor Angelo Banti, which summarized some of 
Marconi’s work.  The piece was likely a part of, or a predecessor to, Banti’s Il telefono 
senza fili sistema Marconi (1897), an illustrated monograph on Marconi and wireless 
telegraphy.8
Consuming information from across the seas, officials gathered opinions about 
radio and sought out possible purchases.  A number of Mexican authorities searched for 
equipment in countries leading the way in wireless experimentation—Great Britain, 
France, Germany, Belgium, Spain, and the United States.
  Mariscol, in turn, disseminated this news to other sectors of the 
administration, including President Porfirio Díaz, Secretary of War and Marine Bernardo 
Reyes, Secretary of Communications and Public Works Francisco Z. Mena, and Camilo 
González, the Director of National Telegraphs. 
9
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telefono senza fili sistema Marconi (Roma: Gli Editori Dell’Elettricistta, 1897). 
 9 G. A. Esteva to the Secretaría de Estado del Despacho de Relaciones Exteriores, Rome to 
Mexico City, 12 April 1899, caja 41-16-5, ARSE; M. Covarrubias to the Secretaría de Estado del 
Despacho de Relaciones Exteriores, Berlin to Mexico City, 10 May 1901, caja 41-16-5, ARSE; 
Experimentation was also occurring in Russia, though Mexico does not appear to have contacted Russia 
as much as the European powers further west. 
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Mexican ambassador in London, began sending Mariscol, Mena, and González 
documents on “the new ‘Marconi’ system of wireless telegraphy.”10
  Interestingly, it was the reports of J. Beuif, the representative in Belgium, which 
initially and most dramatically grabbed the attention of Mexican officials.  Belgium 
officials had quickly reached out to Marconi about his devices.  Soon thereafter they 
started their own experimental trials.  Beuif mailed back numerous letters about radio 
tests and negotiations, in addition to describing accounts of TSH in the European press.  
The ambassador, much like the Belgian royal court, was especially intrigued by the 
medium’s military applications. 
  
 In addition to possessing a strong interest in radio, Belgium’s scheming monarch 
King Leopold II had an interesting connection to Mexico.  His sister, Charlotte of 
Belgium, had married Archduke Maximilian of Austria, the younger brother of Emperor 
Franz Josef, in 1857.  After initiating a hard fought invasion of the country, Napoleon III 
of France made Maximilian the emperor of Mexico in 1864.  Thereafter, Charlotte 
became known as Carlota of Mexico by admirers and detractors alike.  During the 
withdrawal of French forces in 1866, and preceding the subsequent execution of 
Maximilian, Carlota returned to Europe in an attempt to gain support for her husband.  
Following Maximillian’s death and the collapse of the Mexican Empire she remained in 
Europe suffering from a degenerating emotional and mental breakdown.  She lived insane 
and largely kept out of public view until her death in 1927.  
In 1900 King Leopold II had been engaged in a “philanthropic” colonization 
project in the African Congo.  Although according to Beuif, Belgium was a country “not 
                                                             
 10 Adolfo Brule to the Señor Ministro de Relaciones Exteriores, London to Mexico City, 9 Nov. 
1898, caja 41-16-5, ARSE. 
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disposed towards war,” Leopold’s imperial endeavors—even if paraded as a project of 
goodwill—were built on exploitation and genocide, a violent imperialist endeavor based 
on ideas of racial and cultural superiority.11  Like many other European “civilizing” and 
economic projects of the era, this mission was also about modernization.  It utilized 
newly developed technologies including railroads, machine guns, and electronic 
communications.12
King Leopold II, whose boundless greed had generated an interest in matters of 
geography, economics, and technology, quickly perceived the potential of Marconi’s 
ethereal telegraph.  In April 1900, while the monarch’s forces were suppressing a 
prolonged rebellion in the Congo, Leopold invited Marconi to the Royal Palace in 
Brussels to exhibit his new wares.  The king was especially interested in the medium’s 
combat applications.  In addition to foreign ambassadors, including the Mexican envoy, 
the guests largely included military engineers.  Indeed, the Belgium armed forces, like 
those in England, France, Germany, and Russia, had already been experimenting with 
radio.
  These tools made possible the suppression of local populations while 
extracting ivory and other valuable commodities.  
13
                                                             
 11 J. Beuif to Secretario de Relaciones Exteriores, Brussels to Mexico City, 1 Jun. 1900, caja 41-
16-5, ASRE. 
  Befriending the Belgium general who headed the telegraph division, the 
ambassador collected data on the applications of radio in the armed forces.  According to 
 12 “Wireless Telegraphy for Africa,” The Central African Times, 7 Mar. 1902, 4; “‘Wireless’ West 
Africa,” The Sierra Leone Weekly News, 5 Apr. 1902, 7. For more on King Leopold II and the Congo, see 
Adam Hochschild, King Leopold’s Ghost: A Story of Greed, Terror, and Heroism in Colonial Africa 
(New York: First Mariner Books, 1999). 
 13 “Tesla’s Torpedoes, The Beira Post (Beira, Mozambique), 15 Feb. 1899, 4; “Important News. 
Boers Getting Excited,” Mafeking Mail and Protectorate Guardian (Mafeking, South Africa), 30 Sept. 
1899,  3; “Navies of the World,” New York Times, 3 Sept. 1901, 8. 
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Beuif, Mexico too possessed “talented Military engineers and telegraphers that could take 
advantage of the new referred to advancements.”14
Reyes wasted no time in obtaining wireless equipment.  In 1901 he sent a small 
delegation to Europe, under the leadership of Colonel Ignacio Altamira, to seek out 
information and a good price on apparatuses.  Belgium and Spanish radio experiments—
the latter was first reported to Mexico vis-à-vis Belgium—initially interested Mexican 
army officials the most, though they also communicated with French and German 
representatives.  Over the next five years, Altamira toured Europe and the United States 
searching out new information.  Reyes himself became more involved in obtaining 
equipment.  In fact, he played an important role in sealing a partnership between the Díaz 
government and AEG, the German electric company that supplied the equipment and 
expertise for many of Mexico’s first radio stations.  Indeed, this partnership remained 
strong for two decades.  Reyes hoped to use wireless technology to increase the power of 
the Mexican state and his military expeditions in places including southwest Yucatán.
  Reyes and Mena agreed.  
15
Other ambassadors in Europe continued to send back reports.  They not only 
provided information to government and military leaders about new developments and 
uses for radio, but also on how foreign powers were applying policies and legislation on 
TSH.  For example, in 1904 the consul in Britain sent information regarding British laws 
that aimed to bring about more state regulation of radio operations, especially in case of 
war.  Espionage and the transnational nature of wireless worried many British officials 
  
                                                             
 14 J. Beuif to Secretario de Relaciones Exteriores, Brussels to Mexico City, 1 Jun. 1900, caja 41-
16-5, ARSE; J. Beuif to Secretario de Relaciones Exteriores, Brussels to Mexico City, 8 Apr. 1900, caja 
41-16-5, ARSE. 
 15 Bernardo Reyes to the Secretario de Relaciones Exteriores, 1 Aug. 1901, Mexico City, caja 41-
6-5, ARSE; M. Covarrubias to the Secretario de Relaciones Exteriores, Berlin to Mexico City, 10 May 
1901, caja 41-16-5, ARSE. 
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and their turn toward a statist approach influenced Mexican leaders.16  News of state-
directed stations in France also influenced public opinion in urban Mexico.17
Starting in 1904, news about American-made wireless equipment became more 
prevalent.  Coronel Altamira reported on U.S. radios that could transmit successfully at a 
distance of 50 miles.  The following year, Andrew Plecher, a U.S. businessman, 
approached the Mexican consulate in Los Angeles with a proposal to establish a wireless 
system between Sinaloa and the Southern District of the Territory of Baja California.  
The consul dutifully relayed the information, though the Díaz administration had no 
desire for an American-controlled radio system, especially in that part of the country 
where U.S. influences were particularly strong.  The Díaz regime was selective in its 
providers of radio devices, and it was Mexican ambassadors and military officials abroad 
who provided the administration with information on what was available and how other 
governments and businesses used the technology. 
 
 
Internalizing Empire 
In the 1890s the government prided itself on the increased rate of material 
development in the country.  Mena received the country’s first wireless devices in the 
summer of 1899, one of a number of new electric technologies arriving in Mexico.18
                                                             
 16 Mexican consul in Great Britain to the Secretario de Relaciones Exteriores, 1 Jul. 1904, London 
to Mexico City, caja 41-6-5, ARSE. 
  
Electricity, still fairly novel itself, had become more prevalent in the largest population 
 17 “La telegrafía sin hilos: Monopolio del gobierno francés,” El Mundo, 16 Aug. 1906, 2.  
 18 Francisco Z. Mena, Memoria…por el Secretario Comunicaciones y Obras Públicas . . . 1 Jul. 
1900 a 30 Jun. 1901, (Mexico City: Tipografía de Dirección General de Telégrafos, 1902), 169-70. Other 
authors have stated that the first radio equipment arrived in 1900 or 1901. I selected the 1899 date 
because Mena in this Memoria specifically states that he received the devices at the beginning of the 
previous fiscal year, which would have been the summer of 1899. His statements in the remainder of the 
Memoria suggests he understood well how the fiscal-year system worked.  
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centers.  Electric lines, like humming spider webs, began to crisscross the air above 
important thoroughfares.  From 1887 to 1911 more than one hundred light and power 
companies registered in Mexico.  These operations relied on small thermal power plants 
and dynamos, at least until hydroelectric plants began supplying urban areas starting in 
1906.19  Telephone service had expanded too but was still relatively rare, especially in 
rural areas.  The French Lumière brothers had brought cinema to the country in 1896, and 
shortly thereafter began filming Mexican movies.  Representatives of the American 
inventor and businessman Thomas Edison introduced his Vitascope, another moving 
picture device, the same year.  Edison’s movies were made in the United States, but many 
of the Lumière films, like those made by Enrique Moulinié y Churrich, a French radical 
living in Mexico, and Mexican filmmaker Agustín Jiménez, made films about daily life 
across the country, the travels and political life of Porfirio Díaz, and regional cultural 
practices.  For example, Moulinié y Churrich made a brief recording of a performance by 
the nation’s star torero or bull fighter Ponciano Díaz in Puebla in 1897.  Many of these 
and the subsequent films during the Porfiriato possessed themes or provided news that 
strove to build a Mexican national identity.20
Elite members of urban society usually saw these technological developments in a 
positive light.  A number of journals and magazines praised the increased mileage of 
railroad tracks, telegraph and electric lines, and associated goods.  The editors of El 
  Along with phonographs, typewriters, cars, 
and railroads, radio added to a developing mental and physical landscape that 
increasingly included modern technologies.  
                                                             
 19 Elio Agustín Martínez Miranda and María de la Paz Ramos Lara, “Funciones de los ingenieros 
inspectores al comienzo de las obras del complejo hidroeléctrico de Necaxa,” Historia Mexicana 56, no. 
1 (Jul.-Sept. 2006): 231-86. 
 20 Aurelio de los Reyes, Medio siglo de cine mexicano (1896-1947) (Mexico City: Editorial 
Trillas, 1987), 8-50. 
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Mundo, El Mundo Semanario Ilustrado, La Revista Moderna, and El Cronista de México 
published articles relating material progress to the establishment and maintenance of 
peace and stability, even while railroad development was causing strife in the countryside 
for many people.  Yet some criticism existed, mostly ardent nationalists who resented the 
growing influence and presence of foreigners, especially Americans.  Many Porfirian 
intellectuals and government leaders, however, believed that exhibiting Mexico’s 
modernity in big public displays at home and in international exhibitions helped increase 
the nation’s status abroad, and in turn, the likelihood of increased investment, and that 
this was a good thing. 21
 Popular perspectives tended to be more critical and reactive.  Some illustrations, 
including a number of images by the profuse artist José Guadalupe Posada, and 
coinciding broadsheets by Antonio Vanegas Arroyo, often cynically joked about the 
middle-class and elite urbanites who took up bicycling, seeing it at as a foreign and 
passing phase.  Posada’s work also explicitly demonstrates the fear and critical beliefs 
circulating about electric trolleys, which started operating in Mexico City in 1900, and 
even electricity in and of itself.  People held suspicions about the mysterious force that 
moved the streetcars, “the invisible colossus that powers them, which shows itself only 
with sparks and crackles . . .” Similar concerns developed among many who first 
encountered radio.  Not understanding the science, many feared the devil’s work.  Of 
course, the fact the trolleys ran over hundreds of people in their first years of operation 
  
                                                             
 21 Matthews, “De Viaje”: 251-89; Beezley, Judas at the the Jockey Club, 16; Tenorio-Trillo, 
Mexico at the World’s Fairs, 19, 37. 
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did not help relieve criticism.  But as the years passed, electricity became a generally 
accepted norm in parts of Mexico City, if less so in the vast countryside.22
The rise of electricity had other more subtle but important material effects as well. 
The dramatic increase in electricity in the 1890s, especially in more industrialized 
nations, allowed for more efficient production of a wide array of substances and 
manufactured goods.  In the United States, factory workers used electricity to separate 
chlorine and sodium from salt and brine.  Manufacturers used the chlorine, combined 
with lime, to make bleaching powder for paper and textiles.  Sodium figured into the 
creation of caustic soda, used in soaps and an assortment of other goods.  Electrified 
machines and motors made industrial fabrication more rapid and efficient, leading to the 
improved production of iron, brass, copper, glass, porcelain, rubber products, asbestos, 
and mica.  The increase in the number, quality, and variety of goods had a subsequent 
impact on Mexico as Americans and Europeans increasingly sought to sell their products 
abroad.
  
23
Many of these goods came to Mexico through the port of Veracruz.  As a result, 
the city made a fitting entry point for wireless equipment.  In addition to being the main 
hub for foreign trade, it had become a focal point of Porfirian progress and modernity. 
Steamships slowly traversed the murky waters.  Sweaty-browed dock workers unloaded 
foreign products from boats, placing the goods on trains bound for the capital.  SCOP 
employees had also been at work in the port.  These federal agents had devoted 
considerable time improving trade and communications facilities over the past decade.  
Radio was their newest tool.  
   
                                                             
 22 Patrick Frank, Posada’s Broadsheets: Mexican Popular Imagery, 1890-1910 (Albuquerque: 
University of New Mexico Press, 1998), 187-91.  
 23 Elihu Thomas, “Electrical Advances in the Past Ten Years,” Forum, Jan. 1898, 527-40, APS.  
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With the new wireless machines now in hand, Mena fixed his sights on lofty 
goals.  Above all, he, like the younger Gutiérrez, imagined connecting the growing ports 
of the country and directing ships in the Gulf; he envisioned increasing Mexico’s national 
power.  The general had kept abreast with radio developments in Europe.  In addition to 
memos derived from embassies, he read about Marconi and other innovative 
entrepreneurs making newspaper headlines.  After much difficulty, Mena had imported 
equipment from the French inventor Edouard Ducretet, the renowned wireless pioneer.  
Operating out of his Paris laboratory, “equipped with a mast seventy-five feet high above 
the roof,” Ducretet had started his commercial endeavors in 1898.24
His radios, however, failed to live up to the general’s expectations.  Experiments 
with the instruments started when Mena and González ordered the formation of a 
technical group, which began trials along the coast near the city of Veracruz in 1900.  
With frequent shipping traffic, the port was a logical place to set up the first operations.  
The devices worked satisfactorily at a distance of about 1000 feet.  The transmissions, 
however, became more difficult to comprehend when further separated, and they failed 
altogether past 4 miles.  These results shattered Mena’s dreams of communicating with 
places like Campeche from Veracruz, or for that matter, even with ships at sea.
  Based on the designs 
of another technological trailblazer, Russian scientist Alexander S. Popov, Ducretet’s 
newest contraptions were already in demand. 
25
                                                             
24 “Wireless Telegraphy,” Los Angeles Times, 25 Dec. 1898, A5; John I. Waterbury, “The 
International Preliminary Conference to Formulate Regulation Governing Wireless Telegraphy,” The 
North American Review 177, no. 564 (Nov. 1903), 656, APS; “Six Great Pioneers of Wireless,” EBU 
Technical Review (Spring 1995), 90-92, 
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25 Francisco Z. Mena, Memoria por . . . el Secretario de Estado y del Despacho Comunicaciones 
y Obras Públicas, 1 Jul. 1900-Jun. 1901 (Mexico City: Tipografía de la Dirección de Telégrafos, 1902), 
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 Mena contended that he had the solution to the problem: he needed better 
equipment.  And according to most specialists, that meant radios from the Marconi 
Company of England.  Mena explained to congress that it had been a mistake to buy from 
Ducretet.  Marconi’s appliances were proven to be more reliable and powerful.  Mena 
continued that the English apparatuses could transmit 12.5 miles over land and almost 95 
miles over the sea.  But as other SCOP employees reported, Marconi’s equipment could 
not actually send messages at these distances, at least not reliably.26  Still, many officials 
agreed that the English products would considerably best the 6 kilometers (3.7 miles) of 
Ducretet’s machines.  But these hopes too ended in failure.  The talks between state 
leaders and Marconi broke down over a dispute about policies and costs.27
Consequently, the undauntable Mena focused his attention on inventors in 
Mexico.  This time he approached V. Sauvade, an inventor and French national who had 
lived in Mexico for some time.  Not only did Sauvade provide new radio equipment—
which he invented himself—he also came along to assist in the operation of the devices 
and to educate telegraphers, especially Alejandro Gutiérrez, on how to use them.  SCOP 
employees additionally continued to work with the Ducretet products, including a Popov-
Ducretet radiotelephone that they had acquired.  This latter group transmitted messages 
regularly along the coast of Veracruz between Hornos and the Isla de Sacrificios, a 
distance of 2.5 miles.
 
28
                                                             
26 Carlos Merchan Escalante, Telecomunicaciones (Mexico City: Secretaría de Comunicaciones 
y Transportes, 1988), 51. 
 
27 Francisco Z. Mena, Memoria . . .  por el Secretario de Estado y del Despacho 
Comunicaciones y Obras Publicas, 1 Jul. 1901-Jun. 1902 (Mexico City: Tipografía de la Dirección de 
Telégrafos, 1903),  205. 
28 Ibid; “La telegrafía y telefonía sin hilos,” Industria é Invenciones (Barcelona), 16 Jan. 1904,  
8-9; “La telegrafía sin hilos,” El Mundo, 1 Apr. 1902,  1. 
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Mena was most impressed, however, by the Sauvade equipment.  SCOP officials 
conducted a number of experiments in 1901 and 1902 with these radios in the port of 
Veracruz and between Boca del Rio and the Isla de Sacrificios (5.6 miles).  They 
continued with trials between Boca del Rio and Isla de Enmedio (12.5 miles), 
Santiaguillo and Boca del Rio (18.5 miles), and the Fortaleza de Ulúa and Santiaguillo 
(23 miles), all with consistent clarity.  They also made successful transmissions from the 
Fortaleza de Ulúa to the guardafaro or coast guard vessel Donato Guerra, which was 
moving at 20 kilometers per hour at a distance of 70 miles, thus the experiment began the 
use of TSH for communication with government ships. 29
 President Díaz’s personal offices additionally became involved in radio.  Towards 
the end of 1900, Reyes, on behalf of President Díaz, asked Treasurer José Yves 
Limantour to release 40.24 pesos to buy parts necessary to build another experimental 
TSH machine.
  Mexican officials, like their 
Italian, British, German, Russian, and American counterparts, hoped to modernize 
communications in their navy, even if Mexico’s flotillas paled in size and strength.   
30  Under the charge of Dr. Roberto Jofre, a prestigious medical doctor, 
radio tests began between Díaz’s residency of Chapultepec and the National Palace.31
                                                             
29 Mena, Memoria . . . 1901- 1902, 205. 
  It 
was in that December that Jofre and a crew of assistants sent what they had thought to be 
the first radio message in Mexico.  In honor of the president, it stated a simple and 
30 The value in U.S. dollars would be approximately half the number in pesos. 
31 Bernardo Reyes al Secretario de Haciendo, Memoria . . . por el Secretario de Estado del 
Despacho de Guerra y Marina, 1 enero 1900 al 30 Junio 1901, Tomo 1 (Mexico City: Tipografía de la 
Oficina Impresora de Estampillas, 1901),  323; “Continuaciones de ‘el estudio’,” no. 1, Anales de 
Instituto Médico Nacional (Mexico City: Oficina Tipográfica de la Secretaría de Fomento, 1894),  2; 
Ornelas Herrera, ¨Radio y contidianidad en México,”  128. Ornelas Herrera argues that this was the first 
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historically relevant message: “congratulations on your sixth reelection.”32
 As the Chapultepec experiment indicates, corresponding with sea vessels and 
between ports were not the only designs for wireless communications.   More than 
anything else, SCOP and military personnel used this technology in attempts to connect 
and control Mexico’s frontiers.  They wanted to combat previous failures to bring fringe 
regions within Mexico’s political boundaries under the control of the central government.  
This lack of control presented a number of problems for the Díaz administration.   For 
one, these territories had resources that were either underdeveloped or in foreign hands.  
These same areas possessed local populations who promoted independence or failed to 
recognize Mexican authority.  And finally, the border regions in the north remained 
threatened by an expansive United States, whose population, economy, and ambition 
appeared insatiable.  
  Using 
another modern technology, photography, they took a picture of one of the devices and 
the group who helped make the experiment a success.  But it was SCOP officials, 
especially within the DGTN, who drove the development of radio operations.   
 In Mexico, as with most other countries, radio applications built on previous 
designs for cable communications.  As mentioned in the introduction, Juan de a Granje, a 
Mexican merchant of Spanish origins, introduced wire telegraphy to Mexico in 1849.  
The construction of the first telegraph line, starting out of Veracruz, began in 1851.  As 
early as 1847, the year after the United States took approximately half of Mexico’s 
territory, President José Joaquín Herrera strove to establish a climate of security for 
Mexico, undoubtedly a daunting task.  Telegraphy featured into his and subsequent 
                                                             
32 Photo of the first radio experiment in Mexico, December 1900, Colección Fotografía Familiar, 
Acervos Históricos, la Universidad Iberoamericana, Mexico City, further stated as AHI; Although Díaz’s 
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governments’ national security plans.  The first wire telegraphy operations took place 
between Veracruz and Mexico City and then between Mexico City and Orizaba, but plans 
to increase telegraph lines to the frontier territories were in the works during the 1850s 
and 1860s.   
 Although the number of these cables grew during the governments of Benito 
Juárez and Sebastián Lerdo de Tejada, construction of telegraph lines expanded at a much 
greater rate under the Díaz administration.  By the late 1870s cables for Morse-code 
transmissions connected the Pacific and Atlantic coasts.  In fact, by the height of the 
Porfiriato, telegraphy had become an indispensable tool for large businesses, the 
government, and the military.  In the 1880s and 1890s, state agents expanded telegraphic 
operations in the northern and southern frontiers to thwart or at least better respond to 
internal rebellions and filibusters from “expansionist gringos.”33  General Mena, who 
worked to bring TSH to Mexico, played an important role in the development of this 
preceding form of electronic communication.  Although largely owned by U.S. 
businesses during the Porfiriato, government leaders used—or at least wanted to use— 
these lines to deter foreign filibusters from establishing  independent “republics,” internal 
rebellions, and attacks from Kiowas and Comanches who raided from the United States.  
Mexican military officials in the northern frontier pressed the Díaz administration to 
increase communications, arguing that a “lack of communication makes government 
action difficult and allows for the frequent cases of banditry and foreign invasions…that 
cause grave dangers of international foment.” 34
                                                             
33 Noyola, La raza de la hierba, 19, 24-25, 56-57, 66. 
  Similar statements could have been said 
for the area around the southern border as well. 
34 A jefe militar quoted in Noyola, La raza de la hierba, 65-66.  
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But the construction of telegraph lines in the nation’s hinterlands proved 
problematic.  Not only were they farther away from main centers of capital, resources, 
and the federal government, the environment made the construction and maintenance of 
telegraph lines costly and extremely difficult.  In the case of Baja California, the Gulf of 
California separated the territory from mainland Mexico except for a narrow, remote, and 
inhospitable strip of the Sonoran desert.  This arid and sparsely populated environment 
hindered telegraph construction and an attempt to lay a submarine cable across the Gulf, 
for some undeclared reason, had failed as well.35  State officials believed radio would 
remedy the communications situation.  Although originally pitched to imperial powers in 
need of a more efficient connection remote colonies, Ducretet and Marconi originally 
emphasized this exact point.  As Marconi stated in 1898, TSH’s “main value will lie in its 
use in places which have not before been practicable for telegraphic communication, 
where, in fact, wires were an impossibility.”36
The Gulf of California project matured under the direction of engineer Leandro D. 
Fernández, who replaced Mena as the head of SCOP in 1902.  Fernández and his family 
came from a prestigious Durango family that thrived during the Porfiriato.  Like his 
siblings, he was born on his family’s hacienda, San Diego Mancha.  Prior to becoming 
Secretary of Communications and Public Works, he had served as governor of Durango 
from 1897 to 1900.  His brother, Estaban Fernández, followed in his footsteps, ruling as 
  Like the stations built at the Isle of Wight 
and each side of the English Channel, Mexican officials could use radio to cross a 
relatively narrow body of water in order to establish important communication links.  
                                                             
35 Leandro Fernández, Memoria . . . por el Secretario de Estado y del Despacho de 
Comunicaciones y Obras Publicas . . . 1 de julio de 1902 a 30 a junio de 1903 (Mexico City: Tipografía 
de la Dirección General de Telégrafos, 1904), 244. 
36 “Marconi’s Telegraphy,” New York Times, 23 Jan. 1898, IWM 3; “Wireless Telegraphy,” Los 
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the state’s chief executive from 1904 to 1908.  His other siblings helped manage their 
extensive properties.37  But Leandro, unlike his family members, was also a scientist.  
Indeed, before and after his stint at the SCOP he enjoyed a distinguished academic career.  
As a cabinet member he worked hard at expanding Mexico’s infrastructure and was an 
enthusiastic supporter of radio.  The continued success of the early experimental 
transmissions in Veracruz convinced Fernández to move forward with the construction of 
permanent public and military stations to unite the less developed provinces with the core 
of the nation.  He had the perfect first project in mind.38
Fernández’s plan was to create a reliable means of communication across the Gulf 
of California that separated the two districts of the Territory of Baja California from 
mainland Mexico.  The distance across this body of water was far less than that between 
the major ports along the Gulf of Mexico, a fact that made the project much more 
feasible.  And though Baja California had historically had a relatively small population—
the 1900 census estimated the population of the entire peninsula at only 47,082 people—
the region had increasingly become important to trade in the Pacific, especially with the 
United States, and as a center for mining.
 
39
Economic development was a key driving factor in the advancement of 
communications between the mainland and the peninsula.  Gold, silver, and copper had 
enticed a number of Mexicans and foreigners into mineral extraction endeavors in the 
area during the last half of the 1800s.  In turn, some of these enterprises became major 
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developers.  The mining company El Boleo, for example, possessed a small fleet of ships 
and put substantial resources into fostering growth in the peninsula.  Their employees 
largely built the townsite of Santa Rosalia shortly after Frenchman C. A. la Forgue 
founded the outfit in 1885.  Backed with substantial capital from the Rothschild family in 
Europe, El Boleo became one of three largest foreign-financed mining companies in 
Mexico and a major economic power on the peninsula.  They extracted hundreds of 
thousands of tons of copper each year out of lower Baja California.  They exported much 
of this metal but sold some domestically to be used in things like wires for telegraph 
lines.40
Powerful political reasons also existed for building the first radio stations in Baja 
California and Sonora.  Internal revolts rocked the region in the 1850s.  In the same 
decade, foreign filibusters, driven by the successful U.S. land grabs of Mexican territory 
during the Texas Revolution and its subsequent annexation into the United States (1835-
36, 1845), the Bear Flag Revolt in Alta California (1846), and the Mexican-American 
War (1846-48), invaded both Sonora and Baja California in the 1850s.  Most famous of 
these adventurers was William Walker, who after failing to successfully establish the 
“Republic of Lower California,” took power in Nicaragua in 1856.  Similar plots cropped 
up in the 1880s and 1890s and continued into the twentieth century.
  El Boleo additionally played a large role in the construction of the first radio 
station in Baja California, which they used to their financial advantage.  
41
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the Mexican-American War consistently failed, but the policies of Díaz and previous 
administrations had allowed northern Baja California and Sonora to become well within 
the economic orbit of the United States vis-à-vis capital, railroads, and telegraphs.  Díaz 
dangerously planned to gain from this infusion of American money and technology while 
providing increased training for Mexican specialists.  To balance the swelling presence of 
foreigners, he created stronger communications links between central Mexico and the 
northwest, an arrangement that he hoped would help hold these more autonomous regions 
and eventually bring them under stronger federal control. 
Under the direction of Fernández, González, and Enrique Schöndube—AEG’s 
main radio representative in Mexico—work on the Gulf of California radio stations began 
in 1902.  Schöndube had previously worked with the Porfirian government on a number 
of projects involving electricity, and he knew Díaz personally.  Along with two other 
German engineers, Schöndube surveyed the area for the best place to build the stations.  
The original idea was to construct one radio outpost on the Vigía Hill just north of the 
town of Guaymas, Sonora, and the second directly across the gulf in the coastal town of 
Santa Rosalía, Southern District of Baja California.  But following the German engineers’ 
initial survey they abandoned the Vigía site after concluding that the mountainous terrain 
would interfere with radio signals.  Instead, they selected a high point near the light house 
at Cabo Haro, which resided along the shore.  The Santa Rosalía site proved to be a good 
original choice and construction began at both places in December of 1902.  The projects 
did not take long to complete.  El Boleo and government employees finished the Baja 
California station on January 31, 1903.  The operation on the other side of the sea was 
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completed on February 6.42  After hiring telegraphers Luis Sánchez Martinez, Raymundo 
Sardaneta, Juan José Flores Treviño, and Pedro N. Cota to study radio and to operate the 
stations, the two posts exchanged their first “marconigramas” on February 16.43  
Communications officials additionally ordered the construction of cables to connect the 
Sonoran radio station to central Mexico via wire telegraph, which workers completed 
over the following year.44  The radio stations ultimately accelerated a wave of 
construction of all available means of modern communication in the area.45
Unlike previous experiments, these stations were open to the public.  The 
government wanted businesses and residents to communicate with mainland Mexico.  
The government also charged for the service, recouping some of the thousands of pesos 
they had sunk into the adventure.  According to one 1906 newspaper article, the cost to 
use the radio stations was the same as the other telegraphic operations underway in 
western Mexico: “one peso for the first ten words and ten centavos for each additional 
word.”
                     
46
To the great excitement of Fernández, the stations worked well at first, though 
problems arose shortly thereafter.  Radio equipment at the turn of the twentieth century 
was not consistently reliable.  In addition, most Mexican telegraphers had little real 
experience with the technology and largely learned on the job.  Fernández admitted to 
congress that that government’s communications officials still lacked mastery of the 
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“theories and practices” of radio.47  The first years of experiments, however, had taught 
officials a few things, mainly that atmospheric interference, despite technological 
improvements, occurred frequently from July to September when the rain and heat was 
most intense.48
Although problems persisted, the stations worked well enough to entice 
Fernández to order the construction of further works.  In 1906, a pivotal year in terms of 
radio development, the same communications officials and German specialists continued 
to expand operations in the areas around the Gulf of California.  This time they aimed at 
connecting the port of Mazatlán, Sinaloa—interestingly enough, home to an increasingly 
powerful German community—to the telegraphic offices in the Southern District of Baja 
California.
  
49  The engineers decided to erect the outposts at Cerritos, north of Mazatlán 
and next to the city of San José del Cabo.  Once again, overland cables connected both 
stations to other telegraph offices in their respective states and into the federal system.  
These outposts took two years to construct and were not completely finished until April 
of 1908.50
In 1905, the year before the Mazatlán-San José del Cabo project got underway, 
Fernandez’s offices had started the construction of radio stations in another provincial 
territory: Quintana Roo.  For these operations they chose the small and newly established 
town of Payo Obispo (present-day Chetumal), which had a population of 1,500 in 1906, 
and the also recently constructed naval port of Xcalak.  Like the previous stations, SCOP 
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officials used German equipment, though now from AEG’s successor company—
Telefunken.51  The receptor, however, possessed an older cohesor that did not live up to 
expectations.  Along with the naval facilities, the stations stood out in their rural tropical 
environment.  The Quintana Roo stations possessed antennas “consisting of 36 lines in 
the form of umbrellas suspended from a tower of iron twenty-seven meters tall.”52
Separated by the Bay of Chetumal, the two stations lay only 37 miles apart, a 
reality that made their construction a very workable proposition.  Multiple other reasons 
existed for building these stations.  Like Baja California, residents in the area had evaded 
the control of the central government.  The region was little developed and government 
officials saw radio as a convenient way to start incorporating the southern frontier.  But 
these stations, in addition to some commercial and postal applications, possessed a 
dominant military element.  Not only were there continuing conflicts between the 
government and various Mayan groups, especially the Santa Cruz, but also increasing 
military conflicts in neighboring Central American countries. 
  If 
Marconi’s radio tower startled the natives of the Isle of Wight, surely the Maya and 
British colonial woodcutters of the Rio Hondo river basin, further removed from 
industrialized centers, were even more surprised.    
In the late 1800s many Maya communities in southeast Yucatán remained 
independent from the Mexican government.  A legacy of the Spanish empire’s failure to 
suppress and incorporate the area, the early Mexican Republic and the short-lived 
independent state of Yucatán (1841-48) fared to do any better.  Political, economic, and 
cultural contentions exploded a long and often brutal war in the region fought 
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predominately between Mayan peasants on one hand and the Yucatecan and Mexican 
government on the other, a war that lasted from 1847 until the 1910s.  Scholars 
commonly refer to this period, especially during the 1840s and 1850s, as the Caste War.  
The pacification of the Maya along Mexico’s southern frontier remained a goal 
throughout Díaz’s time in office.  The final conquest of Chan Santa Cruz in 1901 by 
Porfirian general Ignacio Bravo and collaborating local leaders is sometimes regarded as 
the definitive end to the Caste War, however, segments of the region’s population 
contested Mexican control until after the Revolution.53
Another important factor in establishing firmer control in the region was Mexican 
relations with the British Empire, specifically the colony of British Honduras.
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  For most 
of the 1800s the British colonists reluctantly supported the Maya population in the area 
that would become Quintana Roo.  The colonists cut valuable woods on Mayan lands in 
trade for weapons and other goods.  The Maya communities also formed a barrier 
between British Honduras and the Mexican state.  As trade with Mexico became more 
important to Great Britain during the 1890s, however, a shift in policy took place.  British 
officials informed the leaders of British Honduras that they needed to comply with 
Mexican attempts to pacify the region.  Between 1893 and 1897 Mexico and England 
formally agreed that the Hondo River was the boundary between the two countries and in 
1898 Mexican officials and businessmen began work founding a city along the Bay of 
Chetumal, Payo Obispo, and a naval site, Xcalak.  The bay, in turn, became one of the 
 54 Present-day Belize. 
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main military bases of operations, complementing Peto, which rested in inland Yucatán 
east of Chan Santa Cruz.55
Engineers and local workers built the Quintana Roo wireless stations at the two 
newly established settlements on the Bay of Chetumal.  There were various reasons for 
selecting these locations.  For one, Mexico had ordered its small southern flotilla to 
observe the bay and the Hondo River, which drained into it, with the mission of stopping 
British contraband to Maya rebels, especially weapons.  However, Great Britain and 
Mexico had come to a disagreement over the allowance of Mexican ships traveling to 
Payo Obispo.  The only passable channel through the shallow bay zigzagged across the 
international border and British officials feared that any decision allowing free passage to 
Mexican vessels would someday haunt them if Mexico continued to become a more 
powerful nation.
  
56  The radio station connecting the naval base and the entrance of the 
bay and Payo Obispo at the other end helped alleviate some of the communications 
problems.  It allowed Xcalak to send messages about naval operations and other matters 
to Payo Obispo, which could then be relayed to Peto—and in turn Mexico City—or to 
British Honduras and vice versa.57  Military officials may have also hoped that the 
stations could be used to communicate with portable radios carried by military 
detachments.  The army had started experimenting with such portable devices beginning 
in 1906.58
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military campaigns until the first year of the Revolution in 1910 and 1911.59  These 
Quintana Roo installations also complemented the incorporation of radio devices aboard 
Mexican coast guard vessels and the anticipation of continued advancements in naval 
communications.60
The construction of the Quintana Roo stations tested Porfirian can-do to the limit.  
For one, the appropriate materials were hard to obtain.  Communications officials often 
had to travel to Mérida in the neighboring state of Yucatán to acquire the essential 
products.  It was also difficult to obtain enough workers and, according to Fernández, 
especially competent workers.  The stations, nevertheless, were completed by 1907.
  Here again, military officials drew directly from Marconi’s designs 
for radio and how European militaries had used the medium in warfare.   
61  In 
total, the government spent 155,650 pesos on constructing these stations and those in 
Mazatlán and San José del Cabo.62
Beginning in 1906 private enterprises also started building radio operations.  This 
became most common among American mining industries in northern Mexico. 
Influenced by the success of the government stations, George H. Holmes of the La 
Esmeralda mine obtained permission from the Díaz administration to start transmissions 
between his mine and the communities of Guadalupe y Calvo and Hidalgo del Parral, 
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Chihuahua.63  Most American mining businesses, however, were more concerned about 
communicating with corporate offices in the United States.  This was certainly the case 
with stations constructed by the American Smelting and Refining Company, the Cananea 
Consolidated Copper Company, the Lluvia de Oro Gold Mining Company, and the 
owners of the Chispas Mine, which operated illegally without government concessions.64
However, the use of private radio spread beyond mining operations.  According to 
a 1906 article in the newspaper El Mundo, a handful of businesses and hacendados 
obtained radio equipment to “communicate with neighboring populations” because 
storms commonly destroyed telegraph lines.
  
65  There is some evidence that some tech-
savvy hacienda owners had also become interested in TSH not only for communication, 
but for agriculture.  They had paid attention to foreign reports of how the technology was 
employed in a number of commercial applications.  One interesting topic that caught the 
attention of this group was the effects of radio waves on plants.  In the early 1900s a 
handful of scientists, U.S. military technicians, and Mexican engineers and hacendados 
experimented and read on the topic.66   In response to individual and business requests, 
the Díaz administration created a specific department within SCOP to grant radio permits 
to private businesses.  Officials specialized in communications and public works 
legislation drew up contracts with private entrepreneurs and experimenters, an 
arrangement that allowed for some supervised private radio use.67
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Although the Díaz administration approved of some private radio use for personal 
business communications, the government controlled all public operations and, outside of 
Telefunken, remained resistive to foreign wireless companies.  In 1906, SCOP shot down 
an initiative by the American De Forest Wireless Company to establish radio posts to 
communicate with ocean vessels along “the entire coast of Mexico where it would pay to 
erect them.” 68
While the SCOP was building stations in Quintana Roo and Baja California, the 
Porfirian government also participated in 1906 International Radio Telegraph Convention 
in Berlin.  For the event, the Díaz administration sent General José M. Pérez to contribute 
to global radio policies and debates about Marconi’s attempt to monopolize radio 
services.  It was the second-ever international conference on wireless communications, 
and it had expanded significantly since the first meeting in Berlin in 1903.  The earlier 
convention only included representatives from France, Great Britain, Italy, Austria-
Hungary, Russia, Spain, and the United States.
  
69
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twenty additional countries, including five from Latin America: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, 
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Washington Universal Postal Convention; both of which had focused on unifying 
disjointed international mail services and regulations.70  These discussions indicate how 
many of the attending officials viewed radio services as an extension of public postal and 
telegraphic operations.  However, there was a large military element to Mexico’s position 
as well.  In fact, the general had specific orders to “ensure the interests of Mexico; 
understanding the military relationship to the coastal stations and aboard our ships of 
war.”71
Backing the agreement, the senate ratified the terms in 1907, which the Diario 
Oficial published in Spanish and French in February 1909.  This conference, along with 
the Constitution of 1857, largely guided communications officials.  The telegraphers and 
engineers involved in the newly constructed Cerritos and San José del Cabo stations 
quickly switched their operating frequency in order to fit within the new international 
guidelines.
  Following the wishes of his superiors, Pérez sided against Marconi and England, 
as most other representatives did, and with Mexico’s German radio providers.   
72
In addition to Cerritos and San José del Cabo, the Mexican state continued to 
expand coastal stations with the assistance of German equipment and expertise.  
Although much of the early energy of radio development shifted to the Pacific and the 
Caribbean, experiments continued along the coast of Veracruz as well.  DGTN 
employees had also conducted a number of transmissions from the Yucatán peninsula in 
hopes of connecting the region to Veracruz, other gulf ports, and of further incorporating 
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southeastern Mexico into the federal communications system.  These experiments carried 
huge trade implications, but they, like the other radio projects, also had ramifications for 
military and political consolidation plans.73
The wireless project in the Gulf of Mexico, however, did not meet with the 
desired success until the last year of the Díaz administration.  After struggling to find the 
appropriate location to build the radio stations and eventually expropriating land to build 
the towers, regular “Marconigrafía” services commenced between Veracruz and 
Campeche in October 1910.  The stations could transmit at a distance of 500 kilometers, 
or almost 310 miles, and the original dreams of SCOP officials had finally been realized.  
Although atmospheric conditions occasionally caused problems, the systems worked to 
the satisfaction of SCOP engineers who exuberantly stated that their achievement made 
Mexican ports of  “the first order.” 
  
74
While working out the last kinks in the new Veracruz and Campeche stations, the 
SCOP also constructed new buildings for their expanding operations.  In Veracruz, where 
the old telegraph and post office suffered from rusting metal and general dilapidation, 
workers built a new building “looking over the sea” with new furniture, “hygienic 
conditions,” and refurbished electric and telegraphic connections.
   Radio was becoming more and more an essential 
part of international commerce as businesses and governments of the most prosperous 
nations equipped their ships with wireless apparatuses. 
75
                                                             
 73 “Aumento de empleado Telecátan,” El Diario, 8 Jul. 1907, 2. 
   Locals and SCOP 
officials inaugurated its opening December 7, 1909.  Its newer proximity to the water 
 74 “Aparatos de telegrafía sin hilos en el Golfo,” El Imparcial, 29 Oct. 1910, 5. 
 75 “Edificio de correos y telégrafos,” El Imparcial 6 Dec. 1909, 2, 8; “El telégrafo en Veracruz,” El 
Imparcial, 11 Dec. 1909, 7. 
84 
 
allowed for more efficient communications with commercial and government ships.  
Similarly, the main telegraph office in Mexico City received a partial make over.76
In 1910 wireless operations expanded in another area as well.  The staff at the 
penal colony on the Isla María Madre off the Pacific coast of the state of Nayarit 
completed a station that communicated with San José and Cerritos.  Not only did this 
radio allow communications between the prison and the mainland, but it also provided 
news about ships in the Pacific and the Gulf of California.
    
77
Life for federal telegraphers at these early radio stations must have been fairly 
simple, if not boring at times.  Although interaction with foreign traders and important 
officials must have been interesting on more than one occasion, these outposts were often 
in desolate locations.  Employees commonly opened their doors to business at eight in the 
morning and generally closed around one in the afternoon.
   
78  Although often separate 
from nearby villages, these stations sometimes included things like warehouses, a small 
naval base, an oven for baking bread, a post office, a wharf, and a rain-catching systems 
for drinking water.79  Typical for the building housing the radio equipment was “a house 
of Iron and wood and two iron towers forty-five meters tall upon elevated land.”80  One 
Mexican scholar described the epicenter of these locations as “a couple of buildings: the 
work station with a gigantic antennae and the staff house, which included a kitchen and a 
cellar. In the rooms, the furniture was minimal, and the workplace was full of cables and 
bulky equipment.”81
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 Apparently the work could be dangerous as well.  In February 1909 the manager 
at the Cabo Haro station ignited the radio building while cleaning a gas generator.  After 
the fire exploded nearby cans of gas, oil, and alcohol, the blaze ravished most of the 
structure within minutes.  The fire also destroyed all of the radio equipment suspending 
communications with Santa Rosalía until the government constructed another station at 
Bacochibampo near Guaymas in June 1910.82
 
  But even if the work was sometimes 
tedious, telegraphers were important to a number of powerful businesses and government 
leaders.  While usually not an entrée into high society, the job of radio telegrapher 
offered stability, respectability, and relatively good pay. 
Radio and Military Modernization 
As previously stated, the military played an important role in radio development. 
Army officials had scouted Europe and the United States for new developments in radio 
technology and had also worked out trade agreements with Germany.  As exhibited by 
the first frontier stations, these military officials, like their SCOP counterparts, hoped that 
radio would help consolidate state control, damper threats of American filibustering, and 
to finally quell Mayan rebellion forever.  Also, like SCOP directors, leaders of the 
Secretariat of War and Marine (SGM) saw radio largely as an extension of wire 
telegraphy.  Army commanders, however, also started the first experiments with portable 
field radios, hoping to incorporate wireless communications as a part of a more modern 
military organization.  These portable wireless communication devices, however, were 
still in an experimental stage when the Mexican Revolution erupted in 1910.  Although 
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radio became better known and increasingly used by the last year of the Porfiriato, most 
army and naval units still relied on older forms of technology. 
A whole company of telegraphers already had existed in the army’s Department 
of Engineers.  In time of war it was organized into divisions of “ten telegraphers, ten 
orderlies, and ten horses.”  Some of their main tasks included “the construction, 
reparation, and destruction of paths of transportation,” “the installation, conservation, 
exploitation, and destruction of telegraph and telephone lines, military as well as public 
and private,” and “the establishment of posts for telegraphic signals of any system and 
the arrangement of the corresponding codes.”  They operated as the vanguard and 
rearguard of army operations, gathering and transferring information, preparing means of 
transportation, and preparing points of communications.  In times of peace, they studied 
theory and applications useful for military service.  The Department of Engineers 
additionally possessed a jurado tecnico, or technical group, that also studied the 
“reception and transmission of telegraphic signals and dispatches.”  The Military College 
likewise taught courses in campaign communications. Among the professors and 
technical groups in the armed forces, radio had become a new and important topic in 
communications development, and engineering, telegraphy, and naval students were at 
least introduced to the subject.83
Radio operations in the military, as in other sectors of Mexican society, 
accelerated in 1906.  Indeed, the SCOP and the military worked together.  The radio 
stations under construction in Quintana Roo served the army and the navy.
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officials, including Luis Sánchez Martinez, who would continue to work with wireless 
military applications throughout the Revolution, also began a series of field radio 
experiments for the military.85  The goal was to build portable equipment that could 
successfully transmit messages at a distance of 30 kilometers or 18.6 miles and over flat 
terrain.  Officials built two sets from parts imported Europe and fabricated in Mexico.  
The resulting products must have been an impressive spectacle.  Each one possessed a 
bronze antenna 35 meters tall, a “ground antenna, of six similar poles and about forty 
meters long, which rest almost horizontal” and “a dinamo of 45 volts per amp mounted 
on a bicycle frame to power it [the radio] by means of the corresponding pedals.”86
The first experiments with these estaciones portátiles began in February 1907 in 
the vicinity of Mexico City.  SCOP employees began by transmitting at short distances.  
They set up one station on the campus of the School of Agriculture and the other in the 
community of San Alvaro, a little over a mile away.  The following month, the radio 
operators moved the second device to the Hacienda de Aragón northwest of the city, 
increasing the distance to 5 miles.  After achieving clear transmissions at both locations, 
they moved the equipment at the School of Agriculture even further away to Ixtapalapa, 
14 kilometers or nearly 9 miles from Aragón.  Messages came through clear in the latter 
location but a little weaker in Ixtapalapa.  Nevertheless, communication was maintained 
between the two points.  On April 5, the experimenters moved the Ixtapalapa station to 
Cerro de Estrella, or Star Hill, but could not obtain a satisfactory signal.  After again 
  With 
the addition of numerous other pieces of equipment to the already large contraptions, the 
devices may have been “portable,” but they were not easily moved.  
                                                             
 85 Fernández, Memoria . . . 1906-1907, 104; Fuentes, La radiodifusión,  24. 
 86 Fernández, Memoria . . . 1906-1907,  103-04. 
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moving the contraption to another hill by the town of Texcoco, 15.5 miles from Aragón, 
they again were able to transmit messages, though with some difficulty.  Deciding to 
move the operations a little closer together, the SCOP officials moved the radio in 
Texcoco to its final testing grounds in the Hacienda de Tepetotlán and then to the town of 
Los Reyes.  After some early problems, communications stabilized at these last locations.  
The resulting report concluded that the portable radios worked well enough at distances 
of 12.5 miles, but not at the 18.5 miles that the military had hoped for.87
Most soldiers, however, had little actual experience with radiotelegraphy.  
Outside of the few portable devices, the Quintana Roo and Chapultepec stations, and 
experiments on sea vessels, radio was largely something heard about and rarely seen.  
Even in the areas of the military where TSH had the most applicability—the Department 
of Engineers, the Navy, expeditionary forces—older technologies were far more 
prevalent and relied upon.  Specialists largely learned how to set up and destroy wire 
telegraphic and telephonic operations and how to use flag signaling.  In addition to light 
signals, most sailors still relied on flag communications.  Even though experiments were 
undoubtedly underway, the reports of the Secretary of War and Marine to congress rarely 
make any mention of radio training or services, on land or sea. 
 
 
Conclusion: Porfirian Radio 
By the end of 1910, radio still played a secondary role in communications in 
Mexico, as it did in all countries using the technology.  Wire telegraphs and telephones 
were far more relied upon to connect the nation.  But radio played an essential role in 
increasing the country’s connection to the outside world and in linking provincial 
                                                             
 87 Fernández, Memoria . . . 1906-1907,  104. 
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territories—especially those with less developed means of transportation, including Baja 
California and Quintana Roo—to the mainland.  Political, economic, and military 
motivations drove the development of this technology, though a small group of engineers 
and academics experimented with radio as well.  A handful of powerful private 
enterprises and hacendados frustrated with the shortcomings of wire telegraphy, or in the 
case of American mining industries, disconnected from far away corporate offices, also 
turned to radio as a new means of communication.  It was, however, SCOP officials and 
the military, with the assistance of foreign engineers and businessmen, who were 
responsible for most of the progress in wireless communications from 1900 to 1910.  
It was state employees that managed the public stations.  They also operated the 
army and naval radio operations in the country.  These officials were in the process of 
making portable radios more efficient when the Revolution started in late 1910.  With the 
outbreak of the subsequent civil war, especially after 1913, combat shifted the emphasis 
of radio use to fit the tumultuous circumstances.  Although the Revolution wreaked havoc 
on the economy, the combatants’ desire for radio and other technologies actually 
accelerated the growth and use of wireless equipment, and the warfare provided training 
for many of Mexico’s future radio specialists. 
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Chapter Three 
 
Revolutionary Radio 
 
 
Religion and science both profess peace (and the sincerity of the 
professors is not being doubted), but each always turns out to 
have a dominant part in any war that is going or contemplated. 
—Howard Nemerov1
 
 
Throughout the month of December 1910, a mixture of anxiety and curiosity 
filled the streets of El Paso, Texas.  A revolution had erupted in Mexico. Francisco I. 
Madero, the reformist son of wealthy land owners, had called the nation to arms after 
unsuccessfully running against Díaz in a fraud-filled election for the presidency.  Rebels 
were attacking federal outposts and towns in the northern mountains and the aging 
seven-term president had sent forces north from Mexico City.  The day after Christmas, 
a weary American mining engineer crossed into El Paso from Chihuahua.  The 
escalating violence convinced the Spanish-American War veteran to return to the 
United States.  Upon his arrival, he told reporters that he had run into the federal forces 
of Brigadier General Juan J. Navarro, an old and decorated military companion of Díaz.  
The Mexican president had charged Navarro with punishing the insurrectionary upstarts 
along the northern frontier.  His soldiers, however, lacked the drive needed to combat 
the mountain insurrectionists.  According to the engineer, Navarro’s three-hundred 
“sorry-looking fighters” looked ragged and demoralized from long marches and recent 
defeats.  Indeed, they had just suffered at the battles of Aldana and Mal Paso, where 
they left many of their dead comrades to rot unburied.2
                                                             
 1 Howard Nemerov, “On the Resemblances between Science and Religion,” Figures of Thought: 
Speculations on the Meaning of Poetry & Other Essays (Boston: David R. Godine, 1978), 54. 
   The American had low 
 2 “Another Victory for Mexican Rebels,” New York Times, 27 Dec. 1910, 4. 
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expectations for the government’s army.  He also provided a second bit of intriguing 
news; another advancing force—the 9th Battalion—carried the iron, cables, batteries, 
and bicycle essential for wireless operations.  Having established a radio tower in 
Chihuahua, they hoped to restore communications with Navarro and the frontlines of 
battle.  The time had come for the military to test its portable equipment in combat.3
  Although the Revolution was not the first war in which combatants used 
wireless communications, radio became an important component of information 
gathering, naval encounters, espionage, and the movement of forces.  Wire telegraphy 
still dominated electronic communications, but TSH increasingly played a more 
important role as the “eyes and ears” of war.  In fact, the warfare accelerated much of 
the technological revolution that had begun in the mid-nineteenth century.  This was 
definitely the case with radio.  Wireless use expanded significantly during the 
Revolution as combatants adapted the medium to meet war conditions.  Not only did the 
number of devices increase, but so too did the number of radiotelegraphers.  However, 
the increase was almost solely among militants; indeed, growth was hampered among 
experimenters attempting to avoid risks associated with the warfare.  But as Carranza 
gained a greater, if still fragile, control over larger portions of Mexico, his 
administration reinvigorated the drive to use wireless telegraphy to consolidate control 
over the nation with a new intensity.  In his acquisition of radio devices, Carranza 
increasingly turned to the United States because of its proximity and technological 
superiority, U.S. actions against President Victoriano Huerta (1913-14), including the 
   
                                                             
 3 Juan A. Hernández to Gral. de División Secretario de Guerra y Marina, Chihuahua to Mexico 
City, 17 Dec. 1910,  exp. xi/481.5/60, tomo 2, Fondo Revolucionario, AHSDN; Juan A. Hernández to 
Gral. División Secretario De Guerra y Marina, Chihuahua to Mexico City, 18 Dec. 1910,  exp. 
xi/481.5/60, tomo 3, Fondo Revolucionario, AHSDN; J. A. Hernández to Gral. Srio. Guerra y Marina, 
Chihuahua to Mexico City, 18 Dec. 1910, exp. xi/481.5/60, tomo 3, Fondo Revolucionario, AHSDN. 
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lifting of an arms band against the carrancistas in February 1914, and the disruption of 
easy access to European equipment caused by World War I.  These revolutionary-era 
leaders saw radio through the lens of military application.  The Revolution intensified 
this tendency as the technology provided an important communications tool for 
combatants.  Wireless messages changed the course of decisive battles, and military 
considerations would continue to color how post-revolutionary leaders saw radio in the 
subsequent decades.  
 
The Madero Rebellion and the Continuation of Porfirian Wireless Policies 
 The Madero uprising and presidency, the first chapter of the Revolution, started as 
a political revolt in 1910 and ended with the assassination of Madero in February 1913.  
Like Díaz himself, much of the Porfirian administration—cabinet members, advisors, 
military officers, governors—had grown old and stingy with their power.  A younger 
generation of middle-class professionals in league with ostracized elites variously 
agitated for a greater voice, for democracy, or at least political spoils.  Few of these 
middle-sector discontents were genuinely radical; rather, they saw themselves as 
champions of the ideals of the 1857 Constitution, ideals to which Porfirian political 
leaders had shown only lip service.  
 It was in a 1908 interview with American journalist James Creelman that Díaz 
inflamed political fires to a point where they could not be easily extinguished.  Telling 
the reporter that he would not run in the 1910 elections, Díaz’s comments spurred a 
burst of widespread civil activity.  The dictator’s decision to betray his word 
antagonized his now energized opponents.  By 1910 Madero had solidified his position 
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as the candidate of the anti-reelecionistas, a newly formed opposition party.  In fact, 
Madero had gathered enough of a following to prompt Díaz to order his arrest before 
the presidential contest.  After escaping incarceration Madero proclaimed his rebellion 
while in exile in Texas.  His revolt fared poorly at first as most of his urban intellectual 
followers met an early defeat.4
 It was under these conditions that Díaz sent Navarro’s forces north.  Through 
the arid terrain they made their way during the cold of winter to scout and skirmish with 
rebels in the vicinity around the city of Chihuahua.  A number of witnesses made note 
of their appearance, including the aforementioned American mining engineer.  After 
obtaining some small victories, rebels under the leadership of former muleteer Pascual 
Orozco dealt Navarro’s forces an obvious and serious defeat.  Not only had the these 
battles, which occurred on December 17-18, 1910, killed dozens of government soldiers 
and demoralized many of those that survived, the attackers had succeeded in 
temporarily isolating the federals, disrupting the wire telegraphs and the nearest railway 
line.  In response, Díaz demanded the accounts of almost every surviving officer 
involved and sent the 9th battalion to Chihuahua.
  That might have spelled the end of his revolt if a large 
number of disgruntled rural Mexicans had not also responded to his call-to-arms.  
Leaders from the northern mountains, including Pascual Orozco, José de la Luz Blanco, 
and Pancho Villa gained armies of peasants, laborers, and small ranchers, who battled 
the federals to a standstill, breathing air into the struggling revolution. 
5
                                                             
 4  Knight, The Mexican Revolution, vol. 1, 183-84. 
   
 5 Juan A. Hernández to Gral. de División Secretario de Guerra y Marina, Chihuahua to Mexico 
City, 17 Dec. 1910,  exp. xi/481.5/60, tomo 2, Fondo Revolucionario, AHSDN; Juan A. Hernández to 
Gral. División Secretario De Guerra y Marina, Chihuahua to Mexico City, 18 Dec. 1910,  exp. 
xi/481.5/60, tomo 3, Fondo Revolucionario, AHSDN; 
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The defeat of one of the more powerful federal forces in the north also prompted 
Díaz and the military to test one of Marconi’s earlier sales pitches for TSH, to use the 
technology to connect with troops in a “lonely spot” where rebels had cut the telegraph 
lines.6  General Angel Garcia Peña, head of the Geographic Explorers Commission, 
tagged along with the 9th battalion, bringing radio materials to “establish and 
experiment with TSH in order to connect Navarro to this city [Chihuahua].”7
Rebels too had realized the potential of electronic communications, including 
radio, though access to such equipment was extremely limited.  In addition to the 
northern rebels, an uprising in the small state of Morelos over the loss of peasant lands 
led by Emiliano Zapata had been underway since 1909.  Nominally joining forces with 
Madero, zapatistas took advantage of TSH via an American reporter who appears to 
have had access to a transmitter.  After they captured the state capital, Stephen Bonsal, a 
special correspondent for the New York Times, stated on May 22, 1911 that 
“Cuernavaca is quite orderly under the rebels, and foreigners are reassured.  As an 
advance on wireless telegraphy I would state that the revolutionary authorities in the 
city reported to me the capture of Cuernavaca five hours before they took the place, but 
they made good on their word.”
   
Improvements in field radios had allowed for transmissions of slightly greater distances 
than in 1907, but they were still far from reliable in the mountainous terrain of northern 
Mexico.  And one set of field radios was far from enough to save the crumbling regime 
and its demoralized army.  
8
                                                             
 6 “Marconi’s Telegraph,” New York Times, 23 Jan. 1898, IWM3.  
  Rebel leaders in Morelos, contrary to popular 
 7 J. A. Hernández to Gral. Srio. Guerra y Marina, Chihuahua to Mexico City, 18 Dec. 1910, exp. 
xi/481.5/60, tomo 3, Fondo Revolucionario, AHSDN. 
 8 Stephan Bonsal, “Mexican Catholics Plan to Rule Nation,” New York Times, 23 May 1911, 1.  
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notions— then and now—possessed a keen understanding of how to use media and 
communications technologies for propaganda.   
Madero also knew about radio.  He had used modern technologies while 
managing his family’s properties prior to the war.  Well-read and well-traveled, he 
surely knew about the progress and uses of TSH.  His forces as well as Zapata’s 
intentionally targeted other means of federal communication for destruction, especially 
trains and telegraphs.  In both Ciudad Juárez and Cuernavaca rebels burned down these 
stations.9
With the fall of Ciudad Juárez and Cuernavaca, Díaz read the writing on the 
wall and resigned.  Uprisings had sprouted up across the country.  He boarded the 
steamship Ipiranga and set off for exile in Europe.  Within days of the ascension of 
Madero an earthquake hit central Mexico, an uneasy sign for the new government.  Díaz 
received news of the disaster via an Atlantic City radio station.  He gave his laments as 
he sailed away . . . both over the waves.
  Most tellingly, Madero rapidly expanded wireless technologies after Díaz’s 
defeat.  
10
Rebellion, however, did not stop with Madero’s presidency.  Some of the old 
revolts continued and new ones arose as Madero failed to enact the social changes that 
so many of those that fought under his banner demanded.  The reluctance to make quick 
or extreme decisions, especially in matters of land distribution and municipal autonomy, 
provoked the zapatistas to continue their fight against the federal government.  Orozco 
rebelled in 1912 with the support of many of his original supporters but also from 
powerful Porfirians including Luis Terrazas and Enrique Creel, making for an 
 
                                                             
 9 Las comunicaciones cortadas,” El Imparcial, 10 May 1911, 1; “Los rebeldes incendiaron varios 
edificios comerciales y la estación del ferrocarril interoceánico,” El Imparcial, 20 May 1911, 1. 
 10 “El Sr. Gral. Díaz recibe noticia del temblor,” El Imparcial, 10 Jun. 1911, 1. 
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interesting mix of reactionary forces with revolutionaries who sought out greater 
reform.  Counterrevolutionaries also took up arms under the banners of Félix Díaz, the 
deposed dictator’s nephew, and Bernardo Reyes, the former Porfirian Secretary of War 
and Marine and governor of Nuevo León.   
Wireless communications proved advantageous for maderista forces.  Using 
TSH, Commodore Manuel Azuerta reported the outbreak of the counter-revolutionary 
rebellion in Veracruz initiated by Díaz.  Azuerta contacted the Madero government in 
Mexico City via the radio system on an American Ward Line vessel in the harbor, by 
which he also obtained orders from the capital.  Along with the response of Generals 
Joaquín Beltrán and José Hernández, Azuerta’s actions were crucial to the quick defeat 
and capture of Díaz, who was arrested within in a manner of hours and sent to prison in 
Mexico City alongside Reyes, whose previous revolt had also been defeated.11
 The Madero administration installed TSH devices aboard its own ships as well.  
In 1911 communications specialists installed radios on the gunboat Bravo.  At the time, 
the Bravo was one of the Mexican navy’s best ships.  It not only roamed the coasts, 
usually in the Gulf of Mexico, but also represented Mexico in the Caribbean.  For 
example, that year it made a visit to the Cuban port of Santiago, where the country’s 
officials showered the Mexican marines with a festive reception before providing a tour 
of the city’s most historic sites.  As one of the navy’s vessels that voyaged to other 
countries, wireless apparatuses made travel and communications with foreign nations 
and ships easier.  Needless to mention, this type of equipment provided Mexican ports a 
more modernized image.  Additionally, as done on the Ward Line vessel, officials 
 
                                                             
 11 Ornelas Herrera, “La radiodifusión mexicana,” 120-21; Ulloa, “La lucha armada (1911-1920),” 
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hoped that the Bravo would relay important messages to coastal stations and to the 
capital.  In 1912 communications officials installed a similar device on the Melchor 
Ocampo, a coast guard vessel that kept surveillance of Mexican shores; in this instance, 
in the Gulf of California.12
On land, the army under Madero—mostly the same forces that served Díaz—
installed a French-made transmitter and receptor in the forest surrounding Chapultepec 
Castle and in the city of Torreón, Coahuila, exclusively for the use of the armed 
forces.
 
13  The Chapultepec station, overseen by engineer Estanislao González Salas, 
Director of Works of the National Palace and Chapultepec, consisted of “two elevated 
towers and a little house in the center for the employed operators” located in the 
northern part of the forest near the boundary of the park.14
Outside of Torreón, the wireless posts surrounding Baja California were the only 
government stations close to continued revolutionary upheaval.  Taking advantage of 
the momentum provided by Madero, members of the radical Partido Liberal Mexicano 
  In addition to field radios, 
these stations established improved communications between the president and the front 
of (counter) revolution rekindled in the north by Orozco.  Through these stations 
Madero and the military improved one of the communication deficiencies of the Díaz 
administration.  Although the federal army under Madero had difficulty in decisively 
defeating Orozco, these radio posts helped the government maintain control in the 
Torreón vicinity. 
                                                             
 12 Merchán Escalante, Telecomunicaciones, 65; Fuentes, La radiodifusión, 25; “Agasajos á 
marinos del cañonero Bravo, El Imparcial, 12 Aug. 1911, 5; De la Fuente, Memoria por el Secretario de 
Estado y del Despacho de Comunicaciones y Obras Públicas, 1911-1912, 129-30. 
 13 Fuentes, La radiodifusión, 25. Bonleper was the name of the French company that supplied the 
equipment.  
 14 Carlos Rincón Gallardo to the Ministerio de Gobernación, 27 May 1912, Mexico City, Vol. 
1254, Exp. 400, Fondo Ayuntamiento, Archivo Histórico del Distrito Federal, further stated as AHDF.  
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or Mexican Liberal Party (PLM)—nominally led by the intellectual Ricardo Flores 
Magón from his armchair in Los Angeles—in addition to members of the Industrial 
Workers of the World and foreign soldiers of fortune, invaded Baja California with 
aspirations for adventure and creating an anarchist utopia.  Although the invaders, who 
saw themselves as liberators, successfully captured the cities of Algodones, Tecate, and 
Tijuana, the different factions and motives within the rebel force turned the 
floresmagonista invasion into a comic farce that ultimately caused residents of Baja 
California and leftist groups in the United States to abandon support for the movement.  
 When former Porfirian diplomat Francisco León de la Barra became interim 
president (1910-11)—Madero waited for formal elections to hoist him into high 
office—Flores Magón rebelled against his tentative former ally.  News about continued 
floresmagonista actions reached Mexico City via telegraph connections through the 
United States, but also via the Santa Rosalía and Bocochibampo wireless stations.  The 
head of the Santa Rosalía rurales, a rural police force first created in the late 1860s, for 
example, used the station there to report that approximately “sixty filibusters were 
marauding around Santa Rosalía and Camilla,” an area that Flores Magón more or less 
correctly argued was controlled by El Boleo, “a rich French company.”15  
Radiotelegraphers also noted the arrival of the steamship Korrigan, from which federal 
forces disembarked to Juventino Rosas’s famous waltz “Sobre las Olas” or “Over the 
Waves.”  The song was a relevant choice considering the naval component of the 
operation and that the wireless telegraphers transmitted news of their arrival via radio16
                                                             
 15 “Vuelven á aparecer filibusteros en la Baja California,” El Imparcial, 19 Jul. 1911, 4; Agustín 
Cue Canovas, Ricardo Flores Magón: La Baja California y Los Estados Unidos (Mexico City: Libro 
Mex, 1957), 50-53. 
  
 16  “Los magonistas merodean por Santa Rosalía,” El Imparcial 24 Jul. 1911, 3.  
99 
 
The federal forces defeated the remnants of the PLM soldiers in the summer of 1911, 
thus ending the invasion.17
 Nature took a far greater toll on radio stations than rebels.  A Pacific hurricane 
devastated a number of communities along the Gulf of California on October 4, 1911.  
Blowing in around midnight and lasting until 2:00 a.m., the fierce storm destroyed 
thousands of dollars worth of property and almost completely devoured small coastal 
villages in Baja California and Sinaloa.  In Guaymas, the storm threw fishing boats and 
large steamers alike onto the beaches and into the town.
  
18  The telegraph lines from 
Guaymas to the Bocochibampo radio office broke in a number of places.  The storm had 
ripped that station’s roof off, flooding the building and soaking the equipment.  In Santa 
Rosalía the hurricane snapped the northern radio tower 20 meters up and broke the 
telegraph line that connected the station to the neighboring town of Mulegé.  In San 
José del Cabo, at the southern tip of the peninsula, the water and winds damaged the 
base of the antenna.  Radio communications broke down between Santa Rosalía and 
Bocochibampo and between San José del Cabo and Mazatlán.  Crews re-established 
communications at the former in four days and the latter in seven.19
 Interestingly enough, the same day that El Imparcial printed its story on the Gulf 
of California hurricane, it also reported experiments of another sort of wireless device.  
 
                                                             
           17 Works on Ricardo Flores Magón and the PLM invasion of Baja California in 1911 include, 
Canovas, Ricardo Flores Magón; James A. Sandos, Rebellion in the Borderlands: Anarchism and the 
Plan de San Diego, 1904-1924 (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1992); Colin M. MacLachlan, 
Anarchism and the Mexican Revolution: The Political Trials of Ricardo Flores Magón in the United 
States (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991); Ricardo Flores Magón, Dreams of Freedom: A 
Ricardo Flores Magón Reader, eds. Chaz Bufe and Mitchell Cowen Verter (Edinburgh: AK Press, 2005). 
 18  “Worst Storm in Fifty Years,” Los Angeles Times, 13 Oct. 1911, I5; “Fue espantoso el ciclón 
que azotó al Puerto de Guaymas, El Imparcial 20 Oct. 1911, 1; “La población de San Ignacio casi 
destruida por el ciclón,” El Imparcial, 21 Oct. 1911, 4.  
 19 De la Fuente, Memoria por el Secretario de Estado y del Despacho de Comunicaciones y Obras 
Públicas, 1911-1912, 130.  
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In October engineer Coronel Vito Alessio Robles commenced heliograph tests between 
the National Palace and Chapultepec Castle.  Similar to TSH, heliography relied on 
Morse code to transmit wireless signals.  The difference, as the name suggests, is that 
heliographs transmitted messages via light, usually the sun.  Using a pivoting mirror 
and a rude shutter, the device could transmit messages over long distances.  Like radio, 
the British had used heliographs in the Second Boer War.  The American military had 
likewise adopted these apparatuses, most famously in its wars with Apache bands in the 
U.S. southwest.  The Mexican armed forces incorporated a greater number of 
heliographs to better communications, a sign of the escalating conflicts.20
The Madero rebellion, however, brought little change to the course of radio 
development that was underway during the Porfiriato.
 
21  The advancements in military 
communications were already in planning before Madero took office.  Employees and 
engineers contracted by the DGTN continued with the projects that they had begun 
during the Porfiriato.  In Mexico City newspaper readers still kept abreast with the 
newest developments abroad, just as they had before.  Residents read about the new 
U.S. station at Fort Meyer, which communicated with a sea vessel approximately 2,500 
miles away, destroying the previous record of 600 miles.22  They read about how the 
Brazilian, Argentine, Paraguayan, and Uruguayan governments were all developing a 
national wireless system.23
                                                             
 20 “Los aparatos heliográficos en el ejercito,” El Imparcial, 20 Oct. 1911, 1.   
  Upgrades to the new SCOP building continued, receiving 
 21 This finding reinforces similar conclusions reached by other scholars about the Mexican 
economy and industry 1910-1913; see Stephen Haber, Industry and Underdevelopment: The 
Industrialization of Mexico, 1890-1940 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1989), 124.  
 22 “Un radiograma a mas de dos mil millas,” El Imparcial, 27 Mar. 1911, 2.  
 23 La telegrafía in hilos en el Brasil,” El Imparcial, 29 Mar. 1911, 3. 
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praise from Madero and his Secretary of Communications and Public Works Manuel 
Bonilla.24
The biggest changes were transitions at the highest levels of government.  Díaz 
reshuffled his cabinet as a last ditch effort to remain in power in March 1911.  The 
Undersecretary of the SCOP and the Director of the Postal Service “resigned.”  On May 
25, Francisco León de la Barra, whom Díaz had just recently placed as Secretary of 
Foreign Relations in the March realignment, became the provisional president of 
Mexico while Madero campaigned to win the presidency by election.
 
25  Under De la 
Barra, engineer Manuel Urquidi became Director General of National Telegraphs and 
then, under Madero, Undersecretary of SCOP.  Miguel A. Cosio filled Urquidi’s former 
position for a short time in 1911.26  The following year Madero gave the position to 
communications specialist Mario Méndez in January 1912.27
Although new to the job, Bonilla knew, or quickly learned, national and 
international communications policies.  Almost as soon as he obtained the position he 
exhibited a firm grasp of Mexico’s wireless agreements and stations during a dispute 
with the New York and Cuba Mail Steamship Company of the United States and U.S. 
Ambassador to Mexico Henry Lane Wilson, Madero’s implacable foe.  In October 
1911, one of the American steamers had entered the waters around Veracruz.  
  The new president made 
Manuel Bonilla his Secretary of Communications and Public Works.  The shifting was 
constant.  
                                                             
 24 “El Nuevo edificio de comunicaciones fue visitado por el Sr. Madero, El Diario, 28 Dec. 1911, 
1.  
 25 For more on De la Barra, see Peter Henderson, In the Absence of Don Porfirio: Francisco León 
de la Barra and the Mexican Revolution (Wilmington, DL: Scholarly Resources, 2000).  
 26 “Entrevista al Sr. Ing. Urquidi,” El Imparcial, 3 Jun. 1911, 3; “Mañana tomará posesión el 
nuevo director de telégrafos,” El Imparcial, 9 Jul. 1911, 5.  
 27 “Nuevo Director de Telégrafos,” El Diario, 4 Jan. 1912, 1, 4.  
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Communicating to the newly functional wireless station, the ship’s telegrapher 
discovered that their calls were unwelcome.  Cosío, than the managing official at the 
Veracruz station, responded that under orders from a 1909 circular, Mexican stations 
were not to communicate with vessels from countries that had not ratified the provisions 
of the 1906 International Wireless Convention of Berlin except in cases of emergency.  
Cosío then recommended that agents of the American steamship company contact the 
U.S. government in order to work out an arrangement.  Infuriated, Assistant General 
Manager W. D. Macy wrote an angry letter to Wilson, hoping to resolve the issue with 
the Mexican government.  Macy argued, and Wilson reiterated, that even though the 
United States was not in compliance with the 1906 International Wireless Convention 
of Berlin, Mexican officials should provide the New York and Cuba Steamship 
Company special communications privileges since it possessed a contract with the 
Mexican government to deliver mail abroad.  Macy contended, however, that the real 
issue was that agents of Marconi’s Wireless Telegraph Company had built the stations.  
Because they were in direct competition with the United Wireless Company, which sold 
equipment to the New York and Cuba Steamship Company, Marconi’s agents had 
convinced Mexican officials not to communicate with American vessels.28
Bonilla responded firmly and elegantly, displaying not only a way with words 
but also a keen intellect.  Of course, the fact that Macy’s reasoning was dead wrong 
made it easier for Bonilla to refute the accusations.  His own words state the Mexican 
government’s position clearly: 
  
It having been shown that the provision grew out of the 
[1906] Convention, the presumption of Mr. Macy has no 
                                                             
 28  W. D. Macy to Henry Lane Wilson, Mexico City, 11 Nov. 1911, RG 59, 812.74/1, U.S. 
National Archives, Washington, DC, further stated as USNA. 
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foundation, as in order for the same to be true it would 
have been necessary for the Marconi Company to have 
exercised its influence in the mind of all the countries 
represented at the Convention…besides, the Mexican 
Government, in the case in question, would never have 
accepted any foreign influence…the General Office of the 
Federal Telegraphs is no way obligated to the Marconi 
Company, it also being untrue that the Veracruz and 
Campeche stations were constructed by the above 
mentioned company, as stated by Mr. Macy, but by the 
‘Telefunken” Company of Berlin, Germany.29
  
 
Indeed, Telefunken had provided the equipment as well as experts for the construction 
of the Gulf of Mexico wireless stations.  Mexican communications officials had also 
attempted to strictly apply the Berlin regulations, including in matters of adjusting wave 
frequencies of radio stations and the liquidation of account balances between 
participating countries.  In fact, the latter issue made Veracruz operators reluctant to 
accept American calls.  Since the U.S. Senate failed to ratify the provisions of the 
convention, Mexico had no legal means to enforce that American citizens pay the 
required tariffs asked by the Mexican government and stipulated in the 1906 
conference.  Bonilla actually proved willing to work with the U.S. government on the 
issue bilaterally if this fiscal component could be agreed upon.  American ships 
provided an important means of international communication for Mexico.  But Bonilla, 
even though new to the job, proved to be a capable negotiator who failed to be 
intimidated by the arrogance of Macy and Wilson.  Lucky for Bonilla, he also had a 
small but knowledgeable group of communications officials that had worked with TSH 
over the previous decade.  
                                                             
 29 Manuel Bonilla to the Secretary of Foreign Affairs, 30 Dec. 1911, México DF, RG 59, fold. 
812.74/1, USNA. 
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The multiple transitions in the leadership of SCOP had little consequential 
impact on the work of the engineers and telegraphers below them.  They continued their 
operations with little pause or change in direction.  Most of the government stations 
rested in areas little touched by the rebellions in 1910 and 1911.  As previously planned, 
experts including engineer José de Prida and foundational telegraphers including Juan 
José Flores Treviño and C. Alejandro Gutiérrez—with the assistance of German and 
Norwegian electronics specialists—put the finishing touches on the Veracruz and 
Campeche stations.  Prida additionally worked on improving the equipment at Payo 
Obispo, which by mid 1911 was in consistent contact with the Campeche operation, and 
in turn, Veracruz.30  SCOP had the station completely rebuilt with new equipment 
before the end of 1912. 31
 In June, SCOP leaders completed another station as well.  Replacing the 
incinerated Cabo Haro post, they proudly opened the doors to the Bocochibampo 
wireless office.  In the 1911 presidential address, Provisional President Francisco León 
de la Barra exclaimed that the Santa Rosalía and Bocochibampo were exchanging 
messages “with great success.” 
  All were new accomplishments, but none were new goals. 
32
                                                             
 30 “Nuevas estaciones de telegrafía sin hilos,” El Imparcial, 2 Jun. 1911, 5; “Estaciones de 
telegrafía inalámbricas,” El Imparcial, 3 Jun. 1911, 3; “Telegrafía inalámbricas,” El Imparcial, 22 Jun. 
1911, 5; “Estaciones de telegrafía inalámbricas en Campeche,” El Imparcial, 25 Jun. 1911, 4. 
  As with preceding state leaders, he emphasized the 
importance of connecting Baja California with the rest of the nation.  The DGTN was 
additionally working on establishing four other stations in San Quintín, Bahía 
Magdalena, Loreto, and Miramar—all in Baja California.  As with the first radio 
towers, these operations were to be connected with wire telegraphs that linked the 
 31 David de la Fuente, Memoria por el Secretario de Estado y del Despacho de Comunicaciones y 
Obras Públicas, 1911-1912 (Mexico City: Talleres Gráficos de la Secretaría de Comunicaciones y Obras 
Públicas, 1913), 129. 
 32 “El mensaje presidencial,” El Imparcial, 19 Sept. 1911, 5. 
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remainder of the territories.  In total, government leaders spent over 32,000 pesos on 
operating, maintaining, repairing, and constructing the stations at Bocochibampo, 
Campeche, Cerritos,  the Islas Marías, Mazatlan, Payo Obispo, San José del Cabo, 
Santa Rosalía, Veracruz, and Xcalak.33  In April 1911, officials working in line with the 
stipulations of the 1906 International Wireless Convention of Berlin made their first 
“liquidaciones” or transactions for radiotelegraphic services with Germany, France, 
Spain, and Norway.34
Federal telegraphers reached other important benchmarks during the De la Barra 
and Madero administrations.  In 1911 the DGTN put into action a plan to better 
organize the national radio system.  For the first time, the government demanded 
systemized call letters for the country’s wireless operations: XA for coastal stations, XB 
for merchant ships, and XD for internal stations.
 
35  Perhaps most impressive, radio 
operators reached new distances with their transmissions from the Veracruz and 
Campeche operations.  With new German equipment in hand, they transmitted 
messages over 500 miles during the day and over 800 miles at night.  They commenced 
communications with the Isla Madre María, San José del Cabo, and Mazatlán posts.  
They additionally reached international stations for the first time.  From that point 
forward these stations possessed a regular means of contact with Havana, Cuba; 
Pensacola, Key West, and New Orleans in the United States; and Colón, Panama.36
                                                             
 33 De la Fuente, Memoria por el Secretario de Estado y del Despacho de Comunicaciones y Obras 
Públicas, 1911-1912, 129-32.  
  
 34 Ibid, 153.  
 35 Merchán Escalante, Telecomunicaciones, 64. 
 36 David de la Fuente, Memoria del Secretario de Estado y de Despacho de Comunicaciones y 
Obras Públicas, 1911-1912 (Mexico City: Talleres Gráficos de la Secretaría de Comunicaciones y Obras 
Públicas, 1913), 129; Francisco I. Madero, “El Sr. Francisco I. Madero, al abrir las sesiones ordinarias del 
congreso, el 16 de Septiembre de 1912,” Los presidentes de México ante la nación: Informes, manifestos 
y documentos de 1821 a 1966 (Mexico City: Cámara de Diputados, 1966), 38. 
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 However, Madero and the new SCOP leadership cannot solely be credited with 
accomplishments in wireless development.  Almost all of these initiatives were part of 
plans drawn up during the Porfiriato and by specialists and government employees who 
had worked under the Díaz administration.  Most of these engineers and telegraphers 
remained loyal to the state—more so to their jobs—even though the top leadership 
changed frequently.  Needless to mention, insufficient electronics and communications 
specialists existed to replace the DGTN workers who had built the Porfirian radio 
system, even if maderistas had wanted to, which they did not.  These experts and 
experimenters had made notable strides and their work remained solicited. 
 Overall, communications developers under Madero continued plans articulated 
during the Porfiriato.  But federal telegraph employees did make impressive gains.  
Their work from May 1911 to February 1913 focused on organizing the national radio 
system, completing and improving Mexico’s coastal stations, and equipping the navy.  
As during the Porfiriato, these projects were aimed at obtaining greater control over 
Mexico’s fringes, improving trade, and projecting a modern appearance to the world.  
However, as exhibited by the military stations in Chapultepec and Chihuahua, the 
acquisition of heliographs, and the arming of the Bravo, the continuance of armed 
rebellion shifted the focus of radio development towards putting down the very 
uprisings that Madero himself had inflamed.  
 
The Usurper and the Militarization of Radio 
 News of Madero’s death reached Cuba, and in turn, the United States via radio 
from Mexico on Valentine’s Day 1913.  Acquiring the information from Havana, the 
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editors of the New York Times printed a report on the president’s death the same day. 37
 With the ascension of General Huerta to the presidency, military matters 
dominated radio development, as with almost every other aspect of his government.  
Although Huerta initially tried to appease U.S. officials, contentions with the United 
States remained a prevalent and serious issue.  Madero had already increased TSH 
operations for the suppression of rebellion, but communications became a key element 
of Huerta’s plans to secure his position and to tame the spreading violence.  With 
militarization in mind, he invested more on wireless apparatuses, and at a quicker pace, 
than any of his predecessors.  His short term in office, however, did not allow him to 
take full advantage of the devices he strove so diligently to acquire.  In fact, Carranza, 
his successor, ended up benefitting more from Huerta’s investments, though Carranza 
also ended up with much of the bill.  
  
The only problem with the account was that Madero was still very much alive.  He was, 
however, murdered eight days later by a disgruntled army major following a ten-day 
long coup started by supporters of  Félix Díaz and Bernardo Reyes called the Decena 
Trágica.  Following the release of Díaz and Reyes from Mexico City prisons, the 
overthrow attempt turned into a battle in the capital’s streets.  Madero was ultimately 
betrayed by Victoriano Huerta, the general that the president had entrusted to defend the 
government.  After working out an agreement with Díaz and American ambassador 
Henry Lane Wilson—Reyes had accidentally got himself shot on the first day of the 
uprising—Huerta assumed the presidency on February 20.  The following night, a small 
group of angry soldiers executed Madero and his vice president, José María Pino 
Suárez, just past midnight, likely on Huerta’s orders. 
                                                             
 37 “Madero Killed, Havana Hears,” New York Times, 14 Feb., 1913, 2.  
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 Huerta spoke about radio advancements during his first address to congress on 
April 1, 1913, only a month and a half after Madero’s assassination.  He mentioned that 
the new coastal stations worked satisfactory.  Interestingly, he also stressed that service 
was underway between the wireless operations in Campeche and Veracruz and the New 
York and Cuba Mail Steamship Company.  Although U.S. and Mexican officials 
worked out the previously mentioned issues surrounding this company when both 
nations agreed to the provisions of the 1912 International Wireless Convention in 
London, it is notable that the topic was one of first things about radio that Huerta 
mentioned to congress.38
 The general, however, quickly ran into his own conflict with the northern 
colossus.  The 1912 U.S. elections ushered in President Woodrow Wilson, who 
disdained Huerta’s coup and the possibility of  U.S. complicity.  Only months after 
Wilson’s election, a conflict erupted over the placement of U.S. wireless devices in the 
Mexican embassy at Tampico.  This poorly planned event caused an anti-American 
uproar in early July 1913.  U.S. Marines, in uniform, disembarked from the warship 
South Carolina to install the equipment, causing public unrest.  This hampered Huerta’s 
attempts to appease the United States.  Although some historians, most notably Alan 
Knight, have argued that anti-American protest in mid-1913 “represented officially-
orchestrated reactions to crises in Mexican-American relations” (and surely this was the 
case in many instances), this Tampico incident was genuinely popular in nature even if 
  This move surely appeased Ambassador Wilson, and 
constitutes one of Huerta’s initial attempts to warm to the United States.  
                                                             
 38  Victoriano Huerta, “El president Interino, Gral. Victoriano Huerta, al abrir las sesiones 
ordinarias del congress, el 1 de abril de 1913,” Los presidentes de México ante la nación, 75. Although 
the unrest caused by the Madero rebellion prevented Mexico from sending a representative to the London 
wireless conference in 1912, the Madero administration did sign onto the agreement before the 
assassination of Madero in 1914.  The U.S. government signed onto the international treaty as well. 
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the Huerta regime tried to use it afterwards to rally domestic support.39
The establishment of an American wireless station in Tampico was a non-issue 
turned into a loud mess by the negligent actions of the U.S. armed forces.  In mid and 
late June 1913, Huerta’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, Francisco León de la Barra, the 
SCOP leadership, and the Wilson administration worked out a deal to allow the 
establishment of the radio office in the American consulate in Tampico so that it could 
communicate with the American war ships, the consulate in Veracruz, and the embassy 
in Mexico City.
  People in the 
gulf ports, like many government officials, had become wary of the American navy, 
which had been floating off the shore since 1912, a presence that had been brought 
about not only by the recent revolts but also by the constant and exaggerated complaints 
of Ambassador Henry Lane Wilson and William W. Canada, the U.S. consul in 
Veracruz.  Both men constantly used radio to shoot their messages across the gulf.  It 
was a tense situation.  
40  In early July, however, the disembarking of disallowed, uniformed 
marines caused a “very bad impression among the public.”  It was only after this public 
protest that the governor of Tamaulipas and other federal officials withdrew the 
permission to install the radio equipment.41
                                                             
 39 Knight, The Mexican Revolution, Vol. 2, 71.  
  Huerta, upset with the U.S. government for 
stalling recognition of his dictatorship, and with America’s increased military presence, 
may have capitalized on the anti-American outbreak, but he did not initiate it.  His 
administration did order the removal of the devices, antagonizing American officials 
 40 Henry Lane Wilson to Francisco León de la Barra, Mexico City, 11 Jun. 1913, caja 16-9-72, 
ARSE; Francisco L. de la Barra to Henry Lane Wilson, 12 Jun. 1913, caja 16-9-72, ARSE; Carlos 
Pereyra to the Secretario de Comunicaciones, Mexico City, 13 Jun. 1913, caja 16-9-72, ARSE 
 41 Peña y Reya to the Secretario de Comunicaciones, Mexico City, 3 Jul. 1913, caja 16-9-72, 
ARSE. 
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who were “loath to believe that   . . . [Huerta’s] government would place obstacles in 
the way of prompt and adequate protection of its citizens in the Consular District of 
Tampico.”42  A month and a half later the Huerta administration agreed to reconsider 
the matter as long as no member of the U.S. armed forces, in uniform or not, installed or 
operated it.43
 This little-recognized event strained tensions and foreshadowed future 
encounters.  Thereafter, public sentiment against the United States along the Gulf of 
Mexico ebbed and flowed but nevertheless persisted.  It reached new heights with the 
Tampico Affair and the U.S. invasion of Veracruz in 1914.  The former erupted when, 
on April 9, 1914, a U.S. naval ship docked at Tampico to gather supplies.  Under 
heightened stress caused by nearby rebels, in addition to the capture of U.S. civilians 
attempting to provide them arms, huertista soldiers ordered the crew out and 
subsequently arrested them.
  The decision proved to be one that Huerta would later regret.  
44  After realizing their mistake and the possible 
consequences of what they had done, the soldiers’ regional commander ordered the 
Americans released and provided an apology.  However, as Knight points out, the 
“apology did little to satisfy Rear Admiral Henry T. Mayo,” who, like his superior 
Admiral Frank Fletcher, was bored of the inaction of the navy in the gulf and infuriated 
by the disrespect of Huerta’s soldiers.  Mayo ordered an official apology and a twenty-
one gun salute to the American flag, without consulting any of his military or civilian 
superiors.45
                                                             
 42 Nelson O’Shaughnessy to Federico Gamboa, Mexico City, 13 Aug. 1913, caja 16-9-72, ARSE. 
  Wilson had already decided that he wanted Huerta out of office, but the 
 43 F. Gamboa to Nelson O’Shaughnessy, Mexico City,  15 Aug. 1913, caja 16-9-72, ARSE. 
 44 Robert E. Quirk, An Affair of Honor: Woodrow Wilson and the Occupation of Veracruz 
(Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 1962), 8-31. 
    45 Knight, Mexican Revolution, vol. 2, 150-51. 
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independent nature of top naval officers would continue to shape U.S. actions, often 
contradicting each other and complicating U.S.-Mexican relations. 
  Huerta’s frustration with the United States mounted, and he increasingly 
drummed up anti-Americanism as Wilson’s opinion of the usurper became clear;  
meanwhile, U.S. operatives continued to use wireless communications—on land and 
ships—not only for American residents in Mexico but also for military and diplomatic 
matters.  The Wilson administration fed on these transmissions, trying to sort out the 
divided opinions received from diplomatic and military personnel.  The navy was 
especially crucial to Wilson’s intelligence gathering operations.  The Secretary of the 
Navy Josephus Daniels was close to the president, and wireless devices, like those on 
the battleship New Hampshire, transmitted important matters relating to the situation in 
Mexico, including Huerta’s threat not to accept their esteemed passenger, President 
Wilson’s new replacement for Henry Lane Wilson, John Lind, in August.46  Indeed, 
throughout the Revolution, U.S. warships and consulates used radio to relay messages 
about Mexico to the United States, increasing communications and news of 
revolutionary events, but offering a wide array of contradictory perspectives.47
Actions from the U.S. Pacific Fleet exhibited these incongruities.  The American 
navy had been “observing” the Revolution from the Gulf of California just as their 
counterparts did in the Gulf of Mexico.  Interestingly, the crews in the Pacific showed 
less hostility to Huerta’s forces than the squadron in the Gulf of Mexico.  In fact, 
Huerta’s ships clearly benefitted from the former’s wireless messages.  The 
Constitutionalist navy in the Gulf of California—consisting of one ship, the Tampico—
   
                                                             
46 “Bryan Calm on Huerta Note,” New York Times, 9 Aug. 1913, 2. 
47 “Rebels Menace Line to Capital,” New York Times, 18 Dec. 1913; Adolfo Gilly, The Mexican 
Revolution. trans. Patrick Camiller (New York: The New Press, 2005), 91. 
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possessed radio facilities.  The ship and its crew switched to the Constitutionalists’ side 
in February 1914.  Fernando Sánchez Ayala, a radio telegrapher, who had worked for 
SCOP during the Porfiriato and for the Huerta administration during 1913, installed and 
operated the equipment.48
It is not clear if Obregón and the Constitutionalist forces possessed other radio 
devices that were in close enough range to communicate with Tampico, though it is 
likely that at least one existed.  Of course, rebels did not need to have this equipment for 
the ship’s wireless device to be useful.  The crew could still use it to listen in on federal 
radio stations, including orders to and from the better-outfitted federal warship 
Guerrero and other coast guard and contracted merchant vessels that possessed TSH 
equipment.  The small but proud Constitutionalist navy certainly attempted to use this 
information to their own advantage and passed it along to their compatriots when back 
in harbor.   
  The remaining federal gunboats in the Gulf of California, 
especially the Morelos and Guerrero, quickly moved to punish their traitorous brethren.  
On March 31st the latter ship attacked and greatly damaged the Tampico.  Limping back 
to the small Sinaloan port of Topolobampo, the sailors and local rebels moved to repair 
the vessel.  Carrancista general Alvaro Obregón toured the ship while it was under 
reconstruction in mid-April 1914.  He hoped to use the Tampico in a siege of Mazatlán 
among other operations.   
Despite possessing a radio, the Tampico could not match the Guerrero in battle.  
Shortly after Constitutionalist craftsmen repaired the Tampico in Topolobampo, the 
Guerrero, still in service, attacked it again, this time on June 16 off the shore of the Isla 
                                                             
48 Merchán Escalante, Telecomunicaciones, 74. 
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de San Ignacio, in between Guaymas and Mazatlán.  And this time the Tampico sank.49  
The American Pacific Fleet had tipped off huertista general Joaquín Téllez via a 
“wireless bulletin” that the rebel ship had taken back to the waters in order to aid the 
siege at Mazatlán.50  Téllez then ordered the Guerrero out to confirm the American 
message.  The U.S. navy then watched the subsequent encounter, idling nearby.  Rafael 
López Fuentes, a federal soldier who boarded the disabled Tampico to gather booty, 
reported that he collected a projectile fired by the Guerrero that had not exploded but 
“probably followed the following path: it penetrated the stern, went through the 
chimney, the letter room, [and] the wireless station, killing two men . . .”51
During these naval engagements, the siege of Mazatlán, and, indeed, all of the 
Revolution, American warships floated close by, observing the naval engagements and 
fighting along the coast.  U.S. officers interacted with their Mexican counterparts and 
rescued American citizens.  Press agents on board relayed combat news to the naval 
radio station in San Diego, and in turn, the U.S. press.  One American correspondent on 
the U.S.S. California reported that just moments before the sinking of the Tampico an 
American lieutenant from the American destroyer Preble had “inspected” the rebel ship.  
The rebel crew had asked for American assistance with a tow or ship repairs, but the 
U.S. sailor refused, saying that such an action would counter American neutrality.  
Afterwards, the officer stated that he “found the vessel pitifully unprepared for a fight.  
The guns were without sights and there were only one hundred rounds of ammunition.  
The ship’s boiler had been burned out by the inexperienced crew, and the commander 
   
                                                             
 49 Obregón, Ocho mil kilómetros in campaña, 130-31. 
 50  Enrique Cárdenas de la Peña, Semblanza marítima del México independiente y revolucionario, 
vol. II (Mexico City: Secretaria de Marina, 1970), 224. 
 51 Quoted in Ornelas Herrera, “La radiodifusión mexicana,” 133. 
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of the ship was crippled as a result of an accidental bullet wound in the leg.”  But “for 
four hours the Tampico made a gallant struggle.” 52  Shortly thereafter, the Guerrero’s 
radio operator contacted Rear Admiral Thomas B. Howard, commander of the U.S. 
Pacific Squadron, stating that his ship was going to move north to Guaymas.  The 
cruiser Denver accompanied the federal vessel for much of its voyage, which the New 
York Times relayed as “evidence of the friendly relations existing between Mexican 
federal officials and the United States naval forces.”53  After intercepting and partially 
decoding American messages about the U.S. invasion of Veracruz, huertista naval 
officials became “very confused” respecting an increasingly tense international 
situation.54
 Despite the actions of the U.S. Pacific Fleet, Wilson not only saw Huerta as an 
illegal usurper of power but also a militarizing and—contrary to the hopes of many 
conservatives in the United States and Mexico—a destabilizing force; he went against 
the long-term interests of the United States.  The Wilson administration put in place an 
arms embargo against Huerta and instead slowly fed his opposition.  Huerta, as a result, 
imported a record amount of war materials from Europe and Japan, including wireless 
devices from the former.  According to a New York Times correspondent in Berlin, 
Huerta hired a German company in January 1914 for the erection of a wireless station 
“to maintain communication with the columns of Federal troops operating against the 
rebels in various parts of the country . . . because ordinary telegraph wires are so 
   Something did not make sense.  President Wilson may have set his aims 
against Huerta, but American naval officers showed little ill will in the Pacific. 
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 54 De Dios Bonilla, Apuntes de la historia de la marina nacional, 296. 
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frequently cut.”55  In an April 1914 presidential address Huerta stated that he contracted 
with a German firm to complete the installation of radio communications across the 
country.56   Huerta also allowed the German consulate to continue radio 
communications in Mexico.57  He additionally bought wireless apparatuses from 
France.  As early as June 1913, as Americans were attempting to get the Tampico 
embassy station approved, Huerta was ordering ten radio stations with 20 horse-power 
engines and 100 meter-tall towers from Harlé & Cie. of Paris.  His agents also bought 
twenty heliographs and two automobiles from the same company.  Harlé sent the 
equipment in mid-1914.58  The secret nature of radio operations by the military 
preceding and during Huerta’s rule makes it difficult to determine the precise number of 
radios in use, but Huerta definitely bought more equipment in a shorter period of time 
than any of his predecessors.  European officials, for their part, agreed that Mexico 
needed a strongman, and in turn overwhelmingly supported Huerta’s regime.  Indeed, 
European military and communication equipment sales to Huerta deliberately—if only 
briefly—challenged American influence in Latin America and isolated the Wilson 
administration diplomatically.59
 Still more evidence documents Huerta’s campaign to militarize TSH.  In 1913 he 
reorganized the military, adding a Department of Transportation and Communication 
within the Secretariat of War and Marine. The next year he decreed the opening of a 
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school for military communications.  He also put to work the Mexican navy, with 
vessels equipped with new radio equipment, in pacification projects, especially along 
Sonora, and “to transport troops in the tropical climes.”60  Under orders from Huerta’s 
SCOP, Mexican wireless pioneer Luis Sánchez Martínez had installed the Telefunken 
radio equipment on the warship Guerrero used during its battles in the Gulf of 
California.61
 
  Huerta also stressed that coastal stations were in contact with Chapultepec, 
emphasizing the centralized control over the service while insinuating that the military 
possessed these strategic tools.  Technological domination had been a key feature of 
state power before and during the Revolution, and Huerta, even more than former 
presidents, expanded TSH as a means of control, though his centralizing objectives 
were more narrowly focused on suppression.  In response, Huerta’s enemies gathered 
their own weaponry and communications networks.  
Radio Contra Huerta 
 The escalation of fighting after Madero’s assassination led to a substantial 
increase in the importation and use of radio equipment.  Not only did the Huerta regime 
accelerate the buying and implementation of TSH, but so too did the Constitutionalists, 
the rebel forces under “First Chief” Venustiano Carranza who picked up the banner of 
the preceding Madero revolution.  Unlike Huerta, carrancista forces mostly obtained 
wireless materials from the United States, initiating the beginning of serious U.S. radio 
sales to Mexico and showing the permeability of the border and Wilson’s decision to 
tentatively back Huerta’s opposition.  In 1913 and 1914 radio equipment proved 
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decisive to Constitutionalist and federal maneuvers, and in battles that directly led to 
Huerta’s ouster from office.   
 Well within a year of Carranza’s call to arms, he and allied anti-Huerta insurgents 
possessed a radio station in Hermosillo, the capital of Sonora, where a wireless office 
had been functioning by late 1913.  After capturing the city of Chihuahua on December 
8, 1913, Villa oversaw the construction of a sister station.  Carranza and Villa used the 
operations to spy on the communications of federals and Americans.  Pablo González, 
the Constitutionalists’ General of the Army of the Northeast, established a wireless 
office on his train of war.  According to the memoir of his secretary Manuel W. 
González, the telegraph car adjoined the general’s personal quarters.  It was well kept 
and fitted “with bunk beds for the telegraphers and some of the officials of the general 
staff,” and a telegraph station.  His radio operator was well liked, tall, fat, and a bit of 
jokester.  Both Pablo and Manuel González valued his work as highly as they did his 
likeable personality.62
 TSH thus affected all the three main armies of the Constitutionalist forces: the 
Army of the Northwest, the Army of the Northeast, and the Division of the North.  Of 
these forces the Army of the Northwest possessed the least amount of wireless 
equipment.  No record exists that shows that Alvaro Obregón, the leading commander, 
ever utilized field radios during his slow and methodic operations along the Pacific 
coast.  He never mentioned possessing this type of equipment in his memoirs.  He did 
write about using telegraphy regularly, indeed that it was crucial to his operations.  
Some statements infer the possibility of TSH use.  Obregón wrote that Wallace Buctoll 
of the U.S. Pacific Fleet had contacted him in late April 1914.  In June, Obregón told 
  A nearby radio was a coveted tool. 
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Villa—then in a dispute with Carranza—that he was unclear on the exact details of their 
conflict because the continual rains had hindered the clarity of his telegraphic service.63
Either way, he most certainly understood the importance of this form of 
communication.  Obregón studied the military developments of the Second Boer War, 
and he strove to apply these and other tools and techniques of modern combat.
   
These suggest, though they do not definitively prove, that Obregón used radio 
operations in his army.  
64  He 
also knew that Huerta’s forces possessed stations that threatened his operations in the 
area.  On June 4, 1914, Obregón reported to Constitutionalist General Rafael Buelna, 
that he had dispatched Captain Medina Cruz of San Blas, Tepic, to overtake the small 
federal outpost in the Islas Marías with the goal of destroying the radio office there.  
After commandeering the steamship Union that evening, Medina and a small force 
landed on Isla Magdalena—the island with the wireless post—early before sunrise the 
next morning.  There, he and his small contingent of soldiers overtook and arrested the 
ten federal soldiers and their commanding officer.  Immediately afterwards, Medina’s 
men disabled the wireless outpost by sabotaging the connection between the station’s 
motor and its electrical source.  Obregón commented that by removing this means of 
communication from the federal arsenal, Medina had disabled an operation that greatly 
jeopardized their actions.65
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  The Islas Marías station was indeed important for gathering 
and relaying federal intelligence.  It not only provided information to the other stations 
 64 Knight, The Mexican Revolution, Vol. 2, 147.  Huerta also studied developments in war craft 
that occurred during the Second Boer War. 
 65 Obregón, Ocho mil kilómetros in campaña, 126. 
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in the region under Huerta’s control—in Guaymas and Mazatlán—but also to and from 
ships of war and Mexico City.  
Villa, chief of the Division of the North, proved impressively keen and 
intelligent in his understanding and manipulation of communications and transportation 
networks.  Historians have noted Villa’s smart use of trains, telegraphy, and force 
during his capture of Juárez after his failed first attempt to take the city of Chihuahua.  
Although federal forces assumed he fled south to lick his wounds, he actually moved 
around and seized a train to the north of the city, forcing by gunpoint a train station 
telegrapher to tell Juárez officials that the line to the south was destroyed.  In turn, the 
Juárez operators told the train to return.  Villa loaded up his men, violently convincing 
telegraphers along the way to give the clear.  As historian Alan Knight put it, “Villa’s 
Trojan train rolled into an unsuspecting town.”66
Villa’s use of TSH was fairly extensive.  He obtained wireless equipment to 
build a station in Chihuahua after succeeding to capture the city on December 8, 1913.  
Like González, Villa constructed a mobile device on a military train for his personal 
use.  He most likely acquired these materials from defeated federal forces or from the 
United States, whether as contraband or after Wilson lifted the arms embargo against 
the Constitutionalists in February 1914.  Villa clearly used radio during his decisive 
campaign into central Mexico in the spring of that year.  
  He captured the city without a fight.  
Villa installed a radio station there the following year. 
Wireless communications played a key role in one of the most important battles 
between huertista and villista forces, and of the Revolution: Torreón, March 1914.  This 
battle directly led to Huerta’s resignation from office.  Both Huerta’s generals and the 
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rebel forces relied heavily on radio communication not only to give orders, but also to 
make important tactical decisions.  Transmissions overheard by the U.S. army and 
Villa’s wireless operators initiated the movement of forces at key moments.  On March 
15, Villa ordered his troops to advance towards Torreón:  “His action was hastened by 
the interception of a wireless message from Pres. Huerta at Mexico City to Gen. 
Refugio Velasco, commanding the federal garrison at Torreón.  As caught by Villa’s 
wireless station, the message directed Velasco to take the offensive immediately against 
the Constitutionalists.”67  Consequently, Villa set in motion his own advance and also 
sent information about his actions, including radio interceptions, to the U.S. press via 
imbedded reporters and telegraph messages.  American soldiers at Ft. Bliss, Texas, also 
overheard huertista messages sent out from Torreón to the federal’s advancing forces.  
The benefits that Huerta hoped to gain from radio communications, in this instance, 
were countered by TSH’s military weakness: it could be overheard.  Federal forces in 
Torreón, however, remained in contact with Mexico City leaders until their complete 
defeat on April 6, 1914.  Because of radio, the Huerta leadership knew well of their 
loss, but they continued to spread misinformation to the press and emissaries in the 
capital until the regime could no longer hide the reality of the situation.68
 
  
Conventionalist Communications 
 Despite misinformation to the press and the people of Mexico City, Torreón fell.  
It was the beginning of the end for the Huerta regime.  The usurper left for exile in July 
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as his remaining forces continued to deteriorate.  But instead of ending the fighting, the 
violence escalated further as the Constitutionalists split, starting another round of civil 
war.  The October 1914 Aguascalientes Convention ended in failure, ending in dreams 
of peace.  Intended to mend differences, the meeting facilitated the joining of villista 
and zapatista forces under the “presidency” of convention-elected Eulalio Gutiérrez 
against those who remained loyal to Carranza.  The former group designated themselves 
the Conventionalists, while the later retained the name of Constitutionalists.  Almost 
immediately thereafter the Conventionalists captured Mexico City while the 
Constitutionalists fled to Veracruz to set up their base of operations there.  However, as 
it quickly became apparent that Gutiérrez was little more than, as one historian put it, a 
“store front” president, Villa and Zapata retained their positions of leadership and 
fought the carrancistas on their own terms.69
 Villa built on established foundations.  As aforementioned, Villa relied 
substantially on electronic communications, including radio, before and after his brief 
stint in Mexico City.  For example, they played a key part in his maintenance of military 
domination and his attempts at economic stimulation in his Chihuahua stronghold.  
Silvestre Terrazas, Villa’s close aid, wrote that  
  
the telephone network, with its center in the capital 
[Chihuahua], was augmented by many kilometers, 
connecting many of the distant villages of the Sierra 
Madre, thus beginning civilized life. And with the 
wireless station, we achieved immediate communication 
with the whole world.  During Villa’s occupation of 
Chihuahua, the area immediately witnessed the 
consolidation of all kinds of communication, and with the 
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well cared for postal service, greatly facilitated activity 
and transactions throughout the region.70
 
 
 Other sources confirm Villa’s efforts to establish a well-functioning government and 
economy in the region.71
 Once in nominal control of Mexico City, the Gutiérrez administration worked 
with the remaining SCOP officials to expand the power of the Chapultepec station 
beginning in November of 1914.
 
72  They also took time to repair the telegraph lines 
connecting their bases of support in Morelos and to the north.  The relationship between 
the Conventionalist and SCOP leadership, however, never had time to cement.  
Gutiérrez, members of his general staff, and the villista and zapatista armies, possessed 
a limited understanding of how the Mexico City bureaucracy worked.73
 Throughout much of 1915 the fractious rebel forces fought over Mexico City.  
After carrancistas successfully took control of the capital for the first time since their 
original evacuation, Villa moved back to the north and Zapata to the south, the regions 
where each felt most secure.  But still, Conventionalists continued to force the 
carrancista generals Obregón and González to each evacuate the city after securing it 
for a short period of time, the latter for only eight days in July.  Indeed, the capital 
changed hands five times from July 1914 to July 1915.  On each occasion the 
  The civil war 
itself disrupted any chance of educating themselves.  Before the improvements to the 
Chapultepec station were complete, Constitutionalist forces were already on the march 
to re-take the capital. 
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surrendering army sabotaged the wireless station and then the invading forces worked to 
repair it.74
 By February 1915, zapatistas possessed a radio operation in Cuernavaca: “The 
Clandestine Wireless Office.”
 
75
 Although interference made reception difficult at times, the equipment generally 
functioned well.  These intelligence agents always worked at night, when reception of 
radio signals was clearest.  According to González, “the results in the wireless office 
were far better than I had originally hoped for.”
  The beginning date for this station—or at least when it 
show up in historical documentation—suggests that the equipment may have arrived 
with the provisional Conventionalist government as it fled to Cuernavaca from Mexico 
City in late January 1915.  L. G. González and a handful of other operators used the 
office’s receiver to intercept messages.  What they found varied greatly.  Transmissions 
ranged from personal regards to family members to information about Constitutionalist 
operations to messages sent to business headquarters from U.S. shrimp companies.  
76  One night he picked up coded 
messages from a radio in zapatista territory, an unknown portable device sending 
messages to the enemy.  During the same listening session he tuned into transmissions 
from a Japanese vessel on the high sea north of the Isla Marias.77
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 Most overheard transmissions came from carrancista stations along both the Gulf 
of Mexico and the Pacific Ocean, which were frequent.  Oftentimes these messages 
were about small financial matters and the movements of individuals or troops.  Many 
of them were inconsequential, but others consisted of discussions on important topics 
by Constitutionalist leaders including Luis Cabrera, Governor Luis Caballero, General 
A. I. Villarreal, General Jesús Acuña, General Alvaro Obregón, and even First Chief 
Venustiano Carranza. 
 American businesses and ships provided the other great source of messages.  San 
Francisco and New Orleans based companies communicated fairly regularly with ships 
off of Mexican waters but also with the stations at Mazatlán and Veracruz.  These 
companies, along with others—especially from the U.S. West Coast—were engaged in 
trade with Mexican companies and with Constitutionalist forces, all while the navy 
anchored nearby.  In the Gulf of Mexico, the Cuernavaca station intercepted messages 
from the U.S. navy to Washington, DC, via the Key West wireless station.  Most of 
these signals, however, were in a code that the zapatista radio operators failed to crack.  
 The zapatistas also possessed at least one field radio. They used it in the battles 
over Mexico City, likely using it to communicate between Cuernavaca and the front 
lines.  In July 1915, carrancista General Coss captured one such zapatista unit 
retreating from Mexico City.78
 However, it is difficult to discern who if anybody communicated with the 
Clandestine Wireless Office in Cuernavaca.  Apparently at least one field device 
  The predominate image of zapatistas stands that they 
were peasant rebels, but they achieved a certain degree of technological sophistication 
little acknowledged.  
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existed.  But messages from zapatista portable radios or villista stations do not appear 
in the historical record, an interesting and confounding omission.  It may be that this 
particular Cuernavaca operation only received messages—nothing is mentioned about 
transmission.  Of course, not sending messages had one advantage; zapatista 
communications could not be overheard.  The clandestine nature of these operations 
makes historical certainty, in this case, a difficult if not impossible endeavor.  
  Meanwhile, Villa constructed stations in areas he controlled in northern Mexico.  
In May 1915 his men started construction on a tower and radio house in the city of 
Durango.  Villistas built another station in Ciudad Juárez.  At times, Villa’s forces 
controlled wireless communications not only these cities but also in the city of 
Chihuahua, Torreón, Mexico City, and in the field.  His communications system was 
impressive, but maintaining it against Constitutionalist forces proved problematic. 
 
Conclusion:  Radio, Civil War, and U.S. Intervention 
After reviewing the first five years of the Revolution, it is clear that the upheaval 
increased the presence of wireless technology while shifting radio use from national 
expansion to the needs of factional combatants.  Under Madero a number of important 
advances were made, including wireless communication with foreign nations, but 
development occurred largely along the lines already established during the Porfiriato.  
Madero, and especially Huerta, also increased TSH imports specifically for military 
purposes.  Following the assassination of Madero, Huerta’s opposition, the 
Constitutionalists, built their own radio network in response to the overthrow, 
ultimately benefitting from Wilson’s distaste for Huerta.  When Carranza could no 
126 
 
longer maintain control over his own alliances, the breakaway Conventionalists used 
their portion of the wireless operations to facilitate governance and for intelligence 
gathering, but the Constitutionalists who remained loyal to the First Chief proved 
keener in communications strategy and development.  The struggle to establish 
dominance in telegraphy would become an essential component of their military and 
administrative planning.  They were also well aware that as long as any side failed to 
monopolize communications the struggle would continue to divide and damage the 
nation. 
The operations of the U.S. navy and diplomatic core also proved disjointed but 
significant to the course of the war.  Whatever the motives of Woodrow Wilson’s 
decision to oust Huerta, and there were many—the influence of Presbyterian covenant 
theology, personal beliefs about democracy and stability, business interests—enacting a 
clear policy in Mexico proved difficult.79
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  The reason why was twofold.  First, Wilson 
faced a barrage of contradictory accounts from diplomats, special agents, and admirals; 
and secondly, the actions of naval personnel along the Mexican coasts complicated 
matters.  While the newly formed Wilson administration diligently strived to understand 
the situation, naval officers in different theaters often acted on their own accord while 
awaiting orders.  Nonetheless, Wilson’s dislike of Huerta ultimately favored Carranza, 
especially after Huerta dissolved congress on October 10, 1914, and Wilson more 
firmly set his mind to regime change in Mexico.  The Constitutionalist forces gathered 
steam as they gained greater access to American supplies and as the Huerta 
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administration suffered from constant U.S. harassment.  One of the more important 
military imports from their northern neighbors, radio proved crucial to Carranza’s 
operations, and the Constitutionalists utilized the equipment with skill, helping to 
facilitate victories during the renewed civil war against Zapata and Villa. 
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 Chapter Four 
 
Reconsolidating the Nation-State 
 
 
Wireless communications defied the bandits, and in a 
large measure our success was due to our ability to 
keep in touch with centers of supplies and the 
outer world. 
—Ignacio Bonillas, 19161
 
 
                                                             
 
 After a number of months battling over the nation’s capital, Carranza’s forces 
entered Mexico City once again on July 31, 1915.  And though their position was still 
fragile, this time they stayed.  Taking the capital, in addition to subsequent victories 
over Villa’s forces in battles including Celaya and León, allowed Carranza’s 
government to obtain firmer control over the country while marginalizing the villistas 
and zapatistas.  During the next five years the Constitutionalists strove to bring the 
whole of the national territory under their  power, making great strides though never 
completely succeeding.  Nevertheless, radio, like railroads and wire telegraphy before, 
became a crucial tool for reconsolidating state power and to obtaining recognition from 
governments abroad.  It was vital for defeating opposing revolutionaries and 
reactionaries still at large and in bringing the centralization and nationalist movements 
of the late Porfiriato to new heights.  Radio technology also became a more crucial 
element in foreign relations under Carranza, not only in interactions with the belligerent 
empires fighting World War I, but also in the Constitutionalists’ opposition to U.S. 
imperialism and their own expansionist endeavors in Central America. 
 
                                                             
 1 Ignacio Bonillas, quoted in “Mexico Being Reconstructed,” New York Times, 5 Nov. 1916, SM9. 
129 
 
Winning the Civil War  
 From the onset of Carranza’s participation in the Revolution, he considered 
communications vital to his success.  Radiotelegraphy continued in importance during 
his actions against opposing militant factions from 1915 to 1920.  Warfare had taken a 
toll on the country’s transportation and communication networks and repairing 
sabotaged telegraph lines became increasingly difficult and costly.  Of course, Carranza 
ardently repaired these links, but to help offset this problem, the Constitutionalist 
leadership also increasingly sought out radios.  In April 1917, Carranza told the 
Constituionalist congress that telegraphers were “the vanguard of the military column.”  
And that they were essential to the “triumph of the Constitutionalist forces.”2  In the 
same speech he proclaimed that his administration had purchased $261,088 dollars 
worth of radio equipment from the United States, that they controlled twelve land 
stations—four of which he deemed high power—four wireless sets aboard ships of war, 
and five portable military radios.3
 Carranza had maintained wireless services throughout the civil wars.  The station 
in Veracruz, the First Chief’s temporary base of operations in late 1914 and early 1915, 
remained functioning and carried out important communications to foreign and 
Constitutionalist sea vessels, the United States—mainly New Orleans—and other 
carrancista offices.  During the same time, Carranza’s communications officers re-
established wireless links between Saltillo and Veracruz.  They also maintained control 
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of the high-powered Campeche station.4  General Pablo Gónzalez found ways to 
incorporate TSH In the northeast of the country.  On December 26, 1914, he boarded 
the New York and Cuba Steamship Company’s steamer Santiago at port in Tampico 
and convinced Peter Podell, Chief Wireless Operator of the ship, to fix the port city’s 
wireless station.  Before Podell got underway, Gónzalez used the Santiago radio to send 
messages to Carranza.5
 In addition to heliographs, flags, and wire telegraphs, Constitutionalist general 
Alvaro Obregón used wireless devices in his spring 1915 campaign against Villa.  As 
John Mason Hart states in Empire and Revolution, “The Constitutionalists who marched 
out of Veracruz . . . to defeat the Villistas and Zapatistas carried a wide array of arms, 
including strategically important artillery and field radios for spotters.”
  These gulf stations were important to Carranza.  They made 
possible revenue increases from more efficient trade, greater communication with 
companies that provided foodstuffs and war materials, and ongoing conversations with 
outside political agents, increasing Carranza’s influence abroad and his chances of 
recognition by foreign governments.  
6  Although it is 
debatable whether the Americans purposefully left this equipment specifically to aid the 
carrancistas as Hart concludes, it was left and used nevertheless.  Carranza also 
understood that radio messages could be overheard by villistas and Americans, which 
he played to his advantage during and after battles including Celaya, especially as a 
means of psychological warfare and publicity.7
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Like the zapatistas’ Clandestine Radio Office in Cuernavaca, constitucionalista 
stations also worked as intelligence gathering outposts, though they had the additional 
benefit and risk of possessing relatively reliable and powerful transmitting apparatuses.  
Carrancista communications officials, such as Mario Méndez—a close Carranza 
communications advisor, lover of all things German, and then head of the Campeche 
station—especially focused on American transmissions.8
 Carranza also obtained much of Huerta’s small but significant navy, including 
radio-equipped vessels such as the Guerrero and the Melchor Ocampo.  The latter saw 
important action in battles over Tampico in 1915 and 1916.  In 1914 the radio-savvy 
General González ordered wireless devices placed aboard the Zaragoza, an old corvette.  
Indeed, by April 1917 the Constitutionalists had at least four ships with radios.  The last 
of these, the Progreso, was a war transport that an American company in New Orleans 
revamped with “a modern radiotelegraphic station with a range of six hundred miles in 
all directions.”  Before Obregón’s rise to power in 1920, wireless specialists 
additionally equipped the government ship Chiapas.
  This station remained in 
carrancista hands throughout the remainder of the Revolution.  
9
 Following the Conventionalists’ final expulsion from Mexico City, the villista and 
zapatista radio operations fell one by one into the hands of the marching 
Constitutionalists.  In August 1915, Jesús Acuña, Carranza’s Minister of Foreign 
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Relations, proclaimed that the Chapultepec station was “now in complete working 
order.”10  With field radios originally used against Huerta in addition to those left 
behind by American forces, Obregón and González pushed into enemy territory.11
  Carrancista officials improved the facilities with new equipment during the 
following year.
  By 
the end of December 1915, villista officials turned over Juárez and its radio station to 
Constitutionalist agents.  Carrancista general Francisco Murguía took Torreón from the 
east and Obregón took Chihuahua City the following year, gaining the wireless 
operations in those respective cities as well.  In the summer of 1916, González took 
over the zapatista radio operation in Cuernavaca.  
12  Although often sabotaged by their withdrawing enemies, 
Constitutionalists repaired these stations and had them in full working order before the 
end of 1916.  In fact, in the final battle of Torreón the defending Constitutionalists used 
radio much like huertista forces had before.  Some of it was the same equipment.  This 
time, however, the defenders were being honest when they transmitted news of Villa’s 
defeat.13
 The Constitutionalists also used radio to keep tabs on and interfere with the U.S. 
forces, especially after Villa’s raid on Columbus, New Mexico.  Desperate after a 
number of disastrous defeats and angered by U.S. recognition and support of Carranza, 
Villa and a small band of his soldiers raided the small American town on March 9, 
1916.  This action would once again provoke the Woodrow Wilson administration.  
This time he sent the Punitive Expedition, led by General John “Black Jack” Pershing, 
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to destroy the villistas.  This, in turn, shifted Constitutionalist radio use in a new 
direction—spying and interfering with American ground forces.  The Carranza 
government wanted Villa’s remaining army disbanded, but it could not look weak or 
tolerant of Americans in Mexico.  He definitely did not want to look like a puppet of 
U.S. whims, precisely what Villa accused him of being.  Carranza’s forces kept tabs on 
American and villista movements, using spies and Villa’s old border radio station in 
Juárez.  
 The American chase for Villa was truly a wireless event.  In fact, it was a major 
testing ground for U.S. military technologies as a whole.  Although the American armed 
forces had used planes, automobiles, and radios to increase vigilance along the Mexican 
border, the invasion provided the first application of these technologies in a military 
campaign into a foreign territory.  Despite difficulties, imbedded journalists sent back 
news of the expedition via wireless to the United States on a daily basis. In the United 
States, newspapers printed these reports in sensationalized accounts in cities across the 
country.  Soldiers in the field and naval radio operators in warships along the Mexican 
coasts sent and received messages from American forts along the U.S.-Mexico border. 
Carrancista radio operators, in turn, interfered with American transmissions.  
U.S. army officials regularly complained that their services were “repeatedly interrupted 
by high power radio waves sent out from one or more [Mexican] stations.”14
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  Of course, 
intentional sabotage by Mexicans was not the sole problem.  Constitutionalist radio 
operators sending reports to Mexico City about U.S. messages they overheard caused 
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inadvertent interference.  American messages also “got tangled up with such things as 
wheat quotations” or other non-military related transmissions.15
Carrancista spies were more interested in using TSH for gathering intelligence 
than disrupting services.  The Juárez station, freshly taken from Villa, proved especially 
useful.  On a nightly basis operators listened to the messages transmitted to and from 
Fort Bliss and Fort Sam Houston, Texas, the American army in northern Mexico, and 
other U.S. stations along the border.  To the surprise of wireless listeners in Columbus, 
New Mexico, and Fort Bliss, Texas, they discovered the Juárez operation after 
overhearing Mexican transmissions discussing American messages.  U.S. military 
officials thought that Carranza’s soldiers had disabled Villa’s station in Juárez.
   
16  They 
were wrong.  In fact, a carrancista employee had just recently finished slapping a new 
coat of paint on the facilities in addition to refurbishing the electric wiring.17
As the Punitive Expedition plodded its way out of Mexico, Carranza’s forces 
dominated wireless communications across Mexico.  They controlled thirty radio 
offices by March 1917—only sixteen fully functional—but still, no other group in 
Mexico could challenge their domination in wireless technology.
  Radio did 
not likely change the outcome of the Punitive Expedition, but it did help Carranza 
maintain a rapid system of intelligence, which influenced the policies of 
Constitutionalist leaders.  
18
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    17 Subsecretario de Hacienda to Venustiano Carranza, Mexico City, to Guadalajara, 8 Mar. 1916, 
CDLXXX. 1. 84. 1, CEHM.  
18  “Una de las grandes obras de la revolución, El Pueblo, 12 Mar. 1917, 10.  
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essentialness of radio to the Constitutionalist cause.  In early November 1916 he said 
that as the war progressed and they acquired more territory, communications grew more 
difficult, leading carrancista officials to “establish a system of wireless telegraphy that 
extended all over Mexico . . . The overwhelming importance of such a system was 
demonstrated during the Revolution.  Wireless communications defied the bandits, and 
in a large measure our success was due to our ability to keep in touch with centers of 
supplies and the outer world.”19   In order to obtain these apparatuses, Bonillas furthered 
that the Constitutionalists dispatched experts to the United States to secure the “most 
modern appliances and inventions.”20
Publications by Modesto C. Rolland, a young engineer and former 
carrancista communications officer who was serving as a propaganda agent in 
the United States, provided comments similar to Bonillas’s.  In 1917 he argued 
that “The wireless service has been improved to such an extent that we are able 
to make the assertion that the entire Republic is covered by stations that control 
the country in a far more efficient manner, proportionately, than the same 
service does in the United States.”
  Nearly in the same breath, he commented that 
government officials had taken over the wireless operation at the American Copper 
Company’s Cananea mine in Sonora.  The Constitutionalists would buy American 
products but they would not tolerate private U.S. wireless operations in Mexico, at least 
those without Carranza’s consent. 
21
                                                             
19  Ignacio Bonillas, quoted in “Mexico Being Reconstructed,” New York Times 5 Nov. 1916, 
SM9. 
  Although a bold and perhaps overstated 
20  Ibid. 
    21 M. C. Rolland, A Reconstructive Policy in Mexico (New York: Latin-American News 
Association, 1917), 7. 
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claim, the Constitutionalists had indeed made significant headway in expanding 
wireless communications across the nation.  
Nevertheless, Villa, Zapata, and Félix Díaz, the nephew of Porfirio Díaz, 
remained threats to carrancista control.  Villa, for example, forced Carranza to 
maintain a large military presence in Chihuahua and Coahuila where villista 
guerilla forces remained active.22  The radiotelegraphy stations in those states 
continued to be used for military operations.  Indeed, communications officials 
updated these stations with new high-powered devices.  Still, Villa briefly took 
Torreón, the home to one of these facilities.  Carranza’s officers, including 
Francisco Murguía, who repulsed Villa from the city of Chihuahua in 1917, 
possessed “two mobile devices that communicate with the wireless stations of 
Chihuahua, Tampico, Alamos, etc . . . which has been improving the condition 
of our forces in that region.”23
The zapatistas also remained a serious if weakened threat.  As previously 
mentioned, General Pablo González had revamped the wireless office in 
Cuernavaca in 1916 and the carrancistas had taken possession of most, if not 
all, of the zapatista wireless equipment.  Meanwhile, the forces under his 
command ravaged the state.  Still, by the end of the year, González had failed to 
suppress the rebels who continued to wreak havoc on trains and along the 
  Indeed, radio increasingly became a regular 
component of intelligence gathering in the last campaign against Villa from 
1917 to 1920.  But despite the technological edge, the carrancistas never caught 
Villa, who prided himself on his intimate knowledge of the northern mountains.  
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southern fringe of Mexico City.  He subsequently withdrew from the state 
without success.  It is not clear if the zapatistas recovered any of the wireless 
equipment afterwards.  It appears that González took it with him.  A February 
1917 article in the Constitutionalist newspaper El Pueblo reported that the 
Morelos radio station was in good working order and that communications were 
clear between Chapultepec and Morelos: a strange statement since Zapata’s 
forces retook Cuernavaca in January 1917.24  Morelos remained largely in 
zapatista hands until 1918, when González marched into Morelos once again.  
Even after the assassination of Zapata in 1919, many of Morelos’ residents 
resisted Constitutionalist control until Obregón gained power in 1920, thereafter 
making amends with much of the remaining zapatista leadership.25
According to historian Douglas Richmond, of all the threats of the time 
“Carranza considered the conservative Félix Díaz to be his greatest menace.”
  
26
                                                             
 24 Ibid; John Womack, Jr., Zapata and the Mexican Revolution (New York: Vintage, 1970), 271-
78; Samuel Brunk, ¡Emiliano Zapata! Revolution and Betrayal in Mexico, (Albuquerque: University of 
New Mexico Press, 1995), 188-94; Paul Hart, Bitter Fruit: The Social Transformation of Morelos, 
Mexico, and the Origins of the Zapatista Revolution, 1840-1910 (Albuquerque: University of New 
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Largely fueled by provincial uprisings against Carranza’s military and political 
policies, Díaz, along with a number of Porfirian reactionaries, used the local 
unrest to gain supporters in central and southern Mexico beginning in 1916.  
They proposed a return to the 1857 Constitution and defended against what 
locals perceived as northern interlopers.  Even without Díaz, states including 
Tabasco and Chiapas had large populations that resisted carrancista forces from 
northern Mexico.  Díaz took advantage of these regional sentiments.  
 25 Knight, The Mexican Revolution, vol. 2, 366. 
 26 Richmond, Venustiano Carranza’s Nationalist Struggle, 162. 
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Díaz’s forces prompted Carranza to expand radio communications into 
Tabasco.  Striving to establish greater control of the state, carrancista SCOP 
officials started construction on a radio tower in Villahermosa in 1917.  Some 
within the SCOP had wanted to build the wireless office in the coastal town of 
Frontera, but Governor Luis Domínguez argued that Villahermosa was the better 
choice because it was the state’s capital, centrally located, and would be better 
situated to assist against Díaz’s operations near the Tabasco towns of Teapa and 
Tacotalpa.27  And as historian Alan Knight mentions, the felicista forces that 
operated through Veracruz, Oaxaca, Chiapas, and the border of Tabasco 
jeopardized  “communications between the central plateau and both the Gulf 
Coast and the Yucatán Peninsula.”28
Throughout Carranza’s rule, the military continued to expand radio.  In 
1918 and 1919 the government built stations in Guadalajara, Jalisco, and 
Córdoba, Veracruz, both “dedicated to the military necessities of the states, in 
combination with two portable stations.”
  Building the station in Villahermosa 
allowed for a more consistent communications link between these areas without 
relying on the always susceptible wire telegraphs.  
29
                                                             
 27 Luis Domínguez to Venustiano Carranza, Villahermosa to Mexico City, 30 Mar. 1917, caja 139, 
exp. xi/481.5/285, AHSDN. 
  They used these instruments to 
connect urban bases of operation to combat zones and to counter the sabotaging 
of telegraph lines in contested areas.  Wireless technology helped the 
Constitutionalists keep tabs on American, villista, zapatista, and felicista forces, 
 28 Knight, The Mexican Revolution, vol. 2, 375. 
 29 “Estaciones radiotelegraficas,” El Heraldo de México, 2 Sept. 1919, 6.  
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which allowed Carranza to maintain at least a modicum of control over large 
swaths of territory. 
 
Rebuilding the Nation 
The pro-Carranza newspaper El Pueblo titled a March 12 headline “One of the 
Great Works of the Revolution.”  Discussing the growing wireless system, the article 
stated that “The services provided by this network to date, are immense, and are due, in 
large part, to the progressive march that has followed the military operations in all of 
the national territory.”30
Indeed, radio development became a crucial part of a renewed nation-building 
campaign.  Although nationalist tendencies were not new when the Revolution broke 
out, Carranza brought rhetoric about Mexican sovereignty and nationalism to a new 
fever pitch.  After the military, Carranza spent more funds on communications and 
transportation than anything else.
  State building and conquest went hand-in-hand.  Carranza not 
only sought out military success but also wanted to establish the foundations of a new 
Mexican nation.  A number of his administrators pushed for the expansion of radio as a 
means to modernize and solidify the Mexico of the future, one they hoped to shape and 
control. 
31
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  Carranza further nationalized the railway system, 
taking control of the lines that had remained in foreign hands.  He also proclaimed state 
control over the railroad telegraph and telephone operations.  From 1915 to 1919 the 
Carranza administration dramatically increased telegraph services in almost all of 
Mexico, expanding the lines from 1,500,000 kilometers to well over 5,000,000 
 31 Ruíz, The Great Rebellion, 346. There was also a significant amount of spending within the 
military budget on communications and transportation.  
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kilometers.32  By mid 1917, the SCOP took up a number of other public works projects 
as well. These were mostly projects started during the Porfiriato but had been 
abandoned during the Revolution, including new railroads, harbor improvements, 
irrigation development, and the national theatre in Mexico City.33
In regards to radio, Carranza’s government enacted two important laws.  
Although it had been government policy since the Porfiriato that all wireless operations 
obtain a state permit to operate legally within the country, most of the U.S. mining 
businesses possessing wireless equipment failed to register their devices.  Porfirian 
officials had either not known or ignored these trespasses, but the First Chief shut these 
stations down.  For one, their existence provoked his nationalist sentimentality, but 
more importantly, they sent messages about Mexican forces to the U.S. military, 
consulates, and businessmen.  In mid March, Carranza established a strict censorship on 
these stations.  Plutarco Elías Calles, then military governor of Sonora, ordered the 
dismantling of the wireless plants in the Cananea and the Nacozari mines.
 
34
                                                             
 32 Richmond, Venustiano Carranza’s Nationalist Struggle, 92-93. 
  On 
October 19, 1916, in response to the continuing civil war but also the Pershing 
Expedition, Carranza and Manuel Rodríguez Gutiérrez—Bonillas’s successor as 
Minister of Communications—published a decree clarifying the First Chief’s policies 
on radio.  The regulations mainly reiterated that individuals or companies could not 
operate radio equipment without government permission.  They were further prevented 
from divulging government information transmitted via radio.  Those who broke the 
law could face a 500 to 1,000 peso fine, up to eleven months in jail, and the confiscation 
 33 “Mexico Plans Many Big Improvements,” Los Angeles Times, 7 Jul. 1917, 19. 
   34 “Optimism along Border,” New York Times, 30 Mar. 1916, 2. 
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of their equipment “to the nation.”35
This law also largely affected foreigners since only two of the dozen or so 
foreign radio operations in Mexico, including the El Aguila oil company, were legally 
registered.  Under this decree carrancistas continued to bring more pressure on 
American mining endeavors.  The American military, or at least the navy, also became 
weary of these stations, since they were not only illegal in Mexican law, but also 
because international observers saw them as a breach of the London International 
Wireless Convention of 1912, of which both Mexico and the United States were signing 
members.  American officials had grown increasingly wary of squabbles over 
infringements of international communications.
  A difficult law to enforce, but it proved useful in 
providing a legal basis for expropriating enemy radio equipment. 
36
Legislators further codified wireless communications in Article 28 of the 
1917 Constitution, which disallowed private or government monopolies 
excepting those “relating to the coinage of money, to the postal, telegraphic and 
radiotelegraphic services.”
   
37  Carranza believed that this section of the document 
held significance because it restricted the creation of foreign monopolistic 
practices.38
                                                             
 35  “Que la reglamentada la instalación de estaciones,” El Economista, 26 Oct.1916, 1. 
  It also clearly categorized radiotelegraphy as a type of public work 
to be controlled by the government.  To help enforce the new policies, Carranza 
sent “special wireless men” to search “the hills near Mexico City, and [to make 
sure] all state governors have received instructions from Mexico City to keep a 
 36 State Department to Navy Department, “Memo. for Aid for Operations,” Washington, DC, 16 
Feb. 1915, RG 59, fold. 812.74/33, USNA.  
 37 The Mexican Constitution of 1917 Compared with the Constitution of 1857, translated and 
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close watch to prevent the establishment of wireless plants without government 
authorization.”39
The Constitutionalist leadership spent large sums of money developing a 
national communications system that emphasized increased radio services.  In late 
1915, a Carranza agent in California sought out “seven radio outfits to be furnished to 
the Mexican government for use along the lower west coast.”
  This also served to counter American claims of rogue German 
operations in Mexico; after all, World War I was now in full swing.  
40  In addition to the 
stations taken from Villa and Zapata, carrancista general Salvador Alvarado finished a 
radio station in Mérida, Yucatán.41  Towards the end of the year communications 
workers toiled “day and night” to build a wireless office just outside the city of Oaxaca 
on Fortín Hill.42  A station in Acapulco, Guerrero, was also up and running before the 
year’s end.43
Under Manuel Rodríguez Gutiérrez’s directorship of the SCOP (late 1916-1920) 
wireless development flourished.  In 1917 he “ordered the installation of wireless 
stations in all the ports open along the coasts of the Republic, both on the Pacific and on 
the Gulf.”
  
44  A highly ambitious goal, but the government was genuine in its 
developmental course, if not successful at every port.  The administration spent 
$261,088 dollars on TSH that year alone, a significant sum.  One station under 
construction, on the Isla de Lobos, Veracruz, worked in tandem with a cast-iron 
Porfirian lighthouse that guided ships around Cabo Rojo, the Red Cape.45
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  The 
 40 “Radios for the Mexican Coast,” Los Angeles Times, 20 Nov. 1915, II 1. 
 41 “La estación inalámbrica de Mérida,” El Economista, 9 Nov. 1916, 5. 
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following year radiotelegraphers were using it to communicate with new equipment in 
the port of Túxpan, 33 miles away.  With these devices, Carranza profited from 
increased trade and important international political links.  The Pacific coast stations 
likewise improved trade routes, aiding passenger liners and cargo ships.46  New 
services, for example, began between Mazatlán to the Islas Marias.  Inland, Carranza’s 
DGTN made “radical repairs” on the Alamo station in southern Sonora.  Before mid 
year, the wireless office was in a ‘perfect state,” with “direct service to Mexico City, 
Bocochibampo, Mazatlán, and San José del Cabo.”47
Before the end of 1918, the Carranza administration possessed eighteen 
functioning stations in total and was in the process of building four more.  The 
government—with substantial assistance from German specialists—also finished the 
powerful “experimental” receiver at Ixtapalapa, Federal District. 
   
48  During the 
following year, the government acquired land for a new wireless office in Saltillo, 
Coahuila, and opened the radio stations in Túxpan and Isla de Lobos, Veracruz, and 
Necaxa, Puebla, for public service.  Pascual Ortiz Rubio, the governor of Michoacán, 
solicited authorization to build a station in the state capital of Morelia.  General 
Francisco D. Santiago likewise asked to establish a radiotelegraphy office in Tepic, 
Nayarit.49
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  The same year, SCOP officials installed newer and higher-powered devices 
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The following year Carranza bought thousands of dollars worth of equipment 
from abroad.  These devices and parts came from the United States, but also from 
Germany.  Employees of the DGTN added equipment to the Tampico station, erected a 
high-powered radio station in Salina Cruz, Oaxaca, and started preparations for new 
works at Puerto Morelos, Quintana Roo, and Bahía Magdalena, Baja California.  Trade 
and state control in important frontiers and commercial areas drove the construction of 
these later operations more than fighting villistas or zapatistas.  SCOP officials and 
German specialists also finished a 200-kilowatt transmitter and two smaller devices at 
Chapultepec.  Consisting of three giant towers 165 meters tall and 12 by 42 meters 
around, the station could send messages over a distance of 9,320 miles, at least on a 
good night.  It compared well with the most advanced transmitters in Europe and the 
United States.  In tandem with the sensitive receiver that picked up messages from 
around the world at the Ixtapalapa station, communications officers could send 
messages to a large portion of Europe, Japan, and South America.  By 1919 there were 
twenty-three fully functional radio stations in Mexico that sent 304,089 messages in that 
year alone.50
In the process of building a viable wireless network to combat their enemies and 
to dominate communications with foreigners, the Carranza administration renewed the 
old goal of increasing central control over Baja California and Quintana Roo.  They 
repaired and refurbished the station at Xcalak, which a hurricane destroyed.  Workers 
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fixed the device quickly because “the remote area” had “no other kind of 
communication with the rest of the country.”51  In 1919 the government finished 
building another high-power station in La Paz, Southern District of Baja California, to 
replace the San José del Cabo office, which was also cut down by a hurricane.  Indeed, 
repairs were needed constantly at most stations, especially for those that faced harsh 
weather conditions.  The business paper El Economista stressed that radio was a “great 
benefit to all the peninsulas states because they can obtain rapid communication with 
the interior of the country.”52  In addition to building a new radio station at Puerto 
Morelos, Quintana Roo— between present-day Cancún and Playa del Carmen—the 
Carranza administration reopened discussions with Great Britain about Mexican ship 
access to Payo Obispo via Chetumal Bay.53  In 1917 Carranza deployed a federal forest 
commission to study the valuable woods located in the region.  With improved port 
facilities and access, scientific knowledge, and increased communications, the Carranza 
administration and affiliated commercial operatives hoped to reap rewards from the 
timber and chicle or gum industry.54
The return to a frontier-connecting radio policy is also clearly 
demonstrated in the continued writings of Modesto C. Rolland.  In 1919 he 
headed a commission designed to report on the economic and infrastructural 
conditions in the Northern District of Baja California.  Another underlying goal 
of the mission was to bring the Baja California peninsula, which had remained 
largely independent during the Revolution, back under federal control.  Rolland 
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believed that one of the best methods for establishing a stronger presence was 
wireless communications.  He praised the region’s radiotelegraphic operations.  
Carranza officials had recently built powerful stations in La Paz in the south, 
and in Mexicali, the capital of the north.  Constitutionalists also constructed or 
took possession of local stations built in the Northern District of Baja California, 
including Ensenada, Tijuana, Tecate, and Los Algodones.  These wireless 
outposts not only linked the territory together, but through Mexicali “intimately 
united this remote region with the center of the republic which had lamentably 
lived disconnected due to a lack of efficient communication.”55
Rolland additionally warned that northern Baja California had become 
too reliant on the United States to relay information.  This especially became 
problematic when American officials placed stricter regulations on 
communications during World War I.  Rolland argued that without the Mexicali 
station, the Northern District of Baja California “would become almost 
completely isolated due to the severity of the measure employed by the 
neighboring nation.”
     
56
 
   These stations helped facilitate a long process of 
dragging the peninsula back into the federal system.   
German Influences and Constitutionalist Foreign Relations:  
The Zimmerman Telegram, World War I, and Carranza’s Expansion of Radio 
 
 Connecting the frontier peninsulas to Mexico City via radio was a return to the 
policies of Díaz and Madero, but Carranza went a step further by overseeing the 
                                                             
 55 Modesto C. Rolland, Informe sobre el Distrito Norte de la Baja California (Mexicali: 
Universidad Autónoma de Baja California, 1993), 38-39. 
 56 Ibid, 51. 
147 
 
construction of high-power stations in the capital and expanding radio’s role in foreign 
relations.  Mexico renewed its participation in international conferences about wireless 
policies and donated a radio station to El Salvador, attempting to counter U.S. influence 
in the region.  But these foreign policy endeavors were aimed just as much at securing 
Constitutionalist control in Mexico as asserting their power outside of the country; they 
were mutually reinforcing undertakings.  World War I greatly influenced these 
developments.  In fact, the war, like the Revolution, was responsible for quickly 
expanding state radio services in Mexico from 1916 to 1919.  
   German officials took up a stronger interest in Mexico because of changes in 
U.S. policies.  The German government had relied mostly on the Sayville radio station 
in New York as the main receiver in the Western Hemisphere for their Nauen 
transmitter.  The U.S. government also allowed Germans access to overseas cables, 
which were used to communicate with Latin America.  In 1915, however, the American 
navy began listening to and censoring the Sayville messages, and in April 1917, when 
the United States joined World War I, the American link was completely closed to 
Germany.57
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  U.S. officials additionally began a widespread crackdown on German 
operatives residing in the United States.  German agents saw Mexico as a key location 
for re-establishing a communication link to Germany, and as a base of operations to spy 
on the United States and spread German propaganda to Latin America.  Indeed, plans 
for helping the Carranza government build high-power radio stations in Mexico City 
had been under discussion since 1916.  The well-established relationship between 
Germany and Mexico in radio development and Carranza’s well-known nationalist and 
anti-American sentiments aided these German initiatives.  It had mostly been the 
148 
 
tentative backing of Huerta by German leaders, and the latter’s invasion of Western 
Europe, which hindered Germany’s trade capabilities, that caused the Carranza 
administration to earlier turn to the United States for wireless devices in 1914 and 1915. 
 But domestic affairs, namely defeating his enemies within Mexico and securing 
control over the country, motivated Carranza to allow the Germans to design the 
Mexico City stations, which both Carranza and the German government funded.  It was 
a pragmatic and shrewd decision.  Despite the fact that Mexican officials willingly 
transmitted and relayed German messages and propaganda, it was largely Mexicans that 
operated the transmitters and receivers, which were mostly used for Constitutionalist 
designs.  It was within this context that Foreign Secretary of the German Empire Arthur 
Zimmerman sent the now famous Zimmerman Telegram, proposing a military alliance 
between Germany and Mexico, to the German ambassador in Mexico Heinrich von 
Eckardt.  And although the German government genuinely perused a policy of 
persuading Mexico to join the war on their side, Carranza was unwilling to do so.  He 
only seriously considered the notion in the case of a full out U.S. invasion of Mexico, a 
conflict that his advisors worked tiredly to avoid.   
 Von Eckardt headed a number of German operations in Mexico, including the 
construction of the massive radio plants.58  Beginning in1916, Von Eckardt solicited his 
superiors in Germany for the creation of a high-power wireless operation in Mexico 
City, arguing that it “would make us independent of the North American stations.”59
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The German Reich Post Office originally resisted the idea, stating that the greater 
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distance and cost made the station undesirable.  Its leaders backed down, however, in 
the face of growing communications problems and increased pressure from the German 
Admiral Staff and Foreign Office, both of which supported the idea.  The Germans 
planned to bring the equipment for the station from New York, where a Telefunken 
subsidiary still operated.60  Possessing their own internal motives for the station, leaders 
of the Mexican Secretariat of Foreign Relations showed their approval for the plan in 
December 1916.  Discussions on the topic, however, remained ongoing throughout the 
following two months while German agents were gathering the equipment in New 
York.  Indeed, a dialogue about the stations between Von Eckardt and Secretary of 
Communications and Public Works Cándido Aguilar occurred regularly, even in the 
midst of the constitutional convention in Querétaro.61
 While still working out the details about the Mexico City station, the Carranza 
administration, with the assistance of German specialists, donated a wireless station to 
El Salvador in January 1917.  The equipment was of German and Mexican make.  
Mexican specialists led by the ever important Luis Sánchez, and including Adolfo 
Girón and Gustavo Santibáñez, built the 4-kilowatt station and trained Salvadoran 
telegraphers.  Upon the Mexican warship Jesús Carranza—named after the First 
Chief’s recently killed brother—the Mexican communications officers arrived along 
with towers and other necessary parts.
   
62
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  Building radio stations in Central America had 
actually been a goal of Mexican state officials since 1912, when they had started their 
first international broadcasts and campaigns to extend telegraph and telephone service 
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abroad.63
 The renewed emphasis on the Salvadoran station resulted from three intertwined 
foreign relations issues: Carranza’s attempt to expand Mexican influence in Central 
America, El Salvador, and Mexico’s joint opposition to American and Guatemalan 
power, and the strong communications relationship between Germany and Mexico.  
Although El Pueblo proudly proclaimed that Carranza was establishing a new “vigorous 
and strong” policy in Central America, his administration had built squarely on 
Porfirian foundations.  President Díaz had possessed firm relations with Salvadoran 
leaders and he had hoped to raise his international prestige as a mediator in Central 
American affairs.  He additionally tried to counter the influence of the United States and 
Guatemala in the early 1900s.  And indeed, many the isthmus’ leaders emulated Díaz, 
even if they did not always agree with him.
  Interrupted by the Revolution, Sánchez and company did not complete the 
tower and connecting office until September 1917.  
64  By the time Carranza had obtained the 
presidency, El Salvador was the only Central American nation that remained truly 
friendly to Mexico.  And as historian Jürgen Buchenau states, Carranza, like Díaz, 
“assumed that the rest of Latin America could learn from Mexico’s example.”65
 Verbally, Carranza and many of his administrators lambasted American 
imperialism and all that it included: dollar and gunboat diplomacy, and U.S. military 
  But 
more than the old dictator, Carranza presented himself forcefully as the torch bearer of 
Latin American nationalism and sovereignty. 
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intervention in Latin American countries.66  Carranza wrote editorials promoting 
nationalism and the right to self-rule.  He appealed not only to the revolutionaries of 
Mexico, but to the “revolutionaries of Latin America, the revolutionaries of the 
universe.”67  As the closest nation south of the United States, Mexican officials and 
artists showed Mexico leading the way against imperialism.  Carranza and his 
communications leaders hoped that the Salvadoran station would help spread this 
message to Central America, to help counter U.S. dominance, and to keep an ear on 
Guatemala’s legendarily paranoiac strongman, el señor presidente Manuel Estrada 
Cabrera.68
 There were other important motivations involved in building the station as well.  
Confronted with inconsistent trade and embargos from the United States, El Salvador 
became a reliable if limited partner for the Constitutionalist forces.  In exchange for the 
radio equipment, two Mexican-constructed aircrafts, and assistance during a devastating 
earthquake, Carranza received good deals on ammunition and a reliable ally on 
Mexico’s southern border.
  
69  El Salvador was also the only Central American country 
that, like Mexico, took a neutral stance during World War I.  German spies and 
communications operatives full-heartedly supported the radio project there and helped 
provide the necessary equipment and expertise.  By 1918 El Salvador received daily 
bulletins from Mexico, including German news and propaganda.70
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 While Sánchez raised the towers in San Salvador, German engineers and other 
SCOP officials finally got the Mexico City project off the ground.  Construction began 
in March 1917.  The shipment of radio materials had left New York on February 28, the 
day before the U.S. press published the soon-to-be notorious Zimmerman telegram.71   
Historian Friedrich Katz hypothesized that this is why American naval officials halted 
the ship and confiscated most of the materials before the crew could unload the goods in 
Veracruz.  Katz’s assumption seems reasonable.  The public release of the Zimmerman 
telegraph caused an uproar in the United States and greatly heightened American 
sensitivity to German communications in the Western Hemisphere.  However, a letter 
from Von Eckardt to Aguilar dated January 31, 1917—before the publication of the 
Zimmerman telegram—exhibits that German operatives already suspected that 
Americans might try to halt the shipment.72
 This setback did not stop the construction of the station.  Germany had sent other 
equipment in December of 1916 and some of the February 1917 shipment may have 
made it through as well.  German and Mexican agents also did a good job of 
improvising in response to the circumstances.  American officials had been mostly 
correct to note Mexico’s reliance on foreign technologies, but the increased difficulties 
in obtaining war materials due to U.S. restrictions and World War I provoked the 
Carranza administration to become more self sufficient.  As a result, the 
Constitutionalist military began manufacturing ammunition, airplanes, and 
communications equipment.  Mexican technical groups began building radio 
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components based on Telefunken designs and made to work with Telefunken 
equipment.  Carranza also tapped domestic manufacturers.  The Compañia Fundidora 
de Fierro y Acero de Monterrey provided the iron for the project.  A generator and rotor 
was constructed from parts made in Monterrey and Mexico City.  Mexico’s National 
School of Telegraphy also began to add new classes on radiotelegraphy and a publicity 
campaign to obtain new recruits.73
 From 1917 to 1919 German and Mexican officials worked together to build a 
receiver and transmitter, which they decided to put in different locations.  They 
constructed the former in Ixtapalapa and the latter in Chapultepec, tackling the receiver 
first.  They chose to build it in Ixtapalapa, a neighborhood on the southern outskirts of 
Mexico City, to hide it from American intelligence officers but also for technical 
reasons.  The first messages from Nauen arrived in late April 1917.  Afterwards, Von 
Eckardt and other members of the German legation and intelligence community 
received messages from Germany on a regular basis, relayed by Carranza officials 
sympathetic to their cause.  German leaders decided that a high power transmitter in 
Mexico City would also be beneficial to Germany.  To build the transmitter, the 
German government relied heavily on Gustavo Reuthe, an engineer who had worked at 
the Sayville station until forced out of the United States by American officials.  Reuthe, 
Eugene Dzinzilewsly—another German engineer—and Mexican specialists Luis 
Sánchez, Agustín Flores, Ignacio Galindo, and Salvador Teyabas, completed the station 
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in July 1918.74  From this point until his death, Reuthe would become an important 
communications operator, teacher, and government consultant in Mexico.  He had a 
huge influence on a number of Mexico’s top radio specialists.  He also continued to 
work on Telefunken’s behalf, and to aid the Mexican efforts to expand their wireless 
reach in Central America.  But the Germans never controlled the Mexico City stations.  
They were not “German operated” as U.S. intelligence reports and subsequent scholars 
contended.75  Early transmissions, also failed to reach Nauen.  This problem persisted 
throughout the year, though operators somewhat circumnavigated the issue by sending 
messages to Spain which were then forwarded to Germany.76
 But German leaders saw the Mexico City radio stations as serving a greater 
purpose than the reception and transmission of military messages.  German leaders 
before, during, and after the war hoped to expand their influence in communications in 
a more general sense.  As Katz pointed out, the German leadership feared that they 
might lose control of their country’s international cable telegraphs once the war ended 
in their loss.  Radio became a significant component in their plans to continue to operate 
strategic global communications, both for political and commercial reasons.  In Latin 
America, German officials specifically targeted Mexico, Brazil, Uruguay, Chile and 
Argentina.  Reuthe remained an important advisor in Mexico City and Telefunken 
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remained a large supplier of radio equipment to Mexico and Latin America well into the 
1920s, as it had been previously during the Díaz and Huerta administrations.  
 In the United States, the Zimmerman telegram and subsequent articles about 
German spies brought fears about wireless communications in Mexico to a near state of 
hysteria.  On March 1, 1917, when the contents of the telegram began to circulate 
widely among American newspapers, articles described “100,000 Germans” in Mexico, 
as if they were poised to invade.77  The same writings described extensive secret 
wireless networks.  One report stated that “authorities” in the San Diego area had 
known about German wireless operation in Baja California for weeks.  These included 
“three wireless stations 600 or 700 miles south of San Diego in the vicinity of San 
Quintin, Baja Cal.”78  These wireless operations supposedly had collapsible masts that 
Germans lowered during the day and raised during the night.  The New York Times 
further claimed that there was another Baja California station around Turtle Bay or 
Bahia Tortugas, which was high-powered and had been overheard “sending in a slow, 
methodical way.”79
 One March 9 New York Times article is particularly interesting for its curious 
blend of accurate information and critical mistakes.  It stated that “semi-official” 
sources told of a powerful wireless station built in Mexico City that allowed “direct 
communication between Germany and Mexico City.”  It also mentioned that one source 
stated that it was not powerful enough to send messages to Germany, but that it could 
  Paranoia was rampant.  
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receive transmissions from Nauen.80  The strange thing is that the Mexican receiving 
station in Ixtapalapa was not in operating order until April.  Indeed, the article appears 
to have caught the German Admiral Staff by surprise.81  Katz states that “the premature 
American announcement was either the result of false information by the U.S. 
intelligence agencies or, since the announcement was made one week after the 
publication of the Zimmerman note, was consciously calculated to intensify the impact 
of the note by attempting to exaggerate German influence in Mexico.”82  The details of 
the newspaper account lends very strongly to a U.S. intelligence source, but at least one 
U.S. operative working with the American embassy in Mexico, someone who had 
closely monitored Mexican radio development, believed that there was “no plant in the 
country capable of being used by Germany in communicating directly to Germany, and 
none can be established without our knowing about it.”83
 The article additionally discussed the El Salvador station built “just over the 
Guatemalan border” in Acajutla.  The source contended that Germans wanted to 
influence Mexican foreign policy in Central American and to make “[El] Salvador a 
base of operations for the invasion of Nicaragua by revolutionists” who would allow 
Germany to build a canal through the country.  This statement played into American 
  Perhaps the U.S. government 
provided the statement to increase American fears, and perhaps to let German leaders 
know that U.S. intelligence agents were on to their plans for wireless in Mexico, even if 
they did not know the exact details.  
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fears about losing control over the trans-isthmian route between the Atlantic and Pacific 
oceans.  Like U.S. intelligence reports, journalists gave little credit to Mexican 
specialists, arguing that Germans ran the El Salvador station and that it was German 
agents that brought the equipment there on the Mexican ship Jesús Carranza.84
 Newspaper articles throughout the remainder of 1917 stated that German spies in 
the United States and Mexico were sending information to Germany, “probably by 
wireless.”
  
Although Germans played an important role in training and assisting Mexicans, it was 
the latter who predominately constructed the station in El Salvador, even if the tower 
met with the approval of Germans.  And although the leadership in Germany welcomed 
all of these developments, it put little actual effort into fomenting revolution in Central 
America.  
85  Some American officials proclaimed Mexican transmissions to Germany 
were an absolute certainty.  Senator James Hamilton Lewis of Illinois, for example, 
blamed Mexican stations for sending sensitive information to Germany about ships 
carrying American soldiers to Europe.  He declared that “because of such information 
they [U.S. ships] were pursued by submarines and their landing [was] announced days 
before our navy was ready.”  He argued that Wilson and his cabinet knew of these 
messages.86  The Constitutionalist government rejected the claims that it spied on U.S. 
military movements and that it sent wireless messages to Germany, stating that its 
equipment was not capable of transmitting that far.  It did, however, admit that it 
transmitted messages regularly to El Salvador.87
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 The members of the Carranza administration and the Mexican press were actually 
divided between pro-ally and pro-German leanings.  Pro-German officials in the 
Carranza administration included Mario Méndez, Cándido Aguilar, Gen. Benjamin Hill, 
and Rafael Zubarán Capmany.  Pro-ally leaders included Félix Palavicini, Pastor 
Rouaix, and Alberto Pani.  Carranza and much of the military leaned towards Germany, 
though they were just as much against American imperialism as pro-German.88  
Obregón, Carranza’s most powerful general, however, tended to favor the United States 
and its allies.89
 It was in this superheated atmosphere that some prominent Mexicans came to the 
United States and spoke of German wireless outposts and corrupt Mexican officials.  
Juan Suárez—half brother of José Maria Pino Suárez, the Mexican Vice President 
whom huertistas had assassinated along with Madero, and an editor for the pro-ally 
Mexico City paper El Universal—told American reporters and businessmen that even 
though Carranza was trying to curb German influence, he could be doing a better job.  
In Suárez’s words, the greatest threat  
  
to the peace and mutual prosperity of our nations is the 
great net-work that the spy system Germany has been able 
to promote in Mexico, especially along the western coast. 
They have twenty-one wireless stations; one of them [is] 
supposed to be the most powerful in existence in the City 
of Mexico and although carefully watched by the 
Mexican secret service, common rumor says it is operated 
by many unscrupulous persons, who would do anything 
for cash. A number of Germans are also employed at this 
station. News of Berlin could be rushed across to Berlin 
without being checked.90
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Suárez had specific “unscrupulous persons” in mind in his exaggerated statement, 
including important members of the Carranza administration’s communications 
department, men including the Director of National Telegraphs Mario Méndez.  
Trinidad W. Flores—an important telegraph official and spy for the faction supporting 
Alvaro Obregón during the 1920 presidential succession—later noted that Méndez 
admired the Germans, welcoming the officials who had operated the Sayville station in 
New York to work at Ixtapalapa and Chapultepec.  According to Flores, Méndez 
happily relayed information to Von Eckardt and flaunted German-Mexican 
connections.91
 U.S. intelligence gatherers confirmed Mexican involvement in relaying German 
information in the fall of 1918.  By that time, the Chapultepec station could finally 
transmit across the Atlantic, and American radio operators along the U.S.-Mexican 
border had been regularly searching the airwaves for suspicious signals coming out of 
Mexico.  The Military Intelligence Division sent reports on their results to the military 
attaché to the American embassy in Mexico City, the State Department, the Office of 
Naval Intelligence, and the Department of Justice.  After connecting an “unknown 
6300-meter station,” which operated each night between 11:30 p.m. and 2:00 a.m., to 
Chapultepec, the Military Intelligence Division spied on the frequency from August 
through October.  They reported each week on the number of messages sent in code, 
Spanish, and English.  On October 3 they reported that 
 
There have been developments in the Radio Subsection 
which may influence our Mexican relations.  Evidence 
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has been secured that seems to convict the Mexican 
government of conniving in the German use of radio at 
Chapultepec for hostile purposes.  This evidence, founded 
on the discoveries of operatives, is being placed in proper 
hands in the form of a detailed memorandum.  The exact 
repetition of the code sent from Chapultepec in the latter 
part of August and upon corresponding days in September 
has resulted in an examination with a view to discovering 
a concealed cipher. The Radio Subsection has translated 
and forwarded 368 intercepted code messages in Spanish; 
received and forwarded 34 in English; received and 
forwarded 321 for decoding; and decoded and forwarded 
3 in code.92
 
  
Although the United States and Mexico never came to war over German 
communications in Mexico, the evidence supports the claims that certain Mexican 
leaders helped relay information between Germany and German agents in Mexico.   
 Carranza, and many of his leaders, however, approached German advances 
pragmatically, just as he had approached U.S. businessmen and officials during his 
struggle against Huerta.  They knew better than to openly support Germany during the 
war.  They had too many problems of their own within Mexico, and once the United 
States joined World War I, the Carranza administration only entertained the possibility 
of an alliance with Germany if the United States initiated a full-scale invasion of 
Mexico.93
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concluded that allowing Germans to help build powerful wireless stations in Mexico 
had great domestic advantages. 
 Mexicans had their own goals for radio development, including for the powerful 
German-designed stations.  In exchange for relaying German news and messages, the 
Carranza administration acquired its most powerful communications tools, advancing 
its influence over the Mexican nation and its ability to communicate with 
representatives of other countries.  Although a small number of German specialists 
assisted, it was mostly Mexicans who operated these plants.  As Aguilar reminded Von 
Eckardt on February 5, 1917, “only the Mexican government can establish wireless 
stations in the national territory.”94  Carranza and many of his generals saw the stations 
as a way to increase their own power and nationalist designs.  Obregón reportedly 
supported the projects because the government in Mexico City could better 
communicate with military elements throughout the country.95
 The stations also fit well with the Carranza administration’s foreign policy 
initiatives.  Although the Mexico City-station operators willingly relayed German news, 
Mexican officials also provided their own nationalist and anti-imperialist propaganda 
abroad.  They sent this information to El Salvador and they had plans to extend radio 
towers into other parts of Central America.
  The new stations in 
Ixtapalapa and Chapultepec allowed for a more consistent means of sending wireless 
messages across the whole of Mexico and to receive them in return, and telegraphers 
used them more for these operations than for communication with Germany.  
96
                                                             
 94 Cándido Aguilar to Heinrich von Eckardt, Querétaro to Mexico City, 5 Feb. 1917, caja 17-9-
278, ARSE.  
  By February 1919, Mexico sent reports to 
 95 “Wireless Joins Mexican Capital and Germany,” New York Times, 9 Mar. 1917, 1. 
 96 Cárdenas de la Pena, El telégrafo, 125. 
162 
 
Buenos Aires, Argentina, and Punta Arenas and Valparaiso, Chile.  The station also 
began “transoceanic press” services, which they sent to Germany, Japan, and ships at 
sea.97
 During 1918 Mexican and Japanese communications officials worked to connect 
their representative nations by radio.  They also designed codes for sensitive political 
messages, a topic of high importance to Japanese officials.
  
98  Japan had started a surge 
in its wireless ambitions, building stations not only in Japan but also for China.99  
However, by September 1918, the Mexican ambassador to Japan told Carranza that 
Japan could not yet transmit messages to Mexico City; in fact, their transmissions could 
only reach Honolulu, Hawaii.  But he also stated that Japanese officials were working 
on a high-power station on Japan’s northern coast, which they hoped would reach the 
Americas.  By late 1918 or early1919 Japan was, at least occasionally, receiving 
Mexican radio transmissions.  This was important to the Carranza government and 
Japan.  Carranza had increasingly turned to Japan to purchase munitions, equipment to 
manufacture ammunition, and weapons in response to American embargos.  Carranza 
had also bought warships from Japan.  Japan, on the other hand, had increased its 
commercial investments in Mexico.100
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 The desire of German leaders to maintain communications channels with the 
Western Hemisphere by building a radio station in Mexico played into Carranza’s 
designs to use wireless to defeat his enemies and secure the whole of Mexico under his 
government.  As long as he could publicly remain neutral and not incite the wrath of the 
United States, which was entangled in the war in Europe, Carranza could play on 
German and Japanese needs to fulfill his own.  Carranza’s nationalist and anti-U.S. 
policies, American off-and-on again embargoes, and a history of partnership with 
Germany drove Constitutionalist decision making.  As World War I winded down in 
November 1918, the Carranza government used the German-designed stations for 
commercial and foreign relations with Germany, the United States, El Salvador, 
Argentina, Chile, and Japan, but also for domestic communications.  
 
Carranza’s Fall 
 With the European war over and 1920 on the horizon, the Constitutionalists 
prepared for their first attempt at presidential succession.  Obregón appeared to himself 
and most others as the clear heir to Carranza’s position.  He was the most powerful 
general and, despite missing his left arm, he was an able and charismatic speaker.  
Carranza, however, had grown weary of Obregón, who had supported the more radical 
wing of Constitutionalists represented by the Partido Liberal Constitutionalista or 
Liberal Constitutionalist Party.  Carranza also hoped to have a “civilian” replacement, 
one that he could influence.  Instead of backing Obregón, the clear favorite, Carranza 
tried to impose Ignacio Bonillas as the next Mexican leader.  As a MIT graduate and a 
capable Secretary of Communications and Ambassador to the United States, Bonillas 
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appealed to Carranza as the type of president that a modern Mexico needed.  But 
Bonillas had little support.  Few people outside of Carranza’s close circle knew 
Bonillas, whereas people recognized Obregón as a victorious general. 
 Fearing Obregón’s escalating power, Carranza attempted to undermine the 
general’s base of support.  The First Chief tried to intimidate or co-opt Obregón 
supporters, including prominent allies in the general’s home state of Sonora.  As a 
result, a number of Sonoran military leaders, including Obregón, Plutarco Elías Calles, 
and Adolfo de la Huerta revolted on April 23, 1920.  They issued the Plan of Agua 
Prieta and prepared their march on the capital.  Although Carranza had made progress 
in strengthening state power over much of Mexico, his failure to address key agrarian 
issues, his hostility towards workers and unions, and his consistent clashes with the 
United States, provided exploitable vulnerabilities.  Obregón promised greater land 
distribution and greater political participation, not to mention a possible path of 
compromise for the remaining villista and zapatista forces.  Most of the military joined 
Obregón, and when other prominent generals including Pablo González joined him as 
well, Carranza chose to flee to Veracruz in an attempt to once again use the port city as 
a place to regroup and reconquer the country.  His ambitions were never realized; he 
was assassinated in the small village of Tlaxcalantongo in the mountains of northern 
Puebla.  The Agua Prieta rebels took power after only twenty-seven days in rebellion, 
making Adolfo de la Huerta the provisional president until Obregón could be officially 
“elected” as president in November.101
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Communications played a crucial and fascinating role in the run-up to the 1920 
election and the subsequent Agua Prieta Rebellion.102  Within the communications 
department, as with the Constitutionalist forces in general, officials split into factions: 
carrancistas, obregonistas, and those that “swam in both waters,” or mediated between 
both sides.103  These agents in turn fought an internal propaganda and intelligence war, 
communicating with foreign countries and carrying out acts of espionage and counter 
espionage.  On June 25, 1919, Trinidad W. Flores wrote to a friend that Carranza 
loyalists in the “Department of Press within the Secretary of Foreign Relations 
communicated by wireless to Santiago, Chile, Buenos Aires, Panama, and El Salvador 
that general González would propose to general Obregón a pact to respect the results of 
the elections in order to avoid another revolution.”  Carranza officials spread other 
statements and rumors favoring them to other parts of Latin America, while 
obregonistas within the DGTN reported these statements to their leaders, who it turn 
sent out their own responses.  Mario Méndez, the diehard carrancista director of the 
DGTN, also ordered his employees not to accept any messages from Tabasco’s interim 
governor Tomás Garrido Canabal, because he no longer possessed “legitimate 
authority.”104  As tensions grew, Méndez attempted to censor information sent by 
Obregón supporters and to fire obregonista members of his staff.105
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wireless operations.  Factions within the central government, including the telegraphers 
of the Secretary of War and Marine, also sided with the Agua Prieta rebels.106
A week before Carranza’s murder, the Sonoran leaders worked out the details of 
the provisional government largely over the radio.  According to one newspaper article: 
   
In a telegram to the revolutionary junta in Washington, 
Provisional President De la Huerta said that he had been 
in communication with Gen. Obregón at Mexico City; 
that Gen. Obregón had recognized the plan of the 
provisional government, had subordinated himself to it 
and was in complete accord with all that had been done 
and with plans in contemplation for perfecting the 
provisional government.  President De la Huerta remains 
in Hermosillo, capital of Sonora, and has established 
communications with Mexico City by wireless.107
 
  
During his hasty flight from the capital, Carranza took weapons, records, and money, 
but he failed to destroy the radio system, which provided the rebels an important 
communications link to Sonora and the American press.  Some stations, however, 
including in Alamos, Acapulco, and Chihuahua, “had been interrupted by political 
events.”108
 
  But most of the wireless network remained intact, and the Sonoran victors 
would greatly capitalize on Carranza’s previous expansion of Mexican communications.  
Conclusion: Radio Control 
 During Carranza’s presidency, wireless communications became an important 
component of state control and foreign relations.  Radio helped secure his government’s 
victory over internal enemies and to consolidate his power over gained territory.  The 
                                                             
 106 Trinidad W. Flores, letter, Mexico City,  22 Oct. 1922, in Contraespionaje político y sucesión 
presidencial, 84. 
 107 Arthur Sears Henning, “Seek Carranza Loot,” New York Times, 13 May 1920, 1.  
 108 De la Huerta, Informes . . . Secretaría de Comunicaciones y Obras Públicas del 11 de abril al 
31 de mayo de 1920, 53. 
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Carranza administration’s ability to communicate with foreign businesses increased its 
capability to obtain weapons, munitions, and other supplies.  The medium also allowed 
Carranza to speak and receive messages from foreign political leaders who provided aid 
and legitimacy to Carranza’s cause.   
 Radio also continued to be central to U.S. interventions into Mexico.  Indeed, 
Mexico became a testing ground for American military technology in general.  The 
Pershing Expedition allowed the U.S. military to test new automobiles, weapons, 
aircraft, and, of course, radio.  Field operators relayed information from the front lines 
to Pershing and other commanders within Mexico and in American forts close to the 
border.  Carranza communication agents, for their part, kept a constant ear on U.S. radio 
messages, often using stations recently acquired from villista forces.  Immediately 
following the withdrawal of U.S. forces, Carranza and a number of his high ranking 
officials, including Bonillas, Calles, and Rodríguez Gutiérrez, worked to close down 
wireless stations operated by American miners—who were correctly scene as spies—
while increasing their purchases of U.S. radio equipment.   
 World War I further escalated radio development in Mexico when German agents 
designed massive receiving and transmitting stations in the Federal District.  These 
operations provided intelligence for German operatives, but Mexicans ultimately 
controlled them, using the devices to spread their own news and propaganda and to 
build closer relations with Latin America, the United States, Germany, and Japan.  With 
this equipment, carrancista, telegraphers and state officials made wireless technology 
an important component of Mexican foreign relations.  Controlling wireless 
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communications also became a crucial factor in governing: a point that Obregón knew 
well, and which would become even clearer to him during his own time in power. 
169 
 
Chapter Five 
 
The Pragmatic President, the Diversification of Radio and 
the De la Huerta Rebellion 
 
 
“Mexico has been bitten by the radio bug” 
—Los Angeles Times, 
December 16, 1923 
 
 In late September 1921, not yet a year into his presidency, Alvaro Obregón 
presided over a massive centennial celebration in Mexico City.  Honoring Agustín 
Iturbide’s successful separation from Spain a hundred years before, conservative 
residents usually recognized the day more than others.  But the Obregón administration 
seized upon the opportunity to put on a lavish display of his first year in office.  The 
regional dances, national artwork, airplane shows, baseball games, and bullfights were 
all meant to endear the new government to local residents and visiting foreigners alike.  
The festivities promoted Mexico’s rich and varied heritage, the new state, and the 
returning commercial elite.  It mythologized Mexico’s past and exhibited the nation’s 
more modern future.1
 The event was also very much a public display of Obregón’s own policies and 
persuasions.  He had billed himself as someone who could bring the country together, 
and as someone less flagrantly opposed to American interests than was his predecessor.  
He pushed capitalists and laborers to work together.
 
2
                                                     
 1 Michael J. Gonzales, “Imagining Mexico in 1921: Visions of the Revolutionary State and 
Society in the Centennial Celebration in Mexico City,” 25, no. 2 (Summer 2009): 247-70; “Helen Delpar, 
“Mexican Culture, 1920-1945,” in The Oxford History of Mexico, ed. by Michael C. Meyer and William 
H. Beezley (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 543-72.  
  For the festival, Obregón’s 
cabinet members invited urban workers and Porfirian-era industrialists alike.  
 2 Buchenau, The Last Caudillo, 100-01.  
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According to Secretary of Foreign Relations Alberto J. Pani, it was “equally accessible 
to all social classes and exhibited a marked nationalist color.”3
 The Obregón administration’s policies on wireless communications were also 
multifaceted and aimed at different audiences.  He built on the structural progress of his 
predecessor while watching over the diversification and popularization of the 
technology, especially after the rise of broadcasting.  This new form of radio 
revolutionized how people thought about the medium, both those who controlled it and 
those who listened.  But underneath the jazz, national airs, and canciones mexicanas 
beaming from commercial and government towers, wireless technology remained a tool 
of military suppression, rebellion, and espionage.  These developments challenged but 
ultimately strengthened the Obregón and Calles administrations’ state and nation-
building designs.  
  And this vibrant 
nationalist color was definitely a mix of different paints.  Alongside charros, rural 
dancers, and Aztec motifs stood exhibits of international companies, modern hygienics, 
film, and radio.  
 Obregón also expanded on Carranza’s Central America policy of gifting radio 
stations and fighting against U.S. communications initiatives in Latin America.  At the 
same time, he strove to increase trade with the United States, including the importation 
of music records, phonographs, and radio receivers.  He allowed private entrepreneurs 
to take the lead in broadcasting while using the state to protect the growth of a 
nationalist industry.  He also encouraged the newly created Secretariat of Public 
Education (SEP) to establish its own station.  As with many of his policies, his actions 
                                                     
 3 Alberto J. Pani, quoted in Delpar, “Mexican Culture, 1920-1945,” 543. 
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in wireless development stemmed from his pragmatist and capitalist leanings but also 
from reactions to outside impulses that forced him to look at radio in more novel ways.  
 
Diversification 
 The 1921 centennial celebration was the first function to popularize radio in the 
imaginations of Mexico City residents.  The attention stemmed largely from displays of 
newly acquired radiotelephone devices, which could transmit the human voice and 
music.  Conversations were direct; telegraphers were no longer needed to decipher 
coded messages.  Government officials had first used radiotelephones like walkie 
talkies for direct communication.  However, a number of aficionados and commercial 
entrepreneurs in the United States, but also in Argentina and Mexico, began using 
radiotelephony to transmit musical performances to multiple receivers, creating the new 
field of radio broadcasting.  Exhibitions of both point-to-point and broadcasting took 
place on September 27, awing thousands of participants.  
 In the event’s International Commercial Exposition located in the Palacio 
Legislativo or Legislative Palace, the DGTN oversaw a popular booth filled with radio 
apparatuses.  Showcasing German, American, and Mexican-made equipment, the 
department provided different examples of the “methods of rapid communication with 
the rest of the Republic and with foreigners.”4
                                                     
 4 “El contingente del ramo en la exposición comercial internacional del Palacio Legislativo,” 
Revista de los Telégrafos Nacionales 1, no. 6 (Oct. 1921): 4.  
  Surrounded by smaller wireless pieces 
and cable telephones, a radio set with a giant windmill-looking antenna prominently 
received messages in the middle of the display.  Operated by DGTN officials Agustín 
Flores and José D. Valdovinos, a 1-kilowatt De Forest radiotelephone garnered the most 
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attention.  Capable of sending and receiving voice transmissions, Flores and Valdovinos 
allowed various people to speak messages to the president, which he supposedly heard 
through a similar device set up in Chapultepec castle.  Public exhibitions of the station 
occurred from nine to ten in the morning and four to five in the afternoon.  In addition, 
Flores and Valdovinos also displayed German and Mexican radiotelegraphs.  These 
devices received messages from Europe and the United States “with total clarity,” 
especially at night when the atmospheric conditions were optimal for reception.  The 
exhibit obtained even more publicity when the newspaper Excélsior and the journals 
Revista de Revistas and Revista de los Telégrafos Nacionales published articles on the 
booth.5
 Just one of a number of government attempts to provide a modern image, the 
DGTN showcase provided other visual cues.  Its location in the International 
Commercial Exposition alone announced that the Obregón administration was open for 
business and that it was obtaining technologies to further facilitate global exchanges.  
The transmission of the voice also possessed its own force, especially because local 
participants had never seen a contraption like this.  To many residents the 
radiotelephone bordered on magical.   
  
 Many scholars argue that the first radio broadcast occurred at the centennial 
celebration.6
                                                     
 5 Ibid, 4-5; Felipe Gálvez Cancino, “Los felices del alba,” tesis de licenciatura, Universidad 
Nacional Autónoma de México, 1975, 112-116; “Y llegó a comunicación sin cables: La primera 
transmisión de radiotelefonía en México,” Relatos e Historias de México 35, July 2011, 81-83.  
  That evening, using similar devices as those at the DGTN exhibit, radio 
aficionados and brothers Adolfo and Pedro Gómez Fernández, transmitted a music 
show to audiences at the Teatro Ideal and the Teatro Nacional, the present-day Palacio 
 6 Among others, Cuauhtémoc Anda Gutiérrez, Importancia de la radiodifusión en México (Mexico 
City: Cuauhtémoc Anda Gutiérrez, 2004), 17; Romeo Figueroa Bermúdez, ¡Que onda con la radio! 
(Mexico City: Pearson Educación, 1996), 41; Gálvez Cancino, “Los felices del alba,” 109-23.   
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de Bellas Artes.  Airing the singer José Mojica, among others, the demonstration was 
the first time that a musical performance was transmitted to a large audience.  The 
Gómez station continued to operate between five and seven in the afternoon until 
January 1922.  Singer and musician Francisco P. Yáñes presided as creative director in 
addition to performing on a number of occasions.  
 The centennial festivities also brought attention to the use of radiotelephony in 
Mexico’s young air force.  Wireless communications became a component of pilot 
training during Adolfo de la Huerta’s provisional presidency in 1920, but 
radiotelephony did not become a demonstrable fact until after the election of Obregón.7  
The day after the centennial celebration, President Obregón, along with members of his 
general staff, foreign diplomats, journalists, and military officers, drove to the Balbuena 
airfield just outside the capital.  There, he presided over the inauguration of 
radiotelephone services at the base, as well as at a similar installation in Pachuca, 
Hidalgo.  Air force officials had additionally equipped a Farman biplane with a 
radiotelephone.  Obregón and his entourage watched Mexican aviators—inspired by 
American daredevil pilots who performed at the centennial—conduct aerial stunts.  The 
president talked via radio to pilot Fernando G. Proal, who was a first-generation 
graduate from the Militar de Aviación and one of the country’s most respected aviators.  
Proal also communicated with officials at the Balbuena and Pachuca stations, who also 
talked with each other.  The latter station transmitted the popular revolutionary ballad 
“Adelita.”  According to a Mexico City newspaper, the president was “very pleased.”8
                                                     
 7 Ornelas Herrera, “La radiodifusión mexicana a principios del siglo XX,” 184-93. 
  
 8 “Las primeras pruebas de la telefonía inalámbrica,” El Universal, 29 Sept. 1921, II 1.  
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 The following day, the press reported on radio’s increasing role in foreign 
relations.  Rafael Cárdenas Jiménez, the Costa Rican consul to Mexico City, told the 
newspaper El Universal that President Obregón “decided to donate powerful wireless 
stations to Guatemala, Costa Rica, Honduras, El Salvador, and Nicaragua with the goal 
of establishing better relations with Mexico.”9
 The centennial events exhibited the major radio developments that had taken 
place during the first years of Sonoran rule.  The celebration displays also hinted at the 
new challenges with using and regulating radio that the Obregón administration would.  
The most important change was the aforementioned radiotelephone.  Although the 
technology had existed in the first decade of the 1900s, it remained impractical until De 
Forest made key improvements in the 1910s.
  Obregón promised to escalate 
Carranza’s radio policies in Central America at the exact same time that he was 
overseeing the incorporation of the medium in new ways into Mexican society.   
10  Incorporated into the DGTN by mid 
1921, it was thereafter applied to inter-departmental communications, aviation, and in 
the navy.  In the words of one newspaper article, “for the Mexican government the 
introduction of the modern [wireless] telephone communications system reveals the 
audacity of their work in the ever-increasing conquest of physical sciences employed in 
human activities.”11
                                                     
 9 “La República Mayor de Centroamérica será gobernado por un triunvirato,” El Universal, 30 
Sept. 1921, 1; Virginia Medina Ávila and Gilberto Vargas Arana, Nuestra es la voz, de todos la palabra: 
Historia de la radiodifusión mexicana, 1921-2010 (Mexico City: DGAPA/FES Acatlán, UNAM, 2011), 
63. 
  Beliefs in the power of science were alive and well, and for many 
urbanites, radio was one of the newest tools in the story of human progress.  Obregón 
 10 N. J. Quirk, “Wireless Telephony in the Navy,” Telephony, Jan. 1908, 30-33, 
http://earlyradiohistory.us/1908df1.htm, accessed 30 Mar. 2012.  
 11 “Dos estaciones de telefonía inalámbrica ayer inauguradas en la Exposición Comercial 
Internacional,” Excélsior, 28 Sept. 1921, 1; “Telefonía inalámbrica en los faros,” El Universal, 7 Oct. 
1921, 3; also see Ornelas Herrera, “La radiodifusión” 62-77. 
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embraced these developments, partly because they were a necessary requirement for 
continued modernization, but also because Obregón—a capitalist and inventor 
himself— genuinely supported them.12
 Radio had also expanded in other less publicized ways.  When Obregón took 
office, twenty-seven radiotelegraph stations operated regularly across the country.  
DGTN officials reinstalled the wireless operation on the Isla María Madre where 
Obregón’s forces had destroyed it six years before.  Indeed, the DGTN moved to install 
“radiotelegraph stations in all the state capitals and the ports of both costs, putting them 
in rapid and constant communication with the Capital of the Republic.”
 
13  The 
workshops of the DGTN amped up their production of radio equipment from none to 
some, providing receivers for the centennial exhibit, but also oscillators, switches, and 
antennas for stations.  They additionally built four portable devices designed to be 
mounted on the backs of mules.14  With an aim of modernizing further, the department 
sent prominent technicians to study abroad.  José Flores Treviño and Raymundo 
Sardaneta studied Europe’s most powerful stations, and Pedro N. Cota went to New 
York to attend conferences held by the increasingly powerful Radio Corporation of 
America (RCA).15
 Efforts to standardize time relied on radio technology.  Of course, this 
phenomenon occurred not only in Mexico but across much of the globe between the 
1880s and the 1930s.  Before the development of the atomic clock in the 1950s, 
  
                                                     
 
 12 Lieuwin, Mexican Militarism, 58. 
 13 “Adolfo de la Huerta, al abrir las sesiones ordinarias el congreso del 1 de septiembre de 1920,” 
Los presidentes de México ante la nación: Informes, manifestos y documentos de 1821 a 1966 (Mexico 
City: Cámara de Diputados, 1966), 409. 
 14 Informes de las dependencias de la Secretaría de Comunicaciones y Obras Publicas del 11 de 
Abril al 31 de mayo de 1920 (Mexico City: Dirección de Talleres Gráficos, 1921), 175. 
 15 Ibid, 171. 
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astronomers had long observed the movements of celestial bodies to measure time.  In 
1884, representatives from industrializing countries began an attempt to universalize 
time by corresponding the hour to its relation to the agreed upon prime meridian of 
Greenwich, England, establishing Greenwich Mean Time.  Scientists based the 
measurement off of the angle of the sun with added adjustments accounting for the 
earth’s elliptical orbit and tilt.16  The development of far-reaching radiotelegraphy 
stations allowed scientists to transmit data on these measurements from locations 
around the globe, further standardizing time and measurements of longitude.  In 1921 
the Mexican Astronomical Observatory started the process of “perfecting” the time in 
Mexico according to international agreements to do so by 1925.  Technicians at the 
observatory in Tacubaya, DF, transmitted measurements via wire to the radio station at 
Chapultepec, where the operators sent out the information to the other stations across 
the country.17
 
  Mexico’s participation in the project allowed its leaders to participate in 
important scientific dialogues and conferences held by modern nations around the 
world.  It aided trade and industry as well.  Companies and governments could now 
count on a greater ability to track the progress of their goods and work.  It also forced 
people into greater regimentation, for better and worse.  
Aficionados, Entrepreneurs, and the Rise of Commercial Radio 
 Thus far it appears that Mexican radio was largely a state project, if dependent on 
foreign manufacturers and training.  But while the revolutionary government 
                                                     
 16 Elisa Felicitas Arias, “The Metrology of Time,” Philosophical Transactions: Mathematical, 
Physical, and Engineering Sciences 363, no. 1834 (Sept. 15, 2005): 2290-91. 
 17 Informes de las dependencias de la Secretaría de Comunicaciones y Obras Publicas del 11 de 
Abril al 31 de mayo de 1920, 171; “El Gral. Alvaro Obregón, al abrir las sesiones ordinarias el Congreso 
el 1 de septiembre de 1921,” Los presidentes de México ante la nación: Informes, manifestos y 
documentos de 1821 a 1966 (Mexico City: Cámara de Diputados, 1966), 451. 
177 
 
maintained a strong interest in radio, amateurs and local capitalists began to operate 
their own experimental stations.  These enthusiasts mostly came from middle class and 
wealthy elements of society.  They included revolutionary communication officials, 
sons of wealthy capitalists, doctors, a communist leader, and engineering students.  
Most were influenced by the rise of similar experimenters and hobbyists in the United 
States and the American radio periodicals they followed.  These amateurs and 
businessmen brought about a brief democratic opening in radio use and new challenges 
for the state, especially in matters of economic development, state propaganda, nation 
building, transnational messages, foreign relations, and anti-government transmissions.  
Through legislation, international conventions, and less formal meetings, the private 
and government sectors ultimately compromised on these issues, reinforcing the 
consolidation of broadcasting into the hands of a few large corporations and the grip on 
the state by the Sonoran dynasty and the subsequent Partido Nacional de la Revolución.  
Monterrey, a large industrial city close to the U.S. border, quickly became one 
of the largest epicenters for private radio use.  Many privileged families in the region 
sent their children to the United States for higher education.  These students, in turn, 
became interested in U.S. technology advancements and trends.  The life of Constantino 
de Tárnava Jr. provides the classic example.  Born to Constantino de Tárnava de Llano 
and Octavia Garza Ayala, members of the Monterrey business elite, Tárnava, Jr., came 
from a relatively wealthy family.18
                                                     
 18 Juan Mora-Torres, The Making of the Mexican Border: The State Capitalism, and Society in 
Nuevo León, 1848-1910 (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2001), 183. 
  Two years after his birth in 1898, his father became 
a deputy director and the first treasurer of the Compañia Fundidora de Fierro y Acero de 
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Monterrey, a large smelting operation backed by local, French, and Spanish capital.19  
Tárnava, Jr., first attended Saint Edwards College in Austin, Texas, and later Notre 
Dame University in Indiana.  Engineering classes in America whetted Tárnava Jr.’s 
interest in broadcasting.  Arguably, he, not the Gómez brothers, conducted the first ever 
broadcasts in Mexico as early as 1919.20  On October 9, 1921, he began more regular 
broadcasts from his experimental station 24-A, Tárnava Notre Dame (TND)—named 
after his Alma Mater—which provided news and music to other fans, including Rodolfo 
del la Garza, the manager of the Bank of Nuevo León.21
Enthusiasts existed in other cities as well.  Manuel Zepeda Castillo broadcast 
from the Teatro Degollado in Guadalajara and Tiburcio Ponce installed station 7-A 
Experimental in Morelia.
  His station became CYO after 
receiving an official license and commercial status in 1923, and XEH in 1939.  It 
remains the longest running station in Mexico today. 
22  In Mérida, Arsenio Carrillo, the Secretary of the Yucatecan 
Association of Radiotelegraphers, operated an experimental station and relayed 
programs from radio station PWX in Cuba.23
                                                     
 19 “La Fundidora Monterrey, S.A.,” 
   By 1922 numerous other cities had 
http://www.monterreyculturaindustrial.org/fundidora.htm, 
accessed  February 26, 2010; Fátima Fernández Christlieb, Los medios de difusión masiva en México 
(Mexico City: Juan Pablos, 1982), 92-93. 
 20 The evidence for his 1919 broadcast is sketchy and debated by Mexican scholars, see Fátima 
Fernández Christlieb, La radio mexicana: Centro y regiones (Mexico City: Juan Pablos Editor, 1991), 60; 
Figueroa Bermúdez, ¡Que onda con la radio!, 41-42; Fernando Curiel, ¡dispara Margot, dispara! 
(Mexico City: Premis Editora, 1987), 17-21. Although it is possible that Tárnava transmitted 
entertainment programming in 1919, documentary evidence does not exist to back the claim. He never 
mentioned doing so in interviews with communication scholar Marvin Alisky, see following citation. 
 21 Alisky, “Educational Aspects of Broadcasting in Mexico,” 26. 
 22 Fernando Mejía Barquera, “Historia mínima de la radio mexicana (1920-1996),” Revista de 
Comunicación y Cultura 1, no. 1 (Mar.-May 2007), http://web.upaep.mx/revistaeyc/radiomexicana.pdf, 
accessed February 17, 2010. 
 23 “Carnet social,” La Revista de Yucatán (Mérida), 3 Mar. 1923, 4. PWX began service in 1922 
and was picked up in many parts of Mexico. 
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broadcasting fans and participants, including Campeche, Xalapa, Oaxaca, Tampico, 
Veracruz, San Luis Potosí, Chihuahua City, Ciudad Juárez, Pachuca, and Cuernavaca.24
Like Monterrey, Mexico City was another center of radio fans and 
experimenters.  In the capital, however, they came from a slightly wider swath of 
society.  Engineering students like Enrique Vaca and José Peredo built their own radios 
from parts of other machines and instructions from U.S. magazines.  Starting in the late 
1910s, they listened to boat signals, radiotelegraphers, other radio aficionados, and after 
1920, U.S. broadcasting stations.
  
25  Adolfo Gómez, the man who organized the 
centennial broadcast, was a military doctor.  His brother, like his father, worked as a 
dentist.  José Allen, one of the founders of Mexico’s Communist Party, transmitted 
messages from the barrio of San Rafael in Mexico City.26  Scientists and hobbyists 
spent long nights constructing radio apparatuses and other novel machines, rarely 
making much money from their efforts.27
Mexico City enthusiasts, engineers, and businessmen also formed the most 
powerful radio interest group in the country: the Liga Central Mexicana de Radio 
(LCMR).
  Engineers in the Federal District universities, 
and their counterparts in the militarily, experimented widely with electricity and radio.  
28
                                                     
 24 Mejía Barquera, “Historia mínima de la radio Mexicana”;  “De la vista a la más estación 
difusora radiotelefonía aprendimos que México rinde el debido culto al genial Marconi: Una interesante 
entrevista,” El Universal,  3 Oct. 1923, II 7. 
  Founded in early 1923, it was the result of the merger of the first Mexican 
radio society, the Liga Nacional de Radio, established on July 6, 1922 at the Colegio 
Francés and two other Mexico City organizations, the Club Central de Radio and the 
 25 Rosalía Velázquez Estrada, “La radiodifusión mexicana: Encuentro con su pasado (1923-
1945),” in Miradas sobre la nación, liberal, 1848-1948, libro 2, Formar e Informar: La diversidad 
cultural, ed. Josefina Mac Gregor (Mexico City: UNAM, 2010), 276. 
 26 Fernando Mejía Barquera, “Historia mínima de la radio mexicana (1920-1996).”  
 27 Ornelas Herrera, “Radio y contidianidad,” 144. 
 28 Central Radio Club and Center of Engineers. 
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Centro de Ingenieros.29  The LCMR’s leaders not only possessed technical knowhow, 
but also had important connections to the business community and the upper echelons 
of government.  Modesto C. Rolland, the LCMR president in 1923, had been a 
mathematics and engineering professor under both Díaz and Madero, a propagandist 
and communications official for Carranza during the Revolution, and the author of De 
la Huerta’s Free Port Decree of October 11, 1920.30  José M. Velasco, another 
important member, owned a prominent radio store in Mexico City and operated some of 
the country’s best receiving equipment, picking up stations as far away as Salt Lake 
City as early as 1922.31  LCMR engineer Salvador F. Domenzáin installed radio 
equipment for Secretary of Foreign Relations Alberto J. Pani.32
American radio practices and programs not only influenced Mexicans, U.S. 
manufacturers also increased their exports of radio receivers to Mexico.  Successful 
commercial broadcasting began in the United States in 1920 and shortly thereafter 
American radio companies began selling their products in Mexico though Mexican 
partners, especially by advertising U.S. programs.
 
33
                                                     
 29 Mejía Barquera, La industria de la radio y televisión, 35. 
  Some U.S. stations even provided 
 30 For information on Rolland’s roll in government see Carlo de Fornaro with chapters by Colonel 
I.C. Enriquiz, Charles Ferguson and M.C. Rolland, Carranza and Mexico (New York: Mitchell 
Kennerley, 1915); Modesto C. Rolland, Lecciones sobre presas. Dadas en la clase de topografia, drenaje 
y reigos en la Escuela Nacional de Agricultura y Veterinaria (Mexico City: Secretaría de Fomento, 
1906); Michael M. Smith, “Carrancista Propaganda and the Print Media in the United States: An 
Overview of Institutions,” The Americas 52:2 (Oct., 1995): 159-60; Modesto C. Rolland, Towards A 
Single Tax in Mexico (New York: Latin-American News Association, 1917); Gilbert M. Joseph, 
Revolution from Without: Yucatán, Mexico, and the United States, 1880-1924 (Durham: Duke University 
Press, 1988),  97; “A Decree Establishing Free Ports in Mexico,” The Nation,  27 Apr. 1921, 632-33; 
“Ship Railway Line Urged Across Mexican Isthmus,” Los Angeles Times,  16 Apr. 1949, A5. 
 31 “Radio, J. M. Velasco y Cía.,” ad, El Universal  9 Dec. 1923, III 4; “Una importante junta 
efectuada por los miembros de la Liga Central M. de Radio,” Excélsior,  22 Jul. 1923, III 10; “Telegram 
Wireless Concert Heard in Mexico,” Salt Lake Telegram, 13 Jun. 1922, 13.  
 32 Fernando Mejía Barquera, “Historia mínima de la radio mexicana (1920-1996).” 
 33 Douglas, Inventing American Broadcasting, 300; Hayes, Radio Nation, 27-34; A January 1924 
newspaper article lists over thirty businesses in the Asociación de Comerciantes de la ciudad de México 
that sold America radio products in Mexico City. “La recepción por radio no está prohibida en México, 
Excélsior, 27 Jan. 1924, II 6. 
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shows targeting Mexican audiences.34  As communications scholar Joy Elizabeth Hayes 
correctly points out, “the birth of broadcasting in Mexico must be situated within the 
context of U.S. expansionism in Mexico and Latin America more generally.”35  
Immediately after World War I and the decline of European influence in Mexico and 
Central America, U.S. manufacturers flooded Latin American markets with 
advertisements and goods.  Radio was an important component of this economic surge, 
both as a communication tool for American businesses and as a commodity.  During 
this time, the U.S. navy—after failing to convince congress to continue a navy-
controlled radio monopoly created during the Great War—helped establish RCA in 
order to buy out American Marconi and gain control of wireless communications in the 
United States and abroad.  By 1921 RCA surpassed previously prevailing German and 
British radio interests in Latin America.36
 In response to these developments and multiple domestic proposals to build a 
radio-chain monopoly, Obregón asked a number of leaders and engineers to investigate 
the history of Mexican radio, recent developments in the field, and how to go about 
regulating the technology considering its growing diversification and use.
  A friend of modernity and capitalism, and 
knowing that Mexico lacked the industrial wherewithal to compete, Obregón allowed, 
even promoted, this American invasion of goods, while simultaneously encouraging the 
development of a domestic broadcasting system. 
37
                                                     
 34 “Radio Concert Honors Mexico,” Los Angeles Times, 17 Sept. 1922, II 8; “Mexicans Now Fond 
of Radio,” Los Angeles Times, 21 Aug. 1923, 4. 
  Beginning 
 35 Hayes, Radio Nation, 25. 
 36 Ibid, 27. 
 37 For the first proposals to build private radio chains see L. B. Rauthbaum, “Proyecto para la 
instalación de la radio-telefonía como medio para desarrollar la instrucción y cultura del pueblo 
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803-R-21, Ramo Presidentes, Obregón-Calles papers, AGN; Also see Mejía Barquera, La industria de la 
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in October 1922, these radio specialists, including longtime consultants such as the 
German World War I-era émigré Gustavo Reuthe, provided their opinions and accounts.  
All of them saw the new trends in radiotelephony—early broadcasting—in the light of 
previous radio operations, building their narratives on the foundation of the country’s 
past relationship with radiotelegraphy.  However, as some specialists admitted, the 
technology had outpaced the existing laws as stated in the 1916 decree and article 28 of 
the 1917 Constitution.  Many aficionados, entrepreneurs, and a number of SCOP 
officials believed that broadcasting paved the road to a new future for radio, where 
transmission of concerts, news, and lectures reached mass audiences.  This perception, 
together with the growing reality, did not fit well with laws that addressed wireless as a 
form of point-to-point communication used more or less as a sort of postal service and 
military tool.  
 The vast majority of advisors recommended a cautious liberalization of radio use.  
One engineer argued that aficionados and experimenters who had been operating 
outside of the law had resolved a number of technical problems and were responsible 
for much of the progress in radio development.  This fact led him to contend that they 
disserved more freedom to operate legally.  Of course, the government had limited 
options in doing otherwise.  Halting private use would have proved immensely difficult 
since many enthusiasts had already began to transmit experimental radiocasts and 
because U.S. and Cuban stations already broadcast programs that reached Mexico.  As 
another specialist pointed out, receivers were fairly easy to make, and a number of 
residents had already constructed them.38
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 But every report to the president argued for strict government vigilance of private 
radio.  Obregón’s experts proposed that commercial companies should be allowed to 
grow—if the government did not want to exercise its right to monopolize the medium—
but that they should all be licensed, censored, and operated by people with sufficient 
technical expertise.  SCOP advisors continued that inspectors from their department 
should regularly check on any private transmitting operation.  Another expert listed a 
long number of concerns about espionage, using radio against the interests of the 
administration, the divulgence of military operations, and interference with national 
radiotelegraph stations—accurately foreshadowing problems that arose shortly 
thereafter.  Others discussed the very real chaos in the United States that resulted from 
ill-regulated radio transmissions coming from thousands of radio hobbyists.  Another 
issue was the desire to make sure that control not be lost by putting concessions in 
foreign hands.  All the advice was couched in patriotic, scientific, and moralistic prose, 
emphasizing what was best for national interests and development, what was best for 
the state: there should be nothing that “attacks the moral and healthy customs” of the 
nation, but the government should assist experimenters and aficionados who can work 
with the government and not interfere with “national stations” and who are not 
“dangerous for the nation.”39
 Aficionados themselves became influential advisors to Obregón, especially 
members of the LCMR.  These specialists had intimate knowledge of the new trends in 
broadcasting and in mid-1923 they approached the government about authoring any 
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new broadcasting regulations. Obregón agreed, but reserved the right to make any 
changes he saw fit.  Other scholars have claimed that the LCMR solely represented 
wealthy commercial interests, but in reality, their members came from business, 
amateur, and state backgrounds.40
All in all, the LCMR-written regulations drafted between March and September 
of 1923 were a compromise.  They addressed all the groups involved in radiocasting, 
but did lean in favor of business.  They divided the ethereal space between 
experimenters, state stations, entrepreneurs, and radiocasts for “public service.”  The 
LCMR deemed public service broadcasts as those that provided educational and 
entertainment programs of “public interest,” whereas amateur radiocasts were those 
dedicated to experimentation.
  They were a fairly diverse if mostly middle class 
bunch of characters.  From the very onset of broadcasting in Mexico, these engineers, 
entrepreneurs, and government representatives worked together for profit but also for 
various ideals of nationalism.  Little autonomy existed among these different sectors of 
society. 
41
                                                     
 40 Luis Antonio de Noriega and Frances Leach, Broadcasting in Mexico (London: Routledge and 
Kegan Paul, 1979), 15; Mejía Barquera, La industria de la radio y televisión, 36-37; Hayes, Radio 
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  The guidelines also established rules for licensing and 
taxation.  They allowed for private profiteering, but the SCOP had to approve all 
permits for which businesses had to pay an annual fee.  The rules restricted the power of 
private transmitters to between 100 and 2000 watts, and limited the accessible 
frequencies to between 350 to 550 kilocycles in hopes of limiting interference over the 
airwaves in order to assure the clarity of the commercial stations then in preparation and 
 41 Mejía Barquera, La industria de la radio y televisión, 36. 
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to make sure amateurs did not interrupt military transmissions.42  During the 
negotiations, Rolland argued for limiting experimenters and public stations from 
broadcasting during certain peak hours of the evening, suggesting his pro-commercial 
leanings.  Yet, on the other hand, the following year the LCMR campaigned for amateur 
rights during the National Radio Convention.43  Rolland also defended aficionados 
against what he saw as unfair fees, though he ultimately bowed to Obregón’s taxation 
policies.44  The LCMR additionally recognized and sought out the government as the 
protector of Mexican broadcasting, allowing for the state’s “supervigilancia” over 
radio.45
Most LCMR members stressed elitist and nationalist visions of radio.  One 
member, Argentina-born wireless specialist F. C. Steffens, disdained popular music.  He 
and a number of writers and radio enthusiasts pushed the government to take a greater 
role in using the medium as a civilizing and educational tool.  Rolland and Manuel M. 
Stampa, a prominent experimenter and officer of the league, declared that the LCMR’s 
purpose was to coordinate the propagation of radio, which “suddenly puts the men of 
remote villages in contact with the civilization of the most advanced centers of 
culture.”
  
46
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  When Rolland protested the tax put on wireless equipment, he stressed the 
detriment to education and human progress, not to enterprise (though he surely saw it as 
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a deterrent to business as well).  Rolland argued that the fee impeded the spread of 
receivers, which college classrooms and households could use to tune into transmissions 
of important conferences and lectures.47
The close interaction between the various groups involved with broadcasting 
was on display during the first commercial broadcasts and the Mexico City Grand 
Radio Fair in 1923.  Before the LCMR and the Obregón administration hammered out 
the final details of the regulations, CYL, El Universal Ilustrado-La Casa del Radio, 
aired the first commercial broadcast in Mexico on May 8, 1923.  Manuel Maples Arce, 
an estridentista or Stridentist poet, delivered the first words.  He leaned into the 
microphone and spoke: “Stars launch their programs at nighttime, over silent cliffs . . 
.”
   
48
This group consisted of a number of prominent elites and intellectuals.  Carlos 
Noriega Hope, editor of El Universal Ilustrado and an important author, helped 
organize the event.  In addition to molding the occasion, he and El Universal editor 
Miguel Lanz Duret represented their respective papers, one-half of the station’s 
partnership.  The other partners, Raúl and Luis Azcárraga, owners of radio store La 
Casa del Radio, socialized with the attendees and participants.  The head of SCOP, and 
former leader of Venustiano Carranza’s revolutionary military telegraphers, Amado 
Aguirre, joined the celebration as a sign of government support and supervision.  
  A motley crew accompanied the tech-enthusiast poet.  Businessmen, politicians, 
musicians, poets, and starlets had all gathered there in the capital, where the station sat 
tightly nestled in the urban center.  
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Andrés Segovia, the increasingly famous Spanish guitarist, played his instrument to 
great applause.  Mexican singers, musicians, and composers came to showcase their 
talents for the event as well.  Actress Celia Montalván and vocalist Julia Wilson de 
Cháves sang various popular songs, and pianist Manuel Barajas and the renowned 
nationalist composer Manuel M. Ponce played original classical pieces.  Before signing 
off and leaving the listening aficionados to the distant static, the function concluded 
with a broadcast of the Mexican national hymn.49
This inaugural radiocast was a foretaste of the country’s multi-cultural future, a 
nationalist soundscape that combined nationalist composers, regional folk songs, and 
modern musical trends from Latin America and the United States.  The program 
included avant-garde artists and editors who promoted a metropolitan and global 
worldview, nationalist composers who disdained popular shows, popular performers, a 
foreigner with monarchist sympathies (Segovia), and a revolutionary communications 
official.  The entertainment provided was as varied as the participants.  But as Barajas 
would make clear in the following year, not everyone agreed with this potpourri 
approach to radio.
  
50
The first commercial broadcast also exhibited the partnership between the new 
state and rising business elites.  The Azcárraga family had obtained a small fortune 
selling Ford cars in Monterrey during the late Porfiriato and during the Revolution. 
Emilio Azcárraga, Raúl and Luis’s brother, had just recently married the daughter of 
  Indeed, broadcasting unleashed a cultural debate about the 
medium, music, and Mexican nationalism. 
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Patricio Milmo, one of Monterrey’s wealthier men and a member of the “Monterrey 
Group” of industrialists.  The Obregón government backed the Azcárragas, participating 
in their opening broadcast and providing public praise.  The partnership not only 
allowed private enterprises to shoulder most of the cost of broadcasting, but also helped 
form a bridge between the revolutionaries in power and businessmen who had not 
originally supported the Revolution.51
Immediately after finishing the 1923 regulations, the LCMR, along with the 
government officials and a multitude of businesses, organized the Grand Radio Fair in 
Mexico City, an impressive ten-day exhibit of wireless systems and products.  Lasting 
from June 16 to 25, booths displayed locally made radio sets and the latest products 
from the United States.  Participants visited the elaborate stands and admired the goods, 
contests, and wacky costumes.  In one of the most outlandish displays, women gave 
away El Buen Tono’s “Radio” cigarettes while wearing mock antenna hats that looked 
like diamond-shaped kites.  The tobacco company was in the process of constructing the 
country’s second commercial station, on which it would continue to promote its 
cigarettes.  In competition with El Buen Tono, CYL representatives passed out “Radio” 
sodas. The government’s participation in radio was prominently displayed as well.  
Obregón inaugurated the event, posing for photos ops at the booths with Rolland and 
the various businesses.  Government radio stations JH-Secretary of War and Marine and 
  Indeed, the Azcárraga operation became one of 
the biggest outlets for state leaders, and in turn, operated with full government approval, 
if not favoritism.  
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VPD-Department of Military Manufacturing both aired music, including the first 
broadcasts of Mexican military bands.52
The collaboration between the government and commercial broadcasting 
companies is seen in another important way as well; many of the station builders and 
operators worked simultaneously for the most important state and commercial stations 
during the 1920s.  The CYB-El Buen Tono station provides a perfect example.  
Inaugurated in September 1923, CYB became one of the most popular stations in 
Mexico during the 1920s.  El Buen Tono, founded by Ernest Pugibet during the 
Porfiriato, remained one of the most profitable enterprises in the country, surviving, and 
even profiting, during the chaos of the Revolution.
   
53  Although Obregón pressed for 
unpopular taxes on industrialists and catered more to worker demands then previous 
presidents, he generally supported Pugibet’s successors at El Buen Tono along with 
many other porfirista entrepreneurs.  The company’s leadership, on the other hand, co-
opted many revolutionary technocrats by giving them positions at El Buen Tono.  
Indeed, many of the most important members of CYB’s management and technicians 
worked, or had worked, for the revolutionary state.  Colonel José Fernando Ramírez, 
instrumental in the creation of army station JH, worked for CYB, in addition to other 
commercial stations.  He also played a prominent role in military radio operations in the 
field.  So too did former JH designers and operators Captain Guillermo Garza Ramos 
and José de la Herrán.54
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“ardent radio fan.” 55  He kept in direct contact with the specialists developing and 
regulating the medium.  He not only inaugurated the 1923 radio fair but also radio 
stations.  CYR-Roserter y Cía. in Mazatlán, for example, commenced in the autumn 
with a message from the president.56
Before Obregón left office radio stations had already expanded significantly.  
The “Hour of Transmissions” section of Excélsior in October and November 1924 
reported eighteen aficionado stations, one pro-Calles labor party station, and seven 
commercial stations.  Dozens of other amateur transmitters existed as well.  The central 
government operated three stations.  The Chihuahua State Telephone Department ran 
another.
 
57  At the same time, Mexican radio listeners could pick up over a hundred U.S. 
stations, a continual presence in Mexico’s electronic soundscape.58
Radio receivers had gained widespread popularity in urban Mexico rather 
quickly.  Following the Grand Radio Fair, the U.S. Department of Commerce stated that 
radios were in high demand in Mexico.
  
59  Journalists reported that show windows were 
filled with radios, often blaring some Mexican or American radio station to the 
amusement of large crowds.  Broadcasting was most popular in Mexico City, but it also 
had dedicated enthusiasts and salesman in Monterrey, Tampico, Mérida, Oaxaca, 
Mazatlán, Chihuahua, and other regional centers.60
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Foreign Relations 
 In addition to supporting and regulating commercial broadcasting, the Obregón 
administration government continued to play a vital and direct role in radio in other 
ways, especially in foreign relations.  Its station in Chapultepec relayed news from 
abroad.  SCOP director and future president Pascual Ortiz Rubio ordered the station to 
provide the Mexican press with the foreign news it received.61
 From his first days in office, Obregón built on the initiatives of his predecessors 
to enhance foreign relations through radio.  This was crucial for Obregón’s drive to gain 
support from foreign leaders from 1920 to 1923, when U.S. government withheld 
recognition.  As a result, Obregón tried to influence policies via radio-listening 
audiences in the United States and wireless communications with German, Japanese, 
Salvadoran, and South American officials.
  Mexico continued to 
build radio towers in Central America.  State officials developed their own broadcasting 
operations within the military and Department of Public Education.  And as the election 
of 1924 neared, government and private stations transmitted speeches from top political 
leaders, including the first ever over-the-air address by a presidential candidate.  The 
state also played a crucial role in protecting the fledgling commercial industry in an 
important international radio conference. 
62
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  For their part, most Latin American 
countries recognized Obregón’s government and chastised the United States for not 
doing the same.  This stance was made clear when their representatives loudly vocalized 
complaints about non-recognition at the Pan-American Conference held in Santiago, 
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Chile, in March 1923.  Mexico did not attend in protest of U.S. polices.63
 Obregón’s greatest inniative was in Central America.  Building on Carranza’s 
work in El Salvador, Obregón promised at the 1921 centennial fair to develop stations 
in the isthmus for a number of countries, specifically in Costa Rica, Guatemala, 
Honduras, Nicaragua, and to improve the Salvadoran.  The goal for completion was 
Mexican Independence day, September 16, 1923. The Secretary of Foreign Relations, 
Secretary of Communications and Public Works, and the director of the Department of 
National Telegraphs all backed the plan.  For the equipment the government turned to 
their oldest ally in radio communications, Telefunken.  
  The 
convention did, however, discuss inter-American communications, especially radio.  
The participants decided to hold a separate pan-American gathering specifically on 
electronic communications the following year, in Mexico City. 
 Some ambassadors in Central America, however, had serious doubts about the 
project, especially the ministers to Costa Rica and Nicaragua.  The latter warned that the 
“unscrupulous” governments in the region might use the machines against the interest 
of Mexico,  a curious statement since he continued on in the next sentence to say that he 
had little faith in the ability of Central Americans to operate and maintain the devices, 
arguing that they did not have the money or talent.  He declared that in the near future 
the radio towers would be “outdated and useless . . . a mountain of old iron” gifted by 
the Mexicans.64
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  Eduardo Ortiz, Obregón’s nephew and the consul in Costa Rica, also 
vocalized fears about possible U.S. reactions to the devices and complaints about the 
 64 Eduardo Ortiz to Alvaro Obregón, San José to Mexico City, March 14, 1923, Ramo Presidentes 
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costs to the federal treasury.65  He provided a counter idea, to forego the stations and to 
instead build “Mexican” libraries for the isthmian workers.  Ortiz even went as far as to 
draw out elaborate blueprints for his imagined facilities.  This concept fit into Ortiz’s 
idea that the Mexican government should directly address the people of Central 
American more than government officials.66
 Interestingly, there was less reserve from the Guatemalan envoy and that 
country’s representatives.  Baltazar Chávez, a Guatemalan official who resided near 
where the radio station was being built, wrote directly to Obregón, giving the sincerest 
thanks from the city of Quetzaltenango and the whole of the country for gifting the 
wireless station that was “attended by personnel of all social classes, having great 
animation and affection for Mexico.”
  However, Obregón had already committed 
to the radio idea.  
67  The consul to the region, Juan de Dios 
Bojórquez, consistently nudged Obregón to get the needed materials to Guatemala to 
speed along the production.68
 The assignment was not an easy one.  There were a number of complicated 
logistics involved.  Much of the equipment had to make its way across the Atlantic from 
Germany to Central America, where it then had to be carried overland through 
rainforests and across undeveloped terrain.  Most problematic, the government 
struggled to cover the costs, lagging in its payment to Telefunken.  On June 13, 1923, 
  In response, the president directly inquired into the 
SCOP’s progress on the Central American projects, urging them to complete the task. 
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SCOP employees crossed the border into Guatemala to ready the site and beginning 
construction on station’s buildings. But back in Mexico City their fellow workers were 
still fabricating the necessary iron towers in the workshops in the Chapultepec station.  
Meanwhile, the actual receivers and transmitters had not yet left Germany because the 
Obregón administration still owed Telefunken $25,000 dollars.69
 Despite the difficulties, and over the protests of some of his ambassadors, 
Obregón pushed ahead with his wireless plans in Central America.  And though not all 
of the operations were in full working order by September 16, 1923, they were at least 
under construction.  Realizing that Obregón would not change his mind, Ortiz changed 
his tone.  He posed for photo ops with the Costa Rican president Julio Acosta García at 
the commencement of the station’s construction.  Their wives christened the radio tower 
with a bottle of champagne during the Independence Day festivities.
  The government also 
possessed a limited number of radio specialists like Luis Sánchez and Gustavo Reuthe 
capable of building these operations, which had to have put a constraint on production. 
70
 The program of donating radio stations to Central America fits interestingly into 
Obregón’s overall foreign policy in the region.  Obregón faced a number of tricky 
problems in hemispheric relations.  For the first years of his presidency he needed to be 
careful not to raise the ire of the U.S. government if he wanted to obtain recognition, 
which would aid him economically, politically, and militarily.  At the same time, a large 
component of his own followers pushed for a more radical, nationalist, and at times, 
anti-American stance, including many of the ambassadors to Central America.  They 
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believed that they needed to strengthen Mexico’s presence and influence in the isthmus 
to build up Mexico’s prestige and deter America’s imperialistic tendencies. 
 Obregón approached the area with caution, but his policies were not as “hands 
off” as some scholars have argued.71  To be certain, he did not meddle heavily in the 
military and political affairs of the region, keeping a low profile.  But he did more than 
lay foundations for the future.  He and his ambassadors established a greater cultural 
presence, including a number of libraries that the administration decided to build in 
addition to the radio stations.  And although the continuous wave-radiotelegraphy 
towers were not set up to broadcast, the Costa Rican government, at least, worked to 
acquire the equipment to adapt the station to both forms of radio.72  Radio receivers in 
general were on the rise in Central American cities.  By the end of 1923, Central 
American urbanites heard a number of Mexican broadcasting stations including CYL, 
CYB, CYX-Excélsior-La Casa Parker, and CYF, in Oaxaca City.  Before the end of the 
following year they could pick up the government’s own public education operation, 
CYE.73
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products.  They heard a lot of classical music, jazz, and popular Mexican canciones like 
“Mi Viejo Amor.”74
 But underneath this cultural campaign, the stations gifted to Central America 
aided Obregón achieve other goals.  For one, he acquired more efficient 
communications with the region’s governments while building a stronger coalition 
against American cultural expansionism.  It also allowed his administration to work 
against U.S. attempts to dominate communications development in the isthmus.  With 
the blessing of their government, American agricultural outfits, especially United Fruit, 
had largely controlled wireless operations in Central America until the 1920s, owning 
the only stations in addition to their own small fleet of ships equipped with wireless 
devices.
   
75  Obregón’s radio campaign impeded American communications dominance 
by building a Latin American coalition to increase state oversight of radio development 
and to oppose American inniatives for a free market policy.  The Costa Rican press 
exhibited this statist position following the groundbreaking for the radio tower donated 
by the Mexican government, stating—contrary to American interests—that Costa Rica 
would build a nationalist wireless system, structured on a government monopoly of 
radio services.76
This position for Latin American unity against the United States on the matter of 
wireless communications was in full display at the Inter-American Committee on 
Electronic Communications held in Mexico City in 1924.  Convention participants 
publicly stated that the goal of the meeting was to improve Pan-American telegraph and 
broadcasting operations, but another consideration soon became apparent as the 
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delegates of the fourteen countries divided into two camps.  On one side, the United 
States promoted private capital-driven communications development with limited 
government intervention.   On the other side stood the Latin American representatives 
who pushed for a more state-directed policy towards radio.  Ignoring the subtleties of 
the issue, U.S. spokesmen claimed that the argument revolved around commercial 
versus state-run radio.77
  All the Latin American delegates in attendance voted against the position of the 
United States and accepted the guidelines put in place by the Mexico City conference.  
The American representatives abstained from voting.  However, the rules established at 
the 1924 meeting had little lasting impact on international communications policies.  
Only four of the attending nations ever ratified the agreement.
  But the Latin American stance against U.S. policy did not 
mean that they opposed the development of private communications industries within 
their perspective countries.  Quite to the contrary, some countries, Mexico included, 
pushed for greater state regulation of wireless telegraphy and radiocasting to protect the 
growth of newly initiated broadcasting industries.  For Mexican officials, it was also 
about sovereignty.  Radio was one of the few “public works” that foreigners never 
controlled.  The problem was that Latin American governments feared the domination 
of American businesses at the expense of native companies and governments.  
78
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  Instead, they decided 
to wait until the next meeting, which was announced in 1925 and took place in 
Washington, DC, two years later.  But the 1924 conference did exhibit the Mexican 
government’s long held unwillingness to allow U.S. corporations to control Mexican 
 78 Schwoch, The American Radio Industry, 73. 
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radio.  The meeting also helped create a framework that the legislature used for federal 
radio legislation, especially the 1926 Law of Electronic Communications, which 
provided the government more regulatory power over broadcasting.79
 
   
The Beginnings of State Broadcasting 
 Within Mexico, a number of state officers hoped that radio would become a tool 
of the revolutionary education system.  José Vasconcelos, the first head of the SEP, 
planned to establish a powerful station in order to transmit scientific and cultural 
programs to schools across the country.80  The department’s leadership believed that 
radio was going to help incorporate rural and indigenous residents into the national fold 
and to spread Mexican culture and political propaganda abroad.  At the same time that 
the SEP struggled to incorporate radio in 1923 and 1924, it was also establishing the 
department of anthropology and the Cultural Missionary Program to spread 
revolutionary ideology and a secular curriculum to the countryside.  These nationalist 
educators planned not only to reach children but also rural adults who were often 
illiterate and had received little in the way of state education.81
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Vasconcelos’s goal of building the station to aid these endeavors.  In the romantic 
words of Gastélum at the station’s inauguration: 
Teachers, workers and students: The Secretariat of Public 
Education will end its labor during the presidential period 
of Gen. Don Alvaro Obregón inaugurating this new 
fountain for the dissemination of thought, which will light 
all corners of the country with the voice of the teacher, the 
eloquent words of our most distinguished intellectuals, 
and harmonies that will surprise those in the classroom, in 
the office or in the workshop, evoking in the spirit the 
memory of ancient and romantic visions, the most noble 
emotions, to inculcate the beauty in the soul and charity in 
the mind.82
 
 
 The public education station also had non-government supporters.  Fernando 
Sayago, writer and director of Mexico City’s Commercial Museum, argued in July 1924 
for a “cultural crusade.”  In one article, he pushed the SEP to urgently establish a high-
powered station to throw the voices and melodies of specialists and classical composers 
across Mexico, especially into classrooms.83
 The station, in the works since 1923, began transmissions in November 1924.  
SEP employees and American specialists outfitted the operation with U.S. equipment.
  Many members of the LCMR shared 
similar opinions. 
84  
The first broadcast was transmitted not only from the SEP’s small transmitter but also 
via the powerful Chapultepec station.  People heard the inaugural radiocast all over 
Mexico, United States, Canada, and even in Europe.85
 It is hard to uncover exactly how much impact these early state “cultural” 
broadcasts really had.  The SEP imported over a hundred radio receivers for rural 
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schools in late 1924.  When Calles took office, he commented that the government had 
succeeded in placing radios in “the majority” all of the federal schools, which numbered 
approximately one thousand.86  The devices were definitely used in rural areas in and 
around the Federal District; “small towns, especially of indigenous populations.”87  
Obregón had clearly stated the goal of the program: “teachers will meet somewhere 
near the ranches and neighborhoods of their students to transmit, on a predetermined 
day and time, a lesson about a useful theme, music, and news to arouse their interest so 
they can participate in the life of our country.”88
 The Department of Agriculture also ventured into radio.  Indeed, officials had 
proposed using wireless for meteorological messages to small farmers since at least 
1922.  In the summer of 1923 the department put forward an ambitious plan to build 
radio stations in its offices in Monterrey, Chihuahua, Hermosillo, Guadalajara, Mérida, 
and Mexico City.  These were not only to receive reports but to transmit news across 
the entire country.  Subsecretary Ramón P. de Negri proposed the plan, aspiring to build 
a rapid communications network between Mexico’s farming zones in order to provide 
important information on the weather, market conditions, and agricultural advice.  
Although originally approved by the president, the plan ultimately faltered because of 
its cost.  Building radio stations was not cheap.  The fact the CYL and the Department 
  Significant progress had been made, 
but the vast majority of rural Mexicans remained unreached.  
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of Aviation were already broadcasting the time, meteorological forecasts, and market 
data may have also made the project appear redundant and unnecessary.89
 As mentioned earlier, the military operated its own radio stations.  The week 
before the 1921 centennial celebrations the Department of Aviation announced its 
acquisition of six radiotelephone devices.  Its station, CZA, transmitted both military 
operations and cultural broadcasts.  In fact, under the direction of engineers Ricardo S. 
Bravo and Fernando Ortiz Monasterio, it was the only station that transmitted every day 
of 1924.
 
90  JH was the first military station, directly supervised by the Secretary of War 
and Marine.  José de la Herrán—whose initials provided the name for the station—
designed and built the station.  De la Herrán had just returned from studying radio at 
John Hopkins University in Baltimore, Maryland, in the United States.  He, along with 
military radio enthusiast and Colonel of the General Staff, José Fernando Ramírez, 
placed the device in Ramirez’s house.  According to De la Herrán’s grandson, they 
inaugurated the station on March 19, 1923 with music from the “band of the General 
Staff of the Secretariat of War and Marine,” among other artists.  The station, which 
played a prominent role in the 1923 radio fair, reached the United States, much of 
Mexico, and the far reaches of the Arctic, where an expedition of Donald Baxter 
MacMillan picked up the station on one of his radios.91
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them helped build the most important commercial stations of the day.92  Likewise, the 
military station VPD, of the National Military Manufacturing and Establishments, 
possessed its own broadcasting station.  It too participated in the radio fair and 
continued to provide occasional musical radiocasts and lectures.93
 The Obregón administration used radio to further incorporate military and other 
labor.  The president had made labor leader Luis N. Morones head of the National 
Military Manufacturing and Establishments.  This department not only operated VPD, 
but also expanded their radio operations among different factories.  Under Morones’s 
direction in 1923, the Fábrica Nacional de Vestuario y Equipo acquired broadcasting 
station 1-R and radiotelegraph station 1-Z.
  
94  The head of CROM and a legislator during 
the early 1920s, Morones had a history of working with communications employees and 
he enthusiastically took to radio.  He had previous organized telephone and telegraph 
operators.  In August 1923, Morones sent a letter to the renowned confidant to the 
leaders, Soledad Gonzáles, in Nuevo León stating that he was sending engineer Víctor 
Pérez Taylor to install a radiotelephone device and to provide instructions on its 
management for her.95
 González, the private secretary of Obregón and close friend and later secretary to 
General Plutarco Elías Calles, was already one of Mexico’s most powerful and capable 
women.  She played an important role in Calles’s electoral campaign in 1923-1924 and 
continued to possess influence and power in political and social circles throughout the 
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decade and beyond.  According to the Mexico City newspaper El Universal, CROM 
received a number of radio devices to receive and transmit lectures and concerts that 
November.  Towns where the government provided equipment included Pachuca, 
Hidalgo; Puebla, Puebla; Orizaba, Veracruz; Torreón, Chihuahua, “Jalisco and other 
places in the Republic.”96  CROM and the associated Federación Obrera Hidalguense 
de Pachuca and Centro Obrera Progresistas de Jérez used radio equipment during the 
last year of Obregón’s presidency, and so too did some agrarian groups.97
 
 
The Lingering Shadow of Civil War: The De la Huerta Revolt 
 These groups proved critical to Obregón and Calles when the latter’s opponent for 
the presidency, Adolf de la Huerta, violently rebelled against the very government he 
had helped establish.  The rebellion was a mix of genuine concerns about the future of 
democracy in Mexico and greedy ambition for power.  Calles had obtained the official 
support of Obregón, making him the favorite to become the next president.  Feeling 
disregarded and upset at the unfair influence of the president, De la Huerta obtained the 
support of military leaders disgruntled about Obregón’s reduction of the armed forces or 
possessing their own ambitions for power.  On December 7, 1924, they rebelled against 
the “impositionists.”98
 Radio proved crucial to the rebellion and its suppression.  As when the Revolution 
first placed De la Huerta into the provisional presidency, radio technology remained, 
and indeed grew more important, as a tool of espionage and military communications.  
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Radio was no longer auxiliary, but essential.  By 1924, radio had also become a much 
greater force for spreading propaganda.  Radios were no longer a rare tool mostly used 
by militaries and government officials.  There were now thousands—an estimated 
15,000 in Mexico City alone—of receivers dispersed across the country and even more 
in the neighboring United States.99
 On December 5, 1924, De la Huerta, and his close supporter, Partido 
Cooperatista Nacional president Jorge Prieto Laurens, arrived in the port of Veracruz.  
According to the local paper El Dictamen, they planned on relaxing at the Hotel 
Imperial before heading north to continue his presidential campaign to the north.  But as 
events revealed two days later, they were actually establishing a base of operations for 
an armed insurrection against the government.  Declaring that the Obregón 
administration was imposing Calles as the next president and had unjustly obtruded 
others into governorships, De la Huerta incited another massive armed conflict.  He 
then imposed his own choice, José Pereyra Carbonell, as provisional governor of the 
state of Veracruz in place of the radical obregonista Adalberto Tejada.  De la Huerta 
then called on rebel forces to move on Mexico City.  In response, Tejada rallied 
peasants and workers.
  Radio allowed De la Huerta to spread word of his 
cause and to counter government stories printed in the press or spread via their own 
radio messaging.  In turn, jamming and intercepting De la Huerta’s wireless 
correspondence was a constant goal of government forces, which then spread their own 
propaganda on an even larger scale.   
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 The De la Huerta Rebellion posed a serious threat to the Obregón government and 
quickly became a full-scale civil war.  Nearly half of the military rose against the 
president, rebels controlled many of the important ports and radio stations, and the 
initial drive on the capital caught the government off guard.  In western Mexico, 
General Enrique Estrada, along with a number of other high-ranking military officers, 
four regiments, and three battalions, mutinied, seizing control of Guadalajara and much 
of the Jalisco countryside.  In the state of Tabasco, General Ferrara Vega joined the 
rebellion along with much of the army under his command.  General Fortunato 
Maycotte, after persuading Obregón to give him 200,000 pesos and war supplies to 
suppress the rebellion, immediately switched sides, rallying insurrectionist in 
Oaxaca.101   In the east, delahuertistas captured the state capitals of Xalapa and Puebla, 
quickly moving nearer to Mexico City.  Many residents believed that Obregón was 
going to abandon the capital in order to fight from another location.102  Momentum was 
on the rebel side.  The revolt, however, stalled after distrust and disagreements along 
the leadership halted the advance on Mexico City, which allowed Obregón to launch a 
successful counter attack.103
Radio espionage provoked a strong fear and public response from the Obregón 
administration.  Immediately following the declaration of rebellion, the government 
ordered the suspension of all internal wireless communication with rebel controlled 
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areas, including Túxpan, Veracruz, and Campeche.104  In order to uncover 
insurrectionary operatives in Mexico City, they used special agents to search the urban 
airwaves for renegade messages and to locate their bases of operation.  José Soto 
worked as one of these spies.  One of his missions included searching for broadcasters 
in the affluent neighborhood of Santa María la Ribera.  In mid-January 1924, he listed 
thirty-nine households with receptors in an eight street area.105  But Soto worked 
hardest at discovering the meeting place of a group of subversives who aided the 
delahuertista cause.106
There is knowledge that individuals meet in a house 
situated between Alamo Street and Chopo Street, among 
them Lic. Carregha, a conspirator against the government. 
Likewise it is known that in the same house a radio 
station with a transmitter and receptor exists for 
communicating with the rebels. It would serve you to 
conduct investigations to locate the house cited.
  His superiors, including commander of the Federal District 
General Arnulfo Gómez, specifically targeted Jorge Carregha, “a known conspirator”: 
107
 
 
Soto also vigilantly watched the house of Ignacio Flores, a suspect connected to 
Carregha who lived on Flores Street and owned a “very well mounted” transmitter.  E 
also had visitors who came and left frequently in automobiles during the night.108
 To compliment Soto’s work, the government put in place new restrictions on 
radio use in the capital.  This led the paper El Universal-Gráfico to publish a headline 
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“Formal Raid against Radio Apparatuses.”109  After intercepting a number of 
insurrectionary messages transmitted from the capital, Gómez restricted all 
transmissions to licensed commercial stations and those under direct approval and 
surveillance of the armed forces.  Aficionado radio stations had to stop their operations, 
others had already been shut down by state officials.  The military further ordered all 
residents with radio receivers to register their names and equipment with the 
government.  Those that failed to do so were condemned as spies and enemies of the 
state.  Radio providers had to inform the Jefatura de la Guranición or Garrison 
Commander of any sales, providing the required information before the transaction 
could be completed.  The government outright forbid the sale of radio transmitters.110
 This was not mere paranoia.  Rebels did rely heavily on radio to communicate 
with spies and different regional commanders.  The revolt was widespread.  Radio 
became a regular means of communication between leaders in Veracruz (and then later 
in Frontera, Tabasco) andco-conspirators in Jalisco, Oaxaca, and the Yucatán peninsula.  
Estrada not only communicated his entrance into the rebellion and the strength of his 
forces via radio, he also transmitted regularly to other generals, including Maycotte in 
Oaxaca via the Salina Cruz station.  In late December 1923, rebel general Rómulo 
Figueroa used wireless to discuss the movement of his forces from the state of Guerrero 
to Morelos.  In Mérida, Yucatán, rebel forces under Ricárdez Broca took possession of 
a number of radio sets used by aficionados.  They also took over the government 
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radiotelegraph station, murdering Remigio Ortegón, the station chief.111  Controlling 
radio communications was an early goal of the various delahuertista forces and crucial 
to De la Huerta’s ability to keep in contact with the rebellion’s leaders in other parts of 
the country.112
 But more often than not, these wireless links so crucial to delahuertista operations 
worked against them.  Government officials regularly intercepted messages that 
provided much of the intelligence on rebel forces and movements.  In mid-January, as a 
significant battle over the city of Puebla neared, military radio specialists overheard a 
conversation between Generals Maycotte and Estrada about delahuertista forces 
abandoning the area around Tehuacán, Puebla, and moving in the direction of 
Esperanza to the north.  After the fall of Puebla, during the march on Veracruz, military 
radio bulletins stated that “wireless messages exchanged between [Gen. Guadalupe] 
Sánchez from Veracruz and various rebel commanders, which were intercepted at the 
Chapultepec station, indicated that Adolfo de la Huerta was making a desperate effort to 
recapture San Marcos [Veracruz?].”
  
113
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artillery, and two airplanes” to reverse the rebel advance.”114  Similar radio 
interceptions and subsequent responses continued throughout the conflict.115
 In February and March of 1924, Otilio González stepped up the rebel wireless 
propaganda campaign as their military situation worsened.  From his newly established 
headquarters in Frontera, Tabasco, De la Huerta sent out a radio “Manifesto to the 
Nation” on February 20.  From New Orleans, Arturo M. Elías relayed the speech in its 
entirety to his half brother, Calles.  Elías obtained the information from the crew of the 
warship Bravo, who overheard the speech while the vessel was being refitted there in 
New Orleans.  The radio address touched on all the grievances set out in his original 
declaration of rebellion before arguing that the Obregón government had violently 
expanded the war across the nation and had sold out to Americans in exchange “for 
ships of war, airplanes, rifles, projectiles, and money.”
  
116  González and rebel radio 
operators in Mérida sent regular messages to the U.S. Associated Press in Dallas, Texas, 
which newsmen subsequently spread to America’s largest papers, including the New 
York Times.  González strived ardently to paint a picture of rebel victories, with some 
success, even in the face of a horribly deteriorating situation from late February through 
April.117
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  The worsening situation inspired De la Huerta to flee Mexico on March 11.  
Departing in a small boat, he stopped briefly in Carmen, Campeche, where he met 
Prieto Laurens who gave him 14,000 silver pesos.  Telling Prieto Laurens that he was 
heading to Campeche and then to Yucatán, De la Huerta actually boarded the steamer 
Tabasco.  On board he bought the loyalty of the crew with his recently acquired pesos, 
who in turn, refused to answer the calls from the sailors of the modified corvette 
Zaragoza, whose loyalty to the rebellion had become suspect.118
 Of course, the Obregón administration had its own radio operations.  Although the 
vast majority of the Gulf Coast fleet joined the rebellion, the four cruisers obtained from 
the United States were equipped with radio stations.  As aforementioned, Americans 
also refurbished the cañonero Bravo.  These ships helped secure the government’s 
victory in Tabasco, Campeche, and Yucatán.  Airplane squadron commander Captain 
Rafael Ponce de León used a radio device in his plane to relay information on the 
location, numbers, and movement of enemy forces—information that was immensely 
valuable.  SCOP officials had recently installed an impressive radio car in the 
presidential train, an accommodation that Obregón converted into his moving military 
quarters during the war.  The president’s own personal telegraph corps operated the 
wireless equipment, including DGTN employees Manuel Serrano and Federico W. 
Kreush y Arce.
  
119
 Colonel José Fernando Ramírez and Captain Guillermo Garza Ramos, who both 
helped build JH, CYL, CYB, and radio station El Mundo, constructed receiving towers 
   
                                                     
 118 Dulles, Yesterday in Mexico, 260-61.  
 119 “. . . embarazado las operaciones,” El Universal Gráfico, 6 Feb. 1924, 1; F. Estévez to Luis G. 
Zepeda, Celaya, Guanajuato, 25 Jan. 1924, exp. 115, inv., 1521, leg. 1, Fondo Fernando Torreblanca, 
FAPCEFT.  
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“in all the military camps” to pick up long distance wireless messages, speeding up 
communications from Obregón and other top generals to the field and allowing for a 
greater coherence during mobilizations.  These devices also intercepted enemy 
messages.  Ramírez and Garza Ramos not only set up the equipment but additionally 
trained field operators on how to use it.120
 As historian Roberto Ornelas Herrera has brought to light, the memoirs of 
General Donato Bravo Izquierdo provides a number of important insights in how 
government forces incorporated radio in Chiapas.  Using a radio set up by Lieutenant 
Pedro Ríos in a small brewery, the general was able to hear messages about the war 
front in Veracruz, including the defeat of Guadalupe Sánchez in Esperanza.  Using the 
recently donated stations in Guatemala and El Salvador, Bravo Izquierdo relayed 
messages to Mexico City and receivers in Veracruz.  These countries also provided 
ammunition to his forces.
 
121
 Obregón’s SGM aired its own propaganda, highlighting its victories, but also 
mentioning some of its setbacks.
   
122
                                                     
 120 F. Estévez to Luis G. Zepeda, Celaya, Guanajuato, 25 Jan. 1924, exp. 115, inv., 1521, leg. 1, 
Fondo Fernando Torreblanca, FAPCEFT; “Mensaje del Gral. Estrada interceptado,” Excélsior, 17 Dec. 
1923, 5; Ornelas Herrera, “La radiodifusión mexicana a principios del siglo XX,” 196. 
  From Mexico City, the department sent out 
bulletins on its own stations, as well as all other government stations.  The Chapultepec 
transmitter sent these reports across the hemisphere and to Western Europe.  The 
 121 Donato Bravo Izquierdo, Un soldado del pueblo (Mexico City: publisher not stated, 1964), 155, 
173, 208, 253; Ornelas Herrera, “La radiodifusión mexicana a principios del siglo XX, 209-10. 
 122 “La tripulación completa de los barcos esta lista en Filadelfia y Nuevo Orleans,” El Demócrata, 
5 Feb. 1924, 1; “El radio y la milicia,” El Demócrata, 7 Mar. 1924, 6.; “Rebels Lose 116 in Pachuca 
Battle,” New York Times, 13 Jan. 1924, S8; Rebels Proclaim Tampico Blockade, New York Times, 15 Jan. 
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receivers in CROM and government factories spread government propaganda among 
urban laborers.123
 The commercial stations also became embroiled in the conflict.  Immediately 
before the official outbreak of the rebellion, Martín Luis Guzmán, a cooperatista 
member and De la Huerta supporter who had planned to use his station El Mundo in 
support of De la Huerta’s campaign, abandoned the operation, and his newspaper of the 
same name, for exile abroad.
   
124  The government also briefly shut down CYL.  Shortly 
thereafter it reopened, airing daily war bulletins provided by the SGM, which listeners 
picked up across Mexico, United States, and Canada.125  CYB continued to broadcast 
performances by the National Conservatory of Music and Theatre, apparently posing no 
threat.126
 
  The rebellion sent a clear message to radio operators:  if you go against the 
government you will be shut down, but if you support the government, it will support 
you.  In Mexico City, questions of loyalty had largely been determined before the end 
of January.  Once the Obregón administration decided that a station would help and not 
hinder its military operations, officials allowed, even encouraged, allied commercial 
broadcasts as a means of building support and further advancing the private 
broadcasting initiatives began the year before.  For almost the entire conflict, 
commercial stations continued to operate.  
 
 
                                                     
 123 “La radiografía utilizaren en operaciones militares,” Excélsior, 7 Jan. 1924. 1. 
 124 Medina Ávila and Vargas Arana, Nuestra es la voz, 104. 
 125 Ornelas Herrera, “La radiodifusión mexicana a principios del siglo XX,” 211, 213.  
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Returning to the New Normal 
 By late April, a month after De la Huerta fled, the revolt had mostly subsided, and 
radio development continued much as it had before.  According to El Demócrata, 
intercepted wireless messages showed the remaining rebels lacking any cohesion and 
evacuating their remaining strongholds in the south.  The landing of government forces 
in the Yucatán peninsula on April 21 put an end to the last serious bastion of rebel 
support. 127  Although pockets of insurrectionists continued to operate for a number of 
months, they received less attention in Mexico City and abroad.  The rebels had done 
significant damage to important radio stations, including in Veracruz, Mérida, and 
Salina Cruz, but government workers were already in the process of repairing them.128  
During the preceding month, the LCMR began to redouble its efforts to expand radio 
construction and use, providing a series of lectures, broadcasts, and conferences.129
 While the military was delivering its final blows to the rebels, Calles and his 
supporters returned to the campaign trail, giving the first radio address by a presidential 
  
Commercial stations once again expanded in number during the last half of 1924.  The 
Inter-American Committee on Electronic Communications, held in Mexico City in 
June, re-established Mexico as a leading Latin American country in communications 
development.  However, the rebellion had instigated one important new change: 
political speech became solidly monopolized by a single political faction and 
commercial stations toned down any dissidence. 
                                                     
 127 “Querían echar a pique los barcos rebeldes,” El Demócrata, 13 Apr. 1924, 16; “Obregon 
Regains Yucatan,” New York Times, 22 Apr. 1924, 11. Interestingly, and perhaps not surprising, after the 
rebels sabotaged the Mérida radio station, U.S. warships allowed “American interests” to use the navy’s 
radios, especially the USS Cleveland.  
 128 “Las comunicaciones telegráficas y ferrocarrileras con Huajuapan, Oaxaca, quedaron reparadas 
en su totalidad,” El Demócrata, 29 Mar. 1924, 6. 
 129 “La interesante conferencia-concierto de hoy de la Liga Central Mexicana de Radio,” El 
Demócrata, 27 Mar. 1924, 2;  
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candidate on April 12.  Showing their continued cooperation with the state, the 
Azcárraga brothers, via CYL, transmitted the program.  The Progressive Civic Party 
(PCP), “the Party of the Middle Class” planned the event.  Architect Guillermo Zárraga, 
the party’s president, worked with the Azcárraga brothers on designing the program.  It 
consisted of the national anthem, military bands, classical music—both foreign and 
nationalist—and canciones mexicanos or Mexican popular, squeezed in between the 
speeches of Calles and two leaders of the PCP.130
 Interestingly, and importantly, Calles and the PCP aimed their speeches at the 
United States as much as Mexico, “to the entire country and to the foreign countries 
where this powerful station reaches.”
   
131   They addressed U.S. fears that Calles was 
“absurdly radical.”  The PCP justified Calles’s proposed policies by connecting them to 
the ideas of social justice that U.S. president Woodrow Wilson espoused following 
World War I.  They also argued that Calles would expand education and incorporate 
rural campesinos, urban workers, and the middle class, exhibiting the government’s 
escalation of populist politics.  The PCP also painted Calles as countering the previous 
wrongs of the landed aristocracy and Catholic Church (though they did not address the 
Church by name).  But the PCP attempted to make these plans more acceptable to U.S. 
officials by emphasizing that Calles would rule democratically and by the law: that he 
was practical, compassionate, “more human and more scientific.”  Following the 
Spanish-delivered speeches, a translator provided them in English.132
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 The radio address was one component of a larger campaign that Calles carried out 
to ease the fears of Americans that saw Calles as representing the “Danger of 
Bolshevism Under the Coming Regime.”133  U.S. officials had grown impatient with 
talks of revolution.  Calles, like Obregón, walked a tightrope, arguing that he supported 
the Revolution, workers, and Mexican autonomy, but also that he was not the enemy of 
foreigners, foreign capital, and the sacredness of contract.134
 Although CYL did reach portions of the United States, the American press and 
government appear to have had little reaction to the Calles-PCP radio event.  The New 
York Times never mentioned the address; instead, the editors gave more attention to 
Calles’s speech to farmers in Morelos the following day, where the candidate paid lip 
service to the legacy of Emiliano Zapata, giving the paper another opportunity to paint 
Calles as a radical.
  
135  Calles’s overall campaign to appear more moderate to Americans 
did, however, have some effect when during the following month other newspapers 
began publishing articles on his increased moderation towards American capitalists.136
 Although it is hard to judge how much affect the speeches had on the Mexican 
public, they do appear to have had some influence.  But just in case Mexico City 
residents missed the address, the pro-Calles newspaper El Demócrata dedicated a total 
of five pages over a two day period discussing the event.  The paper called the radio 
address “a great success” and that it was heard clearly throughout the capital.
   
137
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Following the event, the agrarian group Partido Rojo del Sur Vercruzano—who had 
fought against the De la Huerta Rebellion in Veracruz—sent the presidential aspirant a 
letter praising his defense of campesino rights, offering their support to his campaign, 
and stating that they heard his address clearly on their radio.138
 
  Indeed, if anything 
changed during the time immediately following the rebellion, was the drive of 
government leaders to use radio to directly communicate with the people of Mexico as a 
means to solidify their power.  The rebellion reminded Obregón, Calles, and their 
supporters that their grasp was fragile and that the country remained divided.  After 
weeding out some of their greatest adversaries during the revolt, state officials gave 
more impetus to expanding direct radio communication with those that supported them, 
to the rest of the nation, and to the world abroad.  
Conclusion: Crucial Years 
 The years during Obregón’s presidency proved crucial in both technological 
development and the course of post-Revolution government—developments that were, 
in fact, very much interrelated.  Airplanes were becoming a common component of the 
military.  Engineers and construction workers erected large buildings of grey reinforced 
concrete.  Camaras, cars, and typewriters continued to find their ways into the hands of 
people in towns across the republic.  Articles in newspapers and magazines argued 
about the merits and pitfalls of technology while a new group of radical poets—the 
estridentistas—praised the new modern and metropolitan world that Mexico was 
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entering.  The Obregón administration wrestled with these fast-paced changes while 
struggling to maintain and expand its power.  
 The evolution of radio is a good example of the significant changes underway. 
Despite the still limited reach of the newly established field of broadcasting, wireless 
technology was becoming a more component of government and society.  Radio 
became a more crucial component of foreign relations and the measuring of time.  The 
military also equipped its first airplanes with wireless devices and the Department of 
Agriculture worked on using radio technology to spread farming and meteorological 
information.   
 The most significant change, of course, was the initiation of broadcasting 
operations.  Radio amateurs, many of whom had been operating illegally, expanded in 
number and became some of the most significant developers and promoters of the 
medium.  Indeed, they were responsible for organizing many of the earliest 
broadcasting events and for the first radiocasting regulations in the country.  The 
military commenced its own broadcasting station, and so to did the SEP.  It was also 
during the Obregón administration that commercial radio became a facet of society, 
especially in Mexico City, Monterrey, Guadalajara, and other urban areas.  A number of 
events, but especially the Firpo-Dempsey boxing match, the Mexico City Grand Radio 
Fair, and the speech by presidential candidate Calles provoked greater interest in the 
technology and increased radio sales among tose tat could afford them.  Throngs of 
people crowded around shops that aimed their receivers towards city streets.  
 Obregón’s decision to let commercial enterprises take the lead in radio 
broadcasting signaled a new opening in radio use, recognizing the limits of the 
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government to develop an adequate broadcasting chain, but also the capitalist leanings 
of the Sonoran leadership.  However, the government did not give these stations free 
reign.  The 1924 election and the resulting De la Huerta Rebellion made the 
administration much more hesitant about what private stations aired.  Military officials 
closed down stations, permanently dismantling the one station that supported De la 
Huerta.  During the uprising, the government demanded that all radio owners register 
their devices.  Surely not everyone abided by these orders, but many did, and the decree 
shows the willingness of the Obregón administration to hinder democratic trends in 
radio development in the name of state security.  The rebellion also had other 
significant ramifications for wireless development.  It ultimately led to the increased 
dominance of military radio by the armed forces that remained loyal to the state.  And 
most importantly, it cemented the relationship between the Azcárraga family, their 
station—CYL—and the revolutionary state that the Obregón administration helped 
stabilize and that Calles and his allies built upon.  This is exemplified not only by 
CYL’s willingness to broadcast pro-government messages during the De la Huerta 
Rebellion, but also by the fact that Calles chose the station to air the first-ever broadcast 
in Mexico by a presidential candidate.  
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Chapter Six 
 
Military Operations, Structural Development, 
and Foreign Relations, 1924-1934 
 
 
Man may make a perfect machine, but it 
still will depend on man himself as to 
whether the machine shall be an instrument 
of understanding or misunderstanding.             
  —Dwight Morrow, 19301
 
 
 
 The diversification of radio continued with force during the years in which Calles 
held the presidency and during the subsequent “Maximato,” when Calles still possessed 
considerable influence on national politics from behind the scenes.  And it was in these 
years that the technology and the revolutionary state began to mature.  The biggest 
change in wireless trends was undoubtedly the expanding commercial and state 
broadcasting operations, but broadcasting was only one of the fields of radio that 
interested leaders.  The central government continued to invest in radiotelephony and 
radiotelegraphy for use in the military, foreign relations, and internal communications 
more generally.  It was during the Calles and Maximato years that the military 
professionalized and more securely dominated radio communications, which greatly 
reduced the chances of rebellions to succeed.  Private enterprises also became involved 
in radio outside of broadcasting.  Radiotelegraphy and radiotelephone services 
increased dramatically in the transportation sector.  Although most aspects of radio 
prior to the Lázaro Cárdenas presidency have been underexplored, these components of 
wireless development in Mexico have received even less attention although they played 
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a significant part in transportation and communications development, the suppression of 
rebellions, and the expansion of state power.  
 
Continuing Military Developments 
Under the leadership of Minister Joaquín Amaro, the SGM advanced radio in 
the armed forces while managing to temporarily decrease overall costs.2  The military 
not only continued to incorporate the technology for combat and administrative 
communications, but also along with cinema and print media for “culturization” 
projects.3
Like other radio stations, military stations had specific call names.  By 1925 
most started with the letter “XC,” though some still maintained “XB” names, an earlier 
designation.  During the fiscal year 1924-25, the military transmitted 979 radiograms 
  Radio was an important aspect of army reforms and was included in nearly 
every arm of the military.  Ground and air forces used radio equipment in all of the 
important campaigns of the era, including the Yaqui uprising (1926-27), the Cristero 
Rebellion (1926-29), and the political revolts of Arnulfo Gómez and Francisco Serrano 
in 1927 and of José Gonzalo Escobar in 1929.  Unlike the preceding De la Huerta 
Rebellion, these insurrections against the federal government failed to gain the popular 
support of the majority of the military, a testament to the success of weeding out 
discontented officials and the building of a more loyal army under Amaro’s leadership.  
The greater cohesion of the military also allowed the state to control radio 
communications to a much greater extent, lessoning the dangers of the medium while 
strengthening intelligence gathering practices.  
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and received 895.  In addition to the broadcasting station JH, the SGM possessed XC1, 
a station in the offices of the Secretariat in Mexico City, XC2, in Bahía de Magdalena in 
the Northern District of Baja California, the aviation department’s station, and XC3, 
which was still under construction in Campeche.  The Xcalak and Payo Obispo stations 
were still operational and in use.  By mid-1925, Excélsior pointed out that there were 
military stations operating in Mexico City, Guadalajara, Mazatlán, in addition to others 
in the states of Sonora and Chihuahua.4  The paper correctly noted the continuing 
interest in radio by members of the military.  However, it failed to recognize the large 
number of other stations that had been previously completed before and during the 
Revolution.  In fact, the army already had access to radio offices across much of the 
country.  It also possessed a small number of portable devices and a scattering of 
receivers used for both military matters and entertainment.5
The air force also built another station in the Guadalajara vicinity, where a new 
airbase was under construction.  Used for communications between pilots, ground 
forces, and military bases, General Gustavo Salinas led the aviation and radio projects.  
Accompanying Salinas were “all the technical engineers of the Department of Radio 
and Telephones.”
  As can be seen by the 
location of these stations, the armed forces used radio in central Mexico but also in 
more remote areas of the country, building from precedents established during the 
Porfiriato and the Revolution.  
6
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and project to project, making work on multiple simultaneous inniatives difficult.  But 
progress was underway.   
From 1926 to 1933 the military’s expansion of radio use grew significantly 
under the continued leadership of Amaro, and then during the brief directorships of 
generals Abelardo Rodríguez and Pablo Quiroga.  During the fiscal year 1926-27, the 
SGM received 10,950 radio messages and transmitted 15,620.  Amaro noted that seven 
new “fixed” stations had been erected, which were in communication with fourteen 
portable radios in the field.7  In 1927 the secretariat increased its training programs and 
the construction of transmitters and receivers.  By the following year, the SGM had 
expanded its operations to seventeen fixed stations and thirty-three portable sets.  In 
1929, the number of combined SGM and SCOP stations combined reached sixty-
seven.8  For the fiscal year 1930-31, Amaro reported that there were fifty-two 
transmitters, including portable devices, operated specifically by the military, dispersed 
among twenty-four jefaturas or military headquarters.9  In 1933 army engineers 
constructed ten new stations.10
The armed forces trained more operators to work the new equipment.  On New 
Year’s Day 1930, Amaro inaugurated the Escuela de Transmisiones Militares, which 
had existed in a more experimental form as the Escuela Telegráfica Militar.  By 1931 
the school had sixty soldiers studying military communications.  The following year, 
during the SGM directorship of Abelardo L. Rodríguez, officials once again changed 
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the school’s name, this time to the Escuela de Enlances y Transmisiones.  Naval and 
aviation officials also increased the number of sailors and airmen undergoing training in 
their own radio communication programs.11  In 1932 the SGM possessed eighty-five 
officers and thirty-one soldiers specifically designated for military transmissions.  Every 
major military outpost possessed at least two radio operators.  The nation was divided 
into eight radio zones and new stations were established in the Northern Territory of 
Baja California, Hidalgo, Michoacán, Chiapas, and the Territory of Quintana Roo.  The 
secretariat also began developing new “backpack” radios, which weighed 28.5 pounds, 
in addition to importing similar equipment from Britain and France.12  Indeed, plans 
were underway to provide radio devices to the majority of military units, similar to 
practices in the United States and Europe.  Built in army workshops, the first fifty 
radios were to be sent to infantry battalions, to be followed by sixty more devices 
slotted for Mexican cavalry regiments.13
 In the navy, meanwhile, officials worked to rebuild their small flotillas 
following the mass defection during the De la Huerta Rebellion.  In the process, they 
upgraded or installed long and short-wave radios on a number of their vessels.  During 
the summer of 1927, the U.S. company Johnson Iron Works installed the most advanced 
RCA long and short-wave radio equipment on the cruiser Anáhuac, bought in the 
United States during the De la Huerta Rebellion.  Other ships with wireless devices 
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included the Bravo, Guaymas, Acapulco, Agua Prieta, and the Tampico.  Like other 
departments within the military, the navy began building its own equipment in addition 
to acquiring imports and training its own team of radio technicians and operators.14
Radio became more popular in the air force because it increased military 
surveillance capabilities and because it allowed leaders to expand a professionalization 
campaign via broadcasting.  During the Calles years, the Department of Aviation 
operated its own 2,250-watt broadcasting station and had built and distributed a number 
of receivers.  The military built radio stations at the Balbuena, Mexicali, and 
Guadalajara air fields.  The head of aviation also hoped to install more radios on its 
growing number of planes.  The amount of imported and domestically constructed 
planes had increased significantly.  There were thirty-six aircraft in 1925, six of them 
built or at least put together in Mexico.
  
15  Officials at Balbuena clocked 3,304 flights for 
a total of 470 hours.  The SCOP helped build hangers.  It has to be noted, however, that 
the military never had all of its planes in working order.  Amaro noted in 1927 that the 
air force possessed forty-nine planes (an increase of thirteen in two years), but that only 
eighteen were in actual service.  Twenty-two were in repair, and nine were still under 
construction.16  The SGM had bought eight of those planes from the United States.  
Following yet another U.S. embargo on Mexico, the army bought twelve aircraft from 
England in 1928.17
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year the department increased radio and signal education as a regular part of aviator 
training.18  Documents from 1929 and 1933, however, state that only two planes had 
working radios, only one more than existed in 1921, and the same number that existed 
during the De la Huerta Rebellion.  The pilots of these planes apparently divided their 
time between the different conflicts further diluting their impact on the course of the 
Cristero Rebellion and the military revolts of the late 1920s.19
The emphasis on modern war machinery was a global trend, but it was also 
fueled by events within Mexico.  Rebellions continued to plague the country during the 
last half of the 1920s.  The army’s leadership believed that in conjunction with airplanes 
and ships of war, radio communications provided a valuable asset in combating rebel 
groups, which were mostly based in the mountains of western and northern Mexico.  
For example, the transport ship Progreso, which had been active during the Revolution 
and the De la Huerta Rebellion helped in the defense of Acapulco during attacks by 
insurrectionary forces.  The rebels, led by brothers and merchants Baldomero and 
Amadeo Vidales, called for the redistribution of lands in Guerrero and against the 
Spanish merchants along the Pacific coast in that state and Oaxaca.
 
20
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  The military put 
down the movement quickly, though the Vidales brothers survived and continued to 
influence government policy in Guerrero.  In 1926 General Enrique Estrada, among 
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In response, the military in the region, under the command of General Abelardo 
Rodríguez—Jefe de los Operaciones Militares—stocked up on war materials and put in 
place a “strict and effective vigilance along the border . . . establishing an active service 
of international information and espionage.”  Shortly thereafter U.S. law enforcement 
agents arrested the would-be invaders for violating neutrality laws.21
The insurrections that worried political and military officials the most were the 
Yaqui Uprising and the Cristero Rebellion.  Many leading state agents considered them 
interrelated reactionary movements to government policies by misguided “fanatics.”  
Although the Cristero Rebellion has received much more attention from scholars, it was 
the Yaqui Uprising that initially worried Amaro more.  The result of a train holdup and 
years of contention over land invasions and autonomy, the revolt was their last to date.  
The renewed attacks against the Yaqui began when a contingent of Yaqui men led by 
Luis Matus detained a train aboard which Obregón had been riding on September 12, 
1926.  Calles and the Chamber of Deputies enthusiastically embraced the idea of 
teaching the indigenous group a final lesson, providing a million pesos to “forever” put 
down the Yaqui.
  
22
Amaro hurled a mass of troops at the Yaqui hideouts in the mountains of 
Sonora.  He sent eight infantry battalions and ten cavalry regiments.  Along with 
President Calles, Amaro worked with General Francisco R. Manzo, chief of operations 
in Sonora, and General Román Yocupicio Valenzuela, a Mayo Indian who rose in the 
ranks of the federal military.  Yocupicio would join the failed escobarista rebellion two 
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years later, surviving to later rule Sonora during the late 1930s.23  Estimates of the 
federal forces range from 15,000 to 20,000 soldiers, whereas as Matus led much of his 
2,500 followers into the Bacatete Mountains in the Sierra Occidental.  Only 1,200 of 
them were fighters.24
The campaign incorporated radio on an unprecedented scale.  The army set up 
three fixed stations in Sonora at Estación Ortiz, Cajeme, and Guaymas.  In conjunction 
with this equipment, six portable radio sets accompanied soldiers in the field.  They 
were used in conjunction with at least one of the planes with a radio device, providing 
information for reconnaissance, bombing, strafing, and propaganda assignments.  
Amaro noted that the air force clocked two hundred and eighty-five hours on these 
missions, one hundred of them “bombing and machine-gunning.”
 
25  Surrounded by 
government soldiers, Yaqui combatants and their family members were driven out of 
their mountain hideouts by the aerial campaigns.  Subsequently, the Mexican military 
dealt the demoralized rebels a critical blow at the battle of Cerro del Gallo in late 1927, 
more or less ending the rebellion and armed Yaqui resistance.26
Similarly, federal soldiers incorporated radio in their response to the Cristero 
Rebellion.  A fixed station and three backpack radios were operating in Michoacán.  
Another fixed station operated in Zacatecas, which was connected to four other portable 
devices.  Amaro noted in 1928 that there were eleven 7.5-watt portable stations used in 
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operations against the cristeros, not only in Michoacán and Zacatecas, but also in 
Durango, Jalisco, Guanajuato, and San Luis Potosí.  That year the military established 
another fixed station in San Luis Potosí and built another in Tepic.  The station at the 
Guadalajara airbase and a number of SCOP stations in the northwest also collaborated 
with the armed forces.27
During the middle of the Cristero Rebellion, a revolt by Generals Francisco 
Serrano, Arnulfo Gómez, and Héctor Almada over the imposition of a second Obregón 
presidency showed the world that the Mexican government still faced problems of 
presidential succession and a military of questionable loyalties.  The insurrection, albeit 
relatively brief, also forced Amaro to pull thousands of soldiers and nine aircraft from 
the cristero campaign to search for Gómez, who had fled to the mountains of Veracruz 
in hopes of rallying a more significant force.  This, in turn, prolonged the cristero 
conflict.  However, Serrano and Gómez failed to gain a substantial following from 
within the military, exhibiting, perhaps, that Amaro’s re-education program had actually 
led to greater allegiance to the state among an increasing amount of soldiers.  Learning 
of the rebellion in advance from loose-lipped participants, Calles, Amaro, and Obregón 
moved quickly to crush the revolt.  Immediately Amaro and Calles “installed their 
headquarters at Chapultepec castle, where direct wire and radio communications kept 
them constantly informed.”   They stayed up late into the night during the first three 
days of October “snapping” orders.
  
28
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Serrano in Morelia on October 3.  Gómez survived until early November.  By then 
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defeated his forces.  They found Gómez, along with his nephew, hiding in a cave near 
the city of Xalapa.  They too were executed.  Almada, who had earlier joined Gómez’s 
forces, escaped to the United States.29
Despite the horrible failure of the Serrano-Gómez Revolt, Escobar and a number 
of other generals revolted on March 3, 1929.  Once again, the issue was the presidential 
succession.  They protested what they saw as the imposition of Pascual Ortiz Rubio’s 
presidency, guaranteed by Calles and his partners within the PNR.  This time the 
process had been further complicated by the assassination of Obregón, which a number 
of the generals incorrectly blamed on Calles.  This insurrection also proved more 
dangerous, since approximately 28 percent of the armed forces defected to the side of 
the rebels.
 
30
Of course, radio being a regular component of the military and insurrections, 
continued as an important communications tool during the Escobarista Rebellion.  
When the uprising first broke out, Portes Gil and Calles learned that General Jesús M. 
Aguirre, who originally feigned allegiance, was actually in rebellion when José María 
Dorantos, head of the Seventh Calvary Regiment, and member of the navy still loyal to 
the government, sent a radio message to Mexico City stating that Aguirre was actually 
organizing the revolt in Veracruz.
 
31
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used broadcasting.  With the approval of President Emilio Portes Gil, Julio Tren’s Trens 
News Agency provided bulletins about the “the march of military operations against the 
subversives” on commercial, military, and other government stations.  All programs 
were “favorable to the government and our institutions” and were heard over home 
receivers but also portable and fixed army radios.32
As a military tool, radios were useful but they had their limitations.  Disruptions 
and interference were still common.  Devices broke.  A number of them were second-
hand.  According to a military attaché to the U.S. Embassy who was in contact with a 
“reliable informant, unusually well situated to acquire the data requested,” Mexican 
agents who purchased radio equipment in the United States in late 1926 were corrupt 
and bought on the cheap.  One such buyer named “Bravo” acquired enough equipment 
from a military surplus store in New Jersey to piece together twenty-seven transmitters.  
He bought used so he could pocket money that was provided to him based on the costs 
of new devices.  However, the attaché admitted that the equipment, even if used and 
older, should work and that sets could be built from the materials that reach up to 1,000 
miles.
 
33  Officer arrogance also offset the technological advantages of the federal army 
on more than one occasion, for example, during General Eulogio Ortiz’s campaign 
against the cristeros in Colima in May and June 1929.34
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equipping more planes with radios, and pilots received more training on wireless use, 
the task for some reason proved difficult. 
As exemplified by the Trens reports, broadcasts aimed at the general public 
were another component of state propaganda on military affairs.  Commercial stations 
regularly broadcast war bulletins filled with government reports since 1924.  The 
Azcárraga’s station, CYL, broadcast anti-delahuertista news.  The military provided 
musical programming and lectures, which were not only played on SGM stations but 
also on the SEP transmitter and commercial stations.  In December 1925, J. M. Puig 
Casauranc, Secretary of Public Education, told Amaro that he could use the SEP’s 
station to air propaganda and military orders whenever he needed.35  In 1928 the SGM 
reported that it operated two 2,000-watt stations “on commercial waves” for 
communication with boats, planes, and transmitting programs.36   Assisted by the 
military’s most renowned radio specialist, José Fernández Ramírez, the Trens Agency 
continued reporting on state and military matters into the 1930s, though it was not 
popular among all military leaders.  One officer, Ramón Cortes Gonzales, complained 
to Amaro in late 1929 that the messages sent out from Balbuena airfield reached 
Havana and Guatemala, jeopardizing military operations.37
Amaro also used broadcasting to shape the culture within the armed forces.  One 
of the first subjects addressed by Amaro when he gave his report to congress in 1925 
was his use of radiocasts and receivers as part of a “culturization” program.  Similar to a 
project underway by the SEP, military leaders used radio, along with cinema and 
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magazines, to bring expert lecturers to soldiers.38  Army leaders also hoped that 
broadcasting would entertain soldiers and raise morale.  Station JH operated during 
1923 and 1924.  During 1925 and the first half of 1926, the Department of 
Communications and Signals played music and military conferences each Monday via a 
6,000-watt transmitter.  The station operators temporarily ended their broadcasts on 
June 1, 1926, in order to help expand radio operations in other parts of the country.39  In 
1929 and 1930, military technicians constructed four short-wave transmitters for 
military news, educational classes, and general orders.40  In 1933 the Interdepartmental 
Radio Commission, a committee comprised of specialists who were reviewing the state 
of radio development in the country, noted that there were two SGM broadcasting 
stations, XFG and XFH, which aired programs for the armed forces and the public at 
large.41
In addition to promoting radio within the military, Amaro befriended a number 
of radio equipment providers.  He not only bought radios for himself but he also 
introduced salesmen to other prominent government officials.  In early 1928, Amaro 
bought two radios, one for himself and one for his wife, from Emilio Azcárraga, the 
brother of the co-owners of commercial station CYL, and the owner of the Mexican 
Music Company, a subsidiary of RCA.  These devices were not run-of-the-mill radios; 
they were top of the line.  Amaro’s machine cost one thousand pesos.  His wife’s cost 
three and a half thousand pesos (a thousand pesos less than what Azcárraga said he 
normally charged).  Amaro was not the only government official to buy from 
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Azcárraga, and his relationship with state and party leaders grew substantially when he 
opened his own powerful commercial station—XEW—in 1930.42  Amaro also 
introduced “his friend” Hernegildo Robles, a representative of Zenith Radio 
Corporation of Chicago, to President Portes Gil while pushing the president to help the 
army obtain more apparatuses.43
A testament to how important radio was to top military officials, these leaders 
sent agents abroad to study the medium and to examine how it was used by other 
governments and armed forces.  In fact, the army was sending an unprecedented 
number of people to foreign countries to gain insights into a myriad of subjects 
pertaining to military modernization.
 
44  Most of these student representatives went to 
Europe, but others went to the United States and South America.  For example, in 1928 
one mid-level officer—almost all of these officials abroad were young majors or 
lieutenants—went to Brazil specifically to report on how that country used radio 
communications.  He sent reports back to the SGM, providing information on the 
developmental history of the medium, personnel, costs, the number of stations, and the 
number of messages sent and received.45
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Argentine-made devices, and communications in Argentina’s armed forces.46  At the 
same time, the SGM sent officials to the Second Meeting of the International Technical 
Consultative Committee on Radioelectronic Communications held in Copenhagen, 
Denmark.47  In August of 1934 the military had other officers training on radio 
advancements and uses in England and Spain while back home the SGM had formed a 
new transmissions battalion.48
Military radio was one of a number of examples in which Amaro and his 
successors implemented a serious program of military reform and modernization.  
Although built on the work done by preceding administrations, Amaro instilled a sense 
of loyalty to a much greater extent, especially after the failed rebellions of other 
generals from 1927 to 1929.  But even then, it was a testament to Amaro’s policies and, 
perhaps the weariness of war, that the vast majority of soldiers remained loyal to the 
government during these insurrections.  Radio played an important role in building this 
new military culture, putting down the rebellions of the 1920s, and in spreading state 
propaganda to the public, troops, rebels, and foreign audiences.  
  
 
Public Communications: The SCOP and Private Enterprise 
 Armed forces dominated wireless use during the Revolution, but as addressed in 
the previous chapter, radio communications expanded in a number of commercial 
enterprises and other state agencies during the Obregón and Calles years.  Indeed, radio 
use among commercial aviators and merchant sea vessels outpaced the military by the 
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early 1930s.  Radio messaging from trains, first started by factional leaders during the 
Revolution, became more commonplace on regular passenger services and, of course, 
on the presidential train.  As a result, radio became an integral part of communication in 
transportation, advancing the practice of using the medium to interlink the various parts 
of the country.  The SCOP, which had been a major player in Mexican radio 
development from the beginning, oversaw these developments and provided 
permissions to businesses interested in using wireless technology.  Additionally, the 
SCOP itself continued to expand radio as a vital part of internal government and public 
communications, as well as communications with foreign powers.  
 The number of state radiotelegraph stations fluctuated.  In 1925 the DGTN 
operated twenty-five offices for government and public use.49  By 1926 the number of 
working SCOP stations dropped to twenty-four, though by 1935 the number of 
operations had increased to twenty-eight.  From 1926 to 1935 SCOP agents reported 
that the percentage of all electronic communication messages that were wireless rose 
from 8 percent to over 14 percent.  From its workshop in Chapultepec, the DGTN built 
and repaired wireless devices, providing most of the parts for government stations. 50
 The DGTN also continued to direct much of Mexico’s radio communications with 
foreign nations.  Mexico’s influence in Central America continued under the Calles 
administration.  Stations gifted to the region during the Obregón years kept the 
governmental leaders of El Salvador, Guatemala, and Costa Rica in direct contact with 
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Mexico City.  In 1926 the Mexican government worked out a number of new wire and 
wireless contracts between Central American and Caribbean countries.51  The DGTN 
also expanded its communications with nations in Europe, Asia, and South America.  
The Chapultepec radio towers continued to beam government newscasts throughout the 
latter half of the 1920s and the 1930s to domestic and foreign stations.  Indeed, the 
station increased its power dramatically.  In 1928 the SCOP reported that the station 
operators were in regular communications with Germany, “Paris, England, Argentina, 
Italy, Japan, and others.”  In 1929 the SCOP completed a massive receiver in its newly 
founded Palo Alto station in the Lomas de Santa Fe region of the Federal District.  The 
operation picked up radio messages from around the entire globe.52  In addition to 
radiotelegraphy DGTN employees began to regularly use international radiotelephone 
services starting in the early 1930s.  In January 1931, SCOP director Juan Andreu 
Almazán, later to play a leading role in galvanizing much of the Mexican right against 
Cárdenas, first talked via wireless phone with Primo Villa Michel the Mexican 
ambassador to Germany.53
 During the presidency of Pascual Ortiz Rubio, the SCOP allowed a number of 
U.S. providers to start wireless operations in Mexico.  These agreements, however, had 
a large number of stipulations, put in place to help alleviate fears of foreign domination. 
For example, in 1931 the SCOP signed a deal with the Montgomery Company, a 
subsidiary of Frutera Transcontinental, which was in turn controlled by United Fruit.   
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The concession allowed for the Montgomery Company to start a wireless office in 
Ixtapa, Jalisco, close to the business’ banana plantations in the vicinity of Balderas Bay, 
200 miles south of Mazatlán.  United Fruit had long been one of the main radio 
innovators and developers in Latin America, but it had to concede to a number of strict 
stipulations in order to operate in Mexico.  For one, the station had to be accessible to 
the public and interlinked with the national communications network, though preference 
was to be given to the company’s messages.  The station also had to hire and pay for a 
Mexican staff, including the operator, a mechanic, and a messenger.  The government 
retained the right to close the operation at any time and to buy the station if it chose to 
do so after ten years.  Additionally, the company agreed “not to invoke the aid of their 
diplomatic representative” or the contract would become null and void and the 
installation would become “property of the nation.”  Agreeing to the terms, the 
Montgomery Company used the station mostly to communicate with sea vessels 
involved in transporting their products or with other ships and stations connected to 
United Fruit.  It appears that the operation also kept in touch with certain SCOP 
stations.  Indeed, the Mexican government specified which stations it could contact, 
including the offices in Chapultepec and Mérida within Mexico; Barrios, Guatemala; 
Tela and Tegucigalpa, Honduras; Managua, Nicaragua; and New Orleans and Miami in 
the United States.54
 On January 14, 1932, the SCOP and RCA signed a ten-year contract creating 
“Radiomex, R.C.A.,” which provided more wireless connections to New York, Berlin, 
Madrid, Havana, and starting in1934, Tokyo, among others.  Both RCA and the 
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government shared in the profits and costs.  SCOP officials operated the Mexican end 
of the communication link via Chapultepec, and RCA employees operated traffic to and 
through the United States via their operation on Long Island.  The agreement, decreed 
into law by Ortiz Rubio on June 17, 1932, exhibits the decision by top government 
officials to allow foreign companies a larger role in international communications to 
and from Mexico, conceding the United States’ dominant role in global wireless 
technology and knowhow. 55
 The state and local governments also operated their own radio stations.  In 1924 
Chihuahua’s Department of Telegraphs started XICE, a small operation that broadcast 
every Wednesday and Friday.
  This trend continued during the Cárdenas administration. 
56  In 1925 D. Javier M. Eroza, the Mayor of Mérida, 
Yucatán, installed a radio station on property controlled by the Liga Central de 
Resistencia.57  While governor of Veracruz, General Heriberto Jara inaugurated the 
state’s own station in the capital city of Xalapa in late 1926.58  According to one 1933 
report, the state government of San Luis Potosí operated four radio stations, Tabasco 
had two, and Chiapas relied on one.59
 In the late 1920s and 1930s, passenger and mail aviation services took off, both 
figuratively and literally.  Of course, the SCOP had to approve them all.  Many of the 
pilots were also former or active military aviators.  In January 1927, pilots of the 
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National Air Force scouted out routes that could be used for government and 
commercial purposes.60  In April the SCOP approved the first postal air route from 
Mexico City to Túxpan to Tampico.  Another route began that year between Mexico 
City, Veracruz, Puerto México (today, Coatzacoalcos), Salina Cruz, and, finally, 
Tapachula, Chiapas.61  The same year the SCOP also approved eighteen other 
permissions for aerial navigation, including three to Compañía Mexicana de Aviación.  
One of its owners was none other than Enrique Schöndube, the German immigrant and 
agent of AEG (Telefunken) that engineered Mexico’s first public wireless stations.62  
Over the next few years, a number of companies began domestic and international 
services, especially to the United States.  The most successful air services relied on 
radio for communications.  In 1933 The Mexican Aviation Company possessed twelve 
radio stations: Tampico, Tamaulipas; Rancho Méndez, Hidalgo; Mexico City, DF;  
Túxpan, Veracruz;  Tejeria, Veracruz; Minatitlán, Veracruz;  Villahermosa, Tabasco;  
Ciudad de Carmen, Quintana Roo;  Campeche, Campeche; Mérida, Yucatán; Payo 
Obispo, Quintana Roo;  and Tapachula, Chiapas.  The Central Air-Ways Company had 
stations in Mexico City, DF; León, Guanajuato; and Torreón, Coahuila.63
 Like military aviation stations, the commercial radiotelephone services were not 
only confined to communicating with planes.  The Mexican Aviation Company spread 
word of a Salvadoran coup that it overheard on its receivers.  In fact, some of the first 
reports of murders, the disposal of President Arturo Araujo, and the otherwise “calm 
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situation” heard in Mexico and the United States came from the company.64
 Other transportation sectors incorporated radio for public use.  Starting in 1928, 
the DGTN established equipment and personnel to provide wireless services aboard a 
number of passenger trains that serviced the states of Coahuila, Chihuahua, San Luis 
Potosí, Tamaulipas, Nuevo León, Queretaro, Guanajuato, Aguascalientes, Sonora, 
Sinaloa, and Jalisco.  According to one Mexico City newspaper, passengers needed only 
to grab the attention of a DGTN agent while on the locomotive and to make a request.
  Again, this 
shows how radio messages entered and influenced nations outside of their place of 
origin, and the importance of the medium to the foreign relations of nations.  
65
 In addition to public railway services, SCOP officials made sure that the 
presidential train had working radio equipment.  The “Yellow Train” used by Obregón 
and Calles possessed wireless equipment, much like those Villa used during the 
Revolution.  In 1927 a number of government officials decided that a new train was in 
order.  Through Arturo M. Elías, the president’s half brother and the “Mexican Consul-
General” in New York, the government purchased a truly opulent train from Chicago’s 
renowned Pullman Company.  The “Olive Train” consisted of five luxurious coaches 
for Calles and his staff and another coach specifically for the SGM.  The machine cost 
well over half a million dollars and possessed “every conceivable necessity,” including 
bullet- proof cladding and “the most modern radio sets,” which were in every coach 
excepting the baggage and escort cars.  The Los Angeles Times called it the “most 
  
                                                     
 64 Rebel Coup Triumphs,” Los Angeles Times, 4 Dec. 1931, 1.  
 65 “Servicio telegráfico a bordo de los ferrocarriles,” Excélsior, 12 Feb. 1928, 3.  
241 
 
palatial train in the world.”66  A year later the SCOP added a new short-wave radio built 
in the Chapultepec workshop.67
 
 
Foreign Relations and Legislation 
 As radio became more prominent, executive officials and congressmen signed 
new legislation regulating the medium.  Diplomats also made new agreements on 
communications with a number of other countries, while arguing with the United States 
over the role of the state in broadcasting, the allocation of radio frequencies, and 
interference caused by each other’s transmissions.  Debates over these issues, which 
increased during the last year of the Obregón presidency, continued with even greater 
frequency during the last half of the 1920s and the 1930s.  
 As stated in the previous chapter, the Obregón administration took up a prominent 
role in the international debate about radio development when it hosted the Inter-
American Committee on Electronic Communications in Mexico City in the summer of 
1924.  The event became a showdown between the United States and Latin America 
over the role of states in radio development in the Western Hemisphere.  Mexican 
officials, who had striven to increase their own influence in Latin America, especially 
Central America, had attempted with some success to convince many of the region’s 
leaders that they should build nationalist wireless systems, operated by their respective 
governments, and not to rely on U.S. companies like RCA to provide the service.  South 
American countries, including Brazil and Argentina, pushed similar views, as they had 
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already shown in the inter-American communications conference held in Santiago, 
Chile, the year before.   
A number of conferences, both global and regional—Mexico, United States, 
Canada, and Cuba—followed over the next decade.  The 1927 International 
Radiotelegraph Convention of Washington, DC, and the 1932 International Telegraphic 
and Radio Telegraphic Conference in Madrid were significant, but other bilateral 
agreements and smaller regional meetings proved just as important.  Most Latin 
American countries, including Mexico, continued to operate a number of their 
radiotelegraphic service through the government, many Latin American representatives, 
however, became more willing to cooperate with U.S. private businesses, which 
dominated radio manufacturing and technological innovation.   Delegates as these 
conferences worked out the details for radiotelegraphic and radiotelephonic messages 
for maritime and airplane communications, meteorology, experimental investigation, 
warfare, and commercial and state broadcasting.  The 1927 conference delegates also 
agreed to change the call letters of the participating countries, providing Mexico’s final 
XAA-XFZ designation.68
One direct and significant impact of these international agreements is that they 
prompted Mexican officials to increase and modify their own legislation.  For example, 
the 1924 Mexico City meeting set the foundations for the 1926 Law of Electronic 
Communications.
  
69
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government supervision over private wireless operators, and the requirement of 
citizenship for all radio-station owners.  Both the conference and the subsequent 
national legislation also exhibited the fact that national security risks stemming from the 
Revolution and the De la Huerta Rebellion remained a prominent concern of 
communications officials.  Delegates ardently pushed for the state’s “right to seize such 
stations or suspend their service in case of local or international disturbance” and that 
“all parties concerned keep secrecy in respect to all messages or information intercepted 
by receiving apparatus not intended for the general public or for the party or parties 
hearing the same.”70  The 1926 law also made it illegal to report news contrary to the 
security of the state, international harmony, public order, good customs, decent 
language, or “attacks of any form against government or individuals.”  However, 
showing the growing acceptance and outright promotion of commercial broadcasting 
stations, government officials increased the possible length of a station concession to 
fifty years.71
The focus of most of the discussion between the Mexican government and U.S., 
Canadian, and Cuban officials revolved around wave frequency allocations and the 
related issue of interference.  Radio transmissions broadcast from different locations 
that share the same or similar wavelength interfere with each other, often making 
signals unintelligible; a well known fact that was used to jam signals during World War 
I and the Revolution.  The expanding number of commercial and amateur broadcasters 
  In other words, Mexico pursued a mixed commercial-government system 
that promoted private broadcasting but with strict state oversight and influence.  
                                                     
 70 “Proposals Offered by the Mexican Delegation on the Subject of the Agenda,” 11 Jun. 1924, RG 
59, box 574, D4/179, USNA.  
 71 Article 10 of the Ley de Comunicaciones Eléctricas, in Medina Ávila and Vargas Arana, 
Nuestra es la voz, 83. 
244 
 
in the hemisphere crowded the airwaves, causing constant interference with 
programming.  Certain wavelengths also carry sound clearer and for longer than others.  
Broadcasting businessmen who operated powerful transmitters coveted these 
frequencies, known as clear channels.  
During the 1927 Washington, DC, conference, American delegates and 
businessmen introduced and obtained legislation on wavelength allocation and 
interference in articles five and ten of the resulting document.  The measures stated that 
people should open new stations only if they do not interfere with others.  Since the 
United States operated the vast majority of stations, including those on clear channels, 
they, by means of earlier and quicker development, dominated the airwaves, legally 
leaving few to others.72
 American representatives not only worried about interference with U.S. 
commercial stations, but also with military operations.  As discussed in chapter four, 
U.S. army officials complained that carrancista radio operators were sending out 
messages to interfere directly with transmissions sent and received by the Pershing 
Expedition.  In turn, Carranza complained of American warships purposefully 
interrupting Mexican wireless messages.  As Mexican stations, especially powerful 
border blasters, interfered with a larger number of U.S. stations, some Americans feared 
that the Mexican operations would jam military communications, endangering the lives 
of soldiers.  American journalists continued to blame Mexican stations for intentionally 
breaking up American military messages.  For example, while U.S. Marines were trying 
to quell the rebellion of Augusto César Sandino in Nicaragua, the Washington Post 
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reported that Mexican radio officials “redoubled their signals as the [U.S.] fleet left 
Mexican waters.”  These messages cluttered the airwaves, making American 
transmission more difficult.  However, this was not likely the reason for the increase in 
wireless messages.  As the article later contends, these radiotelegraphers could have 
been “signaling ammunition runners for the Nicaraguan rebel forces,” or at least 
warning boats and Central American allies about the movement of the U.S. vessels.73
Despite agreeing to not allow new stations to use frequencies that would 
interfere with already established American broadcasters, the Mexican government, 
starting in 1930, allowed the construction of massively powerful radio stations along the 
U.S. border that operated on frequencies extremely close to commercial operations in 
the United States.
  
Calles vocally denounced U.S. intervention in Nicaragua.  Nevertheless, the Mexican 
legislature agreed to the stipulations of the 1927 conference two years later.  
74  In fact, the government even assisted their construction.75
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  Medical 
charlatans and other ostracized Americans chased off the airwaves in the United States 
operated these stations, transmitting a motley assortment of Latin American and U.S. 
music, fortune tellers, and advertisements for outrageous medical cures.  The most 
notorious “border blasters” of the 1930s were John R. Brinkley—known as the “goat-
gland doctor” for his procedure of rejuvenating male sexual performance and fertility 
through sewing pieces of goat testicles into men’s testicles—and Norman Baker, who 
 74 Ortiz Garza, Una radio entre dos reinos, 22 
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peddled false cures for cancer.76  Understandably, their operations infuriated a large 
number of U.S. radio-station owners and listeners whose programming suffered from 
terrible interference.  They also infuriated U.S. medical professionals who had worked 
hard to delegitimize Brinkley and Baker.  However, others enjoyed the eccentric and 
eclectic entertainment they provided.  Brinkley’s station received hundreds of thousands 
of positive letters from all over the United States especially from the Midwest.  Indeed, 
the rise of American folk and hillbilly music in the United States starting in the mid-
1930s owes much to these powerful frontier stations that aired live transmissions of 
Woody Guthrie, the Carter Family, and other musicians.  Sadly, thousands of seriously 
ill people also believed in their false cures.77
A number of prominent Mexicans, in addition to Americans, opposed these 
stations.   Just as in the United States, many medical professionals, especially those 
involved in the Department of Public Health, despised Brinkley and Baker’s quackery.  
Lawyer Manuel Ruíz Sandoval protested to Coahuila’s Governor Nazario S. Ortiz 
Garza that Brinkley and the other American broadcasters operating in Mexico were 
agents of U.S. imperialism.  Indeed, Mexican and American newspapers reported on 
these “imperialist” objections.  Americans found the claims ridiculous.  One opinion 
piece in the Los Angeles Times facetiously quipped that “according to all photographs, 
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the doctor’s hirsute embellishment is a Vandyke not an imperialist.”78  Apparently to 
this opinion writer, Brinkley’s facial hair showed that he was more selfish and pompous 
than imperial.  But too some Mexicans who took the jingoist campaigns of the newly 
formed PNR seriously, these stations, approved by members of the very same party, 
flew in the face of their own touted nationalist policies.79
But to many PNR and government members—and the distinction between the 
two was increasingly slim—these stations proved useful.  Although not exactly 
intuitive, the stations, by blanketing other North American countries, became the 
biggest and most effective advertisers of Mexican tourism and culture, which had 
become in vogue among administrators as a way to increase the struggling economy 
already in the pangs of depression.  Indeed, some stations offered free air time to the 
Mexican government to promote their “nationalist” tourism campaigns.  And there was 
no doubt that these American radio rebels were stimulating the border economy and 
lining the pockets of local and national officials.  Radio performers and family members 
spent money in local stores, Brinkley bought the Villa Acuña police new uniforms, 
station managers hired locals for construction jobs, and inspectors and politicians 
obtained kickbacks via fees, fines, and bribes.  The radio charlatans, local businesses, 
and government officials alike cashed in on America’s growing obsession with auto 
travel and “all things Mexican.”
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has pointed out, these stations also became the government’s greatest weapon in the war 
to obtain more of the clear channels that U.S. stations hoarded and jealously guarded.  
State legislators, however, did try to counter the criticisms levied against the 
border blasters by introducing new laws.  Of course, this legislation also grew out of 
other important issues stemming from international conferences and revolutionary 
ideologies.  Some of the most considerable components of these laws show the 
government’s increased demands of commercial-sector cooperation in promoting 
revolutionary credos and state-sponsored culture.  Under new laws created in the 1931 
Leyes de Vías Generales de Comunicaciones y Medios de Transporte and the 1932 Vías 
Generales de Comunicación, commercial stations had to provide air time to the 
Department of Public Health and other state agencies.  Broadcasting religious 
messages—and fortune tellers—became illegal, and the same national security caveats 
were reinforced.  Nationalist elements also figured prominently.  Eighty percent of all 
station employees had to be Mexican.  Another article, aimed at border stations, 
outlawed the practice of having operations in foreign countries telephone or radio in 
shows to be re-broadcast from Mexican stations without government permission.  
Additionally, broadcasters had to speak in Spanish, unless they obtained permission to 
do otherwise.  The 1932 law went so far as to make it illegal to use consistently bad 
grammar that insulted the “purity” of the Spanish language.  Any violation of these or 
other infractions resulted in fines added to the already existing 5 percent tax that the 
government took from all station profits.  In 1933 new regulations made it legal to 
broadcast in another language without government permission as long as the programs 
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were provided in Spanish first and then translated.  Something border blasters still 
regularly failed to do.81
In international circles, the issue of awarding wave frequencies based on 
primacy of use arose again in the 1932 International Telegraphic and Radio Telegraphic 
Conference in Madrid.  Hoping to avoid the issue while remaining an active participant 
in the conference, the Mexican delegates approached the Americans on the first day of 
the conference and put forward a plan to work out their differences on clear channels 
during a smaller regional meeting the following year.  Eager to retain their dominant 
position in communications in the Western Hemisphere and to limit the influence of 
Europe, the Americans agreed.  In fact, U.S. officials worked out a bilateral agreement 
over clear channels with Canada just before the conference in Madrid.
  
82
The 1933 North and Central American Regional Radio Conference took place in 
Mexico City.  As its name suggests, it included other nations in addition to the United 
States and Mexico; Canada, Costa Rica, Cuba, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and 
Nicaragua also sent delegates.  The issues of clear channel distribution, border blasters, 
and interference in general dominated the convention.  Immediately preceding the 
gathering, observers in Mexico and the United States believed that some agreement 
over frequency redistribution and the border stations would be reached.  As a sign of 
cooperation, Mexican officials enacted the 1933 regulations, aimed largely at the border 
blasters, just before the meeting.  The SCOP also hit Brinkley’s operation with a new 
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round of fines that reached upward of $150,000 dollars.83
The Americans came down with an impossible ultimatum 
which the Mexicans understood as an attempt to dictate 
what they should do with stations in their country.  The 
Americans virtually demanded that Dr. Brinkley be put 
off the air and insisted that Mexico should have no 
stations on the border that could carry messages into the 
United States. This demand made failure certain from the 
beginning.
  However, the American 
delegation responded in Mexico City with arrogance.  According to Josephus Daniels, 
the former U.S. Secretary of Navy involved with previous radio disputes,  
84
 
 
In response, Mexican delegates discussed upping the power of Brinkley’s station with 
former U.S. Vice President Charles Curtis, who worked in the interest of XER.  They 
also considered granting permits to establish two more frontier stations.85
 Most American broadcasting company executives sighed with relief as the 
discussions broke down.  They feared any redistribution of the coveted frequencies, of 
which Americans possessed ninety of the ninety-six available wavelengths.  Mexican 
representatives had wanted six of the channels, the same number that the Americans had 
provided to Canada in their bilateral agreement the year before.  The U.S. delegates 
offered three and the conversation stalled.  The Americans also refused to give any of 
the contested wavelengths to the other participants, who also clamored for what they 
considered their fair share of the radio spectrum.  Similarly, the delegates failed to come 
to any agreement over the border stations.  The conference did, however, make progress 
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on eliminating interference on point-to-point radio communications, which operated in 
a different frequency range.86
By 1934 U.S. radiomen in Mexico had erected at least five powerful stations 
along the border.  On top of those five, Americans citizens were in the process of 
having more built.  That year, however, the Abelardo Rodríguez administration moved 
in the other direction and shut down Brinkley’s station XER for grievous violations of 
the 1932 and 1933 rules on language and religion.  The government took over the 
station, making it a part of its own national chain.  Once again state leaders used these 
border stations, built with American capital, to their advantage.  The other stations 
continued, despite breaking the same rules.  U.S. legislators tried to impede these 
operations by enacting the 1934 Communications Act, creating the Federal 
Communications Commission (FCC) and banning the use of transnational remote 
control radio operations.  The FCC became a permanent fixture in the United States but 
the law did little to slow the frontier operations.  Indeed, high-powered “outlaw” 
stations operated on the Mexican side of the border into the 1980s, when the Mexican 
and U.S. governments finally came to an agreement on clear channels.  
  
 
Conclusion: Radio Control 
 One thing that is clear is that despite the massive changes in radio technology 
during the 1920s and 1930s, control remained the prominent issue among state leaders.  
While commercial broadcasting became a firmly established part of Mexican society, 
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the military continued to use radio to combat a number of rebellions, culminating in the 
Escobarista Rebellion of 1929.  Unlike the previous De la Huerta Rebellion, these 
revolts mostly failed to seriously jeopardize the state’s grasp over the national wireless 
network.  In conjunction with an ever-increasing number of field radios, the armed 
forces under Calles, Amaro, and the PNR monopolized military communications and 
used them extensively against their enemies.  Radio an important tool that, in addition 
to new weaponry and airplanes, allowed the post-1930 military to maintain power, and 
just importantly, to raise the level of allegiance to the president and the governing party 
within its ranks.  Radio proved useful on the battlefield, in the barracks, and in the 
home.  
 In addition to radio’s importance to the military’s ability to suppress, or at least 
contain, revolts, the technology proved crucial to the country’s structural development.  
Although little discussed in the current literature on Mexican radio, wireless devices 
significantly increased the efficiency and service of passenger airplanes and railways in 
the late 1920s and early 1930s.  They also became a more common form of public 
communications within the nation, bringing some alleviation to the over-burdened wire 
services.  By the mid 1930s, radio had become a regular component in international 
communications for the state, commercial enterprises, and private citizens.  To keep up 
with the fast pace of technological change and to improve the utility of radio services, 
the SCOP increasingly turned to foreign companies, especially RCA, in order to provide 
new wireless services.  The SCOP also continued the practice of allowing foreign 
companies to use radio for their business endeavors as long as they met the country’s 
strict guidelines.  At the height of Mexican nationalism in the 1930s, radio had 
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surprisingly become less state-controlled than ever despite the government’s increased 
involvement in broadcasting.  Nevertheless, state leaders kept in place a large number 
of nationalist restrictions and the SCOP continued to control the vast majority of the 
internal communications network. 
 The privatization of certain aspects of radio communication correlates with the 
decision first made by the Obregón administration to pursue a mixed state-private 
broadcasting system.  While state officials in a number of departments pursued and 
eventually started their own operations, the government focused just as much of its 
attention on protecting domestic commercial radiocasters.  They did this with 
considerable success, restricting the dominance of American radio corporations, which 
even when affiliated with Mexican companies, controlled little in regards to content and 
day-to-day operations.  The border blasters provide the one glaring exception.  
Government leaders tolerated these renegade American-Mexican operations as long as 
they proved useful as a bargaining chip in international communications forums and for 
promoting tourism and economic development.  But as the Brinkley station 
exemplified, government toleration of abuses was limited, especially when state 
broadcasters could subsequently take control of massively high-power stations.  The 
reliance on commercial and especially foreign businesses for radio equipment while 
restricting outside control of communications services remained a prominent aspect of 
Mexico’s wireless policies, a fact that shows a great deal of consistency with previous 
decisions made during the Porfiriato and the Revolution.  However, within Mexico, 
government leaders reinforced their relationships with wealthy commercial broadcasters 
as a means of amplifying nationalism and allegiance to the one-party system established 
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in the early 1930s.  This, in turn, reinforced monopolistic tendencies in political and 
commercial broadcasting, curtailing and co-opting the more democratic tendencies of 
amateur radiocasters, which possessed much weaker equipment.87
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Chapter Seven 
Broadcasting State Culture and Populist Politics 
 
Think like a wise man but communicate in 
the language of the people. 
—William Butler Yeats 
 
 
 On November 30, 1924, people filled the streets of Mexico City.  Sounds of cars 
and carriages shared the air with the aromas of food vendors and human settlement.  
Fifty thousand eager spectators had packed themselves into the National Stadium to 
witness a historic event, the first peaceful transfer of the presidency since 1884.  In 
honor of the incoming and outgoing presidents, a folkloric ballet, including five 
hundred different couples, danced jarabes tapatíos or hat dances.1
 As radio became more popular, government leaders increasingly depended on it to 
spread populist and nationalist messages that equated state institutions—and starting in 
1929, the single-party, the PNR—as the culmination of the ideals fought for during the 
Revolution.  In the city and the country, among the wealthy and the poor, broadcasting 
provided the perfect medium for building a wide base of support.  It also allowed for a 
partnership between members of the often adversarial commercial and government 
elites.  In exchange for carrying political messages and complying with state 
regulations, government leaders rewarded the owners of the largest commercial 
  Calles, with 
Obregón at his side, not only addressed their gathered countrymen and assembled 
politicians, but also the entire country.  The occasion provided the first ever broadcast 
of a presidential inauguration in Mexican history, marking the beginning of a new era of 
presidential broadcasting. 
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broadcasting stations with favoritism and protection.  By involving wealthy capitalists 
in the development and profits of radio, state officials were able to use the medium to 
incorporate a segment of the economic elite in addition to members of the working and 
middle classes.  Radio helped facilitate a loose though genuine cross-class alliance. 
 To put it succinctly, broadcasting became an essential component of the 
controlled incorporation of the general population into politics.  The medium amplified 
the reach of populist politics and helped establish single-party rule.  Building on Alan 
Knight’s argument that populism is essentially a political style, this chapter provides 
additional substance to Jürgen Buchenau’s more refined definition of the term: “a 
discourse that appeals to ‘the people’ and ‘the nation’ by mass media.”2
 Just as the historiography of Mexican populism understates the Calles era, U.S. 
scholarship on broadcasting’s role in expanding nation building understates the 
influence of broadcasting during Calles’s presidency (1924-28) and the subsequent 
Maximato (1928-35), when Calles still held considerable power behind the scenes.  
  In the case of 
Mexico, state officials used radio to help solidify a larger, more corporate and cross-
class base of political support.  The mass-media component was critical to the rise of 
this political approach, and in the 1920s and 1930s Mexico, where most of the residents 
were illiterate, that meant radio.  Government stations provided a crucial component of 
this outreach, but so too did commercial stations, whose owners, managers, and 
operators partnered with the dominant political leadership in exchange for favoritism 
and protection.   
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Latin American Studies 30, no. 2 (May 1998): 223-48; Jürgen Buchenau, Plutarco Elías Calles and the 
Mexican Revolution (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2007), xxi-xxvii; Jürgen 
Buchenau, “Plutarco Elías Calles and Revolutionary-Era Populism in Mexico,” in Populism in Twentieth 
Century Mexico: The Presidencies of Lázaro Cárdenas and Luis Echeverría, eds. Amelia M. Kiddle and 
María L. O. Muñoz (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 2010), 38-57. 
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Cárdenas brought the presidential radio address to new heights when he forced Calles 
into exile in April 1936 and during the oil expropriation of March 18, 1938, but his 
administration built squarely on radio policies and traditions started by previous 
presidents and political leaders.3
 During the Calles era, state agencies expanded their direct involvement in 
broadcasting to drum up greater public support for the administration at home and to 
influence audiences abroad.  In a country with a high illiteracy rate and rocky 
international relations with its neighboring countries, radio especially appealed to 
revolutionary propagandists.  In a time when legitimacy was associated with the 
keeping of longstanding promises to “the people,” broadcasting provided a way for the 
government to interact with and persuade members of the nation.  Through radio 
stations—especially CZE/XFX—of the SEP, CZI/XEFI of the Secretary of Industry, 
Commerce, and Labor (SICT), and XEO/XEFO and XEUZ of the PNR—the Calles 
administration, and the subsequent governments that ruled under Calles’s influence, 
established the medium as a pillar of populist politics and the one-party system 
established in 1929.  Presidential addresses and political events became commonplace 
over the airwaves and government radiocasters transmitted “cultural” programs to 
teachers, children, farmers, housewives, union laborers, and a growing urban middle 
class.  Through radio these leaders reached out to the groups that formed the mass 
mobilizations that fueled the Revolution, trying to incorporate them into a sturdy base 
of support.  Listeners too influenced these broadcasts because state officials had to cater 
to the interests of audience members and the work hours of laborers and campesinos.  
  In other words, Cárdenas’s use of broadcasting and 
populist politics was not particularly unique, even if his policies were more radical. 
                                                     
 3 Hayes, Radio Nation, 86-87. 
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But all-in-all the programming was a top-down affair, increasing the authoritarian 
nature of post-revolutionary politics.  
  
Radio Instrucción Pública  
 The government’s greatest direct effort in broadcasting from 1924 to 1931 was 
through the SEP, created in 1921 by President Obregón and José Vasconcelos, the 
renowned scholar and the department’s first director.  SEP station CZE (changed to 
XFX in late 1928) reached thousands of Mexicans in addition to listeners abroad.  
During an address to the national congress in September 1924, Obregón laid out the 
goal of this new endeavor: “teachers will meet somewhere near the ranches and 
neighborhoods of their students to transmit, on a predetermined day and time, a lesson 
about a useful theme, music, and news to arouse their interest so they can participate in 
the life of our country.”4  In 1925 President Calles built up the program further by 
creating a specific department—Extensión Educativa por Radio or Educational 
Extension by Radio—to tackle the daunting task of getting receivers into rural schools.  
Its members often traveled miles on the backs of horses and burros through rough 
terrain, though more so in regions closer to the capital than in the country’s remote 
corners.5
  The use of radio coincided with the SEP’s cultural missionary program.  State 
leaders hoped that these secularizing evangelists would educate Mexico’s rural and 
indigenous populations while modernizing Mexico, and as a result, create more 
 
                                                     
 4 Alvaro Obregón, “El Gral. Alvaro Obregón, al abrir las sesiones ordinarias el Congreso el 1 
septiembre de 1924,” Los presidentes de México ante la nación: Informes, manifestos y documentos de 
1821 a 1966 (México: Cámara de Diputados, 1966), 638. 
 5 Medina Ávila and Vargas Arana, Nuestra es la voz, 100. 
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productive citizens with a stronger allegiance to the nation and the state.  SEP officials 
strived to incorporate rural farmers, along with their wives and children, through 
federally trained educators.  Indeed, the increase in the central government’s control of 
provincial education was one of the hallmarks of the SEP, just as mass politics became 
a consequence of the Revolution in general.  Radios and broadcasting were important 
tools in this modernizing effort, a fact little recognized by scholars who have studied 
schools during this period.6  In fact, prominent educational leaders believed radio to be 
“one of the best modern advances to diffuse education and culture.”7
  Despite intellectual prejudices passed down from Porfirian positivists, educators 
consistently worked on incorporating rural indigenous communities to end “Isolation, 
unstable and uncertain government control, a precarious existence, peonage, and the 
circumstances which made rural Mexico a forgotten Mexico.”
  And this was 
undoubtedly true, even is its actual implementation was initially less resounding.  
8  Foreign philosophers 
who questioned racist notions of intelligence influenced Mexican intellectuals in greater 
numbers.  For example, a number of prominent thinkers followed German scholar Max 
Scheler, who argued that inherent differences in intelligence by races was questionable 
if not completely false.9
                                                     
 6 One exception is Elena Jackson Albarrán, Children of the Revolution: Constructing the Mexican 
Citizen, 1921-1940,” (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, forthcoming), which dedicates a chapter to 
the SEP’s radio programs for children in the late 1920s and especially the 1930s.  Another dissertation, 
Marvin Alisky, “Educational Aspects of Broadcasting in Mexico,” PhD diss., University of Texas, 
Austin, Texas, 1953, was the trailblazing work on educational broadcasting, but Alisky failed to obtain 
the source material needed for a thorough study of the subject. Although a work focusing more on radio 
and nationalism, Joy Elizabeth Hayes, “National Imaginings on the Air: Radio in Mexico, 1920-1950,” in 
The Eagle and the Serpent: National and Culture in Mexico, 1920-1940, ed. by Mary Kay Vaughn and 
Stephen E. Lewis (Lanham: Duke University Press, 2006), 243-58, does a fair but brief job on the topic.  
  The examples of countries like Japan seemed to provide proof 
 7 “Las ideas fundamentales de la Secretaría de Educación Pública en materia educativa,” El 
Universal, 1 Jan. 1926, IV 3.  
 8 George C. Booth, Mexico’s School-Made Society (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1941), 
28. 
 9 Ibid, 9-10.  
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of the ability of different ethnicities to adapt and learn from other societies.  By the 
1930s anthropologists, folklorists, and politicians worldwide were promoting 
indigenous nationalism.  In Mexico, like Brazil, the idea of a mixed-race or ethnic 
society increasingly became a point of pride instead of a stigma.  And even though 
intellectuals embraced these ideas selectively, government leaders aspired to create a 
more homogeneous and all-encompassing form of nationalism. 
Of all outside influences, American philosopher John Dewey had the greatest 
impact on Mexican educational experts in the late 1920s and early 1930s.  SEP leaders 
used his example in their talks to missionary teachers in Mexico City and in their 
lectures over the radio.10  Revolutionary educators also differed from their Porfirian 
predecessors in their increased emphasis on political participation and hands-on 
learning.  This too was derived from trends in the United States and Europe, where “the 
pedagogy of action education” had come into vogue.  In place of an innate inability to 
achieve higher education, the perceived problem with incorporating rural populations 
became a lack a sufficient communication and transportation, a problem educational 
leaders hoped cultural missionaries and radio would help remedy.11
 Cultural missionaries and broadcasting intertwined in this campaign to build 
schools for rural and indigenous populations in order to make the provincial poor into 
Mexican citizens aligned with the government.  SEP directors sent teachers to remote 
communities to train local villagers and educators about revolutionary nationalism and 
modernity.  Although originally limited to states close to the capital, such as México, 
  
                                                     
 10  J. M. Casauranc, “Como son y porque son así nuestras escuelas rurales—Platica . . . a los 
miembros de las misiones culturales, el 25 de febrero de 1927” (Mexico City: Talleres Gráficos de la 
Nación, 1927), 10.  
 11 Vaughn, Cultural Politics, 27-29; Claude Fell, José Vasconcelos: Los años del águila (Mexico 
City: UNAM, 1989), 268. 
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Hidalgo, Puebla, Tlaxcala, and Morelos, Calles had expanded the program to other 
areas by 1926.  By the end of the Calles era the program had reached at least twenty 
states.12
 The SEP’s broadcasting station, CZE, commenced regular transmissions during 
the last month of 1924, though it did not make any headway on providing radios to the 
countryside until the following year when SEP leaders imported over a hundred 
receivers from the United States.
  
13  A U.S. newspaper later reported that there were 
“115 large and small schools in Mexico” receiving CZE programming, including 
regular lessons for students, a weekly program for teachers, and twice weekly broadcast 
for very young children.  But the SEP only placed a minority of the radios in the 
countryside: twenty-five in the states of México, Hidalgo, and Puebla; and fifteen in 
Guerrero.  The other seventy-five devices actually went to “larger towns and cities in 
[the state of] México.”14
 Over the course of the decade, SEP officials streamlined the programming to fit 
their targeted audiences.  The station’s early broadcasts mirrored the agendas of the SEP 
leadership, starting out conservative and elitist, and then becoming broader in scope 
throughout the Calles era as policies changed and community input influenced 
programming.  Transmissions originally included classical music and scholars who 
  Perhaps the decision to place the receivers in larger population 
centers first stemmed from the fact that substantial portions of the rural population did 
not speak Spanish.  Basic logistics also likely entered into any considerations.  
                                                     
 12 Booth, Mexico’s School-Made Society, 145; Fell, José Vasconcelos, 257. 
 13 “Pronto llegarán los aparatos de radio pedidos a los Estados Unidos,” El Demócrata, 30 Dec. 
1924, 12.  
 14 “Mexico Pupils Study by Radio,” paper uknown, c. 1920s, caja 9474, exp. 28, AHSEP.  
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discussed a myriad of academic topics in a “simple and plain language.”15  The 
department’s first directors—José Vasconcelos, Bernardo J. Gastélum, and José Manuel 
Puig Casauranc—hoped to bring good European tastes, nationalist composers, and the 
best Mexican experts into people’s homes and schools.16
 A number of institutions of higher learning assisted the SEP’s radio endeavors.  
Participating schools included the National School of Fine Arts, the School of 
Biological Studies, the National University of Agriculture and Veterinary Studies, the 
School of Anthropology, and the National School for Teachers.  These colleges 
provided much of the material aired by the station.  The major sources of music for the 
SEP included the National School of Music, the Chopin Academy of Piano, the 
Academy of J. S. Bach, the Italy Academy of Song, the Popular Night Conservatory of 
Music, and the National School of the Blind.
 
17
 Other government departments also contributed programs and music for CZE.  
The Department of Public Health provided regular talks on hygiene.  The Ministry of 
Industry, Commerce, and Labor, which also had its own broadcasting station, aired 
economic bulletins first thing in the morning on CZE and then later on XFX.  The 
Department of Fine Arts produced a number of classical music performances, including 
pieces from Schubert and renditions of “Madame Butterfly.”  The Secretariat of War 
and Marine furnished music from military and police bands, which played renditions of 
popular Mexican songs, “Taps,” and the national anthem.
   
18
                                                     
 15 “Mexico Radios Culture,” Los Angeles Times, 7 Mar. 1926, F11.  
    
 16 “Una gran estación de radio de la Sria. de Educación,” El Universal, 21 Jun. 1924, II 1, 8. 
 17 Ibid.  
 18 Plutarco Elías Calles, “El Gral. Plutarco Elías Calles, al abrir las sesiones ordinarias el 
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 CZE also provided programs designed to specifically “arouse the interest of the 
Indian . . . native orchestras playing ancient native airs and songs in native dialects.”  Of 
course, no record of “ancient native airs” existed, so the directors of these ensembles 
surely had a lot of creative leeway.  Lectures followed the songs, sometimes in 
indigenous languages, “dealing with the needs, aspirations, and opportunities of the 
Indian races.” 19  Topics included geography, natural resources, hygiene, family 
finances, and home improvement.   Ethnographic discussions about Indians themselves 
were also fairly commonplace, providing metropolitan perspectives on the lives of the 
radio recipients and their neighboring communities, whom they had just recently 
studied.  Indeed, the growing influence of anthropologists in the country had a 
significant impact on the cultural missionaries, who also often acted as amateur 
ethnographers, providing material for later radio programs.  A couple of the 1926 
broadcasts included “The Indigenous Tribes in Mexico,” “Our Archeological Riches,” 
and “Natural Hygiene in Rural Villages.”20
 During the late 1920s, the station managers strove to expand the listenership to all 
“radiofiles” in Mexico, competing directly with commercial and amateur stations.  This 
was likely the result of the popularity of commercial broadcasting operations.  In order 
to persuade villagers to listen to CZE/XFX, the SEP began locking the tuning dials of 
donated radios to the station’s wave frequency.  However, radio inspectors regularly 
found that villagers broke the seals and listened to domestic and foreign commercial 
programming.
 
21
                                                     
 19 “Teach Indians with Radio,” Los Angeles Times, 22 Nov. 1925, 1.  
  By 1928—the year CZE became XFX—the station diversified its 
programming.  In addition to educational talks, weather reports, and Chopin, the station 
 20 “Mexico Radios Culture,” Los Angeles Times, 7 Mar. 1926, F11. 
 21 Hayes, “National Imaginings on the Air,” 243. 
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started providing a variety of canciones mexicanas, and even blues and jazz.  The Jazz 
Band of the Traffic Department, a regular fixture in 1928, played songs including “Mi 
Regular Gal” and “Weary Blues.”22  Guty Cárdenas, one of Mexico’s first international 
popular music stars, played his increasingly famous pieces in addition to renditions of 
songs from his home state of Yucatán.  Other music celebrities, such as Alfonso 
Esparza Oteo and Guillermo Posadas, played popular Mexican folk songs put into big 
band arrangements and Hawaiian guitar compositions.23  As commercial stations were 
vying for government support by producing nationalist programming, the SEP station 
competed with the private broadcasters by incorporating more popular music.  
However, in 1930, Alejandro Michel, the Director of Educational Extension by Radio, 
reported that as part of a “nationalist labor” campaign—a joint endeavor of the SEP and 
the newly formed PNR—he wanted “to counteract the effects of American jazz” by 
playing Mexican regional and popular music in a show that aired every Thursday and 
ended with the national anthem.24
 Most villagers introduced to radios found them amazing.  For many people it was 
the first time they had heard a voice transmitted through a machine.  In November 1925, 
SEP director Puig Casauranc described the reaction of first time rural radio listeners to 
an American journalist: 
   
 imagine a tribe of Indians which has defied 300 years of paleface 
domination and still clings to its ancient tribal language and tribal 
customs, still maintains the village around the burial mound and 
has only such dealing with the outside world as necessary—
people who have never read a newspaper or heard of radio—
                                                     
 22 “Radioconiertos,” Excélsior, 18 Jan. 1928, II 3.  
 23 Ibid; “Radioconciertos,” Excélsior, 25 Jun. 1928, II 3; “Conciertos,” El Nacional, 15 Jun. 1929, 
5.  
 24 Alejandro Michel, “Programa de acción de la obra de Extensión Educativa por Radio de la 
Secretaría de Educación Pública,” Mexico City, 2 Jul. 1930, caja 9478, exp. 4, AHSEP. 
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being called together to hear a message from the great ‘jefes’ 
(chiefs) who sit in Ciudad Mexico, and suddenly hearing their 
own language, their own tribal music, coming miraculously out 
of the bodyless air.25
 
  
Couched in racist language, Puig Casauranc’s statement mirrors other comments made 
by SEP missionaries.  They explained that Indians and campesinos, young and old, 
reacted enthusiastically to the “mysterious” and “magical” devices.26  When educators 
brought the receivers to villages, the community usually put on a large celebration.  In 
Acatlán, Puebla, one such party included orquestral performances, poem recitations, a 
tango, an inauguration speech by community padrinos, an address by SEP zone 
inspector C. E. Sansalvador, and then, lastly, a group listening to the radio.27
 Journalist and author Manuel Santander, who often used the pen name, Jacobo 
Dalevuelta, made a similar statement about his experiences in small pueblos with radio 
receivers: “it is very curious to observe the small town away from the metropolis where 
they have a receiver, the enthusiasm with which every night around the apparatus the 
young and old wait for the remote and mysterious words that magically comes from the 
loudspeakers.”
  In other 
words, it was more often than not the technology itself that awed rural residents, not any 
specific message or program.  
28
                                                     
 25 “Teach Indians with Radio,” Los Angeles Times, 22 Nov. 1925, 1. 
  Much the same as Mexico City urbanites who encountered radio for 
the first time at the 1924 Mexico City Radio Fair, most campesinos introduced to 
broadcasting found the medium, and the devices that carried such messages, 
captivating.  
 26 “La radio como vocero de la alegría,” El Universal, 6 Feb. 1926, 5.  
 27  C. E. Sansalvador, “Programa que se desarrolló en la escuela federal “Emilio Carranza” con 
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 Many rural community members paid attention to the messages of government 
educators; others resented the cultural missionaries and the intrusion of the federal 
government.  As one author noted, sometimes teachers “found it necessary to wear side 
arms and to sleep with a rifle next to the bed” because of stiff resistance to state 
education and government policies against the Catholic Church.29  Some teachers were 
killed, especially during the widespread cristero rebellion.  Even afterwards, violence 
continued into the 1930s.  In 1933, in the small town of Tonantzintla, Puebla, radio 
inspector Luis F. Rodríguez found that the donated device worked perfectly, that 
teachers used it to listen to XFX, and that the station was having an appreciable impact 
by influencing teaching curriculum.  However, half of the town’s residents refused to 
listen to the machine because of disagreements over the policies of the government, 
causing a rift in the community.30
 During the late 1920s and early 1930s, XFX offered a number of transmissions 
specifically for children.  According to historian Elena Jackson Albarrán, “children’s 
programming on the SEP radio station XFX complemented the agency’s project to 
revise history so as to make it more relevant to children and inspire social action.”
  
31
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These programs included regular academic subjects that federal teachers had been 
trained to teach, as in the radio series Periódico Infantil, which broadcast once in the 
morning and once in the afternoon starting in 1930.  The first section began with a brief 
lesson on the history of the Revolution; it was followed by short lectures on zoology, 
 30 Luis F. Rodríguez to the Jefe del Departamento de Enseñanza Rural y Primaria Foránea, 18 
Mar. 1923, Mexico City, caja 9482, exp. 78, AHSEP.   
 31 Albarrán, chapter three, Children of the Revolution, forthcoming, University of Nebraska Press.  
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botany, physics, history, geography, or the “national language.” Afterwards XFX 
broadcast something on physical fitness or children’s games, then math, and finally, a 
talk about either hygiene, civics, or the evils of alcohol.  The afternoon program started 
with “What do You Think?” when the broadcasters offered “simple questions” to be 
answered over the following days.  Children were subsequently encouraged to write in 
to the program.  This was followed by a story, a discussion on manual labor, contests, 
and then a final program on literature.32  XFX’s singing lessons proved to be one of the 
station’s more popular programs in schools.  In the villages and communities with 
functioning receivers, inspectors reported the teachers often used the show in their 
classes.33  Another program developed in the early 1930s included “Troka el Poderoso” 
or “Troka the Powerful,” created by estridentista writer and artist Germán Liszt 
Arzubide.  It taught children the benefits of machines and modernization through the 
narration of an animated robot figure.  Yet another show, “Antena Campesina,” focused 
similarly on the benefits of modernization.  It, however, was directed more specifically 
at indigenous children and their mothers.34
 One of CZE/XFX’s biggest non-student targets was mothers and housewives.  In 
1929, SEP officials bragged that the station reached over three thousand housewives 
daily, who listened to productions including “How to Make a Practical and Economical 
Menu” and “How to Become a Good Housewife.”
  
35
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 33 Luis F. Rodríguez, “Informe de la inspección hecha en la zona de Texcoco, 
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carried a program called “The Home Hour.”  Much of the early hours broadcasting 
focused on cooking, beauty, budgeting, and general “domestic science” issues.  As 
communications scholar Joy Elizabeth Hayes aptly put it: “educators saw radio as an 
effective way to penetrate the home: to consolidate the modern, secular housewife and 
mother and the developmentalist state.”36  Or in the words of SEP leaders: “to better the 
social education of women.”37
 CZE tried to appeal to rural fathers as well.  This was largely done through 
evening broadcasts, which focused more on agriculture, livestock, small industries, 
geography, travel shows, the weather, music, and history lessons.
  As the disseminator of family values in the home, state 
officials hoped that mothers would help create a greater allegiance to the revolutionary 
state among children and their husbands.    
38  In 1931 XFX 
broadcast a program specifically on manual labor for rural males.39  As Undersecretary 
of Public Education Moisés Sáenz stated in Mexican Folkways in 1928, the SEP wanted 
to make “the school the home of the village,” the new church, the new community 
center.40
                                                     
 36 Hayes, “National Imaginings,” 249. 
  Along with other educational leaders in Mexico City, he partnered with allied 
municipal officers to get campesinos into schools to listen to radio broadcasts in hopes 
of improving their crop yields and their abilities as manual laborers.  Sáenz additionally 
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hoped that rural residents would learn the basics of economics and align themselves 
with the government. 
 But did Indians and campesinos actually listen to these programs?  There exists 
no golden list of all the radios donated or sold to schools.  It is clear that the SEP 
imported over a hundred radios in 1925 from the United States.  The ministry also 
prided itself on providing domestically built radios, fashioned by educators, students, 
and employees of the SEP’s Technical Section.  In fact, a number of the radios used in 
SEP’s rural school campaigns were Mexican-made “Titlanti” models.  This coincided 
with an increase in the manufacture of radio parts in Mexico in general.41  Originally, 
SEP officials donated these apparatuses at no cost to the schools.  By the late 1920s, 
however, they charged forty pesos—more or less the production cost—which members 
of villages had to pool together in order to acquire the apparatus.42
 Donations were another source of radios.  Multiple companies gave the SEP 
receivers, especially after the ministry’s radio department began a campaign that traded 
air time for commercial advertisements in exchange for the devices.  In the last half of 
1928 alone the SEP obtained twenty-five radios by this method.
  It is unclear how 
many of these devices were made, but at least dozens, possibly more.   
43
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  By 1933, however, 
the Office of Cultural Radiotelephony was turning down requests from rural schools for 
radios.  Budget cuts resulting from the Great Depression had halted the spread of the 
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program.  Instead, officials worked on repairing and maximizing the use of the radios 
already in operation.   
 When Calles took office, he commented that the government had succeeded in 
placing radios in the majority of federal schools, which numbered approximately one 
thousand.44  But Calles and the officials informing him surely exaggerated.  Over the 
next five years other government representatives continued to talk of placing thousands 
of radios in schools as well.  In Veracruz in late 1929, radical governor Adalberto 
Tejada and Director of the Department of Universities Dr. Genaro Angeles partnered 
their efforts through Jalapa station XFC with the SEP in order to expand political and 
educational programming in their state.  They too hoped to build a greater alliance with 
the peasantry and urban workers.  According to SEP officials, this collaboration allowed 
the “poor people of the state of Veracruz, part of Tamaulipas, Puebla, Zacatecas, and 
Aguascalientes” to benefit from educational broadcasting.45  Tejada and Angeles told 
federal officials and the Veracruz newspaper El Informador that they were going to 
equip all of the approximate two thousand schools in their state.46  But even with the 
help of local Pro-Radio Committees in small towns including Coatepec, Tecelo, and 
Xico, it appears that they never come close to their mark.47
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 45 “La obra cultural de la estación XFX de la Secretaría Educación Pública,” El Universal 12 Dec. 
1929, IV 9. 
 46 “Aparatos de radio para las escuelas primarias,” El Informador (Jalapa), 19 Sept. 1929, caja 
9474, exp. 25, AHSEP; José Suárez G. to María Luisa Ross, Mexico City, 24 Sept. 1929, caja 9474, exp. 
25, AHSEP. 
 47 José Suárez G. to María Luis Ross, Mexico City, 22 Oct. 1929, caja 9474, exp. 25, AHSEP. 
271 
 
number of public education institutions. 48  Despite all the claims about thousands of 
radios, it remains difficult to get an accurate count on the exact number of the devices 
donated or sold by the SEP to schools.  According to information obtained from the 
current records in the Archivo Histórico de la SEP, the Memorias of SEP, newspapers, 
accounts from the U.S. Department of Commerce, and lists by other scholars, it appears 
the number was probably in the low thousands for the entire ten year period of 1924 to 
1934.49  The biggest year for radio placement looks to have been 1930, when the U.S. 
Commerce Department stated that seven hundred receivers had been given out to 
schools across Mexico.50
 Some Mexican rural schools came into contact with broadcasting and XFX 
without a radio provided by the SEP.  In 1933 the thirteen traveling SEP missionary 
groups brought radios along with other essential tools including agricultural and 
carpentry equipment, cooking utensils, and movie projectors.
  
51
                                                     
 48 “$28, 000,000 más para la educación,” La Prensa, 8 Dec. 1928, exp. cccxii. 7. 566, Fondo 
Recortes de Periódico Oficialía Mayor de Hacienda, CEHM. Over 6,100 rural schools existed in 1929; 
Booth, Mexico’s School-Made Society, 114. 
  These educational tours 
visited multiple communities, but took their radios with them when they left.  
Apparently, a very small number of villagers bought their own radios for their 
community centers and schools.  According to one radio inspector, the school in La 
 49 In addition to the Archivo Histórico de la SEP and U.S. and Mexican newspapers, see Las 
misiones culturales en 1927: Las escuelas rurales (Mexico City: Publicaciones de la Secretaría de 
Educación Pública, 1928); Ivonne Grethel Chávez Ortiz, “La radio educativa en el México 
revolucionario,” tesis de licenciatura, Universidad Autónoma Metropolitana, Iztapalapa, DF, 2001; and 
Enrique E. Sánchez Ruíz, Orígenes de la radiodifusión en México: Desarrollo capitalista y el estado 
(Mexico, DF: ITESO, 1984), 22. 
 50 U.S. Department of Commerce, quoted in Sánchez Ruíz, Orígenes de la radiodifusión, 22. 
 51 Max H. Miñano Garcia, La educación rural en México (Mexico City: Ediciones de la Secretaría 
de Educación Pública, 1945), 211; Sánchez, Mexico, 72, 92. Sánchez put the number of cultural missions 
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Estancia, Hidalgo, was already in possession of a fully functional and “magnificent 
Radiola” receiver.52
 In the beginning CZE only aired for a short period of time, six days of the week.  
Soon thereafter the station expanded its air play, providing much longer hours of 
service.  For example, in 1925, the station’s Monday through Saturday transmissions 
totaled forty-five minutes per day.  By 1927, CZE played eight hours per day.  Although 
some authors have claimed that the station broadcasted as much as ten hours per day by 
the 1930s, SEP reports indicate that the average daily broadcast time was actually less 
than in 1927, ranging from four to five hours.
  
53
  Another important factor in obtaining at least a qualitative conclusion on the 
reach of these programs in rural areas is to determine if people in communities with 
radios actually listened to them.  All evidence shows that the results were mixed.  The 
largest obstacles to CZE/XFX were a lack of reliable electricity, interference from other 
stations, and the popularity of commercial programming.  Nevertheless, the station did 
reach thousands of people, and for every story of failure there is another of success.  By 
the end of the Calles era, radio and state broadcasting were known entities in many parts 
of Mexico, and through radio, many residents became more connected with the state 
and the post-1928 state party, the PNR. 
 
 The biggest difficulty in establishing rural radio audiences was electricity.  Many 
villages did not have it, and in communities that did, school teachers—the usual 
recipients of the radios—did not always pay their electric bill.  In other communities, an 
                                                     
 52 Luis F. Rodríguez, “Informa de la visita hecha a las escuelas rurales dotadas de aparato de radio, 
del Edo. de Hidalgo,” Mexico City, 22 Apr. 1933, caja 9482, exp. 78, AHSEP.  
 53 Medina Ávila and Vargas Arana, Nuestra es la voz, 99; María Luisa Ross, “Estación C.Z.E.: 
Obra de extensión educativa por radio de la Secretaría de Educación Pública—programa,” Apr. 1927, 
Mexico City, exp. 9, inv. 297, leg. 15/62, Fondo Joaquín Amara Camaro, FPECTFT.  
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electric line existed and bills were paid, but service still proved irregular.  In 1933 
Professor Luis F. Rodríguez inspected seventy-one of the seventy-five communities 
where the SEP had donated relatively cheap, U.S.-made Atwater Kent receivers.  He 
traveled, usually by himself, though sometimes accompanied by a local educational 
administrator, through the states of Puebla, Tlaxcala, Hidalgo, and México.  Out of the 
schools visited, twenty-one lacked electricity, five had not paid their electric bills, and 
one only obtained power after the owner of a small corn mill provided a current while 
the inspector was there.  Radios could operate on batteries, side-stepping the electricity 
problem, but batteries did not last long, and it could take months before someone would 
obtain replacements in towns large enough to carry them.54
 Another major problem for the SEP radio program was other stations.  A large 
proportion of the schools in Puebla and Tlaxcala reported that they could only receive 
XFX during certain hours of the day, stating that oftentimes the commercial station in 
Puebla—XIAJ—overpowered the SEP signal.  Some teachers and community members 
openly admitted that they enjoyed the other channels, though many still listened to XFX 
on occasion or for a certain program.  SEP officials themselves tuned in different 
channels for villagers.  In the small town of Acatlán, Puebla, inspector C. E. 
Sansalvador wrote to Ross that during the inauguration of the radio he played programs 
  
                                                     
 54 Luis F. Rodríguez, “Informe de la visita hecha a las escuelas rurales dotadas de aparato de radio, 
del Edo. de Puebla, Mexico City, 18 Mar. 1933, caja 9482, exp. 78, AHSEP; Luis F. Rodríguez, “Informe 
de la visita hecha a las escuelas rurales dotadas de aparato de radio, del Edo. de  Tlaxcala, Mexico City, 
25 Mar. 1933, caja 9482, exp. 78, AHSEP;  Luis F. Rodríguez, “Informe de la visita hecha a las escuelas 
rurales dotadas de aparato de radio, del Edo. de Hidalgo,” Mexico City, 22 Apr. 1933, caja 9482, exp. 78, 
AHSEP; Luis F. Rodríguez, “Informe de la visita de inspección a la Zona de Tlalnepantla, Méx.,” Mexico 
City, 24 Apr. 1933, caja 9482, exp. 78,  AHSEP;  Luis F. Rodríguez, “Informe de la visita de inspección a 
la Zona de Texcoco, Mexico City, 13 May 1933, caja 9482, exp. 78, AHSEP. 
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broadcast from American stations in San Antonio and Chicago because he had difficulty 
picking up the SEP’s “bulletins of the revolution.”55
 But scholars have curiously failed to acknowledge the success stories.  A number 
of teachers in the state of México said that they used the XFX singing program in their 
classes.  Rodríguez reported that in Puebla, the school in the community of Moyotzingo 
was “without a doubt the school where they make the best use of the radio.”  He 
continued that over two hundred locals regularly gathered to listen to XFX, using the 
programs to better their agrarian skills.  All of the villages with radios in Tlaxcala 
reported listening to XFX in the mornings before the Puebla station took over.
   
56
 All in all the SEP brought thousands of rural people into contact with 
broadcasting, including state, commercial, and foreign stations.  Despite the many on-
going problems of creating a state-radio listenership in the countryside, the SEP did 
build a closer relationship between the federal government and a number of 
communities.  In this regard, radio was only one of a number of important tools cultural 
missionaries applied in their endeavors.  Movie projectors, farm equipment, cooking 
utensils, and a number of other objects also help SEP employees win the hearts and 
  In 
each community where the radios worked—about half—hundreds or thousands of 
people, depending on the location, came into contact with the devices and the 
broadcasts they trumpeted.  When they worked, these radios were well used.  It cannot 
be accurately said that listeners always listened to the SEP station, but neither was it 
completely ignored.  
                                                     
 55 Ibid; C. E. Sansalvador to Ma. Luisa Ross, Acatlán, Puebla to Mexico City, 13 Apr. 1929, caja 
9474, exp. 25, AHSEP. 
 56 Luis F. Rodríguez, “Informe de la visita hecha a las escuelas rurales dotadas de aparato de radio, 
del Edo. de Puebla, Mexico City, 18 Mar. 1933, caja 9482, exp. 78, AHSEP; Luis F. Rodríguez, “Informe 
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minds of campesinos.  But villagers especially prized the radios as a source of 
education, entertainment, and modernity.  The SEP focused more on the central region 
of Mexico, but states including Guerrero, Nayarit, Oaxaca, Durango, Nuevo León, and 
even the Territory of Quintana Roo, also received SEP radios.  Nevertheless, it must be 
recognized that the reach of this particular program alone was still limited, serving a 
small if expanding fraction of Mexico’s rural populace by the time that Lázaro 
Cárdenas took power during the end of 1934. 
 
SEP Radio Beyond the Schools 
 It would paint an inaccurate picture of SEP broadcasting to discus only the work 
done with schools.  In addition to its educational endeavors, CZE, and then XFX, 
became the government’s most successful medium for communicating political events 
to the nation and to foreigners abroad, at least until the PNR station became well 
established in 1931.  The educational department itself was political.  Its members 
eschewed speeches on secularizing education and building a nationwide allegiance to 
the historical and ideological narrative espoused by some of the more socialist and 
communist members of the revolutionary leadership. 
  Starting from its first broadcast, the SEP station transmitted programs that 
directly relayed political messages and events.  Not only did the station air presidential 
inaugurations but also presidential addresses to the national congress.  In September 
1929 the XFX’s coverage of President Emilio Portes Gil’s address to congress included 
not only the state of the union, but also the ceremonial events before and after that 
commemorated Mexican independence and the nation’s heroes.  Employees placed 
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microphones for the station in the towers of the national cathedral in the Zócalo, at the 
door of the entrance of the Chamber of Deputies, and within the congressional building 
itself.  XFX broadcasted the military marches and music that accompanied the president 
along his brief trip from the executive offices to the legislative house.  This was 
immediately followed by a transmission of the traditional grito de independencia, which 
the station picked up with microphones in the Plaza de Armas and on the balcony of the 
National Palace.  According to María Luisa Ross, the influential manager of the SEP 
station, the program was well-received across the country and in parts of the United 
States.  Residents from a multitude of states, including Puebla, Veracruz, Hidalgo, 
Guanajuato, Morelos, and Campeche sent in letters.  She received similar 
correspondences from radio listeners in the Federal District.  A man in Brownsville, 
Texas, wrote that he had even heard the bells of the cathedral with perfect clarity.57
 The SEP station also broadcast sessions of congress.  In her monthly report for 
September 1929, Ross stated that it had been regular practice to transmit from the 
congress in the afternoon.
   
58
                                                     
 57 María Luisa Ross, “Informe de las labores desarrolladas por la Obra de Extensión Educativa  
por Radio de la Secretaría de Educación Pública, durante el mes de septiembre 1929,  Mexico City, caja 
9474, exp. 25, AHSEP. 
  The previous year, when a correspondent for the New York 
Times published an article on what Mexican stations were most likely to be heard in the 
United States, he stated that CZE, despite its relatively weak strength, could be heard in 
“Southern and Central United States and in some parts of Central Canada.”  In addition 
to providing a typical airplay list of CZE—cooking, exercise, domestic science, music, 
bed time stories—it also discussed the wide variety of political programming on the 
stations, including: 
 58 Ibid.  
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. . .the Mexican Congress, Cámara de Diputados . . . the 
night of the ‘Grito,” Sept. 15, which is the most important 
national celebration and when the President is present and 
takes part, the Mexican Independence ceremonies are 
broadcast by remote control.  Also, remote control is 
extended to the Presidential palace at times for the special 
use of the president.59
 
 
The same article also noted that CZI of the Department of Industry, Commerce, and 
Labor, was also regularly heard, reporting “crop reports, price quotations,” and other 
matters of economic importance.   
 In addition to reaching an audience within Mexico, CZE managers stressed early 
on their desire to get their signal heard abroad.  In fact, the station claimed to be the first 
to officially reach “the heart of Europe.”  After government officials agreed to take 
place in a “worldwide exchange of radio programs” in January 1926, they selected CZE 
to represent Mexico.  Including nations from all across the Americas and Europe, each 
respective country agreed to halt radio transmissions except for during a specific 
allotted time when they were to broadcast a special program.  The goal was to create a 
truly global broadcasting exchange in order to increase interest and sales in radio and to 
better familiarize people to the cultures of the participating nations.60
                                                     
 59 “Radio Stations in Mexico,” New York Times, 11 Mar. 1928, 14. 
  As a result, Ross 
proudly brought to the attention of radio listeners and Mexico City newspaper readers 
that CZE had become the first Mexican station picked up by a European listener.  In 
early February, Jean Maurier, a radio aficionado in Switzerland, had written to the 
station, stating that he briefly picked up CZE on January 30, though he could not keep 
 60 H.S. Fraine to the Mexican Consul in New York, New York, 16 Dec. 1925, exp. 11-30-60, 
ASRE; “Worldwide Exchange of Radio Programs,” El Universal, 10 Jan. 1926, English section 1; 
“México en la semana de radio,” El Universal, 17 Jan. 1926, II 1, 9.  
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the station for long.61  Still, it was an impressive feat for a 500-watt station.  However, a 
radio experimenter had actually beat CZE to the distinction of first radio broadcast to be 
heard in Europe.  In May 1924 engineer Manuel Pesqueira was heard in London from 
his experimental station in the neighborhood of Poptla, Mexico City.62
 At home XFX played an important role in diffusing fear about the assassination of 
once-again president-elect Alvaro Obregón on July 12, 1928.  For the first time, XFX 
and a number of other stations interrupted their broadcasts to give news of the caudillo’s 
death.
  
63  XFX continued by providing updates on political decisions.  It also broadcast 
the full trial of the assassin, José de León Toral, with the goal of showing that justice 
was served and to calm the public.  Station employees placed a microphone before the 
judge’s table.64  Indeed, some SEP officials used the trial, along with the SEP 
broadcasts of war bulletins, to justify a proposal for building a more powerful 
government broadcasting station to expand these specific effects and to reduce 
“fanaticism.”65  The proposal floundered, however, after the creation of the more 
powerful station built by the PNR in 1931.  Calles used his radio address during his 
annual speech to the congress in September 1928 to declare the restructuring of the 
executive office, and that the era of caudillos had ended.  In its place would rise a new 
era of institutional politics, that of the single-party.66
                                                     
 61 Jacobo Dalevuelta, “El radio como vocero de la alegría del Carnaval,” El Universal, 7 Feb. 
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supporters, and those of Obregón, chose Emilio Portes Gil, in a compromise decision on 
the provisional president until new elections would be held in 1930.  
 The SEP radio station was far and away the most important government station 
during the 1920s, and it continued to play a vital role in the early 1930s.  Calles and 
SEP bureaucrats used broadcasting to not only influence rural farmers, housewives, and 
children, but also as the direct mouthpiece for government proclamations, speeches, and 
events, at least until the formation of the PNR radio station in January 1931.  It was, 
however, not the only government station tasked with building a popular base for the 
revolutionary state.  
  
Radio and Mexican Labor  
  Labor, like agrarian groups, constituted another arm of the ascending populist 
coalition.  It is no surprise then, that government leaders also focused radio 
programming to take advantage of this growing portion of the population.  Of course, 
the incorporation of workers into the political system predates the Calles presidency and 
broadcasting; it was a direct result of the Revolution itself.  During the conflict, the 
leadership of all the fighting factions espoused some form of populist rhetoric.  In an 
attempt to gain greater support from peasants and urban workers, Carranza issued a 
number of decrees, most notably the Agrarian Law of 1915, which cast the 
Constitutionalists as agents of social change.  This legislation was more than a simple 
gimmick.  Some carrancistas were genuine in their desire for significant labor and land 
reforms, albeit in different ways than Zapata and other agrarian leaders.   
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 Obregón, then a leading general in Carranza’s forces, capitalized on this shift 
towards greater social reform.  He appealed to campesinos to join his forces, who, in 
turn, came in large numbers just as they did for other factions promising change.  
Obregón is better known for his appeal to urban workers and the city’s destitute when 
he occupied Mexico City in late January 1915, organizing the Revolutionary Committee 
for the Relief of the Poor.  He additionally aligned himself with the Casa del Obrero 
Mundial (COM), whose members made up Obregón’s well-known Red Battalions in 
exchange for the promise of increased benefits.  Constitutionalists built similar 
relationships in Orizaba and Tampico as well.  The general further solidified his 
populist credentials at the constitutional convention in Querétaro in 1917.  There, he 
positioned himself as more radical than Carranza, especially in matters of social justice.  
The resulting document, much more extreme than Carranza had desired, forced 
subsequent political contenders to show themselves as aligned to the constitution, to the 
greater inclusion of the people, and to greater social reforms.67
 During Obregón’s candidacy for high office in 1919 and 1920, the general 
promoted himself as a uniter of the various “liberal” factions: small farmers, urban 
professionals, campesinos, and workers—a charismatic compromiser who could work 
across social divisions.  It was during this initial run for the presidency that Obregón 
cemented his partnership with labor leader Luis Morones and the Confederación 
Regional Obrera Mexicana (CROM), the successor of COM.  Morones, the former 
head of Mexico’s telephone and telegraph union, understood the power of 
communications.  In 1923 and 1924, he and his affiliates provided radios to CROM-
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connected labor groups in Pachuca, Hidalgo; Puebla, Puebla; Orizaba, Veracruz; 
Torreón, Chihuahua, Jérez, Zacatecas; and “Jalisco and other places in the Republic.”68  
One “sindicato moronista” established a radio station in Etla, Oaxaca, which operators 
shortly thereafter moved to Oaxaca City.  It provided pro-Calles propaganda during his 
candidacy for high office.69  In the summer of 1923, Morones provided radio equipment 
to Soledad González, one of Mexico’s most powerful women.  Then working in Nuevo 
León, she was the private secretary of Obregón.  She was also a close friend and, later, 
secretary to General Plutarco Elías Calles.  She played an important role in Calles’s 
electoral campaign in 1923-1924 and continued to possess influence and power in 
political and social circles throughout the decade and beyond.  Politicians, secretaries, 
and unions all received over-the-air lectures and concerts via 1-R, an experimental 
broadcasting station under the direction of Morones’s Fábrica Nacional de Vestuario y 
Equipo or National Factory of Clothing and Equipment.  Morones was also associated 
with the military manufacturing station VPD.  In addition, he used a small group of 
operators to run radiotelegraph station 1-Z.70
 Although Morones was the most important labor leader to take up radio in the 
early 1920s, he was not the only one.  Vicente Lombardo Toledano, who would succeed 
Morones as the leading icon of the labor movement, was a member of one of the first 
radio interest groups in the early 1920s before becoming interim governor of Puebla in 
1923.  José Allen, one of the founding members of the Mexican communist party, was 
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an early radio experimenter and worked on some of the first commercial radio stations.  
Labor leaders, like other politicians, understood the potential that this new technology 
possessed for providing propaganda and building allegiances. 71
   During the Calles years, radio listenership among labor grew.  Under Morones’s 
leadership the SICT started its own “cultural” station under the call letters CZI in 1927.  
The following year Morones resigned.  In 1929 the station became XEFI, following 
new international protocols.  According to communications historian Rosalía Velázquez 
Estrada, “all union groups affiliated with the CROM possessed a receiver and radio 
horn speaker in their gathering places.”
  
72  The scant available data, however, fails to 
confirm this statement.  But we do know that this was the goal, and that state and labor 
organizers had made significant headway by 1934.  The U.S. Department of Commerce, 
for example, made special note that in 1930 the SICT had been placing radios among 
various labor organizations in Mexico.73
 The SEP also donated a large number of radios to labor groups in Tamaulipas in 
February 1930, the same month that Portes Gil turned the reigns of the presidency over 
to Pascual Ortiz Rubio.  In fact, the order to ship the devices occurred the day before 
Portes Gil left office.  This is an interesting fact not only because it occurred upon 
Portes Gil’s departure from the presidency, but also because his greatest political 
support came from Tamaulipas, his home state.  In that month alone, SEP officials, on 
 And we know from aforementioned accounts 
that the gifting and selling of radios to similar groups had been under way since late 
1923.  
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behalf of Portes Gil, sent radio receivers to the Partido Socialista Fronterizo, the Liga 
de Comunidades Agrarias, the Gremio de Alijadores, the Sindicato de Campesinos, and 
the Sindicato de Obreros de la Cía. México de Petróleo “El Aguila,” all of them in 
Tamaulipas.  They also sent another device to a school in the state’s capital Ciudad 
Victoria.74
 Beyond the tie to Portes Gil, reasons for this sudden shipment of radios to 
Tamaulipas organizations are unclear.  Relations between the government and foreign 
oil interests in Tamaulipas had been tense during the Calles years.  Morones, Calles, 
and the congress had pushed ahead stiffer laws that further restricted foreign land 
ownership in Mexico in 1925 and 1926.  At the same time CROM provided declarations 
to the press that El Aguila, the largest petroleum company in the country, was waging a 
fearless and infamous campaign against Mexican workers, provoking conflicts in 
Tampico, Puerto México, and Minatitlan.
  
75  During Portes Gil’s last year in office there 
had been a fight in the congress over a new labor code and over a slight raise in taxes on 
foreign oil interests.76  Building a stronger connection between political and labor 
organizations in a state with a large presence of foreign companies made sense, even if 
relations with foreign oil companies had eased some in the late 1920s and early 1930s.77
   It is also noteworthy that these radio shipments occurred shortly after the 
formation of the PNR, of which Portes Gil became a leader.  The Partido Socialista 
Fronterizo had originally been formed to promote Portes Gil as a candidate for 
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gubernatorial office in Tamaulipas, but the party was quickly subsumed by the more 
national PNR after 1929.  The timing of these gifts, the year after the PNR’s formation, 
appears to show the increased unification of political parties under the newly emerging 
one-party system.  Or perhaps they were nothing more than gifts from Portes Gil to 
groups that had supported him.  The SEP similarly gave Ortiz Rubio, the incoming 
president, one radio for personal use and three others to give away to whomever he saw 
fit.78
 Whatever the reason for the initial gifting of the Tamaulipas radios, federal 
agencies were giving out receivers to a myriad of different labor, political, and 
campesino groups.  In addition to the Tamaulipas organizations, the SEP also sent a 
radio to the Casa del Partido Socialista in Iguala, Guerrero.  The Partido Rojo del Sur 
Veracruzano had also possessed a radio since before Calles took office. Veracruz 
governor Tejada also used radios for communication with labor and campesino groups 
in that state.  The SEP provided eight radios to the National Commission of 
Highways.
  
79
 What exactly did I-R, CZI, and XEFI broadcast?  In many regards programming 
on the labor radio stations was similar to commercial programming with the exception 
that the labor stations had political propaganda and economic news in between the 
music.  A program listed in Excélsior, October 26, 1926, shows that there was a variety 
of song styles: fox trots, canciones yucatecas—some sung by Guty Cárdenas—tangos, 
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danzon, and corridos including “El Ferrocarril” (“The Railroad”).80
 In 1930 Froylán C. Manjarrez, then head of the Department of Publications and 
Propaganda, contacted Joaquín Amaro, the Secretary of War and Marine, proposing to 
“give new organization to the radio service you provide via the broadcasting station 
‘XEFI’ of the Secretariat of Industry, Commerce, and Labor.”  Manjarrez wanted to 
incorporate more professional economists into the programming to discuss the various 
problems within Mexico’s economy—then in a serious downturn—and to provide 
propaganda that ensured laborers that the PNR was making a strong effort towards 
economic and social progress.  He proposed to Amaro a stronger collaboration between 
the two agencies “to wake the public to this positive interest.”
  The latter genre, 
Mexican folk ballads, appears to have been slightly more common on CZI than on 
commercial stations such as CYL, CYB, and CYJ.   But opera and classical 
compositions were common on CZI and XEFI, as with the other stations.  The SICT 
also broadcast regular news on the economic market, especially commodity prices, crop 
reports, and programs on foreign demands. 
81
 The following year, XEFI, under the direction of station managers Carlos del 
Pozo and Jorge Peredo—the latter had previously operated an experimental radio 
station in 1925—also worked with other stations to send the message of President Ortiz 
Rubio during “Pan-American Day.”  The speech, which promoted unity, peace, and 
  The letter insinuates 
that the Secretariat of War had considerable influence on XEFI programming.  
                                                     
 80 “Radioconciertos,” Excélsior, 26 Oct. 1928, II 3. 
 81 Froylán C. Manjarrez to Joaquín Amaro, Mexico City, 6 Mar. 1930, exp. 9, inv. 297, leg. 31, 
Archivo Joaquín Amaro, FPTCFT. 
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respect for national sovereignty was heard in the far corners of Mexico and in many 
parts of the Western Hemisphere.82
 Although government stations helped relay political messages across Mexico, 
labor and campesino groups surely faced the same electric and reception problems that 
plagued the SEP’s radio program in rural schools.  Electricity was more accessible in 
urban centers and factories but not in rural communities.  Little documentation exists 
about whether laborers and campesino groups actually listened to SICT.  Surely, they 
sometimes tuned in to foreign and local commercial programming.  We do know that 
groups listened to addresses from presidential candidates and presidents.  Perhaps at 
times labor leadership enforced a greater adherence to state radio.   
  
 Regional leaders, such as Felipe Carrillo Puerto, radical governor of Yucatán, also 
used broadcasting to reach labor groups.  As discussed in chapter three, this southern 
state already possessed a history of radio experimentation.  Carrillo Puerto used the 
medium extensively for his intertwined work with the Socialist Party of the Southeast 
and the Liga Central de Resistencia.  In the Yucatán, the main political party and the 
government had already become one and the same thing by 1923.  The governor and his 
supporters established a radio station near Mérida, CYY of the Grand Socialist Party 
from the Southeast.  They also bought and distributed sixteen receivers to strategic 
locations throughout the state.  Through these radios party members spread educational 
lectures and music.  On October 31, 1923, CYY aired music and a talk given by 
Professor Eligio Erosa Sierra in Maya, broadcast from a restaurant attended by the 
governor and his family.  Carrillo Puerto was assassinated the following year during the 
De la Huerta Rebellion, but the station continued to provide similar programming.  In 
                                                     
 82 Medina Ávila and Vargas Arana, Nuestra es la voz, 163. 
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1925 station broadcasters transmitted a program in honor of Carrillo Puerto for the re-
inauguration of the station under the new call letters of CCY.  The Mexico City 
commercial station CYB-El Buen Tono rebroadcast the event “to all of the republic and 
beyond the frontiers.”  By the early 1930s CCY was relaying PNR speeches and events, 
as well as commercial programming, from Mexico City stations.83
 
  
XE del Partido Nacional Revolucionario  
 In addition to the SEP and the SICT, the PNR, became an important state 
presence on the airwaves.  Just as the PNR incorporated a number of regional parties, its 
station, XEO (later XEFO, and XEUZ short wave), became the dominant political voice 
on radio.  With the assistance of government and commercial stations PNR messages 
resonated throughout the country. 
  Following Obregón’s assassination, Calles, his supporters, and a number of 
prominent obregonistas worked out an agreement to smooth over political 
complications.  As a result, Calles gained his place as Jefe Máximo of the Revolution in 
exchange for compromising with obregonistas on the selection of Emilio Portes Gil to 
fill the presidency until new elections in 1930.  Another result of this process, Calles 
and allied political leaders formed the PNR to further incorporate and institutionalize 
revolutionary factions.  By 1929 distinguished party members were giving political 
speeches for the new agreed upon candidate—Pascual Ortiz Rubio—over the radio.  To 
                                                     
 83 Gaspar Gómez Chacón, “Carillo Puerto y la radio en Yucatán,” in La Revolución en Yucatán: 
Nuevos ensayos (Mérida: Secretaria de Educación, CESPA Editorial, 2012), 163-201; Medina Ávila and 
Vargas Arana, Nuestra es la voz, 144; “Mensaje del Gral. Lázaro Cárdenas,” El Universal, 1 Jul. 1934, 1, 
3. 
288 
 
accomplish its goals, the PNR, like some government agencies and regional leaders, 
distributed a large number of receivers to various organizations.84
 Before PNR members had their own radio equipment, the proprietors of Excélsior 
ran political speeches for them from their station starting in June 1929.  It also appears 
that the party transmitted from its own equipment shortly thereafter, doing so without an 
official name or permission from the SCOP.
  
85
  As the official station of the PNR, XEO was the only specifically political station 
in operation.  Congress had officially banned all oppositional radio in laws dating back 
to 1926.  As a result, the station, and Mexican radio in general, reinforced the one-party 
system.  In 1931 the station operated with 5,000 watts of power, but government 
officials elevated its strength to 50,000 watts in 1933, making it as potent as the most 
dominant commercial stations and more powerful than all of the state broadcasting 
stations with the exception of those at Chapultepec and Palo Alto.  With the rise of 
XEO, the SEP’s station XFX continued to broadcast political events and work in 
partnership with the PNR, but starting in 1931, XEO became the flagship of party 
broadcasting.  
  The formal inauguration of XE-Partido 
Nacional Revolucionario-XEO was on New Year’s Day 1931. 
 Some notable attempts at anti-government radio programming did occur from 
1924 to 1935, but all met with repression from state officials.  As mentioned in chapter 
five, government agents shut down Martín Luis Guzmán’s radio station El Mundo 
during the De la Huerta Rebellion.  CYL was also briefly shut down.  General Arnulfo 
                                                     
 84 “Seguirá el descuento a los empleados para el P.N.R.,” La Prensa, 9 Oct. 1930, cccxii. 24. 231, 
CEHM. 
 85 Mejía Prieto, Historia de la radio y la t. v., 55; “Resultó un éxito el radio-concierto,” El 
Nacional, 29 Jun. 1929, 1, 6. 
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Gómez used radio during his brief revolt in late 1927.  He hoped to achieve popular 
American support and to persuade U.S. leaders to withdraw recognition of Calles by 
broadcasting to various newspapers “from several of the border cities in Texas and 
Arizona.”86
alleged Communists, pistols in hand, entered the 
[commercial] radio station XEW, ‘the voice of Latin 
America’ . . . tied up the operator José Piña and proceeded 
to broadcast insults to President Ortiz Rubio, Minister of 
War Calles and Ambassador Clark, as well as accusations 
that American imperialism was attempting to provoke war 
on the part of China and Russia against Japan . . .The 
incident occurred after the conclusion of a concert in 
memory of the noted Mexican musician, Carlos 
Menéndez, given under the auspices of the Department of 
Public Education.
  Of course, he was not in Mexico.  During another anti-Calles protest on 
November 7, 1931, a small group of three 
87
 
 
Another account provided in the communist paper El Machete states that members of 
the Communist Party took control of the station as a celebration of the anniversary of 
the Russian Revolution.  According to this article, the rebel air-wave invaders defended 
the Soviet Union, railed against U.S. imperialism, and argued that Calles’s repressive 
regime was responsible for Mexico’s misery.88  Later, in January 1935, shortly after the 
inauguration of Lázaro Cárdenas, commercial station XXX, associated with the Mexico 
City newspaper La Prensa, broadcast a program by the “Three Wise Men” which 
criticized the politicization of the youth and the weak attendance of children at events 
celebrating Three Kings’ Day.89
                                                     
 86 B. R. Armstrong, “Propagandists in Mexico Busy,” Los Angeles Times, 9 Oct. 1929, 2.  
  
 87 “Reds Seize Radio Station,” New York Times, 9 Nov. 1931, 37.  
 88 Hayes, Radio Nation, 39.  
 89 Jackson Albarrán, Children of the Revolution, chapter 3.  
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On the other hand, almost all broadcast stations played programming that 
supported the revolutionary government.  No anti-government or anti-PNR operation 
ever aired long.  Commercial stations did not always agree with government policies 
but they generally worked in partnership with the state.  They played a wide variety of 
“national” pieces and agreed to government supervision and airtime for state 
programming and guest lecturers.  Some of the most powerful radio operations, such as 
the chain of stations being built by XEW’s founder Emilio Azcárraga, worked closely 
with the PNR since the party’s inception.  
Some businesses and government employees briefly resisted XEO-PNR.  In 
mid-January 1932, a disagreement within SCOP broke out about whether the PNR 
station could air as an “official” and “public” operation, or if it had to be taxed and 
labeled as a commercial station.  SCOP officials citing the fact that the PNR station 
aired commercials stated that it could not, according to the law, be a public operation.  
And with that reasoning, officials within the DGTN rejected requests from XEO’s 
management to be changed to XFO—that is, from a commercial to public station.  
Other station owners were outraged over what they saw as a flagrant abuse of the laws 
and favoritism by the government.  However, the matter was ultimately settled in favor 
of the PNR the following month.  The SCOP leadership decided that XEO in and of 
itself could not be a commercial station and that all should be done “within the law” to 
help the station succeed.  The undersecretary further proclaimed that since XEO was not 
providing commercial information, the fees for commercial stations would not apply.90
                                                     
 90  Mariano Cabrera to the Director General de Telégrafos, 16 feb. 1932, Mexico City, exp. 525, 
caja 16, Ramo Secretaría de Comunicaciones y Transportes, AGN; “Memorandum,” Director General of 
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The station did, however, retain an XE instead of an XF name, a call sign supposedly 
reserved for commercial stations.  But for that matter, so did Secretary of Industry, 
Commerce, and Labor station XEFI.  It was not rare for the lines between commercial 
and public to blur. 
 XEO worked with commercial entities but it also collaborated with government 
stations, especially SEP station XFX.  Before the commencement of XEO in 1931, the 
PNR had already turned to XFX to help propagate the party’s messages.  XFX 
collaborated with the leadership of the newly formed party in political campaigns 
including the campaña nacionalista, which argued for the consumption of Mexican-
made products and promoted domestic over foreign arts and music.  During the 1930s, 
XFX began not only to push regional folk music and classical compositions by national 
authors over American jazz but also to avidly promote the PNR’s economic goals by 
reaching out to state governors, businesses, and unions for them.  The station also 
broadcast PNR bulletins, which usually consisted of newspaper reports that showed the 
party in a positive light.  XFX broadcast other PNR-provided programs, including “The 
Conquest of the Mexican Revolution.”91
 After the PNR created its own broadcasting station, the party’s leadership 
continued to work closely with XFX on programming.
  The PNR moved to present itself as the sole 
political representation of the Revolution.  XFX became one of its most useful 
platforms.  
92
                                                                                                                                                                        
Telégrafos, 28 Jan. 1932, Mexico City, exp. 525, caja 16, Ramo Secretaría de Comunicaciones y 
Transportes, AGN. 
  For example, J. M. Puig 
Casauranc and María Luisa Ross communicated frequently with Senator Silvestre 
 91 Alejandro Michel, “Recopilación detallada de los servicios que presta la obra de Extensión   
Educativa por Radio de la SEP,” Mexico City, 29 Oct. 1930, caja 9478, exp. 4, AHSEP. 
 92  Departamento de Prensa y Publicidad, “Partido Nacional Revolucionario,” Mexico City, 1933, 
caja 9485, exp. 63, AHSEP. 
292 
 
Guerrero, the Secretary General of the PNR, “to immediately make an intense labor of 
communication between both stations.”  Ross stated that she enthusiastically supported 
the collaboration and scheduled meetings between the managers.93
XEO’s usual programming consisted of political messages in between musical 
pieces, and, at times, commercials.  The station’s managers consistently demanded top 
notch performers for their broadcasts, whether for a specific program of music, or for 
coverage of live political events.  Regular XEO performers included famed composer 
Miguel Lerdo de Tejada, Pedro Vargas, later called the “Nightingale of the Americas,” 
and Alfonso Esparza Oteo, perhaps the most famous foxtrot performer in Mexico City.  
Talks aimed at “the popular masses” included “Revolutionary Concepts” and “News of 
General Interest.” 
  The operations 
worked together to spread party-approved notions of Mexican culture and state 
propaganda, creating the foundation for a PNR-government-private broadcasting chain 
for political speeches.  But the XEO operators took on the leadership role in this 
partnership. 
94
The PNR’s first broadcasts were in the service of Pascual Ortiz Rubio’s 
presidential campaign.  PNR-affiliated congressmen, generals, and journalists gave 
special addresses.  Journalist Joaquín Piña gave a speech titled “Ortiz Rubio, a President 
for All Mexicans.”
  
95
                                                     
 93 Dr. J. M. Puig Casauranc to Senador Don Silvestre Guerrero, Mexico City, 19 Jan 1931, caja 
9480, exp. 35, AHSEP; María Luisa Ross to Silvestre Guerrero, Mexico City, 21 Jan. 1931, caja 9480, 
exp. 35, AHSEP. 
  They also included operettas, Yucatecan songs, piano pieces, and 
a variety of domestic and foreign numbers.  Some of the congressmen who spoke 
included Federico Medrano, head of the obregonista block in congress, doctor and 
 94 Mejía Prieto, Historia de la radio y t. v., 57. 
 95 “Resultó un éxito el radio-concierto,” El Nacional, 29 Jun. 1929, 1, 6. 
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Congressman Alejandro Cerisola, and a representative from Oaxaca.  Occasionally an 
actor would talk and do a bit of radio-theater. 
Ortiz’s Rubio’s first radio addresses as president was a testament to the growing 
influence of political broadcasting in Mexico.  As was already a tradition since Calles 
was sworn into office six years before, Ortiz Rubio broadcast his inaugural address 
across the nation on state and commercial stations.  The speech carried much of the 
same populist rhetoric that his three predecessors had espoused.  It was heard in 
thousands of communities in Mexico and by certain state officials and inquisitive 
listeners in the United States.  But it was an event shortly thereafter that became more 
memorable.  Almost immediately following the presidential address, Daniel Flores, a 
twenty-three year old man, fired six bullets at the president.  One of them struck Ortiz 
Rubio in the jaw after first cutting through his wife’s ear.  Although the assassination 
attempt would rattle the president, leading to timidity and health problems, his radio 
address to the nation nineteen days later was reported in the United States to have had 
“the double effect of reassuring the country [Mexico] as to his recovery from the bullet 
and to the constructive policy he plans to adopt.”96
Ortiz Rubio extended his approval of  PNR radio by inaugurating the official 
XEO station with a New Year’s address— “A Message of Best Wishes to the People of 
the Nation.”  Subsequent presidents built on this tradition.  The principal stations of the 
  The same report stated that another 
reaction to the broadcast was the “calming today of foreign exchange. The quotation for 
the peso rose and stocks and securities also showed unusual movement compared with 
previous days.”  Broadcasting, especially in times of anxiety, proved influential in 
calming or exciting nationals and foreigners.  
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country also retransmitted the event, exhibiting another development that would 
continue to grow over the next decades, the collaboration of the owners of increasingly 
monopolistic commercial radio station chains with the official single party of Mexico.97
With the installation of its broadcasting station, the PNR 
puts to the service of ideological renovation the most 
effective form of media that we have today.  
  
In addition to Ortiz Rubio, Secretary General of the PNR Silvestre Guerrero and other 
members of the party’s National Executive Committee attended the event.  Manuel 
Jasso, the PNR’s Secretary of Propaganda and Culture gave a speech that laid out the 
goals of “XE del PNR.” 
  The effort that this represents for the party is 
explained by the huge necessity to create a national 
cohesion of an unprecedented organizational strength and 
in which those politically represented understand in 
actuality the integrity of public power; that maintains a 
daily and constant contact with the collectives that 
invigorate the body and still others that constitute our 
nationality.   
 The diffusion of the party’s doctrine, the daily 
information of its management and of the governments, 
the spiritual incorporation of the proletarian masses by 
means of art, literature, and music; comprehension and 
solidarity between the inhabitants of the country; in sum, 
a detailed registry of the everyday palpitations of national 
life, is the work that will serve the XE del P.N.R. into the 
most remote places of the Republic and far beyond the 
borders.98
 
 
Jasso’s speech clearly defined the station as a tool to build mass allegiance to the state 
and the party, which were equated as essentially the same thing.  Although Jasso stated 
that this was to be done through artistic endeavors, the station mainly used artists to 
gain the attention of listeners whom the PNR leadership wanted to receive party 
                                                     
 97 “Un mensaje de buenos deseos para el pueblo de la nación,” Excélsior, 1 Jan. 1931, 1,3, exp. 
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messaging.  It was a multipronged approach that spread “political, cultural, and social” 
programming across the (trans) national soundscape.99
Ortiz Rubio, and the PNR during his presidency, used radio skillfully.  
According to SEP radio director María Luisa Ross, the previously discussed 1931 Ortiz 
Rubio speech for Pan American Day was one of the most popular broadcasts of the 
department’s fiscal year.  XFX received “innumerable” letters from within Mexico, the 
United States, and Canada in appreciation of the president’s address.
 
100
 Radio as a political tool continued to grow during the campaigns and presidencies 
of Abelardo Rodríguez and Lázaro Cárdenas.  Former XFX technical manager engineer 
Javier Stavoli switched over to station XEFO, finally able to work with a 50,000-watt 
station like he had asked for when he worked in the SEP.  His transition to XEFO is one 
of the more important markers of the decline of the SEP station at the expense of party 
radio.  In January 1934, President Rodríguez “broadcast an explanation of Mexico’s 
new minimum wage law of four pesos a day and pleaded for public support to make it a 
universal application.”
  The speech 
exemplifies how the Maximato presidents capitalized on the increased regularity of the 
broadcasting industry and the rising number of receiver sets in the country.  
101
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  Rodríguez used the medium regularly, not only to popularize 
this policy but also the image of the Mexican government in general. The collaborations 
between the PNR and commercial radiocasters continued to grow.  When Rodríguez 
gave his last address to congress in September 1934, XEFO had partnered with nineteen 
other stations to amplify the message.  Many of the participating commercial 
 100 María Luisa Ross, “Informe de las labores . . . durante el periodo comprendido del 1 de agosto 
de 1930 al 21 de Julio de 1931, Mexico City, 31 Jul. 1931, caja 9478, exp. 4, AHSEP. 
 101 “New Radio Voice,” Los Angeles Times, 11 Jan. 1934, A4. 
296 
 
broadcasters were located within Mexico City, like Azcárraga’s XEW, but other 
stations—some affiliated with Emilio Azcárraga, some not—were located in 
Tamaulipas, Nuevo Leon, San Luis Potosí, Coahuila, Durango, Jalisco, and Veracruz.102
 As a candidate, Cárdenas spoke regularly over XEFO and its commercial and 
state broadcasting partners in the capital, Mérida, Tampico, Veracruz, Monterey, 
Saltillo, Nuevo Laredo, Querétaro, Torreón, Guadalajara, and San Luis Potosí.  Even 
the border blaster XENT in Laredo, Nuevo León—owned by the famed gringo “cancer-
curing” quack Norman Baker—transmitted PNR broadcasts of the Cárdenas campaign, 
providing another interesting dynamic in the relationship between these American 
broadcasters in Mexico’s northern borderlands and the political leadership of the 
nation.
   
103  The Mexican Telephone and Telegraph Company and Erickson Telephones 
also aided the PNR-Cárdenas campaign, providing over 3,000 kilometers in cable.104  In 
between presidential campaigns XEO directors kept Calles informed of their 
programming, especially those involving the “Calles Doctrine and the economic 
progress of Mexico.”105
  According to Hayes, Cárdenas “distributed hundreds of radios to his supporters 
in rural villages and working-class neighborhoods” during his fabled gira or campaign 
trek across the country in 1934.  Hayes also notes that Cárdenas used a “radio train” to 
contact city officials and party members, among others, which “signaled his 
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commitment to the new medium.” 106  The use of radio by the PNR had definitely 
increased.  But as with the gifting of radios to labor groups and campesinos, Cárdenas’s 
use of radio trains was not a new innovation.  As discussed in chapter three and six, 
rebel leaders and earlier presidents used radios on locomotives.  During the De la 
Huerta Rebellion, aboard President Obregón’s recently revamped presidential train in 
Guanajuato, political ally Fernando Torreblanca sent wireless messages to his wife in 
Mexico City, giving “mucho, mucho, mucho, cariñosos recuerdos,” and making sure 
that his son brushed his teeth.107  The following year journalists were invited to ride on 
the presidential train to see where “grand irrigation works” were soon to be built in 
Chihuahua.  The SCOP operators helped them send reports via radio back to their 
respective newspapers in Mexico City.108
                                                     
 106 Hayes, Radio Nation, 86. 
  Technicians provided presidents with radio 
on other modes of transportation as well.  In 1929 President Portes Gil talked via 
radiotelephone on his “presidential plane” during Mexico’s Air Week celebrations.  In 
addition to speaking to the president of the Mexican Aviation Company, which operated 
an important airplane mail service, the president sent a message to his wife: “From an 
altitude of 23,000 feet, as we are now over the crater of El Popo the volcano and 
enjoying the gorgeous beauties of nature, to you, to mother, and to Chacha, our little 
 107 “many, many, many, loving memories.” F. Estévez to Luis G. Zepeda, Celaya, 25 Jan. 1924, 
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girl, loving greetings. — Emilio.”109
 None of this detracts from Cárdenas’s skill in political broadcasting.  Cárdenas—
along with Portes Gil who had acquired the land for the station—had been instrumental 
in the foundation of XEO as the president of the PNR in 1930.
  Radio had become a norm in presidential travels 
by the late 1920s. 
110  He had become 
familiar with the medium’s strengths and weaknesses well before he took office in late 
1934.  During his presidential campaign he used radio abundantly to further the reach of 
his call to increase social reforms and state cooperation with the common people.  In 
one speech, “carried by all the radio stations in the Republic,” he emphasized the rights 
of workers, and that a genuine cooperatist system would rein supreme; he stressed the 
need to incorporate men and women and the need to end the exploitation of man by 
other men and by machines.  He renewed a call for the “organization of the workers 
across the entire Republic.”111
                                                     
 109 Emilio Portes Gil, quoted in “Mexican President Flies Over Volcano,” New York Times, 12 
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  The oil expropriation speech he gave in 1938 electrified 
people from every nook and cranny of the country, elevating Mexican nationalism to an 
all time high.  Although some of this can be attributed to Cárdenas’s own intelligent use 
of the medium, the simple fact that stations—including government, but mostly private 
operations—expanded rapidly and abundantly during his presidency provided Cárdenas 
the essential tool.  In other words, his ability to rally the populace stemmed directly 
from the maturation of radio technology and the Mexican broadcasting industry. 
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 When Cárdenas took office, presidents had been using broadcasting for over a 
decade, and wireless telegraphy for thirty-five years.  The traditions of using radio to 
broadcast inaugural address, speeches to and by the congress, New Year’s Day 
speeches, presidential campaigns, and in other moments deemed nationally important, 
had all been a part of the government broadcasting system built by state agencies during 
the Calles presidency and, starting in 1929, in partnership with the PNR.  By the time 
that Cárdenas forced Calles’s exile in April 1936, the PNR had constructed an 
impressive broadcasting operation.  Giving the first radio address by a Mexican 
presidential candidate, Calles initiated direct political broadcasting in 1924.  Ten years 
later most of the powerful stations across the country aired political and government 
messages.  
 Broadcasting opened up a new era of populist and nationalist politics.  
Government leaders used the medium to incorporate rural societies, laborers, 
businessmen, and urban middle-class urbanites into state allies, with some success. 
Although many areas remained out of constant reach of the government, or stood 
opposed to their intrusion, the voice of state leaders reached greater audiences than ever 
before.  Cárdenas masterfully built upon these foundations during his presidency. 
 In addition to constructing a populist and corporatist coalition, Calles and top 
leaders of the PNR, including Cárdenas, used radio to incorporate and dominate over 
smaller regional parties.  By monopolizing political speech over the airwaves, the party 
consistently provided the furthest reaching propaganda, reinforcing its prominent 
position.  This was done by party members who provided radios to targeted labor 
300 
 
unions and rural community centers, by incorporating state broadcasting into education, 
and the cooperation of regional state stations.  
 Cárdenas pushed for greater state intervention, but the radio system was already 
in place and in working order.  The SEP, Chapultepec, the army, the SICT, the SCOP, 
and the PNR all transmitted regular messages and programming.  Other government 
departments would create their own operations, reaching a high of fourteen stations.112
 
  
Agencies also broadcast on commercial stations, which had to allow air time for state 
bulletins by law.  The relationship between state leaders and commercial broadcasters 
was firmly established, if not always smooth.  Government directors allowed flexibility 
in how private companies built their programming in exchange for their commitment to 
relay state and political messages, and for playing a certain percentage of “nationalist” 
music.  The PNR in particular gained the cooperation of the most dominant commercial 
broadcasters, building a close relationship between media moguls and the one-party 
system that would evolve for generations.  
The Maturation of Radio 
 The first four years of the Cárdenas administration were tumultuous and exciting.  
The president had exiled Calles and a number of his allies in 1936, nationalized the oil 
industry in 1938, fought a rebellion by San Luis Potosí strongman Saturnino Cedillo 
that broke out days later, and faced serious obstacles in implementing his radical land 
and labor reforms.  But unlike the 1920s, the Cárdenas administration faced much less 
risk of rebellion from within the military.  The state had much more firmly secured its 
position.  And though definitively not loved by all, Cárdenas had garnered more popular 
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support than his revolutionary predecessors.  He not only appeared more genuine in his 
efforts to reach out to people across the nation, he had better means to do so, and 
subsequently his words did not go unnoticed or without weight.   
 Radio development and use increased dramatically during the Cárdenas years.  
Simultaneously, state and party broadcasting stations reached their pinnacle while 
massive commercial broadcasting chains solidified their dominant position on the 
airwaves.  In 1937 eighty-nine broadcasting stations operated across Mexico, thirteen 
official, and three “cultural.”113  By 1940, 113 broadcasting stations aired across, and 
many beyond, the nation.114  In order to maintain a strong presence in the face of the 
expanding private-sector operations, the government upped state messaging on 
commercial stations.  Beginning in 1937, all large stations retransmitted the 
government’s La Hora Nacional, and a number of those aired additional official 
messages and speeches.  By 1943 approximately sixty of those stations were affiliated 
with Emilio Azcárraga, who, along with his brothers, had been cooperating with 
revolutionary governments for the preceding twenty years.115
 By the early 1930s radios had become common and loud enough in Mexico City 
that government health officials called for bans and limitations on the use of the devices 
in public.  In 1931 the agents officially prohibited the common practice of blasting 
loudspeakers from storefronts, and city officials likewise ordered saloons to turn off 
their radios by 9:00 pm.  Not stopping there, they began enforcing noise ordinances 
against private residences where inhabitants played phonographs and radios too 
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loudly.116  According to certain members of the Department of Public Health, all the 
noise caused serious health issues.  They received a number of complaints.  One woman 
told them that “radio noise had driven her mad.”  A Mexico City lawyer argued that his 
client died because radios prevented her from sleeping while ill.117  By the end of 1935 
there were well over 300,000 receivers in Mexico and by the end of 1940 there were 
over 700,000.118
 In a number of other areas radio developed along lines established during the 
Calles era.  The SCOP and Mexican military continued to use radio to suppress 
rebellions and to consolidate a stronger presidency throughout the nation.  Interestingly, 
much of the SCOP’s efforts—and with the outbreak of World War II, the armed 
forces’—attention remained focused on the frontiers and coasts.  The military, however, 
also increased the number of radio schools and devices in bases across much of the 
interior.  Commercial and state broadcasters continued to broadcast abroad and to build 
closers ties with Central America.  Emilio Azcárraga expanded his partnership with 
NBC in the United States, and Mexican stations continued to broadcast speeches from 
the president and other top party figures, also providing English translations, exhibiting 
the continued transnational goals of Mexican political radio. 
  
  The armed forces under Cárdenas continued to professionalize and increase its 
technological capabilities.  In addition to importing tanks and new planes, the SGM 
                                                     
 116 “Mexico City Adopts Hush Regulation,” Los Angeles Times, 20 Dec. 1931, 1. 
 117 “Mexico City Acts to Cut Noise, Aiming especially at Radio, “New York Times, 23 Mar. 1931, 
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established new radiotelegraph and radiotelephone offices and built new devices.  
During the fiscal year of 1935-36, the SGM reported that it had built sixty portable 
radios, two receptors, and two transmitters.  The military sent and received just over 
388,000 messages.  The military established new transmission schools among a number 
of military camps spread across the country; pictures of them fill the pages of the SGM 
Memorias provided to congress.  After becoming Secretary of War and Marine in 1937, 
future president Manuel Avila Camacho praised a regional commander in 
Aguascalientes who convinced the manager of local commercial station XEBI —with 
strong cooperation with the local authorities—to broadcast the Hora Cultural Militar.  
Two years later, General Edmundo M. Sánchez gave a radio address as Secretary of 
Militar Action of the PRM in favor of Avila Camacho’s candidacy for president.  In 
1937 the SGM graduated over forty radio specialists, and the SCOP graduated similar 
numbers.  The navy also had bases under construction in the Southern Territory of Baja 
California and the state of Guerrero. 119
 The SCOP continued to work at interconnecting central Mexico and the frontiers.  
Indeed, Secretary of SCOP Francisco J. Mújica stated in 1938 that the department was 
giving special attention to linking the Baja California Peninsula and the Territory of 
Quintana Roo to Mexico City “in cooperation with the general plan of the government 
  Military professionalization and technological 
advancement increased further with U.S. aid and cooperation during World War II as 
fears of German espionage in Mexico once again filled newspapers in both countries.  
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to incorporate these territories into national activities.”120  In early January 1936 it 
eliminated fees for official radio and wire communications between the territories of 
Quintana Roo and Northern and Southern Baja California with authorities in other parts 
of the mainland.  SCOP employees revamped the radio stations in Xcalak and Carrillo 
Puerto, Quintana Roo.  They also built two 500-watt stations in Tuxtla Gutiérrez, 
Chiapas, and Oaxaca, Oaxaca.  The department’s workshop in Chapultepec was 
constructing two similar stations for Mérida, Yucatán, and Ensenada, Northern 
Territory of Baja California.121  The following year they placed new Mexican-built 
transmitters for the stations in Guaymas, Hermosillo, La Paz, Mérida, Tapachula, and 
another for Coahuayana, Michoacán, “to keep the local public informed.”122
 The SCOP also increased its international communications capabilities with its 
longtime partners.   Between 1936 and 1940, the department initiated radiotelephone—
radio voice—communications with El Salvador, Cuba, and Guatemala.  The 
Chapultepec station increased the efficiency of its radiotelephone communications with 
the United States, Europe, and Japan.  Likewise, XEFO/XEUZ and other stations 
affiliated with the PRM station, and commercial stations including XEW and XEQ, 
participated in a number of Panamerican projects, adding a more cooperative 
transnational element to their broadcasts during the U.S. Good Neighbor era and World 
War II.  In 1939 the party station regularly broadcast the “Hora de Difusión 
Panamericana,” during which they transmitted programs influenced by, and sometimes 
  
                                                     
 120 Francisco J. Mújica, Memoria de la Secretaría de Comunicaciones y Obras Publicas de 
septiembre de 1937 - agosto de 1938 (Mexico City: D.A.P.P, 1938), 13, 25 
 121 Francisco J. Mújica, Memoria de la Secretaría de Comunicaciones y Obras Publicas de 
septiembre de 1936 a agosto de 1937 (Mexico City: DAPP, 1937), 23-27; Mújica, Memoria . . . 1937-
1938,  28. 
 122 Angulo, Memoria . . . 1939-1940, 117. 
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played by, artists from other Latin American nations.123  International partners XEW 
and NBC, in addition to the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, exchanged programs 
that spread both Mexican and American programs across much of North America, the 
Caribbean, and parts of Central and South America.124
 Although the numbers of radio specialists continued to grow, the innovators of 
Mexican wireless continued to serve in prominent state and commercial 
communications positions.  The Azcárragas’ broadcasting franchise continued to 
expand, including not only the chain affiliated with NBC, but another, headed by XEQ, 
affiliated with CBS.  They also maintained a cozy relationship with members of the 
ruling party, a relationship that has lasted to this day.  José R. de la Herran, who co-
founded SGM station JH, built radio installations for the Mexican air force in the mid 
1920s, and who had helped construct stations for CYB and CYL in 1923, the Oaxacan 
Light and Power Company station in Oaxaca in 1924, and Monterrey’s XET in 1930, 
installed XEW and XEQ’s powerful transmitters from 1934 to 1940.
  
125
                                                     
 123 “Hora de Difusión Panamericana,” El Nacional, 24 Nov. 1939, 6; “XEFO  XEUZ,” El 
Nacional, 28 Nov. 1939, 6. 
  General 
Guillermo Garza Ramos y Trillo, who had worked with De la Herran in the private and 
government sectors, worked in a number of high ranking positions in the Escuela 
Militar de Transmisiones during the Cárdenas years.  He would serve as the 
Comandante General de Transmisiones for Baja California during World War II starting 
in 1942, and by 1955 he had become director of the military school he had worked for 
 124 “Una importante transmisión de la XEW a Norte Americana y Canada, El Nacional, 29 Nov. 
1939, 7; “Un acontecimiento internacional en México,” El Nacional, 29 Nov. 1939, 7. 
 125 Instituto Politecnico Nacional, Generación 70-74, “Don José R. de la Herran, Pionero de la 
Radiodifusión mexicana,” (Mexico City: Asociación Mexicana de Periodismo Cientifico, 1983), 9-13.  
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during the late 1930s.126  Former carrancista communications official and former 
president of the LCMR, Modesto C. Rolland, became Cárdenas’s Undersecretary of the 
SCOP.  Felix Palavicini, the former carrancista official, editor of El Universal, and 
CYL partner founded XEN-Radio Mundial, a state-approved commercial station that 
provided international and national news in addition to popular and classical music 
concerts aired in tandem with state and commercial stations.  He would subsequently go 
on to become a popular XEW commentator in the 1940s.127
 
  Radio specialists tended to 
have long professional lives despite changes in administration and policy, and along 
with their careers, the radio industry they helped create was maturing. 
Conclusion: Radio and the Making of Modern Mexico 
 It was during the Calles years, including the Maximato, that broadcasting became 
an essential component of state planning and propaganda.  Although Carranza, and 
especially Obregón, had promoted their own strain of populist politics before—a 
necessary requirement for any leader of the Revolution—Calles brought populism to a 
whole new level, solidifying cross-class and corporatist alliances that brought larger 
numbers of people in contact with the Mexican state.  Broadcasting was crucial to this 
endeavor.  Government officials helped expand the number of radios to schools, labor 
groups, and government agencies, while middle-class and wealthy residents 
increasingly bought their own devices.  Bars and other businesses also acquired their 
own receivers to play for patrons and employees.  State stations, including the PNR 
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operation, were not the favorite channels of most Mexicans, and efforts to get radio into 
rural communities faced numerous problems, not least of which was a lack of 
electricity.  But even facing these seemingly unsurpassable barriers, radio reached 
larger and larger numbers of people in the late 1920s and early 1930s.  And many 
people did listen to the SEP and PNR stations, especially important political events and 
speeches.  In order to make sure that government messaging was reaching public 
audiences, PNR legislators produced laws that forced commercial stations to air pro-
government propaganda, and that restricted messages contrary to the desires of the state.  
Government officials and the owners of prominent stations also collaborated on the 
airing of music that was “Mexican” in an attempt to build a stronger national culture, 
one that was more loyal to the revolutionary state and to Mexican commercial products.  
This partnership, and more importantly, the technology of radio broadcasting, allowed 
for this expansion of populist politics and nationalist sentiment, both of which Cárdenas 
built upon as he brought the political use of radio to new heights during the expulsion of 
Calles from Mexico in 1936 and the oil expropriation of 1938.  Broadcasting had 
become a permanent part of government and Mexican culture.  
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Conclusion 
 
 Forty Years of Radio Technology 
 
 
 
 On the night of March 18, 1938, an important state message interrupted regular 
radio broadcasting.  At 10:00 p.m. President Cárdenas approached a government 
microphone and declared that a number of foreign petroleum companies had 
consistently and blatantly defied the laws of the nation and, for that, the state and 
workers were taking over their operations.  Mexicans high and low celebrated the grito 
while U.S. and British oilmen, some of whom listened to the English translation, 
steamed in disbelief.  The British recalled their diplomat and a number of American 
entrepreneurs clamored for swift retribution.   Although Cárdenas, before and after, 
attempted to calm U.S. sentiments in other radio addresses, some residents of Mexico 
and the United States feared another rebellion or intervention.1
 They got the former when longtime San Luis Potosí strongman General Saturnino 
Cedillo launched an insurrection just days after the oil declaration.  Angered over 
Cárdenas’s agrarian policies and efforts to weaken the general’s grip on power in his 
home state, Cedillo hoped to capitalize on animosities by persuading other generals, 
together with U.S. businessmen, to join him.
   
2
                                                     
 1 Lázaro Cárdenas, “Expropiación de la industria petrolera: El Sr. Presidente dirige transcendental 
mensaje al pueblo de la república,” El Nacional, 19 Mar. 1938, 1; Stephen R. Niblo, War, Diplomacy, 
and Development: The United States and Mexico, 1938-1954 (Wilmington, DE: SR Books, 1995), 36; 
Hayes, Radio Nation, 83-85; Santiago, The Ecology of Oil, 338. 
  And like so many prominent rebels 
against the Mexican political order, he attempted to incorporate radio as a tool in his 
movement.  Indeed, he had been involved in a previous scandal involving radio 
 2 For more on Cedillo, see Dudley Ankerson, Agrarian Warlord: Saturnino Cedillo and the 
Mexican Revolution in San Luis Potosí (DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 1984). See also the 
conclusion of Navarro, Political Intelligence, 262-65.  
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messages and a plot to kidnap President Ortiz Rubio.  At one point Cedillo managed to 
broadcast from a U.S. border station in McAllen, Texas, just across the Rio Bravo from 
Reynosa, accusing Cárdenas of orchestrating a “communist dictatorship.”3  But within 
Mexico, federal operatives quickly discovered his wireless operations; worse for 
Cedillo, few people outside of a smattering of foreign businessmen and residents in San 
Luis Potosí genuinely supported the uprising, which the army quickly put down. 4
 In terms of wireless development, the oil expropriation and the Cedillo rebellion 
show the complicated growth and evolution through which Mexican radio had passed in 
the preceding forty years.  Cárdenas amped up his broadcasts on both the rebellion and 
the expropriation, appealing to a larger audience than preceding presidents and with 
much greater means.  Responses to Cárdenas’s oil expropriation broadcast came from 
every region of Mexico.  And more than any previous point in Mexican history, it was 
clear that a professional army dominated military radio, and that party leaders and 
aligned businessmen controlled broadcasting.  These trends stemmed directly from the 
policies of Porfirio Díaz and the actions of preceding revolutionary leaders.  
    
 Since the days of the Díaz administration, officials had used radio as a military 
tool and as a way of increasing state presence throughout the country.  Connecting the 
frontier territories to the center of the nation loomed as an especially important goal, 
and it remained so throughout the revolutionary era.  Outside of experiments off the 
coast of Veracruz and in Chapultepec at the turn of the twentieth century, German 
specialists, SCOP employees, and military officers had built the first radiotelegraph 
towers in the Baja California peninsula and the Territory of Quintana Roo.  Although 
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briefly interrupted by the Revolution, especially after the assassination of Madero, 
every single group of rebel victors, from Madero to Cárdenas, expanded wireless 
endeavors in the fringe territories and further increased Mexico’s radio capabilities in 
Central America.  Carranza used World War I as a means to gather more powerful 
equipment from Germany, fueling unstable relations with the United States, but greatly 
expanding his administration’s reach via electronic communications.  When World War 
II broke out in 1939, fears of German spies and poorly defended frontiers continued to 
worry the presses and governments of both Mexico and the United States.  But by this 
time the Mexican state was more firmly behind the United States, and Mexico’s 
communications system was more advanced, even if it paled in comparison to that of 
the Northern Colossus.  Still, the drive for national unification and state expansion, and 
the use of radio to accomplish these goals, were ongoing processes. 
 Radio had a significant impact on the Mexican Revolution, and, in turn, the 
Revolution dramatically affected wireless development in Mexico.  Following the onset 
of violence in 1910, the technology in question had become an important component of 
rebel and state communications, increasing correspondence capabilities between leaders 
and with foreign businessmen and government officials.  Radio also became a common 
component of military intelligence gathering.  Messages sent and overheard over the 
airwaves changed the course of some of the Revolution’s most significant battles.  All 
sides of the conflict used wireless, and it became an essential component of 
Constitutionalist control as they attempted to consolidate their power and influence 
from 1915 to 1920.  Venustiano Carranza and his cadre of advisors propagated new 
decrees and legislation that provided a stringent nationalist framework for radio, a 
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response to the Revolution and U.S. military interventions during the invasion of 
Veracruz and the Pershing Expedition.  The laws provided a legal framework for 
confiscating illegally operating foreign stations and those of their domestic enemies.   
 Despite attempts to control wireless, insurrectionists from Adolfo de la Huerta in 
1924 to Saturnino Cedillo in 1938 found ways to use the technology to help organize 
their movements.  However, the Mexican army, which increasingly became more 
professionalized during the 1920s, dominated the military use of radio following the De 
la Huerta rebellion.  The increased technological superiority together with an ever 
consolidating state hegemony, even if far from complete, helped presidents including 
Calles, Portes Gil, Ortiz Rubio, Rodríguez, and Cárdenas, put down armed challenges to 
their authority.  Although divisions and conspiracies remained a common component of 
politics, radio became an important tool that helped maintain the Sonoran Dynasty and 
the subsequent single-party system.  
 Broadcasting became another essential component in building government 
support, amplifying state propaganda, and consolidating control.  State leaders and 
wealthy entrepreneurs understood the value of controlling the airwaves, especially in a 
society that had survived years of civil war and factionalism, and they compromised to 
establish a form of shared power.  What better way to funnel a chaotic and popular 
revolution than with broadcasting—the world’s greatest megaphone?   More people 
were incorporated into the governing project, but voices of political dissent and 
religious proselytizing more often than not found their operations quashed.  The 
revolutionary leaders in the national arena shaped these authoritarian tendencies, using 
force, favors, and legislation.  They constructed their own broadcasting operations and 
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then increasingly turned to more successful commercial-station owners to carry their 
messages.   
 When broadcasting became a reality during the presidency of former carrancista 
general Alvaro Obregón, the president opened up the medium to private development, 
but with serious restrictions on what could be aired.  He also initiated state 
broadcasting, which became a major component of radio from 1924 to 1938.  
Continuing rebellion forced state leaders to ban all radiocasts that attacked the 
government, increasing authoritarian trends in the name of stability and patriotism.  The 
partnership between the government and the most prominent radio station owners 
emerged as a key component of modern broadcasting in Mexico and reinforced the post 
1929 one-party system and the monopolization of commercial broadcasting, trends that 
have continued to have a significant impact on Mexican society. 
 This consolidating and authoritarian strain in Mexican radio should not be 
surprising.  The technology evolved in a period when revolution had fractured the state 
and when the victors raced to put it back together while incorporating larger bases of 
support.  To figures including Calles and Cárdenas, broadcasting had to be subjugated 
to the state’s terms for matters of national security, national development, and political 
need, even while these presidents promoted the growth of the commercial sector.  Even 
without revolutions, most forms of mass media have tended to start out relatively open 
and democratic, and then become more authoritarian and closed over time.5
                                                     
 5 Wu, Master Switch, 5-6. 
  In the 
United States, for example, three corporations—the National Broadcasting Company, 
Columbia Broadcasting System, and the American Broadcasting Company—dominated 
radio broadcasting and television for decades.  A handful of corporations still controlled 
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the most powerful U.S. media networks as of 2013.6  Radio proved especially prone to 
state and corporate control.  As journalist and technology specialist Timothy Wu 
recently wrote about U.S. broadcasting, “radio becomes the clearest example of a 
technology that has grown into a feebler, rather than stronger, facilitator of public 
discourse.”7
 The first forty years of radio development in Mexico displays similarities and 
differences with other nations and empires.  Using wireless offices to connect frontier 
regions greatly mirrored how agents from Great Britain, France, and Germany relied on 
radio to build links with their own island possessions and far-flung colonies.  The 
United States government similarly incorporated radio devices to place frontier 
  This conclusion holds true for Mexico as well, albeit under different, and 
even more limiting, circumstances.  After a violent revolution, powerful state and 
corporate transmitters quickly drowned out their amateur counterparts, which grew in 
number, but waned in influence.  As most people contented themselves with owning a 
receiver to hear the news, advertisements, and entertainment programs, the proportion 
of listeners to transmitters dramatically increased.  In comparison to their American 
counterparts in the north, or even their Argentine counterparts to the south, the 
democratic tendency—think of amateur or HAM operators communicating with each 
other within and across political boundaries—in radio had a smaller window in which to 
establish itself because it was interrupted by warfare and a revolutionary state bent on 
reconsolidating control.   
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territories under its political control, including Alaska and Hawaii.  U.S. military 
officers and businessmen also established stations in the Philippines, Central America, 
Cuba, and Puerto Rico.  Unlike these other powers, however, Mexico consistently relied 
on foreign specialists and technology.  Its education and manufacturing institutions 
paled in comparison to the more industrialized nations.  All of the aforementioned 
countries also used wireless to advance their navies, of which Mexico had by far the 
smallest.  But, in comparison to Central America and many other parts of Latin 
America, Mexico was economically powerful and technologically advanced.   
 World War I caused all states involved to place radio under strict government 
supervision.  In the United States, radio was largely a commercial and private affair, but 
as with other nations, wireless activities were greatly restricted, supervised, and largely 
taken over by the state during the conflict.  Even when the U.S. congress returned radio 
to the hands of businesses and hobbyists, it worked to create new stringent codes, 
guidelines, and state oversight.  The government also supported the formation of large 
private corporations that could informally spread American political, as well as 
economical, interests.  Britain and Germany subsequently made radio a state-directed 
medium.  But a lack of serious studies about the effects of early wireless developments 
around the world still makes any sort of global comparison difficult.   
 Like its French, Austrian, Argentine, and Brazilian counterparts, Mexican 
broadcasting was a mixed system.8
                                                     
8 See Neulander, Programming national Identity; Claxton, From Parsifal to Perón; McCann, 
Hello, Hello Brazil. Britain and Germany followed more state-controlled approaches to broadcasting, 
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  That is to say, the government promoted both state 
and private stations.  Obregón’s decision to allow commercial stations was influenced 
by a number of factors.  He himself was an inventor and capitalist and supported such 
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endeavors, a number of his most important advisors backed the idea, the government 
had little money to establish a successful radio network, private experimental operations 
were hard to stop and had advanced the field, and the state was still fragile with other 
important tasks at hand.  Another likely reason was the increasing presence of U.S. 
broadcasting and radio equipment.  Receivers already started pouring southward over 
the lengthy U.S. border in 1923 and 1924, and Mexican listeners could pick up dozens 
of American stations.  If the government was going to successfully establish its own 
cultural programs to counter U.S. programming, it would need the assistance, money, 
and connections of Mexico City and Monterrey capitalists.  A similar argument has 
been made about the reasoning behind why the administration of Getúlio Vargas turned 
to commercial broadcasters in Brazil, except that in this case, the threat came from 
radio-savvy Argentina.9
 But until the last year of Cárdenas’s presidency, state agents kept a strong and 
direct presence in broadcasting.  At its height, the government operated fourteen 
stations and often worked in partnership with the largest commercial broadcasters.  
Unlike Argentina and Brazil, Mexico had government broadcasting stations that not 
only operated but that were influential in the 1920s, a result of Mexico’s unique 
revolutionary circumstance and the correlating rise of populist and corporatist politics, 
which also came to Mexico earlier.  Like state official in France, Brazil, and Argentina, 
Mexican intellectuals and bureaucrats attempted to use radio to educate and bring “high 
culture” to the greater population.  Many of these educators disliked the popular music 
broadcasts on stations like CYB or CYL, but some intellectuals and radio specialists 
were less critical; and Government broadcasting incorporated regional, popular, and 
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even foreign music, as much, if not more, than the original commercial stations.  
Classical music dominated almost all stations in the 1920s, even if intermixed with 
corridos, canciones yucatecos or trios, tangos, jazz, and fox-trots.  But by the 1930s 
Azcárraga, with the assistance of NBC and CBS, came to monopolize more of the 
popular musicians, largely by providing better facilities and out paying what the 
competition could offer.  State stations relied on advertising at times, but it was never 
their main source of income, and the government, unlike in France, could not 
successfully implement a tax to fund the government stations.  Since the Azcárraga 
family had proved a longtime and successful partner of the government since 1923, and 
recognizing the huge success and reach their operations had obtained, the PNR, together 
with its successors, the PRM and PRI, decided to cooperate with them instead of 
competing with them.  
 That partnership continues to the present day.  Indeed, Emilio Azcárraga, his son 
Emilio Azcárraga Milmo, and grandson Emilio Azcárraga Jean became the most 
successful electronic media owners in Latin America, only recently surpassed in wealth 
and influence by Carlo Slim, who has come to dominate private telecommunications in 
Mexico.  The Azcárraga family not only retained its prominent position in commercial 
radio during the 1940s but also in television from the 1950s to the 1990s as owners of 
Televisa.  They possessed approximately 80 percent of television viewership in Mexico 
and a similar percentage of advertising revenue, in addition to state funding.10
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  The 
family did not always agree with the policies of reigning presidents, whether it was 
Calles’s war against the cristeros, or attempts to tax and regulate television, but they 
still remained stalwart allies of the party.  Azcárraga Milmo won notoriety for his 
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blatant support of the PRI in the 1990s, stating that Televisa was a “part of the 
government system,” and that he himself was the “number two priista in the country.”11
 Nonetheless, the media became more open in the late twentieth and early twenty-
first century than it was in the mid-1900s.  Following the 1985 earthquake, which killed 
over ten thousand people in Mexico, radio shows, reflecting an overall trend in Mexico 
City society, more openly chastised the government.  Critical talk shows obtained larger 
audiences and, in turn, greater revenues.  These stations forced government-aligned 
operations to rethink their strategies.  Political reforms in the 1990s and the death of 
Emilio Azcárraga, Jr., also opened up radio and media in general.
   
12  Still, complaints 
continue.  The election of Enrique Peña Nieto in 2012 was mired by stories that argued 
that Televisa, led by Azcárraga Milmo’s son and namesake, had unethically partnered 
with the candidate.13
 The Mexican broadcasting industry originally sprang from the merger of 
Constitutionalist radio specialists with educated private experimenters and businessmen 
influenced by U.S. broadcasting trends.  However, the state remained an important 
  If so, this partnership between the Azcárragas and government 
officials began in the 1920s when CYL aired Calles’s address to the nation as a 
presidential candidate after the station proved its loyalty during the De la Huerta 
Rebellion.   
                                                     
 11 Ibid, 30. A priista is a supporter of the PRI.  
 12 Ibid. 
 13 Jo Tuckman, “WikiLeaks reveals US Concerns over Televisa-Peña Nieto Links in 2009,” The 
Guardian, 11 Jun. 2012, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/jun/11/wikileaks-us-concerns-televisa-
pena-nieto, accessed 28 Dec. 2012; Jo Tuckman, “Mexican Media Scandal,” The Guardian, 26 Jun. 2012, 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/jun/26/mexican-media-scandal-televisa-pri-nieto, accessed 28 
Dec. 2012; Jenaro Villamil, “Proyecto Jorge: El plan Televisa-Peña Nieto para alcanzar la presidencia,” 
Proceso, 8 Sept. 2012, http://www.proceso.com.mx/?p=319353, accessed 28 Dec. 2012. There were 
numerous other reasons for Peña Nieto’s victory, including security concerns, growing animosity towards 
the rule of the rightist Partido Acción Nacional (PAN), and fears that the leftist candidate Andrés Manuel 
López  Obrador would be destabilizing if in presidential office.  
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participant, mostly because of the continued (and not altogether erroneous) perception 
of radio as a security risk, and because of the history of state-controlled radiotelegraphy 
operations in matters of governance and the building of consensus.  A number of state 
officials also feared the domination of the airwaves by the country’s northern radio 
provider, at least until a bilateral move toward accommodation between the United 
States and Mexico followed the oil nationalization, continuing financial difficulties, and 
the start of World War II.14  Not all state involvement was shunned by Mexican station 
owners.  Many of them embraced, if reluctantly at times, political participation, 
government collaboration, and state protectionism.   Likewise, the official party favored 
the creation of vast commercial broadcasting chains, which greatly expanded the reach 
of government discourse.15
                                                     
 14 Niblo, War, Diplomacy, and Development, 35-57.  
  As the single-party system became more firmly entrenched 
under the PRM and the PRI, and as Mexico rebuilt stronger partnerships with the 
United States during the Good Neighbor and World War II eras, the state reduced its 
direct broadcasting operations.  But the partnership first constructed in the 1920s 
remained.  Built upon decades of communications development, Mexico, the modern 
nation born of corn, eagles, serpents, cacti, silver, blood—and radio—had begun. 
 15 “Comentemos el ‘encadenamiento’,” El Nacional, 13 Dec. 1939, 7.  
319 
 
Works Cited and Selected Bibliography 
 
Primary Sources 
 
Archives Consulted 
 
AGEY  Archivo General de la Estado de Yucatán 
              Gobernación 
 
AGN  Archivo General de la Nación de México 
              Gobernación 
   Hemeroteca 
                         Particulares 
             Presidentes 
 
AHDF  Archivo Histórico del Distrito Federal 
              Ayuntamiento 
 
AHSDN Archivo Histórico de la Secretaría de la Defensa Nacional 
   Biblioteca 
   Fondo Revolucionario (online) 
 
AHSR  Archivo Histórico Genaro Estrada de la Secretaría de Relaciones   
 Exteriores 
   Diplomático 
   Consular 
 
AHUNAM Archivo Histórico Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México 
              Amado Aguirre 
              Hemeroteca Nacional 
                    Biblioteca Nacional 
 
BTTSCT Biblioteca Telecomunicaciones y Telegrafía de la Secretaría de 
 Comunicaciones y  Transportes 
    Manuscritos 
    Revistas 
    Memorias por el Secretario de Comunicaciones y Obras   
                          Públicas 
 
CEHM Centro de Estudios de Historia de México, CARSO 
    Fondo Manuscritos del Primer Jefe del Ejército    
      Constitucionalista, 1889-1920 
    Fondo Recortes de Periódico Oficialía Mayor de    
      Hacienda 
 
FAPECFT  Fideicomiso Archivos Plutarco Elías Calles y Fernando Torreblanca 
320 
 
   Archivo Plutarco Elías Calles 
   Fondo Plutarco Elías Calles 
   Fondo Elías Calles 
  Fondo Presidentes 
  Archivo Fernando Torreblanco 
   Fondo Espías 
    Fondo Fernando Torreblanco 
    Archivo Joaquín Amara Camaro 
  
NLBL  Nettie Lee Benson Library, University of Texas at Austin 
              Mexican Revolution Newspaper Collection 
              
UI  Universidad Iberoamericana, Acervos Históricos 
               Colección Porfirio Díaz 
 
USNA  U.S. National Archives 
   Record Group 59 
 
WHS              Wisconsin Historical Society 
   National Broadcasting Company Records 
    
 
 
Newspapers, Magazines, and Periodicals 
Anales de la Asociación de Ingenieros, 1902-1905 
Anales de Instituto Médico Nacional, 1894 
Beira Post, (Beira, Mozambique), 1899 
Boletín Informativo, S.C.O.P, 1957 
Chicago Daily Tribune, 1936 
Christian Advocate, 1899 
Diario de Campeche, 1926 
Diario Oficial, 1909-1911 
Elektron, 1911 
El Demócrata, 1924 
El Diario, 1907-1912 
El Economista, 1916-1917, 1931 
El Economista Mexicano, 1908-1909 
El Gráfico, 1930-1931 
El Heraldo de México, 1919-1920 
El Imparcial, 1909-1911 
El Informador (Jalapa), 1929 
El Mundo, 1899-1906, 1923-1924 
El Nacional, 1929-1940 
El Progreso de México, 1899-1910 
El Pueblo, 1917 
321 
 
El Renovador, 1915 
El Universal, 1923-1940 
El Universal Gráfico, 1923-1924, 1930 
El Universal Ilustrado, 1923-1924 
El Telegrafista, 1953-1955 
Excélsior, 1921-1940 
Friends’ Intelligencer, 1899 
Industria é Invenciones (Barcelona), 1904 
La Convención, 1914-1915 
La Gaceta (San José, Costa Rica), 1923 
La Prensa, 1930 
La Revista de Yucatán, 1923-1924 
La República, 1917 
La Voz de Tijuana, 1925 
Los Angeles Times, 1898-1945 
Mexican Folkways, 1928-1934 
Mexican Herald, 1899-1900 
McClure’s Magazine, 1899 
National Public Radio, 2012 
New York Times, 1897-1941, 2011  
Proceso, 2012 
Radio Broadcast, 1922-1930 
Relatos e historias de México, 2011 
Revista de los Telégrafos Nacionales, 1921-1922 
Revista Mexicana de Ingeniería y Arquitectura, 1923 
Salt Lake Telegram, 1922 
Telephony, 1908 
The Chautauguan, 1899 
The Guardian, 2012 
The Living Age, 1898-1941 
The Mafeking Mail, (Mafeking, South Africa), 1899-1901 
The Nation, 1921 
The New American Review, 1899 
The Oklahoman, 1914-1940 
The Pioneer (Allahabad, India), 1897-1899 
The Rhodesia Herald, 1900-1901 
The Sierra Leone Weekly News (Freetown, Sierra Leon), 1902 
The Times of Swaziland (Bremersdorp, Swaziland), 1899 
The Tribune (Lahore, Pakistan), 1899 
Wall Street Journal, 1922 
Washington Post, 1927-1933 
Zion’s Herald, 1897-1899 
 
 
322 
 
Government Publications 
Comisión Inter-Americana de comunicaciones eléctricas: convención, resoluciones y 
actas.  Mexico City: Gobierno de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos, 1926. 
 
“Continuaciones de ‘el estudio’.” numero 1, Anales de Instituto Médico Nacional. 
Mexico City: Oficina Tipográfica de la Secretaría de Fomento, 1894. 
 
Gastélum, Bernardo J. Palabras del Dr. Bernardo J. Gastélum en la inauguración de la 
estación de radio de la secretaria de educación publica C. Y. E., instalada en 
esa dependencia del ejecutivo por acuerdo del C. Secretario de Educación Dr. 
Bernardo J. Gastélum, siendo Presidente de la Republica el C. Gral. Alvaro 
Obregón México, 30 de noviembre de 1924.  Mexico City: Editorial “cultura,” 
1924. 
 
“General Postal Union; October 9, 1874,” The Avalon Project: Documents in Law, 
History and Diplomacy, Yale Law School, Lillian Goldman Law Library, 
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/19th_century/usmu010.asp, accessed 22 Nov. 2010.  
 
International Radiotelegraph Conference of Washington, 1927.  Washington, DC: 
Government Printing Office, 1928. 
 
International Radiotelegraph Convention of Washington, 1927.  London: His Majesty’s 
Stationary Office, 1928. 
 
International Radio Telegraph Convention. Hearing before the Committee of Foreign 
Relations. U.S. Senate, 17th Congress, 1st session.  Washington, DC: 
Government Printing Press, 1928. 
 
Inter-American Committee on Electrical Communications: City of Mexico May 27-July 
22, 1924.  Mexico City: Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores, 1926. 
 
International Radio Telegraph Convention of Berlin: 1906.  Washington, DC: 
Government Printing Press, 1912. 
 
Joliffe, C. B. “Statement of C. B. Joliffe, Chief Engineer Federal Radio Commission,” 
U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Merchant Marine, Radio, and Fisheries, 
Remote Control Border Stations—H.R. 7800, 73rd Congress, 2nd Session, 
Washington, DC, February 15, 1934. 
 
La educación pública en México: A través de los mensajes presidenciales desde la 
consumación de la independencia hasta nuestros días.  Mexico City: 
Publicaciones de la Secretaría de Educación, 1926. 
 
Memoria por el Secretario de Estado y del Despacho de Comunicaciones y Obras 
Públicas.  Mexico City, 1898-1934. 
323 
 
 
Official List of Radiotelegraph Stations Open for International Traffic, 2nd edition. 
Berne: International Telegraph Bureau, 1911. 
 
Papers relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States with the Annual Message 
of the President, Transmitted to Congress, December 3, 1906, part 2. 
Washington, DC: Government Printing Press, 1909. 
 
Scott, James Brown, editor. The International Conferences of American States, 1898-
1928.  New York: Oxford University Press, 1931. 
 
Secretaría de Comunicaciones y Obras Públicas. Ley de Comunicaciones Eléctricas. 
Mexico City: Talleres Gráficos de la Nación, 1926. 
 
Secretaría de Educación Pública. La educación pública en México: A través d los 
mensajes presidenciales desde la consumación de la independencia hasta 
nuestros días.  Mexico City: Publicaciones d la Secretaría de Educación, 1926. 
 
Secretaría de Educación Pública.  Las misiones culturales en 1927: Las escuelas 
normales rurales.  Mexico City: Publicaciones de la Secretaría de Educación 
Pública, 1928. 
 
Secretaría de Fomento Colonización e Industria, Censo de 1900.  Mexico City: Oficina 
Tipografía de la Secretaría de Fomento, 1901. 
 
The Mexican Constitution of 1917 Compared with the Constitution of 1857.  Translated 
and arranged by H. N. Branch.  Philadelphia: The Annals of the American 
Academy if Political and Social Science, 1917. 
 
U.S. Army.  Regulations Governing Commercial Radio Service between Ship and Shore 
Stations.  Washington, DC: Government Printing Press, 1914. 
 
U.S. Congress. House.  Letter from Acting Secretary of War Henry Breckinridge to the 
U.S. Secretary of State, 6786 H.doc.1721/2.  Reproduced for the 63rd Congress, 
3rd Session, Washington, DC, August 26, 1913. 
 
U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Interstate Commerce United States Senate. 
Commission on Communications. 71st Congress, 1st Session. Volume 1 May 8, 
1929 to June 7, 1929.  Washington, DC : Government Printing Press, 1930.  
 
U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Merchant Marine, Radio, and Fisheries. Remote 
Control Border Stations—H.R. 7800. 73rd Congress, 2nd Session. February 15, 
1934.  Washington, DC : Government Printing Press, 1934. 
 
 
324 
 
U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Merchant Marine, Radio, and Fisheries. 
Regulation Of American Broadcasting Companies Operating Across The 
International Border.  73rd Congress, 2nd Session.  March 22, 1934.  
Washington, DC: Government Printing Press, 1934. 
 
Wireless Stations of the World: Including Shore Stations, Merchant Vessels, Revenue 
Cutters, and Vessels of the United States Navy.  Washington, DC: Government 
Printing Office, 1 October 1910), http://earlyradiohistory.us/1910stat.htm, 
accessed 11 March 2010. 
 
Wilson, Woodrow.  “Wilson’s Special Message on the Tampico Affair, 10 April 1914, 
Washington, DC, in The Messages and Papers of Woodrow Wilson.  New York: 
The Review of Reviews Corporations, 1924. 
 
 
Books, Articles, and Pamphlets  
 
Banti, Angelo.  Il telefono senza fili sistema Marconi.  Roma: Gli Editori 
Dell’Elettricistta, 1897. 
 
Booth, George C.  Mexico’s School-Made Society.  Stanford: Stanford University Press, 
1941. 
 
Bravo Izquierdo, Donato.  Un soldado del pueblo.  Mexico City: publisher not stated, 
1964. 
 
Brown, Clinton Giddings.  You May Take The Stand.  Austin: University of Texas 
Press, 1955. 
 
Collins, A. Frederick.  “The Slaby-Arco Portable Field Equipment for Wireless 
Telegraphy.”  Scientific American, 85, no. 26 (December 28, 1901): 425-426. 
 
Crookes, William.  “Address of the President before the British Association for the 
Advancement of Science, Bristol, 1898.”  Science, New Series 8, no. 201 
(November 4, 1898): 561-575.  
 
Daniels, Josephus.  Shirt Sleeve Diplomat.  Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina 
Press, 1947. 
 
De Fornaro, Carlo, with chapters by Colonel I. C. Enriquiz, Charles Ferguson, and 
Modesto C. Rolland. Carranza and Mexico.  New York: Mitchell Kennerley, 
1915. 
 
Elías Calles, Plutarco.  Pensamiento político y social: Antología (1913-1936).  Mexico 
City: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1988.  
 
325 
 
Fernández Ramírez, J. and José de la Herrán. “Radio: Nuestra experiencia en radio.” 
Revista Mexicana de Ingeniería y Arquitectura 1, nos.7-10 (September-
December, 1923): 430-435,  527-534, 599-605, 672-681. 
 
Flores Magón, Ricardo.  Dreams of Freedom: A Ricardo Flores Magón Reader. Editors 
Chaz Bufe and Mitchell Cowen Verter. Edinburgh: AK Press, 2005. 
 
Flower, Sydney B., ed.  The Goat-Gland Transplantation: As Originated and 
Successfully Performed by J. R. Brinkley, M.D., of Milford, Kansas U. S. A., in 
Over 600 Operations Upon Men and Women.  Chicago: New Thought Book 
Department, 1921. 
 
Glazebrook, Richard.  “The Origins of Wireless.” The Scientific Monthly 20, no. 3 
(March 1925): 291-296. 
 
González, Manuel W. Contra Villa.  Mexico City: Editorial Botas, 1935. 
 
Harbord, James G. “America’s Position in Radio Communications.”  Foreign Affairs 4, 
no. 3 (April 1926): 465-474. 
 
King, Clyde L., editor.  “Legislative Notes and Reviews.” The American Political 
Science Review 24, no.3 (August 1930): 659-665. 
 
Maples Arce, Manuel, et al.  El Estridentismo antología.  Mexico City: Difusión 
Cultural/Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, 1983. 
 
Maples Arce, Manuel.  Las semillas del tiempo: Obra poética, 1919-1980. Mexico City: 
Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1981. 
 
Matute, Álvaro, editor.  Contraespionaje político y sucesión presidencial: 
Correspondencias de Trinidad W. Flores sobre la primera campaña electoral de 
Álvaro Obregón, 1919-1920.  Mexico City: Universidad Nacional Autónoma de 
México, 1985. 
 
Mazzotto, Domencio. Wireless Telegraphy and Telephony.  Translated by Selimo 
Romeo Bottone.  London: Whittaker & Co., 1906. 
 
Novo, Salvador.  La vida en México en el período presidencial de Lázaro Cárdenas. 
Mexico City: Consejo Nacional para la Cultura y las Artes, 1994.  
 
Obregón, Álvaro. Ocho mil kilómetros en campaña.  Mexico City: Fondo de Cultura 
Económica, 1959. 
 
Reitz, Deneys. Commando: A Boer Journal of the Boer War.  South Africa: CruGuru, 
2008 
 
326 
 
Rodríguez, Arnulfo. “Y llegó la comunicación sin cables: La primera transmission de 
radiotelefonía en México.” Relatos e Historias México 35 (July 2011): 80-83. 
 
Rolland, Modesto C.  Informe sobre el Distrito Norte de la Baja California de la Baja 
California.  Mexicali: Universidad Autónoma de Baja California, 1993. 
 
Sánchez, George I.  Mexico: A Revolution by Education.  New York: The Viking Press, 
1936. 
 
Sarton, George and John Christian Oersted. “The Foundation of Electromagnetism.” 
Isis 10, no. 2 (June, 1928): 435-444. 
 
Shoup, G. Stanley. “The Control of International Radio Communications.” Annals of 
the American Academy of Political and Social Science 142 supplement: Radio 
(March1929): 95-104. 
 
Stewart, Irwin. “Recent Radio Legislation.” The American Political Science Review 23, 
no.2 (May 1929): 412-426. 
 
Terman, Frederick Emmons.  Fundamentals of Radio.  New York and London: 
McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1938.  
 
Terrazas, Silvestre.  El verdadero Panco Villa.  Mexico City: Ediciones Era, 1985. 
 
The Brinkley Hospital for the Treatment of Rectal and Colonic Disorders, Varicose 
Veins and Ulcers, Hernia or Rupture.  Little Rock: The Brinkley Hospitals, 
1939. 
 
Waterbury, John I. “The International Preliminary Conference to Formulate Regulation 
Governing Wireless Telegraphy.” The North American Review 177, no. 564 
(November 1903): 655-656. 
 
Whittemore, Laurens E.  “The Development of Radio.” Annals of the American 
Academy of Political and Social Science, vol. 142, Supplement: Radio (March 
1929): 1-7. 
 
 
   Secondary Sources 
 
Adas, Michael.  Machines as the Measure of Men: Science, Technology, and Ideology 
of Western Dominance.  Ithica: Cornell University Press, 1989.  
 
Aceves González, Francisco de Jesús, Pablo Arredondo, and Carlós Luna, 
compiladores.  Radiodifusión regional en México: Historias, programas, 
audiencias.  Guadalajara: Universidad de Guadalajara, 1989. 
 
327 
 
Agostoni, Claudia.  Monuments of Progress: Modernization and Public Health in 
Mexico City, 1876-1910.  Calgary: University of Calgary Press, 2003. 
 
Ahvenainen, Jorma.  The History of the Caribbean Telegraphs before the First World 
War.  Helsinki: The Finnish Academy of Science and Letters, 1996. 
 
Ahvenainen, Jorma.  The European Cable Companies in South America before the First 
World War.  Helsinki: The Finnish Academy of Science and Letters, 2004. 
 
Aitken, Hugh G. J. Syntony and Spark: The Origin of Radio, 2nd edition.  Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1985. 
 
Albarrán, Elena Jackson.  “Children of the Revolution: Constructing the Mexican 
Citizen, 1920-1940.”  PhD dissertation, University of Arizona, Tucson, Arizona, 
2008.  
 
Albarrán, Elena Jackson.  Children of the Revolution, forthcoming on University of 
Nebraska Press.  
 
Albert, Pierre and André-Jean Tudesq.  Historia de la radio y la televisión. Mexico 
City: Fondo de Cultura Económico, 1982. 
 
Alisky, Marvin. “Early Mexican Broadcasting.” The Hispanic American Historical 
Review 34, no. 4 (November 1954): 513-526. 
 
Alisky, Marvin. “Educational Aspects of Broadcasting in Mexico.” PhD dissertation, 
University of Texas, Austin, Texas, 1953. 
 
Alisky, Marvin.  “Mexico’s Rural Radio.” The Quarterly of Film Radio and Television 
8, no. 4 (Summer 1954): 405-417. 
 
Alva de la Selva, Alma Rosa.  Radio e ideología, segunda edición.  Mexico City: 
Ediciones El Caballito, 1982. 
 
Alvarado Mendoza, Arturo.  El Portesgilismo en Tamaulipas: Estudio sobre la 
constitución de la autoridad pública en el Mexico posrevolucionario.  Mexico 
City: Colegio de México, 1992. 
 
Anda Gutiérrez, Cuauhtémoc.  Importancia de la radiodifusión en México.  Mexico 
City: Luis Cabrera, 2004. 
 
Anderson, Benedict.  Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of 
Nationalism.  London: Verso, 1983.  
 
Ankerson, Dudley.  Agrarian Warlord: Saturnino Cedillo and the Mexican Revolution 
in San Luis Potosí.  DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 1984. 
328 
 
 
Anduga, Aitor. Wireless & Empire: Geopolitics, Radio Industry & Ionosphere in the 
British Empire, 1918-1939.  Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009. 
 
Antonio de Noriega, Luis and Frances Leach. Broadcasting in Mexico.  London: 
Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1979.  
 
Archer, Gleason. The History of the Radio to 1926.  New York: American Historical 
Society, 1938. 
 
Baker, W. J. History of the Marconi Company.  New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1970. 
 
Balk, Alfred. The Rise of Radio: From Marconi through the Golden Age.  Jefferson, 
NC: McFarland & Co., 2006. 
 
Bantjes, Adrian A.  As if Jesus Walked on Earth: Cardenismo, Sonora, and the Mexican 
 Revolution.  Lanham, MD: SR Books. 
 
Barbero, Raúl E.  De la galena al satélite: Crónica de 70 años de radio el Uruguay, 
1922-1992.  Uruguay: Ediciones de la Pluma, 1995. 
 
Barbour, Philip.  “Commercial and Cultural Broadcasting in Mexico.” Annals of the 
American Academy of Political and Social Science 208, Mexico Today 
(March1940): 94-102. 
 
Barragán Rodríguez, Juan.  Historia del ejército y la revolución constitucionalista, 
volume 2.  Mexico City: Talleres de la Editorial Stylo, 1946. 
 
Barty-King, Hugh. Girdle Round the Earth.  London: Heinman, 1979. 
 
Beezley, William.  Judas at the Jockey Club, 2nd edition.  Lincoln: University of 
Nebraska Press, 2001. 
 
Benbow, Mark.  Leading Them to the Promised Land: Woodrow Wilson, Covenant 
Theology, and the Mexican Revolution, 1913-1915.  Kent, OH: Kent University 
Press, 2010. 
 
Benjamin, Thomas.  La Revolución: Mexico’s Great Revolution as Memory, Myth, and 
History.  Austin: University of Texas Press, 2000. 
 
Betancourt, Enrique C.  Apuntes para la historia: Radio, televisión y farándula de la 
Cuba de ayer . . . . San Juan, Puerto Rico: Ramallo Bros., 1966. 
 
Britton, John A. and Jorma Ahvenainen. “Showdown in South America: James 
Scrymser, John Pender, and United States-British Cable Competition.” Business 
History Review 78 (Spring 2004): 1-27. 
329 
 
Britton, John A. “‘The Confusion Provoked by Instantaneous Discussion’: The New 
International Communications Network and the Chilean Crisis of 1891-1892 in 
the United States.” Technology and Culture: The International Quarterly of the 
Society for the History of Technology  48 (October 2007): 729-757. 
 
Brock, Pope.  Charlatan: America’s Most Dangerous Huckster, the Man Who Pursued 
Him, and the Age of Flimflam.  New York: Crown Publishers, 2008. 
 
Brown, F. J. The Cable and Wireless Communications of the World.  London: Sir Isaac 
Pittman & Sons, 1927. 
 
Brunk, Samuel. ¡Emiliano Zapata! Revolution and Betrayal in Mexico.  Albuquerque: 
University of New Mexico Press, 1995. 
 
Buchenau, Jürgen.  In the Shadow of the Giant: The Making of Mexico’s Central 
American Policy, 1876-1930.  Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 1996. 
 
Buchenau, Jürgen.  Plutarco Elías Calles and the Mexican Revolution.  Lanham, MD: 
Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2006. 
 
Buchenau, Jürgen.  The Last Caudillo: Alvaro Obregón and the Mexican Revolution. 
Chichester, West Sussex: Wilely-Blackwell, 2011. 
 
Bulmer-Thomas, Victor. The Economic History of Latin America since Independence. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994. 
 
Burns, Russell. Communications: An International History of the Formative Years. 
London: Institution of Electrical Engineers, 2004. 
 
Cámara Nacional de la Industria de la Radio y Televisión.  Cápsulas culturales: 
Espacios abiertos en radio y televisión a las raíces de México.  Mexico City: 
Cámara Nacional de la Industria de la Radio y Televisión, 1985. 
 
Campbell, Timothy C. Wireless Writing in the Age of Marconi.  Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 2006. 
 
Cantril, Hadley and Gordon W. Allport.  The Psychology of Radio.  New York: Harper 
& Brothers Publishers, 1971.  
 
Cárdenas de la Pena, Enrique.  El telégrafo.  Mexico City: Secretaría de 
Comunicaciones y Transportes, 1987. 
 
Cárdenas de la Pena, Enrique. Semblanza marítima del México independiente y 
revolucionario, volume 2.  Mexico City: Secretaria de Marina, 1970. 
 
330 
 
Carriloo, Ana María. “¿Estado de pete o estado de sitio?: Sinaloa y Baja California, 
1902-1903.  Historia Mexicana 54, no.4 (April-June 2005):1049-1103. 
 
Carrillo Olano, Alejandra. “Radio Altiplano del estado Tlaxcala: Entre el modelo 
comercial y la radio pública,” tesis profesional, Universidad de las Américas 
Puebla, 2007.  Online, 
http://catarina.udlap.mx/u_dl_a/tales/documentos/lco/carrillo_o_a/index.html, 
accessed 16 February. 2011. 
 
Carson, Gerald. The Roguish World of Doctor Brinkley.  New York: Holt, Rinehart and 
Winston, 1960. 
 
Castro Martínez, Pedro.  Adolfo de la Huerta y la Revolución Mexicana.  Mexico City: 
INEHRM/UAM, 1990. 
 
Castro Martínez, Pedro.  Álvaro Obregón: Fuego y cenizas de la Revolución Mexicana. 
Mexico City: Ediciones Era, 2009. 
 
Chávez Ortiz, Ivonne Grethel. “La radio educativa en el México revolucionario.”  Tesis 
de licenciatura. Universidad Autónoma Metropolitana, Iztapalapa, DF, 2001. 
 
Chomsky, Noam.  Necessary Illusions: Thought Control in Democratic Societies 
Boston: South End Press, 1989. 
 
Chomsky, Noam and David Barsamian.  Propaganda and the Public Mind: 
Conversations with Noam Chomsky.  Cambridge, MA: South End Press, 2001. 
 
Claxton, Robert Howard. From Parsifal to Perón: Early Radio in Argentina, 1920-
1944.  Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2007. 
 
Clegern, Wayne M. “British Honduras and the Pacification of Yucatan.” The Americas 
18, no.3 (January, 1962): 243-254. 
 
Coatsworth, John H. and Alan M. Taylor, editors. Latin America and the World 
Economy Since 1800. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1998. 
 
Coe, Lewis. Wireless Radio: A Brief History. Jefferson, NC and London: McFarland & 
Company, 1996. 
 
Coerver, Don M., Suzanne B. Pasztor, and Robert M. Buffington.  Mexico: 
Encyclopedia of Contemporary Culture and History.  Santa Barbara: ABC-
CLIO, 2004. 
 
Connolly, Priscilla.  El contratista de don Porfirio: Obras públicas, deuda y desarrollo 
desigual.  Mexico City: Colegio de Michoacán, UAMA, Fondo de Cultura 
Económica, 1997. 
331 
 
Contreras, Mario and Jesús Tamayo, Coordinadores.  México en siglo XX. 1900-1913: 
Textos y Documentos, 2 volumes.  Mexico City: Universidad Nacional 
Autónoma de México, 1983. 
 
Coronado, Jorge.  The Andes Imagined: Indigenismo, Society, and Modernity. 
Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2009. 
 
Coronado Ponce, Alán René. “La radiodifusión familiar en México y su inserción en la 
dinámica de concentración de medios: un estudio de caso de Guadalajara.”  
Tesis de maestría. Universidad de Guadalajara. Guadalajara, México, 2004. 
 
Cortés, Eladio.  Dictionary of Mexican Literature.  Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 
1992. 
 
Cue Canovas, Agustín.  Ricardo Flores Magón: La Baja California y Los Estados 
Unidos.  Mexico City: Libro Mex, 1957. 
 
Curiel, Fernando. ¡dispara margot, dispara! Un reportaje justiciero de la radio difusión 
mexicana.  Mexico City: Premia Editora, 1987. 
 
Curiel, Fernando.  La telaraña magnética y otros estudios radiofónicos.  Mexico City: 
Ediciones Coyoacán, 1997. 
 
D’Agostino, Salvo.  “Hertz’s Researches on Electromagnetic Waves.” Historical 
Studies in the Physical Sciences 6 (1975): 261-323.   
 
De Andrade Martins, Roberto.  “Resistance to the Discovery of Electromagnetism: 
Ørsted and the Symmetry of the Magnetic Field:” 165-85. 
ppp.unipv.it/Collana/Pages/Libri/Saggi/.../V%26H%20245-265.pdf, accessed 21 
January 2012. 
 
De Armas Chitty, J. A.  Historia de la radiodifusión en Venezuela.  Caracas: Edición de 
la Cámara Venezolana de la Industria de la Radiodifusión, 1975. 
 
De Dios Bonilla, Juan.  Apuntes para la historia de la marina nacional.  Mexico City: 
publisher not stated, 1946. 
 
De los Reyes, Aurelio, editor.  Historia de la vida cotidiana e México, volume 5, Siglo 
XX. Campo y ciudad.  Mexico City: Colegio de México and Fondo de Cultura 
Económica, 2006. 
 
De los Reyes, Aurelio.  Medio siglo de cine mexicano (1896-1947).  Mexico City: 
Editorial Trillas, 1987. 
 
332 
 
Delgadillo García, Octavio. “Radio Broadcasting and Popular Culture: Forming the 
Nation in Oaxaca, Mexico, 1920-1940.” Masters thesis, San Diego State 
University, San Diego, California, 2007. 
 
Delpar, Helen. “Mexican Culture, 1920-1945,” in The Oxford History of Mexico, edited 
by Michael C. Meyer and William H. Beezley. Oxford and New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2000, 543-572. 
 
Diacon, Todd A. Stringing Together a Nation: Cândido Mariano de Silva Rondon and 
the Construction of a Modern Brazil, 1906-1930.  Durham: Duke University 
Press, 2004. 
 
Douglas, Susan J.  Inventing American Broadcasting, 1899-1922.  Baltimore: The John 
Hopkins University Press, 1987. 
 
Dowsett, H. M.  Wireless Telephony and Broadcasting.  London: Gresham Publishing 
Co., 1924. 
 
Dulles, John W. F. Yesterday in Mexico: A Chronicle of the Revolution, 1919-1936. 
Austin: University of Texas, 1961. 
 
Eccles, W. H. Wireless. London: Thornton Butterworth Limited, 1933. 
 
Eisenhower, John S. D.  Intervention! The United States and the Mexican Revolution, 
1913-1917.  New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1995. 
 
England, Shawn Louis. “The Curse of Huitzilopochtli: Origins, Process, and Legacy of 
Mexico’s Military Reforms, 1920-1946.”  PhD dissertation, December 2008, 
Arizona State University, Tempe, Arizona. 
 
Esparza, Rafael R.  La aviación.  Mexico City: Secretaría de Comunicaciones y 
Transportes, 1987. 
 
Fallaw, Ben and Terry Rugeley, editors.  Forced Marches: Soldiers and Military 
Caciques in Modern Mexico.  Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 2012.  
 
Felicitas Arias, Elisa. “The Metrology of Time.” Philosophical Transactions: 
Mathematical, Physical, and Engineering Sciences 363, no.1834 (Sept. 15, 
2005): 2290-2291. 
 
Fell, Claude.  José Vasconcelos: Los años del águila.  Mexico City: Universidad 
Nacional Autónoma de México, 1989. 
 
Fernández Christlieb, Fátima.  La radio mexicana: Centro y regiones.  Mexicali: Juan 
Pablos, 1991. 
 
333 
 
Fernández Christlieb, Fátima. Los medios de difusión masiva en México.  Mexico City: 
Juan Pablos, 1982. 
 
Figueroa Bermúdez, Romeo. ¡Qué onda con la radio!  Mexico City: Pearson 
Educación, 1997. 
 
Filine, Benjamin.  Romancing the Folk: Public Memory and American Roots Music. 
Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2000. 
 
Finn, Bernard and Daqing Yang, editors.  Communications under the Seas. Cambridge, 
MA: MIT Press, 2009. 
 
Fowler, Gene and Bill Crawford.  Border Radio: Quacks, Yodelers, Pitchmen, Psychics, 
And Other Amazing Broadcasters of the American Airwaves. Austin: University 
of Texas Press, 2002. 
 
Fox, Elizabeth.  Latin American Broadcasting: From Tango to Telenovela.  Lutin, 
England: Lutin University Press, 1997. 
 
Frank, Patrick. Posada’s Broadsheets: Mexican Popular Imagery, 1890-1910. 
Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1998. 
 
Fuentes, Gloria.  Radiodifusión.  Mexico City: Secretaría de Comunicaciones y 
Transportes, 1988. 
 
Fuentes Díaz, Vicente.  Historia de la Revolución en el Estado de Guerrero.  Mexico 
City: Instituto Nacional de Estudios Históricos de la Revolución Mexicana, 
1983. 
 
Gallo, Rubén.  Mexican Modernity: The Avant-Garde and the Technological 
Revolution. Cambridge: MIT Press, 2005. 
 
Gálvez Cancino, Felipe. “Los felices del alba.” Tesis de licenciatura, Universidad 
Nacional Autónoma de México, Mexico City, 1975. 
 
Gargurevich, Juan.  La Peruvian Broadcasting Co.: Historia de la radio.  Lima: La Voz 
Ediciones, 1995.  
 
Garner, Paul. Porfirio Díaz. Edinburgh: Longman, 2001. 
 
Gilly, Adolfo. The Mexican Revolution. Translated by Patrick Camiller. New York: The 
New Press, 2005. 
 
Gómez Chacó, Gaspar, editor. La Revolución en Yucatán: Nuevos ensayos. Mérida: 
Secretaria de Educación, CESPA Editorial, 2012. 
 
334 
 
Gómez Vargas, Héctor. Memorias suspendidas: Orígenes de la radio en León.  León: 
Consejo para la Cultura de León y Universidad Iberoamericana, León, 1998. 
 
Gonzales, Michael J.  The Mexican Revolution, 1910-1940.  Albuquerque: University of 
New Mexico Press, 2002. 
 
González Cruz, Edith.  La compañía El Boleo: Su impacto e la municipalidad de 
Mulegé, 1885-1918.  La Paz: Universidad Autónoma de Baja California Sur, 
2000. 
 
Granados, Pával. XEW: 70 años en el aire.  Mexico City: Editorial Clio, 2000. 
 
Haber, Stephen. Industry and Underdevelopment: The Industrialization of Mexico, 
1900-1940.  Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1989.  
 
Haber, Stephen, Armando Razo, and Noel Maurer. The Politics of Property Rights: 
Political Instability, Credible Commitments, and Economic Growth, 1876-1929 
Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press, 2003. 
 
Hagedom, Dan. Conquistadors of the Sky: A History of Aviation in Latin America. 
Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2008. 
 
Halperín Donghi, Tulio.  The Contemporary History of Latin America. Edited and 
translated by John Charles Chasteen.  Durham: Duke University Press, 1993. 
 
Hamnett, Brian.  A Concise History of México, 2nd edition.  Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2006. 
 
Hart, John M.  Empire and Revolution: The Americans in Mexico since the Civil War. 
Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002. 
 
Hart, Paul.  Bitter Fruit: The Social Transformation of Morelos, Mexico, and the 
Origins of the Zapatista Revolution, 1840-1910.  Albuquerque: University of 
New Mexico Press, 2005. 
 
Hayes, Joy.  Radio Nation: Communication, Popular Culture, and Nationalism in 
Mexico, 1920-1950.  Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 2000. 
 
Headrick, Daniel R.  The Tools of Empire: Technology and European Imperialism in 
the Nineteenth Century.  New York: Oxford University Press, 1981.  
 
Headrick, Daniel R.  The Tentacles of Progress: Technology Transfer in the Age of 
Imperialism, 1850-1914.  New York: Oxford University Press, 1988. 
 
Headrick, Daniel R.  The Invisible Weapon: Telecommunications and International 
Politics, 1851-1945.  New York: Oxford University Press, 1991. 
335 
 
 
Henderson, Peter.  In the Absence of Don Porfirio: Francisco León de la Barra and the 
Mexican Revolution.  Wilmington, DL: Scholarly Resources, 2000. 
 
Herman, Edward S. and Noam Chomsky.  Manufacturing Consent: The Political 
Economy of the Mass Media.  New York: Pantheon Books, 1988 
 
Hills, Jill.  The Struggle for Control of Global Communications: The Formative 
Century. Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2002. 
 
Hobsbawm, Eric.  Nations and Nationalism since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality, 
Canto ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991. 
 
Hochschild, Adam.  King Leopold’s Ghost: A Story of Greed, Terror, and Heroism in 
Colonial Africa.  New York: First Mariner Books, 1999.  
 
Hong, Sungook.  From Marconi’s Black-Box to the Audion.  Cambridge, MA: MIT 
Press, 2001. 
 
Hong, Sungook.  “Marconi and the Maxwellians: The Origins of Wireless Telegraphy 
Revisited.” Technology and Culture 35, no. 4 (October 1994): 717- 749. 
 
Howeth, Linwood S.  History of Communications-Electronics in the United States 
Navy.  Lansing: University of Michigan Library, 1963. 
 
Hugill, Peter. Global Communications since 1844: Geopolitics and Technology. 
Baltimore: Johns Hopkins, 1999. 
 
Hurtado, Albert L. “Empires, Frontiers, Filibusters, and Pioneers: The Transnational 
World of John Sutter.” Pacific Historical Review 77, no. 1 (February 2008): 19-
47. 
 
Huuderman, Anton A.  The Worldwide History of Telecommunications.  Hoboken, NJ: 
Wiley-Interscience, 2003. 
 
Innis, Harold.  Empire and Communications.  Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 
2007. 
 
Javier Mora, Francisco, editor.  El ruido de las nueces: List Arzubide y el estridentismo 
mexicano.  Salamanca: Universidad de Alicante, 1999. 
 
Joseph, Gilbert M. and Daniel Nugent, eds.  Everyday Forms of State Formation: 
Revolution and the Negotiation of Rules in Modern Mexico.  Durham: Duke 
University Press, 1994. 
 
336 
 
Joseph, Gilbert M.  Revolution from Without: Yucatán, Mexico, and the United States, 
1880-1924.  Durham: Duke University Press, 1988. 
 
Juhnke, Eric S.  Quacks and Crusaders: The Fabulous Careers of John Brinkley, 
Norman Baker, and Harry Hoxsey.  Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 
2002.  
 
Kahn, Ed.  “The Carter Family on Border Radio.” American Music 14, no. 2 (Summer 
1996): 205-217. 
 
Katz, Friedrich.  The Secret War in Mexico: Europe, The United States, and the 
Mexican Revolution.  Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984. 
 
Katz, Friedrich.  The Life & Times of Pancho Villa.  Stanford: Stanford University 
Press, 1998. 
 
Keegan, John.  Intelligence in War: Knowledge of the Enemy from Napoleon to Al-
Qaeda.  New York: Alfred K. Knopf, 2003. 
 
Kiddle, Amelia M. and María L. O. Muñoz, editors.  Populism in Twentieth Century 
Mexico: The Presidents of Lázaro Cárdenas and Luis Echeverría. Tucson: 
University of Arizona Press, 2010. 
 
King Cobos, Josefina.  Memorias de radio UNAM, 1937-2007.  Mexico City: 
Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, 2007. 
 
Knight, Alan. “Popular Culture and the Revolutionary State in Mexico, 1910-1940.” 
The Hispanic American Historical Review 74, no. 3 (August 1994): 393-444. 
 
Knight, Alan. “Populism and Neo-populism in Latin America, Especially Mexico.” 
Journal of Latin American Studies 30, no. 2 (May 1998): 223-248. 
 
Knight, Alan. The Mexican Revolution, 2 volumes.  Lincoln: University of Nebraska 
Press, 1986. 
 
Krysko, Michael A. American Radio in China: International Encounters with 
Technology and Communications, 1919-1941. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 
2011. 
 
Lawson, Chappell H.  Building the Fourth Estate: Democratization and the Rise of a 
Free Press in Mexico.  Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002. 
 
Leal, Luis. “Torres Bodet y los ‘Contemporáneos’.” Hispania 40, no. 3 (September 
1957): 290-296. 
 
337 
 
Lear, John.  Workers, Neighbors, and Citizens: The Revolution in Mexico City.  
Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2001. 
 
Lee, R. Alton.  The Bizarre Careers of John R. Brinkley.  Louisville: University of 
Kentucky Press, 2002. 
 
Lewis, Tom.  Empire of the Air: The Men Who Made Radio.  New York: Edward 
Burlingame Books, 1991. 
 
Lewis, Tom.  “‘A Godlike Presence’: The Impact of Radio on the 1920s and 1930s.” 
Magazine of History 6, no. 4 Communication in History: The Key to 
Understanding (Spring 1992): 26-33.  
 
Lewis, Peter and Corinne Pearlman.  Media & Power from Marconi to Murdoch: A 
Graphic Guide.  London: Camden Press, 1986.  
 
Leyva, Juan.  Política educativa y comunicación social: La radio en México, 1940-
1946.  Mexico City: Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, 1992. 
 
Lieuwen, Edwin.  Mexican Militarism: The Rise and Fall of the Revolutionary Army, 
1910-1940.  Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1968. 
 
Luz Ruelas, Ana.  México y Estados Unidos en la revolución mundial de las 
telecomunicaciones.  Mexico City: Universidad Autónoma de Sinaloa and 
Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, 1996. 
 
Macías Richard, Carlos.  Nueva Frontera mexicana: Milicia, burocracia y ocupación 
territorial en Quintana Roo.  Chetumal: Consejo Nacional de Ciencia y 
Tecnología y Universidad de Quintana Roo, 1997. 
 
Macías Richard, Carlos. “El territorio de Quintana Roo. Tentativas de colonización y 
control militar en la selva maya (1888-1902).” Historia Mexicana 49, no.1 
(July-September 1999): 5-54. 
 
MacLachlan, Colin M.  Anarchism and the Mexican Revolution: The Political Trials of 
Ricardo Flores Magón in the United States.  Berkeley: University of 
 California Press, 1991. 
 
Martínez Miranda, Elio Agustín and María de la Paz Ramos Lara. “Funciones de los 
ingenieros inspectores al comienzo de las obras del complejo hidroeléctrico de 
Necaxa.” Historia Mexicana 56, no. 1 (July-September 2006): 231-286. 
 
Matthews, Michael.  “De Viaje: Elite Views of Modernity and the Porfirian Railway 
Boom.” Mexican Studies/Estudios Mexicanos 26, no. 2 (Summer 2010): 251-
289. 
 
338 
 
McCann, Bryan. “Carlos Lacerda: The Rise and Fall of a Middle-Class Populist in 
1950s Brazil.” Hispanic American Historical Review 83, no. 4 (Winter 2003): 
661-96. 
 
McCann, Bryan.  Hello, Hello Brazil: Popular Music in the Making of Modern Brazil. 
Durham : Duke University Press, 2004. 
 
McCreery, David.  “Wireless Empire: The United States and Radio Communications in 
Central America and the Caribbean, 1904-1925.” South Eastern Latin 
Americanist 37 (Summer 1993): 23-41. 
 
Medin, Tzvi. El minimato presidencial: Historia política del Maximato, 1928-1935. 
Mexico City: Ediciones Era, 1982.  
 
Medina Ávila, Virginia and Gilberto Vargas Arana.  Nuestra es la voz, de todos la 
palabra: Historia de la radiodifusión mexicana, 1921-2010.  Mexico City: 
DGAPA/FES Acatlán, Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, 2011. 
 
Mejía Barquera, Fernando.  “Historia mínima de la radio mexicana (1920-1996).” 
Revista de Comunicación y Cultura 1, no. 1 (marzo-mayo 2007), 
http://web.upaep.mx/revistaeyc/radiomexicana.pdf, accessed February 17, 2010. 
 
Mejía Barquera, Fernando.  La industria de la radio y televisión y la política del estado 
mexicano (1920-1960).  Mexico City: Fundación Manuel Buendía, 1989. 
 
Mejía Prieto, Jorge. Historia de la radio y la t. v. en Mexico.  Mexico City: Editores 
Asociados, 1972. 
 
Merchán Escalante, Carlos A. Telecomunicaciones.  Mexico City: Secretaría de 
Comunicaciones y Transportes, 1988. 
 
Meyer, Michael C. and William H. Beezley, editors.  The Oxford History of Mexico. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000. 
 
Meyer, Lorenzo.  México y los Estados Unidos en el conflicto petróleo, 1917-1942. 
Mexico City: Colegio de México, 1972.  
 
Meyer, Lorenzo. "Un tema añejo siempre actual: El centro y las regiones en la historia 
mexicana."  In  Descentralización y democracia en México.  Edited by Blanca 
Torres.  Mexico City: Colegio de México, 1986. 
 
Miller, Tom. On The Border.  New York: Harper & Row, 1981. 
 
Miñano Garcia, Max. H.  La educación rural en México.  Mexico City: Ediciones de la 
 Secretaría de Educación Pública, 1945. 
 
339 
 
Miquel, Ángel.  Disolvencias: Literatura, cine y radio en México (1900-1950).  Mexico 
City: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 2005. 
 
Mora-Torres, Juan.  The Making of the Mexican Border: The State, Capitalism, and 
Society in Nuevo León, 1848-1910.  Austin: University of Texas Press, 2001. 
 
Moreno, Julio.  Yankee Don’t Go Home!: Mexican Nationalism, American Business 
Culture, and the Shaping of Modern Mexico, 1920-1950.  Chapel Hill: 
University of North Carolina Press, 2003.  
 
Moreno Rivas, Yolanda.  Rostros del nacionalismo en la música Mexicana: Un ensayo 
interpretación.  Mexico City: Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México 
Escuela Nacional de Música, 1993. 
 
Mota Martínez, Fernando and María Esther Núñez Herrera.  Locutores en acción: Vida 
y hazañas de quienes hicieron la radio Mexicana.  Mexico City: Times Editores, 
1998. 
 
Navarro, Aaron W.  Political Intelligence and the Creation of Modern Mexico, 1938-
1954.  University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2010.  
 
Nemerov, Howard.  Figures of Thought: Speculations on the Meaning of Poetry & 
Other Essays. Boston: David R. Godine, 1978. 
 
Niblo, Stephen R. War, Diplomacy, and Development: The United States and Mexico, 
1938-1954. Wilmington, DE: SR Books, 1995. 
 
Nickles, David Paull.  Under the Wire: How the Telegraph Changed Diplomacy. 
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2003. 
 
Norris, Renfro Cole. “A History of La Hora Nacional: Government Broadcasting Via 
Privately Owned Radio Stations in México.” PhD dissertation. University of 
Michigan, Ann Arbor, Michigan, 1963. 
 
Novelo, Victoriano.  Yucatecos en Cuba: Etnografía de una migración. Mexico City 
and Mérida: Publicaciones de la Casa Chata, 2009. 
 
Noyola, Leopoldo.  La raza de la herba: Historia de telégrafos Morse en México, 2nd 
edición.  Puebla: Benemérita Universidad Autónoma de Puebla, 2004. 
 
Ornelas Herrera, Roberto.  “Radio y contidianidad en México (1900-1930),” in Historia 
de la vida cotidiana en México, tomo V, vol. 1, Siglo XX, Campo y ciudad. 
Edited by Aurelio de los Reyes.  Mexico City: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 
2006, 127-169. 
 
340 
 
Ornelas Herrera, Roberto.  “La Radiodifusión mexicana a principios del siglo XX (Las 
comunicaciones inalámbricas en México 1900-1924),” tesis de licenciatura, 
Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, Mexico City, 1998. 
 
Ortiz García, José Luis.  La guerra de las ondas: Un libro que desmiente la historia 
“oficial” de la radio mexicana.  Mexico City: Planeta Mexicana, 1992. 
 
Ortiz Garza, José Luis.  Radio entre dos reinos: la increíble historia de la radiodifusora 
mexicana más potente del mundo en los años 30.  Mexico City: Vergara, 1997. 
 
Pakenham, Thomas.  The Boer War.  London: Abascus, 1997. 
 
Paz Salinas, María Emilia.  Strategy, Security, and Spies: Mexico and the U.S. as Allies 
in World War II.  University Park, PA: Penn State Press, 1997. 
 
Peña y Peña, Alvaro.  Territorio de Quintana Roo.  Mexico City: Secretaría Educación 
Pública, 1970. 
 
Pérez Montfort, Ricardo. “‘Esa no, porque me hiere’: Semblanza superficial de treinta 
años de radio en Mexico, 1925-1955.”  In Avatares del nacionalismo cultural: 
Cinco ensayos by Ricardo Pérez Montfort. Mexico City: Centro de 
Investigación y Docencia en Humanidades de Morelos/Centro de 
Investigaciones y Estudios Antropología Social, 2000): 91-115. 
 
Peterkin, Allan.  One Thousand Beards.  Vancouver: Arsenal Pulp Press, 2001. 
 
Peterson, Adrian M. “Early Wireless Stations in the Philippines.” Wavescan. Online 
journal, http://www.ontheshortwaves.com/Wavescan/wavescan090830.html, 
accessed 21 Feb. 2012. 
 
Plasencia de la Parra, Enrique.  Historia y organización de las fuerzas armadas en 
México, 1917-1937.  Mexico City: Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, 
2010. 
 
Plasencia de la Parra, Enrique.  Personajes y escenarios de la Rebelión Delahuertista, 
1923-1924.  Mexico City: Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, 1998. 
 
Popkin, Jeremy D.  Revolutionary News: The Press in France, 1789-1799.  Durham: 
Duke University Press, 1999. 
 
Quirk, Robert E. An Affair of Honor: Woodrow Wilson and the Occupation of Veracruz. 
Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 1962. 
  
Radovsky, M.  Alexander Popov: Inventor of Radio. Translated by G. Yankosky. 
Honolulu: University Press of the Pacific, 2001. 
 
341 
 
Raines, Rebecca Robbins.  Getting the Message Through: A Branch History of the U.S. 
Army Signal Corps.  Washington, DC: Center of Military History, United States 
Army, 1996. 
 
Rashkin, Elissa J. The Stridentist Movement in Mexico: The Avant-Garde and Cultural 
Change in the 1920s.  Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2009. 
 
Resler, Ansel Harlan. “The Impact of John R. Brinkley on Broadcasting in the United 
States.” PhD dissertation, Northwestern University, Evanston, Illinois, 1958.  
 
Richmond, Douglas W. Venustiano Carranza’s Nationalist Struggle, 1893-1920. 
Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1984. 
 
Robles, Sonia.  “Shaping México Lindo: Radio, Music, and Gender in Greater Mexico, 
1923-1946.”  PhD Dissertation, Michigan State University, Lansing, Michigan, 
2012.  
 
Rodriguez, Julia.  Civilizing Argentina: Science, Medicine, and the Modern State. 
Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2006. 
 
Rolle, Andrew F.  “Futile Filibustering in Baja California.” Pacific Historical Review 
20, no. 2 (May 1951): 159-166. 
 
Romero Aceves, Ricardo.  Baja California: Histórica y legendaria.  Mexico City: 
Costa-Amic Editores, 1983. 
 
Romo Gil, María Cristina.  Introducción al conocimiento y práctica de la radio.  
Mexico City: Editorial Diana, 1987. 
 
Rosales Vargas, Manuel and Virginia Licona Peña, editors.  Historia de las 
telecomunicaciones.  Mexico City: Telecomm/Telégrafos, 1999. 
 
Rosenberg, Emily S.  Spreading the American Dream: American Economic and 
Cultural Expansion, 1890-1945.  New York: Hill and Wang, 1982. 
 
Rubenstein, Anne. “Mass Media and Popular Culture in the Postrevolutionary Era,” in 
The Oxford History of Mexico. Editors Michael C. Meyer and William H. 
Beezley. New York: Oxford University Press, 2000, 637-670. 
 
Rudel, Anthony.  Hello, Everybody! The Dawn of American Radio.  Orlando: Harcourt, 
Inc., 2008. 
 
Rugeley, Terry. Yucatán’s Maya Peasantry & the Origins of the Caste War, 1800-1847. 
Austin: University of Texas Press, 1996. 
 
342 
 
Rugeley, Terry.  Rebellion Now and Forever: Mayas and Caste War Violence in 
Yucatán, 1800-1880.  Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2009.  
 
Ruíz, Ramón Eduardo.  The Great Rebellion, 1905-1924. New York: W.W. Norton & 
Company, 1980. 
 
Sakar, Tapan K. History of Wireless. Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons, 2006. 
 
Sánchez Ruiz, Enrique E. Orígenes de la radiodifusión en México: Desarrollo 
capitalista y el estado.  Mexico City: ITESO, 1984. 
 
Sandos, James A.  Rebellion in the Borderlands: Anarchism and the Plan de San Diego, 
1904-1924.  Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1992. 
 
Santiago, Myrna I.  The Ecology of Oil: Environment, Labor, and the Mexican 
Revolution, 1900-1938.  Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006.  
 
Saragoza, Alex M.  The Monterrey Elite and the Mexican State, 1880-1940.  Austin: 
University of Texas Press, 1990. 
 
Sarlo, Beatriz. The Technical Imagination: Argentine Culture’s Modern Dreams. 
Translated by Xavier Callahan.  Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2008. 
 
Schantz, Eric Michael. “All Night at the Owl: The Social and Political Relations of 
Mexicali’s Red-Light District, 1913-1925,” Journal of the Southwest 43, no. 4 
Border Cities and Culture (Winter 2001): 449-602. 
 
Schruben, Francis W. “The Wizard of Milford: Dr. J. R. Brinkley and Brinkleyism.” 
Kansas History 14, no. 4 (Winter 1991-1992): 226-245.   
 
Schuler, Friedrich.  Secret Wars and Secret Policies in the Americas, 1842-1929. 
Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 2010. 
 
Schwoch, James.  The American Radio Industry and Its Latin American Activities, 
1900-1939.  Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1990. 
 
Smith, Michael M. “Carrancista Propaganda and the Print Media in the United States: 
An Overview of Institutions.” The Americas 52, no. 2 (October 1995): 155-174. 
 
Sosa Plata, Gabriel.  Las mil y una radios: Una historia, un análisis actual de la 
radiodifusión mexicana.  Mexico City: McGraw-Hill, 1997. 
 
Spicer, Edward H.  Cycle’s of Conquest: The Impact of Spain, Mexico, and the United 
States on the Indians of the Southwest, 1933-1960.  Tucson: University of 
Arizona Press, 1967. 
 
343 
 
Standish, Peter and Steven M. Bell. Culture and Customs in Mexico. Westport, CT: 
Greenwood Press, 2004. 
 
Sterling, Christopher H.  Military Communications: From Ancient Times to the 21st 
Century.  Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO, 2008. 
 
Sullivan, Paul.  Unfinished Conversations: Mayas and Foreigners between Two Wars. 
 Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991. 
 
Süsskind, Charles.  “Hertz and the Technological Significance of Electromagnetic 
Waves.” Isis 56, no. 3 (Autumn 1965): 342-345.  
 
Taylor, Lawrence D. “The Mining Boom in Baja California from 1850 to 1890 and the 
Emergence of Tijuana as a Border Town.” Journal of the Southwest 43, no. 4 
Border Cities and Culture (Winter 2001): 463-492. 
 
Tenerio-Trillo, Mauricio.  Mexico at the World’s Fair: Crafting a Modern Nation. 
Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996. 
 
Torres, Blanco, editor.  Descentralización y democracia en México.  Mexico City: 
Colegio de México, 1986. 
 
Torres, Carlos Alberto, editor.  Education and Social Change in Latin America.  Albert 
Park, Australia: James Nichols Publishing, 1995. 
 
Tuchman, Barbara W.  The Zimmerman Telegram.  New York: Ballantine Books, 1958. 
 
Walker, Jesse.  Rebels on the Air: An Alternative History of Radio in America.  New 
York: New York University Press, 2001. 
 
Weightman, Gavin.  Signor Marconi’s Magic Box: The Most Remarkable Invention of 
the 19th Century & the Amateur Inventor whose Genius Sparked a Revolution. 
Cambridge, MA: Da Capo Press, 2003. 
 
Winseck, Dwayne R. and Robert M. Pike. Communications and Empire.  Durham: 
Duke University Press, 2007. 
 
Wood, Andrew Grant.  Revolution in the Street: Women, Workers, and Urban Protest in 
Veracruz, 1870-1927.  Wilmington, DL: SR Books, 2001. 
 
Womack, Jr., John.  Zapata and the Mexican Revolution.  New York: Vintage, 1970. 
 
Wu, Tim.  The Master Switch: The Rise and Fall of Information Empires.  New York: 
Alfred A. Knopf, 2011. 
 
344 
 
Wyllys, Rufus Kay. “The Republic of California, 1853-54.” Pacific Historical Review 
2, no. 2 (June 1953): 194-213. 
 
Vaughn, Mary Kay. The State, Education, and Social Class in Mexico, 1990-1928. 
DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 1982. 
 
Vaughn, Mary Kay. Cultural Politics in Revolution: Teachers, Peasants, and Schools in 
Mexico, 1930-1940.  Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1997. 
 
Vaughn, Mary Kay and Stephen E. Lewis. The Eagle and the Virgin: Nation and 
Cultural Revolution in Mexico, 1920-1940.  Durham: Duke University Press, 
2006. 
 
Velázquez Estrada, Rosalía. “La radiodifusión mexicana durante los gobiernos de 
Alvaro Obregón y Plutarco Elías Calles,” tesis de licenciatura, Universidad 
Nacional Autónoma de México, Mexico City, 1980. 
 
Velázquez Estrada, Rosalía. “La radiodifusión mexicana: encuentro con su espada 
(1923-1945).” In Miradas sobre la nación liberal: 1848-1948: Proyectos, 
debates y desafíos, Libro 2, Formar e informar: la diversidad cultural. Mexico 
City: Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, 2010, 275-313. 
 
Vianna, Hermano.  The Mystery of Samba: Popular Music and National Identity in 
Brazil.  Edited and translated by John Charles Chasteen.  Chapel Hill: University 
of North Carolina Press, 1999.  
 
Yang, Daqing.  Technology of Empire: Telecommunications and Japanese Expansion in 
Asia, 1883-1945.  Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2010. 
 
Young, Marilyn B. “‘I was thinking, as I often do these days, of war’: The United States 
in the Twenty-First Century.” Diplomatic History 36, no.1 (January 2012): 1-16. 
 
 
